THE WAR WITH MEXICO
BY THE SAME AUTHOR
The
Annexation of Texas
Octavo ix + 496 pages
By mail, postpaid, $3.00
This is the only work attempting to
deal thoroughly with an affair that
was intrinsically far more important
than had previously been supposed,
and was also of no little significance
on account of its relation to the war
with Mexico.
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
PUBLISHERS
THE
WAR WITH MEXICO
JUSTIN H. SMITH
FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY
AT DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
THOR OF "THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS," "OUR
STRUGGLE FOR THE FOURTEENTH COL-
ONY," "ARNOLD'S MARCH FROM
CAMBRIDGE TO QUE-
BEC," ETC.
VOLUME II
Ntfo gork
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
1919
All rights reserved
COPYRIGHT, 1919,
BT THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.
Set up and printed. Published December, 1919.
Norwood Press
J. S. Cushing Co. Berwick & Smith Co.
Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.
CONTENTS OF VOLUME II
MAPS AND PLANS IN VOLUME II
CONSPECTUS OF EVENTS .
PRONUNCIATION OF SPANISH
CHAPTER
XXI. BEHIND THE SCENES AT MEXICO .
XXII. VERA CRUZ
XXIII. CERRO GORDO . . . . .
XXIV. PUEBLA .
XXV. ON TO THE CAPITAL
XXVI. CONTRERAS AND CHURUBUSCO
XXVII. NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . ^
XXVIII. MOLINO DEL RET, CHAPULTEPEC AND MEXICO
XXIX. FINAL MILITARY OPERATIONS
XXX. THE NAVAL OPERATIONS . .
XXXI. THE AMERICANS AS CONQUERORS .
XXXII. PEACE . . ....
XXXIII. THE FINANCES OF THE WAR . . .
XXXIV. THE WAR IN AMERICAN POLITICS .
XXXV. THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE WAR .
XXXVI. CONCLUSION
NOTES ON VOLUME II . .
APPENDIX (LISTS OF SOURCES)
INDEX
PAGB
vi
xi
xiii
1
17
37
60
79
99
120
140
165
189
210
233
253
268
294
310
327
517
563
MAPS AND PLANS IN VOLUME TWO
As equally good sources disagree sometimes, a few inconsistencies are un-
avoidable. Numerous errors have been corrected. An asterisk indicates an
unpublished source. Statements, cited in the notes, have also been used.
PAGE
1. The Fortress of San Juan de Ulua in 1854 . . . . .21
From a *plan in the War Dept., Washington.
2. Siege of Vera Cruz : General Plan . . . . .24
From a map drawn by McClellan from surveys done by six Ameri-
can officers (N. Y. City Public Library) ; *a map drawn by order of
Lieut. Col. Henry Wilson (War Dept., Washington).
3. Siege of Vera Cruz : The American Works . . . .28
From a map drawn by Lieut. Foster, based on surveys of four
American officers (War Dept., Washington).
4. From Vera Cruz to Perote . . . . . . . 39
Based on a map issued by Manouvrier and Snell, New Orleans,
1847 (Papers of N. P. Trist).
5. Contour Lines near Cerro Gordo . . . . . .40
From a *drawing in the War College, Washington.
6. Battle of Cerro Gordo : General Map 43
Based on a map drawn by Lieut. Copp6e from the surveys of Maj.
Turnbull and Capt. McClellan (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1 ; 30 Cong., 1 sess.) ;
a map drawn by McClellan (Mass. Hist. Society) ; a *sketch of a
reconnaissance by Lieut. Tower (War Dept., Washington) ; *Cro-
quis de la Posicion del campo de Cerro Gordo, 1847 (War Dept.,
Washington) ; a plan by I. A. de Soiecki (Vera Cruz City archives) ;
and a *sketch by Lieut. Thos. Williams (among his letters).
7. Battle of Cerro Gordo : Central Portion 51
Based on the same sources as No. 6 supra.
8. From Jalapa to Puebla 61
Based on a Fomento Dept. map.
9. Profile of the Route from Vera Cruz to Mexico .... 62
From a map published by Manouvrier and Snell, New Orleans,
1847 (Papers of N. P. Trist).
10. A Part of the Valley of Mexico 80
From a map surveyed and drawn by Lieut. M. L. Smith and Bvt.
Capt. Hardcastle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 11 ; 31 Cong., 1 sess.) ; and a map
by Balbontin (Invasi6n Americana).
11. Battles of August 19 and 20, 1847 : General Map ... 100
Based on a map drawn by Hardcastle from the surveys of Maj.
Turnbull, Capt. McClellan and Lieut. Hardcastle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1 ;
yii
viii MAPS AND PLANS IN VOLUME TWO
30 Cong., 1 sess.) ; the Smith and Hardcastle map (No. 10 supra) ;
a *map drawn by Capt. Barnard from the surveys of Capt. Mason
and Lieuts. Beauregard, McClellan, and Foster (War Dept., Wash-
ington) ; a map drawn by Hardcastle from the surveys of Mason
and Hardcastle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1 ; 30 Cong., 1 sess.) ; a map in
Apuntes; and a map drawn by McClellan (Mass. Hist. Society).
12. Battle of Contreras . ... ! r* . :i . . . 108
Based on the Turnbull map (No. 11 supra) ; a *plan of Capt. Gard-
ner (Pierce Papers) ; *notes by Capt. Henshaw on a map by Hard-
castle (Mass. Hist. Society) ; a *sketch by Lieut. Collins, 4th
Artillery (Collins Papers) ; New Orleans Picayune, Sept. 12, 1847 ;
a plan by Balbontin (Invasion Americana) ; and a map in Apuntes.
13. Battle of Churubusco Ill
Based on the Turnbull map (No. 11 supra) ; a map drawn by
Hardcastle from the surveys of Mason and Hardcastle (Sen. Ex.
Doc. 1 ; 30 Cong., 1 sess.) ; and a sketch by Balbontin ("Invasion
Americana").
14. The Tete de Pont, Churubusco 112
*Drawn by Lieuts. Beauregard and Tower from Beauregard's
survey (War Dept., Washington).
15. Profile of East Curtain, Tete de Pont, Churubusco . . .113
*Drawn by Beauregard from the surveys of Lieuts. McClellan,
Beauregard, and Foster (War Dept., Washington).
16. The Fortifications of Churubusco Convent . . . .114
*Drawn by Beauregard and Tower from Beauregard's survey (War
Dept., Washington).
17. Battles of Mexico : General Map 141
Based on a map drawn by Hardcastle from the surveys of Turn-
bull, McClellan, and Hardcastle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1 ; 30 Cong., 1 sess.) ;
and a map drawn by McClellan and Hardcastle (published by the
government) .
18. Battle of Molino del Key . . . . .. . . .143
Based on the maps specified under No. 17 supra; a sketch by Hard-
castle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1 ; 30 Cong., 1 sess.) ; and a sketch in New
Orleans Picayune, Oct. 17, 1847.
19. Battle of Chapultepec 150
Based upon the maps specified under No. 17 supra; a *sketch
drawn by Tower from surveys of Beauregard and Tower (War
Dept., Washington) ; a plan accompanying Gen. Quitman report
(Sen. Ex. Doc. 1 ; 30 Cong., 1 sess.) ; "recollections of Senor
D. Ignacio Molina, Chief Cartographer of the Fomento Dept.,
Mexico.
20. Blindage at Chapultepec 151
21. The Citadel, Mexico, in 1840 (War Dept. *plan, Washington). 159
22. Alvarado, Mexico 198
A *plan by J. L. Mason (War Dept., Washington).
23. A Part of Tabasco River . 205
Based on a map in Ho. Ex. Doc. 1 ; 30 Cong., 2 sess.
MAPS AND PLANS IN VOLUME TWO ix
PAGE)
24/ Guaymas, Mexico . . 206
From a plan in Ho. Ex. Doc. 1 ; 30 Cong., 2 sess.
25.] Mazatlan, Mexico . . 207
From a *drawing by Commander Wouldridge of Brigantine Spy
(Admiralty Papers, Public Record Office, London).
26. The Tip of Lower California 207
Based on a map in Sen. Ex. Doc. 18; 31 Cong., 1 sess.
27. Territory acquired from Mexico . . . . . .241
CONSPECTUS OF EVENTS
1845
March. The United States determines to annex Texas ; W. S.Parrott
sent to conciliate Mexico.
July. Texas consents ; Taylor proceeds to Corpus Christi.
Oct. 17. Larkin appointed a confidential agent in California.
Nov. 10. Slidell ordered to Mexico.
Dec. 20. Slidell rejected by Herrera.
1846
Jan. 13. Taylor ordered to the Rio Grande.
Mar. 8. Taylor marches from Corpus Christi.
21. Slidell finally rejected by Paredes.
28. Taylor reaches the Rio Grande.
Apr. 25. Thornton attacked.
May 8. Battle of Palo Alto.
9. Battle of Resaca de la Palma.
13. The war bill becomes a law.
June 5. Kearny's march to Santa Fe begins.
July 7. Monterey, California, occupied.
14. Camargo occupied.
Aug. 4. Paredes overthrown.
7. First attack on Alvarado.
13. Los Angeles, California, occupied.
16. Santa Anna lands at Vera Cruz.
18. Kearny takes Santa Fe.
19. Taylor advances from Camargo.
Sept. 14. Santa Anna enters Mexico City.
20-24. Operations at Monterey, Mex.
22-23. Insurrection in California precipitated.
23. Wool's advance from San Antonio begins.
25. Kearny leaves Santa Fe for California.
Oct. 8. Santa Anna arrives at San Luis Potosf.
xi
xii CONSPECTUS OF EVENTS
Oct. 15. Second attack on Alvarado.
24. S in Juan Bautista captured by Perry.
28. Tampico evacuated by Parrodi.
29. Wool occupies Monclova.
Nov. 15. Tampico captured by Conner.
16. Saltillo occupied by Taylor.
18. Scott appointed to command the Vera r Cruz expedition.
Dec. 5. Wool occupies Parras.
6. Kearny's fight at San Pascual.
25. Donlphan's skirmish at El Brazito.
27. Scott reaches Brazos Id.
29. Victoria occupied.
1847
Jan. 3. Scott orders troops from Taylor.
8. Fight at the San Gabriel, Calif.
9. Fight near Los Angeles, Calif.
11. Mexican law regarding Church property.
28. Santa Anna's march against Taylor begins.
Feb. 5. Taylor places himself at Agua Nueva.
19. Scott reaches Tampico.
22-23. Battle of Buena Vista.
27. Insurrection at Mexico begins.
28. Battle of Sacramento.
Mar. 9. Scott lands near Vera Cruz.
29. Vera Cruz occupied.
30. Operations in Lower California opened.
Apr. 8. Scott's advance from Vera Cruz begins.
18. Battle of Cerro Gordo ; Tuxpdn captured by Perry.
19. Jalapa occupied.
May 15. Worth enters Puebla.
June 6. Trist opens negotiations through the British legation.
16. San Juan Bautista again taken.
Aug. 7. The advance from Puebla begins.
20. Battles of Contreras and Churubusco.
Aug. 24-Sept. 7. Armistice.
Sept. 8. Battle of Molino del Rey.
13. Battle of Chapultepec; the "siege" of Puebla begins.
14. Mexico City occupied.
22. Pena y Peiia assumes the Presidency.
Oct. 9. Fight at Huamantla.
20. Trist reopens negotiations.
Nov. 11. Mazatlan occupied by Shubrick.
CONSPECTUS OF EVENTS xiii
1848
Feb. 2. Treaty of peace signed.
Mar. 4-5. Armistice ratified.
10. Treaty accepted by U. S. Senate.
May 19, 24. Treaty accepted by Mexican Congress.
30. Ratifications of the treaty exchanged.
June 12. Mexico City evacuated.
July 4. Treaty proclaimed by President Polk.
THE PRONUNCIATION OF SPANISH
The niceties of the matter would be out of place here, but a few general
rules may prove helpful.
A as in English "ah"; e, at the end of a syllable, like a in "fame,"
otherwise like e in "let" ; i like i in "machine" ; o, at the end of a syllable,
like o in "go," otherwise somewhat like o in "lot"; u like u in "rude"
(but, unless marked with two dots, silent between g or q and e or i) y like
ee in "feet."
C like k (but, before e and i, like **A in "thin"); ch as in "child";
g as in "go" (but, before e and i, like a harsh h} ; h silent ; j like a harsh h ;
U like f Hi in "million" ; n like ni in "onion" ; qu like k ; r is sounded with
a vibration (trill) of the tip of the tongue (rr a longer and more for-
cible sound of the same kind) ; s as in "sun"; x like x in "box" (but, in
"Mexico" and a few other names, like Spanish j) ; z like * th in "thin."
Words bearing no mark of accentuation are stressed on the last syllable
if they end in any consonant except n or s, but on the syllable next to the
last if they end in n, s or a vowel.
* In Mexico, however, usually like s in " sun." f In Mexico usually
like y.
XIV
THE WAR WITH MEXICO
XXI
BEHIND THE SCENES AT MEXICO
September, 1846-March, 1847
THE revolution of August 4, as already has been suggested,
was a complex and inconsistent affair, combining most hetero-
geneous elements : the popular institutions of 1824 and the
autocratic power of the soldier upheld with bayonets ; the army
and the people, whose relations had always been, and in Mexico
always had to be, those of wolf and lamb ; the regular troops
and the National Guards, who loved each other as fire loves
water; General Salas reluctantly taking orders from Citizen
Farias, and both of them doing obeisance to Liberator Santa
Anna, whom both distrusted ; and all cooperating to revive
a federal constitution, which had been found in practice un-
workable, and needed, in the opinion of everybody, to be
redrawn. 3
Such a state of things argued insincerity ; and in fact many
had taken up the cry of Federalism at this time simply because
the failure of reactionary designs had made the word a popular
appeal, and because nearly all the former leaders of that school
having been crushed by the Centralists there seemed to be
room for new aspirants; while the state of things indicated
also that more troubles were soon to arrive, since evidently
no final solution of the political problem had been achieved,
and such a welter of principles, traditions and methods was a
loud invitation to the demagogue and the schemer. Don
Simplicw predicted that new stars were to flash out soon in
the political heavens, and then disappear before the astronomers
would have time to name them ; and it added significantly,
"The comets will be found to be all tails." 3
VOL. II B 1
2 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
In particular the field was open for radical democracy. Calm
judgment is never listened to in a period of excitement, and
the Mexicans, like the French of 1792, instead of resorting to
the practical Anglo-Saxon rule of compromising differences,
believed in carrying principles to their logical end. Centralism
and monarchical ideas had failed to render the nation happy ;
democracy was therefore the panacea, and the more of it the
better. The demoralized condition of the people promoted
this dangerous policy. Referring to all those concerned with
public affairs, a thoughtful writer of the day characterized
them as ignorant, destitute of honor, patriotism, morality,
good faith or principles of any kind, and influenced exclusively
by self-interest and ambition ; and naturally men of the opposite
kind held aloof in disgust and despair. For these reasons the
conservative wing of the Federalists, led by Pedraza and known
as the Moderados (Moderates), found itself distanced in the
race for support ; and the Puros that is to say, pure Federal-
ists and democrats gained the ascendency at once. 3
Their acknowledged leader, as we have seen, was the patriotic
though indiscreet Farias, but he was more honest than brilliant,
and a man stepped forward now who reversed that description.
This man was Rejon. A keen, subtle mind, a bold, unfaltering
will, a ready, plausible tongue and a tireless ambition quite
indifferent about means, characterized him chiefly, and for the
present crisis these were redoubtable qualifications. The
Spanish minister once remarked, after conversing with him,
that it was impossible to trust a person who possessed no
principles except the transient interests of his ambition. And
Rejon had another qualification that was no less important.
Though unworthy of confidence and everywhere distrusted,
Santa Anna counted as an essential factor in all plans, a power
that each party felt it must have ; and Rejon was believed at
this time to represent Santa Anna. 3
The aims and to some extent the methods of the radical
faction w r ere borrowed from the United States, but without
regard to differences of race, experience and present circum-
stances. Government, they maintained, should be completely
democratic and completely secular ; and they dreamed of this
consummation almost voluptuously, as a Mussulman dreams
of paradise. They held public meetings, where everybody
POLITICS AT MEXICO 3
was free to speak ; and in these disorderly gatherings they dis-
cussed religious freedom, the seizure of Church property, the
reformation of the clergy, the secularization of marriage and
education, the necessity of destroying military domination in'
politics, and the capital punishment of all suspected monar-
chists. In short, from the conservative point of view, they'
passed sentence of death on society. Santa Anna did not
sympathize with their programme. He wished society to live
-for him, and he was conducting now an equivocal corre-
spondence with men hostile to the Puros. But it probably <
suited his purpose to have them succeed for a time, and to >
have the substantial citizens add to their litany, "From Rejon
deliver us, good Lord!" He himself had played the part of
the Lord before now, and was willing to do so again, though he
preferred the more terrestrial name of dictator. 3
Of course property felt the menace, and it had reason to do
so. During the latter part of September, 1846, an editorial'
in the official journal, commonly attributed to Rejon, intimated f
that if the rich did not contribute for the war, the people would
know where to find their wealth; and even foreign houses'
were threatened. The British minister forced a prompt re-
traction of this language so far, at least, as his fellow-country : '
men were concerned ; but within two weeks a number of
capitalists were invited to loan $200,000 with an intimation
that, unless they did so, the money would be taken. Every
one understood that the leopard, though now comparatively 1
silent, had not changed his spots and would not, and hence
four elite- militia corps, familiarly known as the Polkos, were
formed at Mexico to protect life and property. One of these,'
called the Victoria battalion, was composed of merchants,
professional men and scions from wealthy families. Another,'
which bore the name of Hidalgo, consisted of clerks; and the
Bravos and Independencia battalions, made up largely of
artisans, represented the industrial interests of the city. The
ministry, who desired to exclude such persons from the National
Guard, opposed the recognition of these corps; but, supported
by Salas,. the substantial citizens carried the day. 3
An equally natural reaction caused by radical violence was
political. In the hope of welding the Federalists into a harmo-
nious party, the council of government had been revived, and
4 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
members of both wings had been appointed to it. Santa
Anna, in order to establish his particular friend Haro at the
head of the treasury, next proposed to transfer Farias from
that office to the presidency of the council. This was under-
stood correctly, no doubt as a move to eliminate him
virtually from the government, and was fiercely denounced;
but Santa Anna then remarked that should Salas for any reason
drop out, the president of the council would take his place
at the head of the government, and Pedraza could have the
post in case Farias preferred to remain as he was. 1 This put
a new look on the matter, and the programme was carried out ;
but the Puro attacks upon their rivals continued to excite
bitter resentment. When it was arranged that Farias and
Pedraza should publicly shake hands, and crowds gathered
to witness the amazing ceremony, it failed to occur. The
Moderados belonging to the council resigned ; the body ceased
to enjoy prestige and influence; and Farias lost all official
power. Naturally some of the blame for this result was laid
to the charge of the Pedrazists. Partisan rancor grew still
more savage. The fury of the French revolution was rivalled.
"We must finish with our enemies or die ourselves," cried one
factional organ ; " the scaffold must be raised ; we must drink
their hearts' blood." Bankhead described the situation as one
of "universal terror and distrust." 3
About the middle of October there came an explosion. Ap-
parently Rejon demanded that Salas initiate the Puro reforms,
and the acting Executive, who was not only weak and incom-
petent but obstinate, resented the pressure, and turned his
face toward the Moderados. To the Puros this looked reac-
tionary, and he was charged with a design to prevent Congress
from assembling. Next it was required of Salas that he should
give way to Farias as the representative of the new regime,
and probably there were threats at least of bringing this change
about, if necessary, through an insurrection of the populace. 2
Then Salas, with the Hidalgo battalion of which he was the
commander, took possession of the citadel. The people, alarmed
by rumors that a sack was contemplated, flew to arms; and
Rejon found it necessary to moderate his tone. 3
When the Executive, as W;as inevitable, dismissed him from
office, he submitted; and Santa Anna himself, though his
AN EXPLOSION 5
orders to Rejon had been to hold the post whatever Salas might
do, found public sentiment at 'the capital too strong for him,
and concluded to accept the change. Rejon's conduct had
excited so much dissension and alarm, that his removal grati-
fied all sensible persons at Mexico. The rumors and the
disturbance were now attributed officially to agents of the
United States, and comparative quiet returned. 3
The aims of Santa Anna and those of the Puros may have
been exactly contrary in these events; but both overshot the
mark, and they suffered a common loss of prestige. As one
method of restoring it, they induced the governors of San Luis
Potosi and Queretaro to declare that within their jurisdictions
the Liberator would be recognized as head of the nation until
the assembling of Congress; but their principal scheme was
to carry the Presidential election. Congress, chosen on the
first day of November, was to elect, and it consisted chiefly
of men termed by well-to-do citizens "the dregs of society "
that is to say, poorly educated radicals taken from the
masses. 3
This appeared to ensure a Puro triumph, yet there were
serious difficulties. Rejon had been discredited, and the
former administration of Farias had left painful memories.
Besides, it was feared that his election would offend Santa
Anna, who of course was not on very cordial terms now with
the tribune of the people, and preferred to have a weak man
like Salas, with whom satisfactory relations had grown out of
the Rejon episode, continue in power. At one time Almonte
seemed to be the Puro favorite ; but finally it was decided to
cast the Presidential vote for Santa Anna, who could not
legally hold the chief political and the chief military offices at
the same time and would no doubt remain with the army,
and to elect Farias to the Vice Presidency as the actual execu-
tive. 3
Even this combination, however, met with strong and un-
expected opposition. The conservatives and moderates were
naturally against it ; certain states for the voting was done
by these quasi sovereignties as units could not forgive
Santa Anna for past misdeeds, and the powerful Church party
looked upon Farias as Antichrist. Finally Escudero of Chi-
huahua, whose delegation held the balance of power, opened
6 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
negotiations with Farias, and that gentleman declared in writ-
ing his willingness to "join loyally" with any one who desired
"in good faith the welfare of the country." Holding this
instrument a weapon, should there be need of it in their
hands, a number of the Moderados, who realized his honesty,
vigor and good intentions, and believed now that he would
give them a share in the administration, accepted the Puro
candidates, and on December 22 by a narrow majority these
were elected. The news produced a commotion; but without
encountering serious opposition Farias took up the reins of
government at once. 3
His primary aim was to support the war. This he intended
; to do because he felt an ardent patriotism, but other reasons
also lay in his mind. Abominating the military class, he
desired to have as many as possible of the corrupt officers left
on the field, and he designed to keep the army so busy, that it
would not be able to prevent the states, which were generally
Federalist and democratic in sentiment, from organizing their
strength, and making sure that no tyrannical central power
would ever raise its front again. But the first requirement
for military operations was money. Farias had, therefore,
to take up immediately the financial problem, and he found
it most difficult. 3
Of all the fields of Mexican misgovernment the worst had
been the treasury, for it not only required a care and a good
judgment that were peculiarly foreign to the national tempera-
ment, but provided opportunities for illegitimate gains that
were most congenial. During Spanish rule the needs of the
country had been fully met, and about nine millions a year,
almost half of the revenues, left as a surplus. Under Iturbide
a financial system which three centuries of able administration
had built up was despised, and with mines abandoned, agri-
culture discouraged, commerce paralyzed, honesty relaxed,
taxes diminished for the sake of popularity, and expenses in-
creased for the sake of glory, the foundations of ruin were
promptly laid. The logical superstructure soon mounted
high in the shape of two British loans, which bound Mexico
to pay about twenty-six million dollars in return for about
fifteen, a large part of which was practically thrown away
by her agents. 5
FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES 7
The expulsion of the rich and thrifty Spaniards, the costs
of civil wars, in which the nation paid for both sides, unwise
and unstable fiscal systems, borrowing at such rates as four
per cent a month, incredibly bad management, 4 and methods
of accounting that made it impossible for the minister of the
treasury to know the actual state of things, were enough to
complete the edifice ; but they were supplemented with pecula-
tion, embezzlement, multiplication of offices, collusion be-
tween importers and customhouses, and systematic smuggling
winked at by half-starved officials. Revenue after revenue
was mortgaged, and by 1845 the government found itself
entitled to only about thirteen per cent of what entered the
treasury. 5
Since the beginning of hostilities our blockade, assisted by
new methods of wholesale smuggling, had greatly reduced
the income from duties, which had always been the principal
reliance; the adoption of the federal system had given the
best part of the internal revenue to the states ; and the residue
was almost wholly eaten up by the officials. The foreign
debt amounted now to more than fifty millions and the domestic
debt was nearly twice as great. Every known source of income
had been anticipated. Freewill offerings had proved illusory.
By ceasing to make payments on account of the debt in May,
1846, the government had largely increased its income, of
course, but it had forfeited all title to financial sympathy ;
and the high officials, who robbed the treasury still in this time
of supreme distress, had stripped it of all title to respect. 5
The government, therefore, had no real credit. Men who
made this kind of gambling their business would now and then
furnish a little money for a brief term at an exorbitant rate.
In February, 1846, for example, a loan was placed at a total
sacrifice of about thirty-seven per cent. But when the treas-
ury was authorized to borrow fifteen millions in a regular
way, nobody cared to furnish any part of the sum. New taxes
were equally vain. In October, 1846, the government imposed
a special war "contribution" in order to save the Mexicans,
it explained, from becoming foreigners in their own country,
like the Spaniards of Florida ; and the chief result was to
enrage a handful of persons, who found they had been silly
enough to pay while almost everybody else had laughed. In
8 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
November a forced loan was demanded of the clergy, but the
project aroused such opposition that substantially it had to
be given up. The whole gamut of methods, even violence,
has been tried in vain, said the ministry in December. Business
was dead, confidence gone, capital in hiding or sojourning
abroad ; and if by good luck a bag of silver dropped into the
treasury, it seemed to evaporate instantly. Financially,
reported the Spanish minister, the situation of the country was
"truly frightful." 5
To make it more, not less, frightful, there did exist one vast
accumulation of riches. This was the property belonging to
the Church. No one could seriously deny that the nation had
authority to use, in a time of dire need, funds that had been
given to the organization in days of plenty, for this was a
principle of Spanish law, and the Crown had exercised the right
without so good an excuse. There was also a particular reason
in the present instance, for the wealth of the Church, aside from
articles used in worship, consisted mainly of land, and, as
virtually no land tax existed in Mexico, it was escaping the
common burden a burden, too, that was peculiarly for its
advantage, since in the case of American conquest it was bound
to lose its exclusive privileges. Besides, there was the saying
of its Founder, "Freely ye have received, freely give." 5
Very naturally, then, people had been casting their eyes for
some time at the riches of the Church. In June, 1844, El
Siglo XIX, the most thoughtful newspaper of Mexico, had
suggested raising funds for the Texas war by mortgaging some
of its property; and a few months later Duff Green, then on
the ground, had expressed the opinion that Mexico would have
to choose between that resource and forced loans. In July,
1845, the correspondent of the London Times dropped a similar
hint in that journal, and in the course of the year it became
a popular idea, that the Church could perform a great public
service, and at the same time vastly strengthen its own position,
by providing means for the anticipated war against the United
States. In October, 1846, the Monitor Republicano suggested
once more a mortgage of ecclesiastical property; and at one
time the government actually decided upon the measure.
Bankhead admitted that he could see no other resource. These
hints were not, however, acted upon by the clergy; and after
i
THE POLICY OF FARIAS 9
many long discussions they would only agree to advance SI 0,000
or $20,000 a month for a limited period. This was to insult the
nation, exclaimed the Monitor Republicano?
Charged now with full responsibility, Farias met the issue
squarely. Not only was he determined to carry on the war,
but the letters of Santa Anna had been, and were, most urgent.
November 7 the General demanded that "no step" should be
neglected, if it could "help to prevent the name of Mexican
from soon becoming the object of ridicule and contempt for
the whole world." "Do not reply that the government cannot
obtain funds," he wrote later; "This would be saying that
the nation has ceased to exist ... so rich a nation cannot lack
money enough to support its independence, nor can the govern-
ment say that it has no authority to look for the money."
These letters evidently referred to ecclesiastical property, and
they were followed up at New Year's with almost daily com-
munications of the same tenor. Such fearful urgency had a good
excuse, for the government was now sending him no funds. 6
It had none. Although Farias kept faith with Escudero,
the Moderados as a party showed the radical chief no mercy;
the Centralists loathed the apostle of federalism; all con-
servatives detested the typical democrat, and the clericals
abominated the extinguisher of titles. All the old ladies
thought him worse than Luther, and many of every kind and
condition rebelled at his brusque and tactless ways. No person
of substance would lift a finger to support his measures. A
cloud of distrust, passion, hostility and mortal hatred mostly
an emanation from the whole wretched past of the country
grew thicker about him each day. Raise money he could not.
Moreover he probably felt little desire to do so by any of the
ordinary methods. One of his cardinal principles was the
necessity of destroying the fuero, the political strength and the
intellectual domination of the Church by reducing its wealth;
and now the demand of Santa Anna, the army and the nation
that funds be provided for the war, appeared to make this policy
opportune and even irresistible. 6
A committee of Congress reported against the plan of borrow-
ing on the security of Church property ; but that signified little,
for no practical substitute was offered. There were fears that
the army would break up. There were fears that for self-
10 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
protection it would proclaim a dictatorship or march upon the
capital. Santa Anna's warning and threatening communica-
tions were shown to Congress. The legislators tried to evade
the issue, but they were told that all the responsibility rested
upon their shoulders; that it was for them to choose between
the salvation and the ruin of the fatherland ; and on January 7
they grappled with the problem. Behind them tireless,
uncompromising, inexorable the Executive insisted upon
action; and behind him stood Santa Anna, demanding the
same thing and promising to support it. 9
The session lasted virtually until January 11. The debates
were hot, and they were bitter. To make use of the Ckurch
lands, it was argued, would invade the rights of property, lay
upon one class of society the general burden, and, should the
lands be sold, involve a tremendous loss of values, since there
was little ready money in the country, and few would have
the means and inclination to purchase. The country must be
saved, answered Rejon, Juarez and their allies; is there any
other resource? point it out. "If the Yankee triumphs,"
cried one speaker, "what ecclesiastical property or what
religion will be left us?" And upon these principal themes
were played an infinite number of variations in all the possible
tones of Mexican eloquence and fury. 9
Just before midnight on the ninth, however, the turmoil
ceased ; the handsome chamber of the Deputies became still.
High above the throne in front glimmered pallidly the sword
of Iturbide; in letters of gold, on the semi-circular wall at
the rear, all the names of the Benemeritos of Mexico reflected
the subdued light; shadows filled the galleries; exhausted
members half-slumbered in their chairs, and others talked
wearily here and there in groups; but the stillness was momen-
tous, for the first article of a new law had been passed, author-
izing the Executive to raise fifteen millions, for the purposes
of the war, by pledging if necessary, even selling property
vested in the Church. 7 Minor discussions followed. The
religious, charitable and educational work of the clergy was
guarded completely; many provisions designed to hamper
the realization of the main purpose were accepted in order to
conciliate opposition; and at length, on January 11, the plan
became law. 9
A CRISIS AT MEXICO 11
"The crisis is terrible/' wrote the minister of relations two
days later, and well he might. All the fierceness and intrigues
of partisan politics, all the cunning of high and low finance,
all the subtleties of priestcraft and all the terrors of a haughty
Church came into play. 8 Freely we have received, but we will
not give, and anathema to him who takes, was in effect the
dictum of the prelates. For a time it looked as if no official
would venture, at the peril of excommunication, to promulgate
the law ; but Farias and Juarez found a man, and he was ap-
pointed governor of the Federal District, in which lay the
capital, for that purpose. Then came protests from the
"venerable" clergy, complaints from state governments,
mutinies of troops, and civilian insurrections organized by
priests. Cries of " Viva la religion ! Death to the govern-
ment!" resounded in the streets of the capital. Ministers
of state were hard to find, and they soon went out of office.
Minor officials resigned so rapidly they could hardly be counted.
Santa Anna, after hailing the law as the salvation of the country,
turned against it. Moderados in Congress, encouraged by the
outcry, hurled epithets harder than stones at the Puros. 9
On the other hand some of the Deputies, the regular troops
at the capital, who expected to profit by the law, the comandante
general of Mexico, the National Guards and the democratic
masses rallied to the support of the government; and Farias,
his long head erect, and his face, always thoughtful and sad,
now anxious but set, appealed to the patriotism of the nation,
made the most of his authority as chief of the state, and held
to his course with inflexible energy and courage. Not only
was he determined to have the law respected, but he demanded
that it should be made effective. Chaos was the result.
"When we look for a ray of hope," said El Republicano, "we
discover nothing but alarms, anxieties and every probability
of social dissolution." "Furious anarchy," was Haro's de-
scription of the scene. There must soon be a crash, he added ;
" the Devil is running away with us." 9
Peaceful interests were not, however, entirely forgotten
amid this turbulence. During the second week of January
Moses Y. Beach, proprietor and editor of the New York Sun,
arrived at Vera Cruz from Havana. He carried a British
passport. Besides his wife Mrs. Storms, a remarkably clever
12 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
newspaper woman, accompanied him. Presumably she was
to play the part of secretary, for Beach had large financial
enterprises in mind, and confidential clerical assistance would
certainly be necessary. For some reason letters were written
from Cuba to Santa Anna and the authorities at Vera Cruz
denouncing him as an American agent; and the party had to
go through with a tedious examination of three days, for the
comandante general had been expressly ordered to watch all
suspicious foreigners hailing from the United States. But the
ordeal was passed satisfactorily, and on the twenty-third or
twenty-fourth of January Beach arrived at the capital. Letters
from Roman Catholic prelates of the United States and Cuba
gave him a confidential standing at once in the highest Church
circles ; his project of a canal across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec
excited the lively interest of Santa Anna's particular friends;
and his plan for a national bank brought him into friendly
relations with Farias and the other Puro leaders. 10
Still, the presence of this agent of civilization did not restore
tranquillity. On February 4 the government contrived by
shrewd management to put a law through Congress, which in
effect gave it autocratic power to raise five millions, and thus
cut through the complications and restrictions that had rendered
the action of January 11 substantially inoperative. The wrath
of the Church blazed afresh. At all hazards Antichrist must
be put down. Already they had concluded to supply Santa
Anna with money, in return of course for his aid against Farias,
and now they opened negotiations with the Moderados. This
party, however, thought it would be good tactics to divide the
Puros by supporting Farias, provided he would let them control
his policy, and they so proposed ;> but the impracticable fellow,
who was battling for principles and not place, declined the
offer. Finally the Puros themselves, realizing that all the
other factions were against their chief, decided that under his
leadership they could not succeed, and resolved to throw him
overboard. 11
While they were casting about for a method, a certain Person
advised the clericals to offer an organized resistance against
the laws of January 11 and February 4, and circumstances
made that course easy. General Peiia y Barragan, suspected
of conspiring against the government, was placed under tern-
INSURRECTION AT MEXICO 13
porary arrest, and this made him eager to head a revolution.
Farias, understanding that the Independencia battalion could
not be trusted, ordered it to Vera Cruz, imagining that it would
not refuse to march against the enemy. But on various more
or less valid pretexts it did so ; the other three elite battalions
joined with it ; and on February 27 they declared that Farias
and Congress, having lost the confidence of the nation, had
forfeited their authority, demanding at the same time the
annulment of the "anti-religious" laws. 12 Amidst the ringing
of bells and burning of gunpowder, the city echoed with the
cries, "Death to Gomez Farias! Death to the Puros!"
Cannon were soon at the street corners, and the usual scenes
of a Mexican insurrection, fatal chiefly to peaceful residents,
were presently on exhibition. The clergy, there is ample reason
to believe, paid the costs, and priests left the confessionals to
herald this new crusade in the streets. 13
After about nine days of indecisive skirmishing, however,
the clericals felt discouraged. The nation had not rallied to
their cause as they had expected. The sum of $40,000 was
required for the next week of fighting, and they hesitated.
But again a. certain Person urged them on. The awkwardly
drawn Plan was reduced to one article Farias must be
deposed. On that almost all could agree. Monarchists,
Centralists, Santannistas, Clericals, Moderados, Puros were
for once in happy unison. Salas reappeared with some troops
to take revenge on his old enemy. And yet with epic heroism
Farias, never faltering and never compromising either his official
dignity or his personal character, held firmly on With his few
soldiers and such of the populace as he could arm. Again the
battle raged, and again the innocent fell. But who was it that
directed this tempest? Who was the mysterious Person,
overwhelming the government of Mexico with darkness and
confusion at this critical hour ? He was Moses Y. Beach, agent
of the American state department and adviser to the Mexican
hierarchy. Permission had been given him to bring about
peace, if he could ; and, unable to do this, he seized the oppor-
tunity to help Scott. 13
The time had now arrived for the Saviour of Society to
appear, since all rational persons were desperately tired of the
vain struggle; and Pena y Barragan wrote to Santa Anna,
14 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
begging him to take possession of the Presidential chair. Con-
gress did nothing, for many Deputies fearing that it might
act in a manner contrary to their sentiments remained away
from the chamber, and a quorum could not be assembled ;
but when Pedraza was arrested by the government, a large
group of Moderado members, feeling that Santa Anna's "vic-
tory" at Buena Vista had confirmed his power, addressed him
to the same effect as Pefia ; and the Liberator, giving his best
corps barely four days of repose, and explaining his departure
from the north as one more sacrifice on the altar of his country,
set out with a substantial body of troops for Mexico. 14 Along
his route women made wreaths and threw them before his
feet. Men of every faction acclaimed him ; and from Queretaro
to the capital the road was filled with carriages, in which all
sorts of persons desiring to reach his ear strove to outdo one
another in despatch. 20
On the first news of the insurrection Santa Anna's impression
had been that its ulterior aim was hostile to him, 15 for his
partisans at the capital supported the government; and, as
a Puro envoy confirmed this impression, he promised Farias
military aid ; but then appeared Moderado agents with strong
assurances and probably with stronger financial arguments,
and he went over, though not openly, to their side of the contro-
versy. Both parties were ordered by him to discontinue
hostilities, and both did so at once ; for, as the clergy had now
shut their strong boxes, the insurgent officers were anxious to
reestablish a connection with the national treasury, while
the regular's of Farias would not disobey Santa Anna. After
the President's arrival at Guadalupe Hidalgo a Te Deum was
celebrated there in honor of his triumph over the Americans ;
and the next day, March 23, amidst real demonstrations of joy,
he formally superseded Farias, while a certain Person 16 dili-
gently but vainly sought after by the police was hastily
making his way through the mountains in the direction of
Tampico. 20
Apparently Santa Anna had experienced the luckiest of
turns. Precisely when the Americans had shattered his plans,
and he found himself buried in the northern deserts with a
broken, starving army, 17 this insurrection gave him a splendid
occasion for making a triumphal march to the capital amid
SANTA ANNA TRIUMPHANT 15
plaudits of gratitude and admiration, and he now found himself
at the summit of prestige and power. 18 In reality, however,
his situation was by no means entirely satisfactory. Under-
standing that the Puros who in reality had served him with
substantial good faith and therefore stood highest in his present
sympathy had lost their dominant position, he allied himself
with their opponents; but the Moderados disliked and dis-
trusted him still, and he received at least one distinct notice
that by taking their side he was placing himself gratuitously
in the hands of his enemies. The Puros did not feel extremely
grateful to him for merely avoiding an open break with them ;
and, although it seemed wise to join in the acclamations lest
some worse thing befall them, they were already sharpening
their arrows against him. Indeed, they were believed to be
sharpening their daggers, and he took full precautions. The
clergy had trembled and recoiled on hearing that his arms
had triumphed against the Americans, and the Saviour of
Society now appeared to lean toward them or toward their
strong boxes; but they knew him well enough to foresee, as
they soon realized, that he intended to extort ample compen-
sation for all the favor shown them. 20
Such was the inner state of things, and the external course of
events proved not less interesting. The effect of the insur-
rection upon the progress of the war, as we shall presently see,
was notable, and in substance it produced a counter-revolution
in domestic politics. As Farias was no more willing to resign
than to compromise, some disposition of him seemed necessary,
for Santa Anna would evidently have to take the field again
shortly, and it would not have been expedient, whatever the
rights of the case, to let the executive power fall back into his
control. It was therefore decided to abolish the Vice Presi-
dency; and in this way fell on April Fool's Day the noblest
but most unpopular man in the country. 19 At the positive
dictation of Santa Anna General P. M. Anaya, a Moderado,
was then elected substitute president, while the raging Puros
raged in vain. The clergy succeeded, by offering two millions
of real money, in persuading Santa Anna to annul the laws of
January 11 and February 4; but the day before he did this,
Church property worth twenty millions was placed by Congress
theoretically, at least within the reach of the government. 20
16 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
Not many weeks before this, Don Simplicio had announced,
"There will be presented an original tragi-comedy entitled
' All is a farce in our beloved Mexico,' " and now J. F. Ramirez,
who had been minister of relations when the hated law passed,
exclaimed in bitterness of heart : All of us, without an exception,
have been acting in a way to deserve the contempt and chastise-
ment of cultivated nations ; " we are nothing, absolutely noth-
ing, with the aggravating circumstance that our insensate
vanity makes us believe that we are everything." 20
XXII
VERA CRUZ
February-March, 1847
ON the twenty-first of February, General Scott, who had
sailed from Tampico in a storm the day before, observed in
the distance what seemed to be greenish bubbles floating on the
sea. These were the Lobos Islands, and presently he found
there on transports the First and Second Pennsylvania, the
South Carolina, and parts of the Louisiana, Mississippi and
New York regiments of new volunteers. Within a week many
more troops, including nearly all the regulars of the expedition,
arrived from Tampico or the Brazos, and the natural break-
water that protected the anchorage a sandy coral island of
about one hundred acres, fringed with surf, covered with bushes
and small trees woven together with vines, and scented by the
blossoms of wild oranges, lemons and limes veiled itself behind
the spars and cordage of nearly a hundred vessels. 3
Judicious measures prevented the smallpox from spreading.
Drilling began ; and the drum, fife and bugle aroused a fight-
ing spirit, while visiting, social jollity and military discussion
tended to create an army solidarity. In the evening bands
played martial airs, and the watch fires on the coast gave an
additional sharpness to the ardor of the soldiers. Meanwhile
the General, who still expected vigorous opposition to his land-
ing, waited impatiently for more surf -boats and heavy ordnance,
looked anxiously for the ten large transports l in ballast req-
uisitioned by him in November, elaborated his plans for dis-
embarking, and issued the corresponding orders. 3
The next rendezvous was to be off Anton Lizardo, about a
dozen miles beyond Vera Cruz and some two hundred more from
the Lobos anchorage, where islands, reefs and the shore of the
mainland combined to form a deep and capacious harbor;
VOL. II C 17
18 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
and about noon on the second of March the steamer Massa-
chusetts plowed through the fleet, dashing the spray from her
bows, and set off in that direction. A blue flag with a red centre
waving at her main-truck indicated that Scott was aboard,
and when the noble figure of the commander-in-chief , standing
with uncovered head on the deck, was observed, peal after peal
of cheers resounded from ship to ship. The clanking of anchor
chains followed them ; the sailors broke into their hearty songs ;
the sails filled gracefully ; and the fleet stood away. 3
For two days its progress was not fast, but then a norther
set in. Like a panorama, peak after peak on the lofty sky
line passed rapidly astern ; and finally Orizaba, the " mountain
of the star, " upreared its head superbly more than three miles
above sea level not far inland. Then came Green Island, where
the Albany and Potomac were on hand to give any needful
assistance, 2 and the John Adams showed her black teeth to lurk-
ing blockade-runners ; while in the distance the frowning bas-
tions of Ulua "castle" could be made out, and the sixteen domes
of Vera Cruz appeared to be promenading along her white
wall. Pitching and rolling on the huge billows of inky water,
with foam leaping high over their bows, the transports threaded
their way swiftly between the tumbling and roaring piles of
surf that marked the reefs, and finally, on March 5, the swallow-
tail pennant of Commodore Conner and the flags of the American
squadron were seen off Anton Lizardo. Cheers followed cheers
as the transports dropped anchor one after another ; and when
the sun went down in a blaze of glory behind Orizaba, the spirits
of the men, stimulated by so many novel, beautiful and thrilling
scenes, by the approach of combat and the expectation of
triumph, reached the very culmination of military enthusiasm.
It was a good beginning except that Scott arrived a month
late, and the yellow fever usually came on time. 3
"Heroic" Vera Cruz, the city of the "True Cross," was in
form an irregular hexagon, with a perimeter some two miles in
length, closely packed with rather high buildings of soft, white-
washed masonry. Although famous as the charnel house of
Europeans, it was a rather pleasant place for those who could
endure the climate. The little alameda, across which many a
dandy strutted every day in tight linen trousers, a close blue
jacket, gilt buttons and a red sash, and many a pretty woman
VERA CRUZ 19
tottered coquettishly in pink slippers, was charming. The
curtained balconies gave one a hint now and then of ladies
making their toilets and smoking their cigarettes just within;
and the flat roofs, equipped with observatories commanding
the sea, were delightful resorts in the cool of the day. Along
the water front extended a massive wall, supplemented at the
northern end with Fort Concepcion, at the southern end with
Fort Santiago both of them solidly built and, between
the two, with a mole of granite some two hundred yards in
length. Landward the defences were feeble, for it had long
been assumed that any serious attack would be made by water ;
but there were nine well-constructed, though in most cases 5
not large, bastions, and between them dilapidated curtains of
stone, brick and cement about fifteen feet high and two and a
half or three feet thick. 9
Behind the town extended a plain rather more than half a
mile wide ; and beyond that rose hills of light sand enlarged
editions of the dunes that ran along the shore north and south
of Vera Cruz which gradually increased in height until some
of them, two or three miles inland, reached an elevation of
perhaps three hundred feet. Then came dense forests, cut
here and there by a road and occasionally diversified with oases
of cultivated land, richly scented by tropical fruits and flowers.
To the southwest of the city lay a series of ponds and marshes,
drained by a small stream that passed near the wall ; and this
creek, supplemented by cisterns and an underground aqueduct,
provided the town with water. In the opposite direction, on a
reef named ' the Gallega distant nearly three quarters of a
mile from Fort Concepcion rose the fortress of Ulua, built
of soft coral stone, faced with granite, in the most scientific
manner, and large enough to accommodate 2500 men. 4 Water
batteries lay wherever it seemed possible to effect a landing,
and tremendous walls, enfeebled by no casemates, towered
to a height of about sixty feet. 9
At the beginning of March, 1846, Mora y Villamil, the highest
engineer officer in the Mexican army and at this time coman-
dante general of Vera Cruz, feared that on account of Slidell's
departure the Americans might suddenly attack him. Aided by
Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Robles, a skilful and active subordi-
nate, he drew up detailed plans for repairing the crumbling fortifi-
20 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
cations of the city and castle, and these were approved by the
government; but the lack of money prevented the full exe-
cution of them. In October the captain of a British frigate
warned the new comandante general that an American attack
was imminent; and at about the same time Santa Anna,
while bitterly reproaching the government for its neglect of
the town and pointing out what needed to be done, charged
him to make the "strong buildings" a second and a third line
of defence in case of attack, and then perish, if necessary, under
the ruins of the city; but again the want of funds vetoed
adequate preparations. On the other hand, unpaid soldiers
paid themselves by stealing powder and selling it. 9
About the middle of November it was learned at Mexico
from a New Orleans newspaper that an expedition against
Vera Cruz had been projected, and within two months the
news was confirmed. Santa Anna heard of it, and wrote
that 6000 militia should be assembled there. He was told
in reply that his demand would be met early in February;
and assurances were given to Congress that everything req-
uisite had been done. 5 By the fourth of March the coman-
dante general, to whom the information had been transmitted,
was inditing urgent appeals for help, and soon the appearance
of Scott showed that a crisis had arrived. In reliance on the
promises of the general government, hopeful and incessant work
on the fortifications now began; but within four days letters
from the war department, conferring unlimited powers upon
the commander, admitted that on account of the Polko in-
surrection at the capital no assistance could be given, and many
of the people not only left the city, but endeavored to draw
their friends and relatives from the National Guards. 9
In point of fact military men had long known that Vera
Cruz, as a fortified town standing by itself, was indefensible.
General Mora admitted that it needed stronger exterior works
than could be constructed ; and there was no squadron to keep
Ulua supplied with provisions. The proper course for the
comandante general was either to strip the city of whatever
Scott could use, and merely endeavor to prevent him from
advancing farther, as was privately argued by leading members
of Congress, or for the moral effect of such an example to
send all . non-combatants away, and struggle until crushed \
A FIGHTING CHANCE
21
but neither public sentiment nor the government would have
permitted the first of these plans, and, while the comandante
had the second in mind on the fifth of March, it was too heroic
for execution. 9
Besides, there seemed to be a fighting chance. Ulua was much
stronger than when the French, aided by fortune, had captured
it, and the anchorage occupied by them could now be shelled.
Some of the guns had been improperly mounted ; some of the
SAN JUAN DE ULUA
Scale of Metres
carriages were old ; at some of the embrasures balls of different
calibres were mixed ; pieces without projectiles could be found,
and projectiles without pieces; rust had impaired the fit of
many balls ; but the city and the fortress together had probably
three hundred serviceable cannon and mortars, 6 more muskets
than men, and plenty of ammunition. As an assault was
expected, the streets were defended with cannon and barri-
cades, sand-bags protected the doors and windows, loopholes
without number were made in the wall, the rather shallow but
22 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
wet ditch was cleared, and although barbed cactus made the
approach of an enemy to the bastions almost impossible,
thousands of pitfalls each with a sword, bayonet or short
pike set erect at the bottom were dug beyond the wall, so
arranged that no one marching straight forward could well
avoid them. 9
Juan Soto, the governor of the state, was indefatigable,
and as ^the state militia numbered about 20,000, it seemed
reasonable to count upon succor. Giffard, the British consul,
expected that substantial help would come from that source.
Other states were likely to furnish aid ; and the people, taught
by the long inaction of the Americans off the shore to despise
them and encouraged by fictitious reports that assistance would
be rendered by the national government, felt united and enthu-
siastic. 7 The city council offered all its resources, and the
well-to-do raised funds for a hospital by giving a theatrical
performance. The garrison, led by the brave, active and pop-
ular though not very able Morales, now comandante general,
; may be estimated as at least 1200 in Ulua and 3800 in the
city. 8 About half of them were merely National Guards;
but these, decorated with tricolored cockades and red pompons,
looked and felt extremely dangerous. "As God lives," cried
one of their leaders, " either we will triumph, or all of us, without
a solitary exception, will be interred in the ruins." The civil-
ians remaining in town may have numbered 3000. 9
Bearing in mind the necessity, not merely of taking Vera
Cruz and Ulua, but of getting his army away from the coast
before the advent of yellow fever, and satisfied that Polk
would show him no mercy in case of ill-success, General
Scott examined his problem with all possible care, and con-
sulted freely the officers he particularly trusted. 10 He could
not very prudently have left, say, 5000 men to mask or possibly
reduce Vera Cruz, as some critics insisted he should have done,
and advanced with the rest, for the essential purpose of his
expedition was to capture that place, and such a course might
have been viewed by the government as insubordinate.
Besides, that policy would probably have been regarded by the
Mexicans as a sign of weakness ; the possession of the harbor
and shipping facilities would evidently aid all further opera-
tions; by holding them it would be possible to deprive the
THE DEBARKATION 23
enemy of war supplies and other necessaries ; the arms, ammu-
nition and cannon of the Mexicans were highly valuable, espe-
cially to them ; and the American army would not have been
an adequate aggressive force after thus detaching nearly half
its numbers. The obstacle before Scott had, therefore, to be
faced and overcome. 13
The best method, evidently, was to reduce the town before
seriously attacking Ulua, because that success would greatly
diminish the enemy's fire, make it possible to contract and so
strengthen the American line, and somewhat facilitate the
transportation of supplies. Such had been the General's plan
from the first. Officers eager for distinction recommended an
assault, and Scott well knew that a quick, brilliant stroke would
best win him fame and popularity. 11 But he understood
equally well that an assault, necessarily made at night, would
entail a heavy loss of his best men enough, perhaps, to
prevent his advancing farther and escaping the pestilence
besides involving a great slaughter of both combatants and
non-combatants in the town. On the other hand, as the British
consul and the British naval commander agreed, there was not
enough time before t,he yellow fever season to warrant relying
upon starvation alone. 12 Siege and bombardment were there-
fore indicated, and Scott promptly decided upon that plan as
combining, better than any other, humanity with effectiveness. 13
The initial step was to select a point for debarking; and
Conner, whom Scott had requested in December to study this
problem, had already fixed upon the beach of Mocambo Bay,
two and a half or three miles southeast of Vera Cruz, which
was somewhat sheltered from northers and could be swept by
the guns of the fleet. Sacrificios Island, a strip of sand repre-
senting a large reef, was just off shore, too, forming an an-
chorage here. Accordingly Scott, with Conner, the principal
generals, Robert E. Lee, P. G. T. Beauregard and other officers,
went up in the little steamer Petrita, reconnoitred the spot, and
then probably to deceive the Mexicans regarding his inten-
tions ran within a mile and a half of Ulua, where he was
almost sunk by the gunners. 14 His judgment agreed with the
Commodore's, and orders were given to land on the eighth.
But when that morning came, signs of a norther showed them-
selves. The glass fell. The heat became stifling. A southerly
THE WAR WITH MEXICO
THE DEBARKATION 25
wind loaded with moisture blew, and the summit of Orizaba,
clad in the azure hue of the poet, stood sharply forth; hence
the orders were countermanded. 17
The signs failed, however, and the extra day was available
for the last preparations. A detailed plan of debarkation had
been drawn up and announced while the army was at Lobos
Islands, but certain difficulties had not been anticipated. The
ten large transports in ballast had not come, and to land from
a great number of small vessels at Sacrificios, where there was
little room and foreign warships occupied all the safe anchorage,
appeared imprudent. Conner, therefore, offered to transport
the army on larger, better and more ably handled vessels belong-
ing to the squadron, and Scott's wise acceptance of the proposal
involved extensive readjustments. 17
These, however, were skilfully arranged, and when the dawn
of March 9 announced a perfect day, a scene of the greatest
activity began. Signals fluttered to mastheads. In clarion
tones officers issued their orders. Despatch boats dashed here
and there. Sailors and soldiers roared their favorite airs.
Fully half of the 10,000 and more troops were placed on the
frigates Raritan and Potomac, and most of the others on smaller
vessels of the squadron. At about eleven o'clock the order to
sail was given. Amid thunderous cheers the Massachusetts
plunged through the fleet, and took its place in the lead with
Conner's flagship. A gentle breeze from the southeast filled
the sails; and the war vessels and transports were off. After
a smooth voyage they began to arrive near Sacrificios at about
one o'clock, and in close quarters, but without mishaps or
even the least confusion, each dropped anchor in its allotted
space. 15 The yards and rigging of the foreign war vessels
were black with men, and ladies, armed with glasses and
parasols, gazed impatiently from the deck of the British
packet. 17
Without the loss of a moment three signal flags rose to the
main-truck of the Massachusetts, and the work of landing
Worth's brigade of regulars began. The double-shotted cannon
of the squadron were brought to bear on the shore. Seven
gunboats drawing eight feet or less formed a line within good
grape range of the beach, and cleared for action. About sixty-
five surf-boats, which had been towed from Anton Lizardo by
26 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
steamers, were rowed by naval crews to the vessels carrying
troops each having a definite assignment and after re-
ceiving from fifty to eighty soldiers apiece, making up the
whole of the brigade, attached themselves in two long lines to
the quarters of the steamer Princeton, which had now anchored
about 450 yards from the shore. This process consumed several
hours, and it was hardly ended when a shell whizzed over
them. "Now we shall catch it," thought the soldiers, for
rumors of opposition had been heard, two or three hundred
cavalry could be seen, and artillery was supposed to be lurking
behind the dunes. 17
The flash of a signal gun shot now from the Massachusetts;
the surf-boats cut loose, faced the shore abreast in the order of
battle, and struck out for land ; and a cheer burst from every
American throat. Great Orizaba cast aside its veil of haze,
and stood out against the setting sun. Not a cloud flecked the
sky ; not a ripple marred the burnished water. Ulua and Vera
Cruz thundered loudly, though in vain. National airs rolled from
our squadron. Shells from the gunboats broke up the Mexican
cavalry and searched the dunes. The oars of the straining
sailors flashed. Muskets not loaded but with fixed bayonets
glittered. Regimental colors floated at the stern of each boat.
Suddenly one of the boats darted ahead and grounded on a bar
about a hundred yards from the shore. Out leaped Worth ;
his officers followed him ; and the whole brigade were instantly
in the breaking ground-swell, holding aloft their muskets and
cartridge-boxes. 17
Here was the chance of the enemy, for our vessels could not
fire without endangering Americans ; but no enemy was to be
seen. 16 Led by their color-bearers the regulars quickly splashed
ashore, formed in a moment, charged to the crest of the first
dune, planted their standards and burst into cheers; the men
on the ships, tongue-tied for some time by an excitement and
anxiety that made their brains reel, answered with huzza
after huzza till they made the bay " seem peopled with victori-
ous armies," wrote one of the soldiers, and the strains of "Star-
Spangled Banner" broke from the bands. Less formally, but
rapidly and in order, the boats went back for the troops of
Patterson and Twiggs ; and by midnight, without having met
with a single accident, more than 10,000 men, duly guarded
VERA CRUZ INVESTED 27
by sentries, were eating their biscuit and pork on the sand or
preparing to bivouac. 17
During the night Mexicans in the rear did some shooting but
without effect, and the process of investment began. Diverting
attention from this by having a gunboat, sheltered about a mile
from the city behind Point Hornos, throw shot and shell into
Vera Cruz for a couple of hours the next forenoon, Scott had
Pillow's brigade capture the hill of Malibran behind Worth's
camp, and push on toward the rear of the city. Quitman
then passed it; Shields passed Quitman, and Twiggs passed
him. Wallowing up and down the slopes of deep sand in a
sultry heat without water to drink proved to be extremely
hard work ; and breaking through the valleys, where a matted
growth of chaparral armed with thorns as keen as needles
and stiff as bayonets resisted everything but sharp steel,
was harder yet. Day and night Mexican irregulars, both in-
fantry and horse, and cannon salutes from the city and the
castle embarrassed operations, and there were many brisk
skirmishes. Moreover the landing had scarcely been made
when a norther set in, covering the men with sand, blowing
away old hilltops and building up new ones. But not long
after noon on March 13 Twiggs reached the Gulf north of the
city. The next morning a well-supported detachment from
each brigade advanced as far as it could find cover, driving the
Mexican outposts before it; and by night these detachments
were only about seven hundred yards from the town. 21
The American position as a whole, known as Camp Wash-
ington, was now a semi-circular line about seven miles long.
There were gaps, but these were rapidly closed with strong
pickets. The railway and the roads were all occupied; the
visible water supply of the city was cut off; and on March 16
Scott announced that nothing less than a small army could
break through. Meantime, whenever the weather permitted,
artillery, stores, horses and provisions were landed in the most
systematic manner. Safeguards were issued*- to the repre-
sentatives of foreign powers at Vera Cruz, and in a letter of
March 13 to the Spanish consul 18 Scott indicated plainly that
" bombardment or cannonade, or assault, or all" of these might
be expected by the citizens. 21
The time to plant artillery had now arrived, and the ideal
28
THE WAR WITH MEXICO
spot was found on the sixteenth ; but after a battery had been
laid out there, access to it proved to be dangerously exposed.
Two days later, however, a fairly good point was discovered,
near the cemetery and Worth's position, about half a mile
south of the town, which screened it somewhat from the castle ;
and preparations to establish two mortar batteries there, about
one hundred yards apart, began the following night. At the
SIEGE OF VERA CRUZ
AMERICAN BATTERIES
A Fort Santiago
B Battery of San fernando
C Battery of Santa Barbara
D quarters for Infantry
E quarters for Cavalry?*
&HIM
same time a deep road, wide enough to admit a six-mule team,
was under construction. 21
Most of this labor had to be done at night, and the utmost
possible silence observed. As the transports lay a mile off
shore, while the only wharf was an open beach, and a norther
blew violently from the twelfth to the sixteenth, the work of
landing ordnance and ordnance stores proceeded slowly. Fortu-
nately the work on the batteries was not discovered; but the
fire of Paixhan guns and heavy mortars from the city and
castle, though irregular and singularly unfruitful despite the
undeniable skill of the gunners, 19 compelled the Americans to
adopt extreme precautions. Nor were these embarrassments
the only ones. Notwithstanding seasonable orders, only fifteen
carts and about a hundred draught horses had arrived. Not
THE BOMBARDMENT 29
more than one fifth of the ordnance requisitioned by Scott about
the middle of November and due at the Brazos he now
reminded Marcy by January 15, had yet appeared. A great
many artillery and cavalry horses had been drowned, injured
or delayed ; and there was a shortage of almost every requisite
for siege operations. 20 But the army and the navy cooperated
zealously; soldiers took the places of draught animals; and
in spite of every difficulty three batteries, mounting seven 10-
inch mortars, were in readiness by two o'clock on the afternoon
of the twenty-second, and the soldiers felt eager to hear what
they called the "sweet music" of these "faithful bull-dogs." 21
At this hour, therefore, Scott formally summoned the town,
intimating that both assault and bombardment were to be
apprehended. The reply was a refusal to surrender ; and at
quarter past four, accompanied by a deafening chorus of joyous,
frantic shouts and yells, the American batteries opened, while
the " mosquito fleet " of two small steamers and five gunboats, 22
each armed with a single heavy cannon, stationed themselves
behind Point Hornos, and fired briskly. 24
Like "hungry lions in search of prey/' a soldier thought, the
shells from the mortars flew "howling" to their mark. With
heavier metal and vastly more of it, Vera Cruz and the castle
replied. The city wall blazed like a sheet of fire. Shot, shell
and rockets came forth in a deluge, it seemed to the men ; and
the two columns of smoke, rolling and whirling, mounted high
and collided as if striving to outflank and conquer each other.
Still more terrible was the scene at night. A spurt of red fire;
a fierce roar; a shell with an ignited fuse mounting high,
pausing, turning, and then more and more swiftly drop-
ping; the crash of a roof; a terrific explosion that shook the
earth ; screams, wailing and yells all this could be distinctly
seen or heard from the American lines. During the twenty-
third and the following night the fire still raged, but on the
American side more slowly, for although ten mortars were now
at work, a norther interrupted the supply of ammunition. 24
But while the bombardment made an interesting spectacle,
as a military operation it was proving unsatisfactory. The
ordnance thus far received by Scott was inadequate for the
reduction of the city to say nothing of Ulua. With mortars,
especially as the distances could not be ascertained precisely,
30 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
it was impossible to be sure of hitting the bastions and forts.
Shells could be thrown into the town, but while the houses suf-
fered much, the fortifications and garrison escaped vital damage,
and there was no sign of yielding. Not a few in the American
army, who had supposed that a fortified city could be taken
at sight like a mint julep, grew impatient ; the officers eager for
assault fumed ; Worth, proud of his quick work at Monterey,
sneered; Twiggs grunted. As an army man Scott naturally
desired that branch of t,he service to reap all the glory of its
campaign, but he now found himself compelled to ask for naval
guns heavy enough to breach the wall, and make an assault
practicable ; and when Perry, who had taken Conner's place
on the twenty-first, insisted that men from the squadron should
work them, he consented. 24
The new battery, constructed by Robert E. Lee and mounting
three long 32's for solid shot and three 68's for shells, was planted
just behind the bushy crest of a slight eminence, only some 800
yards from the city wall, where the enemy did not suppose
that such an enterprise would be ventured ; and until the guns
were about ready to be unmasked on the morning of the twenty-
fourth, its existence was not suspected. 23 Here were instru-
ments of power and precision, and they told. The Mexicans
concentrated upon them a terrific fire, but with no serious effect ;
and when on the next morning a battery consisting of four
24-pounders and two 8-inch howitzers joined the infernal
chorus, the fire, though hindered occasionally by the tardiness
of ammunition, was "awful," said Scott and Lee, while the city
appeared like one dense thunder-cloud, red with flashes and
quivering with incessant roars. 24
That night the batteries played still more fiercely. Some-
times four or five shells were sizzling through the air at once.
The fire, said an officer, was now "perfectly terrific"; and
to heighten the wildness of the scene, many vessels could be
observed by the light of the moon going ashore in the norther.
About thirty were wrecked by this one gale, and others had
to cut away their masts. In the meantime preparations for
assaulting both by land and by water, should an assault prove
to be necessary, were actively pressed. 24
In town, during the early period of these operations, the
enthusiasm continued to run high, for the cautious and faint-
THE SITUATION IN VERA CRUZ 31
hearted had gone away, and the reports of the irregulars, con-
stantly skirmishing against the Americans, were colored to
suit the popular taste. Work on the fortifications proceeded,
and fresh cartridges for the artillery were made with feverish
haste. Bands played; the gunners amused themselves by
firing at small and far distant groups among the sand-hills;
and at night fireballs and rockets lighted up the plain in an-
ticipation of the hoped-for assault. When the investment was
completed, when the American outposts drew near the town,
and especially when it became known that preparations for
a bombardment were under way, the people grew more serious ;
but it was expected that forces from without would break the
line, or at least prevent the construction of batteries. 26
A painful disappointment followed, however. Soto made
great efforts to collect the tax levied by the state; but the
citizens, impoverished by the long blockade, had no money,
and without cash troops could not be fed. In spite of many
hopes the fluctuating bands under Colonel Senobio, the chief
leader of the irregulars in the vicinity, do not seem to have
risen at any time far above 1000, and perhaps never reached
that number. In vain Soto appealed for an able general and
a nucleus of regulars. They were not within reach, and the
few pieces of artillery could not be moved. The states of
Puebla and Oaxaca tried to help, but were tardy and in-
efficient. 26
Men from the upper country dreaded the yellow fever ; and
those of the coast, volatile by nature, ignorant of real warfare,
without organization, training or discipline, were astonished
and confounded when they struck the solid American line.
They pecked at it continually, but Morales himself could see
that no skill, concert or strength marked their efforts. Dis-
couragement and wholesale desertion followed. The city,
therefore, could not obtain provisions by land ; and as most of
the seamen alongshore fled to the mountains, and boat com-
munication became more and more difficult, it was realized
that supplies from the interior were out of the question. After
March 20 the troops could be given little or no meat; but
soldiers were detailed to fish the prolific waters under the guns
of Ulua, and no doubt beans and tortillas, the staple food of the
common people, continued to be fairly plentiful. 26
32 " THE WAR WITH MEXICO
The opening of the bombardment, however, precipitated a
crisis, and as our fire grew more and more intense, the con-
sternation and suffering increased. Crashing roofs; burning
houses; flying pavements; doors, windows and furniture
blocking the streets ; a pandemonium of confused and frightful
sounds ; bells ringing without hands ; awful explosions ; domes
and steeples threatening to fall ; the earth quaking ; crowds of
screaming women, who rushed hither and thither ; terrible
wounds and sudden deaths all these were new and over-
whelming scenes. 25 Only one bakery escaped destruction, as it
happened, and the children cried in vain for bread ; the priests
would not leave their shelter to comfort and absolve; and
finally the very instinct of self-preservation was lost in a stupid
despair more dreadful to witness than death itself. 26
The troops in the southwestern section, under our heaviest
fire, became terror-stricken. In other quarters men left the
ranks to look after families and friends; and when a murky
dawn ended the terrible night of the twenty-fifth, demoraliza-
tion was rife. People wandered about the streets cry-
ing for surrender. Always passionate, they now hated
their own government for deserting them. The consuls
went out under a flag of truce, but Scott refused to see
them, sending them word it was reported that any
persons leaving the city would be fired upon, and that unless
it should surrender in the meantime, new as well as the old
batteries would open the next morning. This fact over-
whelmed the people; and the prospect of being exterminated
at leisure by an enemy who could not be injured, beat down their
last thought of resistance. 26
Consul Giffard had predicted that any plausible excuse for
surrender would be turned to good account. Supplies were
now said to be failing, and in the course of this dreadful night
an informal meeting of officers agreed upon capitulation.
Naturally the idea gave offence to many, and there was talk of
opening a way through the American line with the sword.
But a council of war soon decided to negotiate ; commissioners
were appointed; and Scott, who was invited to take similar
action, did so. The six men came together on the afternoon
of the twenty-sixth, but could not agree; and the Mexicans
returned to the city, leaving behind them a proposition. 29
THE SURRENDER OF VERA CRUZ 33
Worth, who was our chief representative, believed the ncg3-
tiations were simply a waste of time, and favored an immediate
assault ; but Scott saw that the Mexicans, while trying to save
appearances, really meant surrender, and the next morning
granted with certain vital modifications their terms. 27 His
demands were accepted, and it was thus agreed in substance
that Landero, to whom the command had been turned over,
should march his army out with all the honors of war, the
troops be paroled, and the armament so far as not destroyed
in the course of the war be disposed of by the treaty of
peace. It was further agreed that all the Mexican sick should
remain in town under Mexican care, private property be re-
spected, and religious rights be held sacred. 29
It was a "shameful surrender," declared Santa Anna, and
from a military point of view this could hardly be denied. Ulua
had practically not been touched ; it had a considerable supply
of provisions, and there was a chance of obtaining more from
blockade-runners. Vera Cruz was in a harder yet not in a
desperate plight. Men of importance there, knowing the city
would be denounced for surrendering, naturally endeavored to
prove that it had suffered terribly and exhausted its resources
before yielding; and the principal neutrals friendly toward
them, engaged mostly in trade, and more willing to have life
sacrificed than property raised an outcry against the pro-
ceedings of Scott that became a fierce indictment in Europe
and the United State's. But the British naval commander,
though not inclined to favor the General, reported that the
casualties in the city were only eighty soldiers killed or wounded,
about one hundred old men, women and children killed, and
an unknown number injured, and that its food supply, while
no doubt less delicate and varied than could have been desired,
would have lasted beyond the middle of April; and there is
considerable evidence that his figures were approximately
correct. 28 Ammunition did not fail, nor did water. 29
The surrender was really due therefore to the moral effect
of Scott's artillery. Even Giffard, who termed his operations
cruel and unnecessary, admitted this ; and, bearing in mind the
General's obligations to obey his government and save the lives
of his men, the inevitable horrors of an assault by night, and the
serious danger that a reliance upon starvation as the sole means
VOL. II D
34 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
of reducing the city would have given time for Santa Anna's
regulars and the yellow fever to arrive, one concludes again
and finally that Scott's method was humane and wise. 29
Owing to inequalities of the ground, the character of the soil,
great skill on the part of our engineers, incessant care and re-
markable good fortune, the total losses caused by 6267 Mexi-
can shot, 8486 shells and all the bullets of the irregulars were
only about nineteen killed and sixty-three wounded. The
siege was not exactly a fete champetre, however. It was tire-
some to be awakened at night so often by Mexican skirmishers,
disagreeable to be routed out by the diabolical screech of a
heavy shell, and quite annoying to have one of the " big dinner-
pots," as the soldiers called them, explode close by. Satu-
rating dews, abominable drinking water, scanty and bad
rations, howling wolves, lizards in one's boot, "jiggers " that
made the feet itch incessantly, fleas that even a sleeping-bag
could not discourage, and sand-flies nearly as voracious, were
minor but real afflictions. When a norther began, the whole
aspect of nature seemed to change. The sky became a pall,
the atmosphere a winding-sheet, the wind a scourge ; and the
roaring, chilling blast filled one's ears, eyes, mouth and even
pores with biting grit, cut the tents into ribbons, and sometimes
buried their sleeping inmates. 30 To escape from the Mexican
shot sentries often had to burrow in the sand, and under the
tropical sun they learned to appreciate the power of the old
brick oven. When carrying provisions or dragging cannon,
amidst hills that blazed like the mirrors of Archimedes at
Syracuse, men often dropped. 31
On the other hand, besides the initial high spirits, which
helped immensely, and the excitement and comradeship that
knocked off the edge of hardships, there were special sources
of cheer particularly the "blue-shirts," as the seamen were
called. When turning out in the face of an icy sand-blast
sharp enough to cut granite, it was something to hear a salty
voice give the order, "Form line of battle on the starboard
tack!" But sailors on shore leave, who burst from their long
confinement like birds let loose, and "cruised" in the environs
with perfect abandon, were better yet. Their sport with the
wild monkeys was truly edifying, and their delight over the
burro would have set Diogenes laughing. Sometimes they
VERA CRUZ OCCUPIED 35
rode him, and sometimes they carried him. Planted in the
Mexican style just forward of the creature's tail, they felt
that at last they were riding the quarter-deck, and commanding
a snug vessel of their own. Above all they enjoyed "mooring
ship." This congenial manoeuvre was achieved by taking
aboard for "anchor" a heavy block of wood, previously attached
to the donkey's neck with a long rope, then racing at full
speed, heaving the "anchor," paying out the cable, and
bringing up in a heap on the sand the donkey on top, very
likely. 31
Not less cheering and a little more military was the news,
which arrived by the fifteenth of March, that "Old Wooden-
leg's" army had been "licked up like salt" at Buena Vista.
And still another comfort was to gaze from a safely remote hill
at Vera Cruz, which looked the soldiers agreed so oriental,
with airy palm trees visible over the white wall, hundreds of
buzzards floating in wide circles far above, the dark bulwarks
of Ulua set in waves of purple and gold on the left, a forest of
American spars and masts on the right, piercing the misty
splendor of the yellow beach, the bright sails of fishing boats in
the middle distance, and the vast, blue, cool Gulf beyond it
all. How the panting soldiers gloated on the prospect of taking
possession ! 31
And on March 29 they did so. The day was enchantingly
summerlike ; a delightful southeast breeze came over the water ;
and the domes of Vera Cruz were gilded with splendid sunshine!
In a green meadow, shaded with cocoanut palms, a little way
south of the town, Worth's brigade was drawn up in a dingy
line, and a dingy line of volunteers, about seventy yards dis-
tant, faced it. At one end of the intervening space, near the
city wall, stood sailors and marines. The American dragoons
and a battery were opposite them, and a white flag waved at
the centre. A little before noon the Mexican troops, in their
best uniforms of blue, white and red, marched out of the gate,
formed by company front with a band at the head of each
regiment, advanced to the flag, and stacked arms. A few
slammed or even broke their muskets; many kissed their
hands to the city ; and a standard bearer, who had removed his
flag from the staff and secreted it in his bosom, wept for joy
when permitted to keep it. But most of the men seemed in
36 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
fairly good spirits, and as a rule the much-decorated officers,
who retained their swords, produced a fine impression. 32
As the rear of the column left the gate, the Mexican banner
on Fort Santiago, after receiving a last salute from the guns
of the city and castle, was lowered; and then issued forth
a crowd of men, women and children, loaded with fiddles,
guitars, parrots, monkeys, dogs, game-cocks, toys and household
utensils, that was enough to destroy any funereal sentiments
which otherwise might have been felt. Even by the Mexican
accounts, not a word or look of triumph, not even a note of
authority, was chargeable to the victors ; and Worth, who
received the column, proffered a thousand courtesies. General
Scott, the so-called "vain-glorious," remained in the back-
ground; but he sent a note excusing from their parole about
forty officers, whom he expected to aid him at the capital as
in effect advocates of peace. 32
Amid cheers and the waving of caps, American flags then
rose on the forts, greeted by hundreds of salutes from sea and
shore. It seemed, wrote a soldier, as if there were nothing in
the world but cannon, and all the cannon thundering; and
the glory of the Stars and Stripes, gleaming amidst the smoke,
gave a new significance to the emblem of patriotism. With his
bands playing favorite American airs, Worth's brigade now
marched into the town; and later Scott, with his staff and a
brilliant escort, followed it. Perry took formal possession of
Ulua ; and the disbanded Mexican troops that resided elsewhere
scattered to their homes, preparing the people for submission
wherever they went by tales of American invincibility, and
teaching them by every sort of outrage to welcome American
rule. 32
XXIII
CERRO GORDO
April, 1847
I BELIEVE it would be many months after the capture of
Vera Cruz and the fortress of Ulua, said Minister Pakenham
in substance at the end of January, 1847, before an army strong
enough to advance any distance into the interior could be col-
lected there, and meantime the climate wouM be "frightfully
destructive." Heat, fatigue, differences in food, and the yellow
fever will cause heavy losses, wrote Bermudez de Castro, the
Spanish minister at Mexico in March, and the road to the
capital passes so many centres of population and so many fine
military positions, that without great labor and preparations
an invading force can be destroyed. Two men better qualified
to express opinions on the matter could scarcely have been
found; but without hesitation the "scientific and visionary"
Scott addressed himself to the task. Had the requisitions duly
made by him in November been complied with, he might by
this time, at a trifling cost in lives, have been standing on the
great plateau, and quite possibly within the capital ; but now,
with only two thirds of the desired troops 1 and an insufficient
supply of many other essentials, he fearlessly girded up his
loins. 5
Stores were expeditiously landed. The First Infantry and
two independent volunteer companies received orders to
garrison the town and the fortress. It was arranged to mini-
mize the danger of yellow fever by keeping the Americans at
the water-front as much as possible and cleaning the city.
The military department of Vera Cruz, extending fifty miles
inland, was created. Foreign merchants, under the threat of
a six per cent duty on exported gold and silver, supplied funds
by cashing official drafts on the Un'ted States at par. "One
more appeal ... to the ninety-seven honorable men, against,
37
38 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
perhaps, the three miscreants in every hundred," urging them
to cooperate actively in preventing even trivial outrages, was
issued ; and the people of the region were addressed 2 in a
proclamation. 5
"Mexicans," said Scott, I am advancing at the head of a
powerful army, which is soon to be doubled, and another army
of ours is advancing in the north. "Americans are not your
enemies/' however, but only the enemies of those who mis-
governed you, and brought about this unnatural war. To the
peaceable inhabitants and to your church, which is respected
by the government, laws and people in all parts of our country,
we are friends. Everything possible will be done to prevent
or punish outrages against you; and on the other hand any
citizen, not belonging to the regular forces, who undertakes
to injure us will be severely chastised. "Let, then, all good
Mexicans remain at home, or at their peaceful occupations."
Let them also furnish supplies, for all who do so will be paid
in cash and protected. If such a course be followed, the war
may soon end honorably for both sides; and the Americans,
"having converted enemies into friends," will return home. 5
The problem of transportation, however, caused the General
a great deal of trouble. As early as the beginning of February
notice of his probable needs had been given by him to the
quartermaster's department, and presumably steps had been
taken to meet them ; but the loss of animals on board the ships
during storms or by the wrecking of transports had upset all
calculations. 3 For wagons especially he was dependent upon
the United States. At least eight hundred were needed, and
up to April 5 only one hundred and eighty had arrived, though
three hundred more were known to be on the way. Four or
five thousand mules were required for wagons, two or three
thousand for pack-saddles, and about four hundred mules or
horses for the siege train; and by the same date less than
1100 had been obtained. An expedition to the village of La
Antigua 4 on the north shore met with little success in this
regard, and a more important one, to the rich country on the
upper Alvarado River, 4 which was supposed to abound in
horses and mules, produced but very disappointing results. 5
In the opinion of Scott, however, the district near Jalapa, a
beautiful city about seventy-four miles inland, was likely to
MEXICAN DEFENSIVE PLANS
39
prove more satisfactory. From Beach's friend, Mrs. Storms,
who had presented herself to him on March 20, he seems to
have learned that friendly sentiments were entertained there.
No serious opposition below that point and even for some
distance beyond it seemed to him probable; and hence on
April 8, although his means for equipping a road train were
but a quarter of what he desired, and only an inadequate siege
train could be moved, the second division of regulars, com-
manded by Brigadier General Twiggs, marched for Jalapa, which
VERA CRUZ TO PEROTE
N
Win..Eng.Co..N.Y
was also the first point where large quantities of subsistence
and forage could be obtained. 5
Measures to defend the route had been set on foot by Mexico
in good season. 6 From the lofty plateau of the interior the
national highway which it was evident that an American
army would have to follow on account of its artillery wound
through mountains to sea level, presenting, according to the
minister of war, "almost insuperable obstacles against any
audacious invader." Not far above Jalapa the village of Las
Vigas marked a spot of military value, and the narrow, rugged
pass at La Hoya, though it could be turned without much
difficulty, afforded an excellent opportunity to stop a weak
force or delay a strong one, while below that city Corral Falso,
40
THE WAR WITH MEXICO
Cerro Gordo, Plan del Rio and the national bridge (puente
nacional) were fine points. As early as October 11, 1846, an
order to fortify several of these positions was issued. Some
gangs of laborers assembled, a little preparatory clearing of
the ground was done, a few cannon were moved about; but
energy, money, supplies, appliances and engineering skill fell
indefinitely short of the requirements, and up to the twentieth
of March, 1847, nothing substantial was accomplished. 9
That day Santa Anna arrived near the capital on his return
from the north, and, although he expected Vera Cruz to delay
the Americans much longer than it did, he seems to have taken
the southern danger into consideration at once. Disputes
between the generals had sprung up. As a result La Vega
was given the district from
Vera Cruz to Corral Falso,
General Gregorio Gomez
that extending from Corral
Falso to Las Vigas, and
General Gaona a jurisdic-
tion above this; and each
was ordered to fortify his
beSt P' ntS aild
CONTOUB L.NEB NEAR CERRO GORDO.
rm. j- r i u 4 many troops as he could.
The difference of elevation between two J ^
lines is fifty metres. Over all or these officers
was then placed General
Canalizo, a little man with a big tongue, as commander-in-
chief of the eastern division. The forces under Senobio and
other chiefs were to be gathered, "regularized" and trained.
The troops a cavalry brigade, two brigades of infantry and
a force of artillery that had followed the President from
La Angostura were ordered to march toward Vera Cruz by
the shortest route, a brigade under Rangel to proceed from
the capital in the same direction, and 2000 National Guards,
from Puebla to join those corps ; and General Mora, who now
commanded the Army of the North, was instructed to send
his bronze 16-pounders to Jalapa with all possible speed. 7
Every effective engineer then at the capital received similar
marching orders, and attention was given to the need of
ammunition, wagons, mules and other necessaries. At the
same time instructions were issued to block the route ma
SANTA ANNA AT THE FRONT 41
Orizaba at Chiquihuite, a naturally strong position below that
city. 9
Late on March 30 news that Vera Cruz had fallen reached
the capital. At once the government expelled Black, the
American consul residing at Mexico, and issued a circular call-
ing upon all citizens to forget rancor and dissension, offer their
lives and fortunes, and stand unitedly behind the President.
"Mexicans," exclaimed Santa Anna, "do not hesitate between
death and slavery. . . . Awake ! A sepulchre opens at your
feet; let it at least be covered with laurels!" and he adjured
Canalizo in the name of the country to fortify Corral Falso
and Cerro Gordo, and above all to defend the national bridge
"in all possible ways and at all costs" in order to give time for
troops to concentrate above it. With Senobio's forces and
the militia amounting, said this letter, to more than 2000
men and aided by the topography of the ground, itself
"equal in value to an army," the enemy could be detained,
the President assured him ; and he was authorized to shoot
every deserter and every coward. At the same time Governor
Soto was directed to proclaim martial law, call out all the fit
men between the ages of fifteen and fifty years, and aid Canalizo
in every possible way. Then, after transferring the executive
power to General Anaya, the substitute President, Santa
Anna left the capital on April 2. As he went down the steps
of the palace to his waiting carriage, he and the onlookers felt
sad presentiments they could not hide. Even his enemies
had tears in their eyes, and it seemed to every one like a final
good-by. 9
On the way gloomy reports met him. Soto wrote that while
all in his power had been done, the fate of Vera Cruz had
smitten the people with terror, and the resources of the etate
were far from adequate. Canalizo wrote no more hopefully.
Efforts had been made to rouse the spirit of the public. 8 Under
penalty of death all intercourse with the Americans had been
prohibited, and under the same threat all citizens had been
ordered to place beyond the invader's reach whatever could
be of service to him. But the outlook was dark. Although a
good engineer had been at the national bridge for a week,
work on the fortifications had scarcely begun; eight hundred
out of a thousand men had fled panic-stricken on learn-
42 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
ing of Scott's triumph at Vera Cruz, there was little ammunition
or money, and the bridge could not be held. In view of Santa
Anna's adjuration Canalizo promised to make another effort,
but he soon ordered La Vega to abandon the position. The
light fortifications recently built were demolished, and as
wagons to carry the guns away could not be obtained, they
were spiked and pitched into a ravine. 9
Observing at La Hoya that virtually nothing had been done,
Santa Anna ordered Engineer Cano to fortify the pass, and
then went on to his great hacienda of El Encero, eight miles
below Jalapa, where he arrived on the fifth. Two days later,
in company with Lieutenant Colonel Robles, he passed Corral
Falso, five miles farther down the highway, and the hamlet of
Cerro Gordo, nearly five miles beyond that, and finally, making
a steep and circuitous descent, he came to Plan del Rio, about
five miles from the hamlet. Near the first of these three posi-
tions the highway passed through a narrow, craggy defile, that
could not be turned ; but Santa Anna decided to make a stand
at the second, because according to the country people and the
traditions of both the Spanish regime and the revolutionary
war, it was equally unassailable on the flanks, and holding it
would force the Americans to remain within reach of the yellow
fever, winch ceased to be terrible just above Plan del Rio. 14
Very little work had been done at Cerro Gordo, but the
position seemed admirable. About half a mile below the hamlet
the descending highway entered a ravine, which rapidly
deepened. On the left of this rose a hill named El Telegrafo,
which, though low and easily ascended from the direction of
the hamlet, was five or six hundred feet high on the opposite
side and extremely steep. To the right of the ravine the grade
of the hamlet continued for more than a mile, ending finally
in three tongues, just south of which the plateau was cut,
approximately east and west, by a precipitous canyon of rock
more than five hundred feet deep, the channel of a small stream
called the Rio del Plan. The tongues, which may be desig-
nated from south to north as A, B and (7, were parallel to the
highway and more or less fully commanded it. 10 Near the head
of the ravine, at a spot that may be called D, a road branched
off from the highway toward the tongues, and there was a
low eminence, E, in this vicinity. 14
CERRO GORDO
43
44 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
Believing that Scott could advance with artillery only by
the highway, Santa Anna gave his chief attention to this part
of the terrain, and recalling Cano and his men from La Hoya,
he sent them to assist Robles here. At the ends of the tongues
parapets were laid out, which, though not completed, served
to indicate the correct positions ; and in front of each the bushes
and trees were cut down and left on the ground, so that an
assailant should be impeded and should have no screen. On
A General Pinzon, a mulatto of considerable ability, was placed
with about six guns and some five hundred men. At B, where
the highway had formerly run, there were not less than eight
guns and about a thousand troops under General Jarero. C
was held by Colonel Badillo with about five pieces and nearly
three hundred men. 11 E was entrusted to General La Vega
with a reserve of some five hundred grenadiers; and that
officer had charge also of a six or seven gun battery at D and
of a neighboring breastwork, parallel to the highway which
was cut at that point and completely dominating it, where
the Sixth Regiment, counting nine hundred bayonets, was
placed. In all some 3500 men, including the artillery, occupied
this wing. 14
April 17 Santa Anna transferred Robles, Cano and their
laborers to the other side of the highway. On the summit of
El Telegrafo, which commanded the entire position, there was
a level space of about an acre, and in it stood a square stone
tower. Here a breastwork, some distance back from the crest
and partly enclosing the tower, was imperfectly constructed;
four 4-pounders were planted ; all the bushes, cactus and small
trees within musket range on the slope were cut down and left
on the ground; and the Third Infantry, consisting of about
one hundred men, took possession of the summit. To the left
and rear of this point ran a spur, which rose to a minor crest
a broken ledge eighteen or twenty feet high some thirty
feet lower than the summit and about a hundred yards from it.
In the rear of all these points, close to the hamlet, lay the main
camp and strong reserves of troops and guns. To Santa Anna
the position seemed impregnable. He reported to the govern-
ment that it was completely fortified, well armed with artillery
and garrisoned with 12,000 men. 12 News from the capital
that revolutionary movements were on foot and that some-
CERRO GORDO 45
thing must be accomplished to prevent the idea of peace from
gaining currency, no longer troubled him. Confiding in his
army and his position he gave free rein to his vanity, his lord-
liness and his exultation. Here should the proud invaders be
rolled back or here under the saffron wing of the plague should
they rot. And then let domestic foes tremble ! 14
But a number of circumstances undermined him. The
narrow camp, too much crowded with cottages, tents, huts and
market booths, became confused even while there were no
hostilities. Insects kept the troops restive. The supply of
water, brought in barrels from the Rio del Plan, was insuffi-
cient, 13 and many drank the crude sap of the maguey, which
made them ill. A sort of cholera set in, and exposure pro-
duced lung troubles. Far worse, however, were the moral
distempers. Some of the troops had turned their backs to
the Americans at Palo Alto, the Resaca, Monterey and Buena
Vista, while others had recently, to their utter amazement,
seen heroic Vera Cruz and mighty Ulua, the pride of Mexico,
haul down their flags ; and men of both classes represented the
enemy as invincible. Every deserter was ordered shot, and
this interference with a popular diversion gave offence. 14
. Looking at the shaggy hills and ravines on his left, Santa
Anna declared that a rabbit could not get through there.
Perhaps not, thought many a soldier, but the Americans are
not rabbits. About seven hundred yards in front of El Tele-
grafo stood a similar though somewhat lower hill called La
Atalaya, which commanded a wide expanse of the rough country,
and the engineers felt it should be fortified and strongly held ;
but the President would merely station twenty-five men there.
Robles himself believed that Scott could turn the main position,
and wanted fortifications erected at the extreme left; but
Santa Anna would listen to no advice, and his cocksureness
itself excited alarm. In private, officers talked of a disaster,
and even Canalizo foreboded it. The tinder of a panic was
ready. 14
Meanwhile Twiggs with two field batteries, 15 six 24-pounders,
two 8-inch howitzers, four 10-inch mortars, and a squadron of
dragoons in all some 2600 men set out in the footsteps
of Cortez. 16 Most fortunately the troops had a stock of en-
thusiasm, for the beginning of the march was terrible. After
46 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
going three miles along the beach they struck off at a right
angle for six or eight on a deep, sandy road, sometimes three
or four feet below the level of the ground, with a blazing sun
overhead, not a breath of moving air, and Twiggs's horse for a
pace-maker. Many threw away everything detachable, and
the greater part of the division at least four fifths, it was
said fell by the way. Some died, and many others did not
rejoin the command for days. Unbroken mules and drivers
ignorant of their business added to the difficulties. The
meagre facilities for transportation did not permit even officers
to have tents, and some of the scanty supplies were lost through
the breaking down of wagons. 19
The next day, happily, a change took place. The column
set out before sunrise, marched more slowly, and halted oc-
casionally; and the national highway, no longer buried in
sand, proved to be a spacious, comfortably graded cement
avenue, carried over the streams by handsome bridges of cut
stone, and flanked on both sides by the estates of Santa Anna. 17
Now it penetrated a dark forest of palms, cactus, limes and
countless other trees festooned with vines, and now it crossed
rolling prairies. Here it was cut through solid rock; here it
skirted a beautiful hill, with a charming vista of leafy glades ;
and presently it was clinging as if in terror to the face of a cliff.
Bowers carpeted with many soft hues and perfumed with
heliotrope recalled ideas of Eden, while marshes full of strange
bloated growths, bluish-green pools rimmed with flowers of a
suspicious brilliancy, and thick clumps of dagger plants tipped
with crimson offered suggestions of a different sort. 19
Matted tangles of leafage spattered with gold, big tulipans
gleaming in the shadows like a red rose in the hair of a Spanish
dancer, blossoms like scarlet hornets that almost flew at one's
eyes, and blooms like red-hot hair-brushes, the sight of which
made the scalp tingle, were balanced with big, close masses
of white throats and purple mouths, and with banks of the
greenish- white cuatismilla, discharging invisible clouds of a
fragrance that seemed to be locust blended with lily of the
valley. Trees with tops like balloons, like corkscrews and
like tables, trees drained almost dry by starry parasites that
swung from their branches, trees covered with strawberry
blossoms or what appeared to be strawberry blossoms
TWIGGS'S ADVANCE 47
that were to graduate into coffee beans, trees bare of every-
thing except great yellow suns, the Flower of God, that fasci-
nated one's gaze these and countless other surprises followed
one another ; and then would come a whole grove netted over
with morning glories in full bloom. Amid scenes like these our
exhausted troops quickly regained their spirits. 19
Toward the end of the march on the eleventh, when about
thirty-seven miles from Vera Cruz, the troops crossed a branch
of the Antigua, and soon came to the river itself. In the
triangular space thus bounded rose a hill crowned with an old
fort. 18 Here stood the national bridge, a magnificent structure
more than fifty feet high and nearly a quarter of a mile in length,
commanding romantic views of the rapid stream winding
through towering vistas of luxuriant vegetation. On leaving
the bridge the road made a sharp turn to the left at the foot of a
high and very steep bluff ; and it seemed as if a battery planted
at the top of the bluff, as La Vega's had been, might stop an
army until overpowered with siege guns. But Canalizo had
been wiser than his chief, for there were fords above and below
and cross-roads in the rear, that made it possible to turn the
position. So amidst a wondrous illumination from glow-
worms and fireflies, the troops made their third camp here
in peace. 19
Beyond this point the influence of Canalizo could be seen.
The bamboo huts thatched with palm-leaves were all vacant
and empty. Scarcely one living creature could be seen except
flitting birds. These, however, still abounded : parrots, ma-
caws, hawks, eagles, orioles, humming-birds, mocking-birds,
cardinals brighter than cardinals, cranes larger than cranes,
talkative chachalacas, toucans as vociferous as their bills were
huge every color from indigo to scarlet, and every note
from the scream to the warble ; and the same ocean of green
still rolled its vast billows, warmed and brightened by the
same golden sun. 19
At the end of this march, about thirteen miles from the
national bridge, the highway narrowed and pitched down a
long, steep, winding descent, with overhanging trees and rocks
on one side and a precipice on the other, as if making for the
centre of the globe. Then it crossed Rio del Plan, and came to
a small, irregular opening, where a few scattered huts could be
48 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
seen. This was Plan del Rio. Views of superb heights de-
lighted the eye, but the hot breath of the coast could be felt
in the valley. Even the hollows between the sand-hills of
Vera Cruz were thought less pestilential. But the men lay
down, and, as a soldier wrote, covered themselves with the
sky. 19 '.
In the midst of scenery like this, "Old Davy" Twiggs ap-
peared like a perfectly natural feature. His robust and capa-
cious body, powerful shoulders, bull-neck, heavy, cherry-red
face, and nearly six feet of erect stature represented physical
energy at its maximum. With bristling white hair and, when
the regulations did not interfere, a thick white beard, he seemed
like a kind of snow-clad volcano, a human ^Etna, pouring forth
a red-hot flood of orders and objurgations from his crater of a
mouth ; and he was vastly enjoyed by the rough soldiers even
when, as they said, he "cursed them right out of their boots."
In a more strictly human aspect he made an excellent disci-
plinarian, and he could get more work out of the men than
anybody else in the army; but as a warrior, while he always
looked thirsty for a fight, he was thought over-anxious to fight
another day to be, in short, a hero of the future instead of
the past ; and as a general, Scott had already said that he was
not qualified " to command an army either in the presence,
or in the absence of an enemy." His brains were, in fact,
merely what happened to be left over from the making of his
spinal cord, and the soldiers' names for him the "Horse"
and the " Bengal Tiger" classed him fairly as regarded
intellect. 20
Twiggs had been warned by Scott that a substantial army,
commanded by Santa Anna, lay in his front; lancers were
encountered on April 11; and a reconnaissance of that after-
noon, made because the enemy were said to be in force just
ahead, proved that guns commanded the pass of Cerro Gordo ;
yet the next morning he advanced in the usual marching order.
Nothing saved his division but the eagerness of the Mexicans.
They opened fire before he was entirely within the jaws of
death, and he managed to retreat extricating his train with
difficulty, however. The enemy have given up and withdrawn,
boasted Santa Anna, while the Americans felt ashamed. Further
reconnoitring on that day gave a still more impressive idea of
DISCOURAGEMENT 49
the problem ahead ; but the General, as if intoxicated by hold-
ing an independent command, ordered an assault made at
daybreak the next morning. The Volunteer Division, consist-
ing at present of two brigades, a f.eld battery and a squadron
of cavalry, then arrived. Patterson, who led it, seemed,
however, by no means eager to accept the responsibility of
command, and, as no confidence whatever was felt in Pillow,
the second in rank, he placed the entire force under Twiggs
on the ground of illness. Pillow and Shields, who were thought
no less willing than Twiggs to make a bid for glory at the
expense of their men, then demanded a day for rest and prepara-
tion ; and accordingly, about sunset on the thirteenth, orders
for the attack were issued. 20
But the officers and sold'ers, distrusting alike the informa-
tion and the ability of their commander, now felt extremely
depressed. The situation appeared hopeless, thought even
Lieutenant U. S. Grant ; and Captain Robert E. Lee descr'bed
the Mexican position as an "unscalable" precipice on one side
and "impassiHe" ravines on the other. It seemed, wrote
a third man, like a Gibraltar ; and the idea of assailing it w th
Twiggs for leader inspired the deepest alarm. Everybody
not selfishly ambitious desired to wait for the commander-
in-chief ; and yet Polk, in order to justify his depreciat'on of
Scott, said with reference to this very s'tuation, that our forces
wou'd be victorious " if there was not an officer among
them." Suddenly, however, the faces of the men brooding
round their bivouac fires lighted up, for news came that
Patterson, in order to veto the project of Tw : ggs, had assumed
the command, and ordered offensive operations to be sus-
pended. 20
Scott, whose ideas of an army differed radically from those
prevalent in Mexico, hard'y believed that Santa Anna could
place himself below Jalapa at this time with as many as 4000
men, even though reports of a larger number reached him;
but he arranged to drop his work at Vera Cruz on the first news
of serous opposition, and 'etters from Twiggs and Pillow, re-
ceived late on Apr'l 11 led him to set out the next day. Early
on Wednesday afternoon, the 14th, he was at Plan del Rio,
doffing his oM straw hat as the soldiers, who doubtless realized
that in taking Vera Cruz by siege instead of assault he had
VOL. n E
50 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
spared their lives, cheered tumultuously. Instantly chaos
became order, confidence reigned, and the jealous clashes of
the commanders ended. Now something will be done, thought
the officers ; the soldiers began to laugh and whistle ; and what
an officer called a "hum of satisfaction" pervaded the camp.
Already the battle was half gained. 23
Engineers Beauregard and Tower had by this time done
some reconnoitring, and, as indeed would have been fairty
obvious to any intelligent person, had concluded that a turn-
ing movement against the Mexican left toward which a
trail had been found to lead offered the best hope. But an
idea was not a plan. The reconnaissances were far from com-
plete, and reports upon the Mexican position and numbers
differed materially. Hence the commander-in-chief, who
accepted everything valuable done by his subordinates but
never surrendered his own judgment, decided to begin anew,
and, in the hope of gaining the highway in Santa Anna's rear
and cutting oft* his entire army, sent Captain Lee at once to
the ravines. 21 Friday that indefatigable engineer found him-
self in contact with the Mexican lines far to the rear of El
Telegrafo. Reconnoitring could go no farther, and the high-
way toward Jalapa was not actually seen ; but there were good
reasons for believing it near, and the! construction of a "road"
for troops and artillery on the route discovered by Lee was
pressed with great energy. At about 9 o'clock on Friday
evening all the facts and conclusions were brought together in
a plan by Major John L. Smith, senior engineer on the ground,
and in substance his plan was adopted. Its essential point
was, in accordance with Scott's announced aim, to gain the
highway in the Mexican rear first of all, and then not until
then attack in the rear and perhaps also on the front. 22 After
the adjournment of this conference the army was further
cheered by the arrival of Worth, 1600 picked men and a num-
ber of heavy guns. The Mexican forces were estimated as
12-18,000, and Scott had only 8500; but the bright stars of
that night looked down on an army sleeping soundly in full
courage and confidence. 23
At seven or eight o'clock the next morning Twiggy advanced.
His instructions were to avoid a collision, occupy La Atalaya,
reach the Mexican left, and rest on his arms near the highway
PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS
51
until the remainder of the army should be in position, and the
time for acting decisively should arrive. Accordingly, after
marching about three miles along the highway he turned off
to the right by the road already cut, ordering the men to trail
arms and preserve absolute silence. At one point the road
lay for twenty-five or thirty feet in view of the enemy, and
Lee proposed to screen it with brush. But this appeared to
Twiggs quite unnecessary, and hence the Mexicans could ob-
serve not only the troops but four mountain howitzers, four
6-pounders, and two 12-pounders gleaming in the sun. Pinzon
BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO
CENTRAL PART OF THE FIELD
Scale of Feet
and also the outpost on La Atalaya notified Santa Anna of
the American movement, and strong reinforcements were
therefore despatched to that hill. 26
Twiggs advanced but slowly, for the road hewed in the
roughest way through oaks, mesquite, chaparral, cactus and
the like and over almost impassable ground could barely
answer its purpose, but about noonday the command found
itself in the vicinity of La Atalaya. Lieutenant Gardner of
the Seventh Infantry was then directed to ascend a neighbor-
ing hill with Company E, and take an observation of the
enemy. He was attacked; upon which Colonel Harney, now
commanding Twiggs's first brigade in place of Persifor F.
52 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
Smith, who was ill, sent forces to relieve him, pursued the
Mexicans to La Atalaya with the Mounted Rifles, First Ar-
tillery and other troops, and after a stiff combat occupied that
point. 26
One of the captains for on such ground independence of
action was unavoidable inquired of Twiggs how far to
charge the enemy. "Charge 'em to hell!" roared the Bengal
Tiger; and naturally enough a small American force rushed
down the farther slope of La Atalaya and began to ascend
El Telegrafo. It was then in a desperate situation, exposed
to the cannon of the Mexicans and to overwhelming numbers.
A party of Americans under Major Sumner, which bravely
hastened to its relief, succeeded only in sharing its plight.
But happily cover was found; a howitzer discouraged the
enemy ; and later this group was able to retire. La Atalaya
remained in American hands despite attempts to recover it;
but the Mexicans had been fully warned, and our troops were
not lying on their arms near the Jalapa route. Meantime or
soon Shields's brigade came to the support of Twiggs, who
now had control of nearly 5000 men. The casualties amounted
to about ninety on our side and more than two hundred on
the other; but the Mexicans, whose operations had been
directed by Santa Anna himself, believed the Americans had
seriously attacked El Telegrafo, and exulted loudly with shouts
and music over what seemed to them a triumph. 26
Santa Anna did not yet believe, or would not admit, that
Scott's main drive would be aimed against his left, but he
recognized the wisdom of strengthening that wing. He there-
fore ordered a breastwork, which was made of short palisades
reinforced behind with stones and brush, to be thrown up near
the base of El Telegrafo, placed a couple of 12-pounders, the
Second Ligero and the Fourth Line regiments on the summit,
selected brave Ciriaco Vazquez to command there, planted
five guns on a slight eminence near headquarters to guard the
mouth of a wooded ravine on the left, had the ground in front
of this battery partly cleared, and ordered the Eleventh regi-
ment and Canalizo's cavalry to support the guns. The Ameri-
cans were not less active. By dint of extraordinary exertions
General Shields's brigade, assisted by other troops, dragged a
24-pounder and two 24-pound howitzers with ropes through
THE BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO 53
the woods and rocky gorges, pulled them up the steep and bris-
tling side of La Atalaya, mounted them, and constructed a
parapet for them and the rocket battery; and with perhaps
even greater difficulty four New York companies placed an
8-inch howitzer on the farther side of Rio del Plan over against
the tongues, A, B and C. Darkness and rain did not facilitate
these operations. 26
Sunday morning the sky was clear, a gentle breeze from the
Gulf just fluttered the red, white and green flag on the stone
tower, and the Mexican trumpets blared in all directions.
Soon the guns of La Atalaya solemnly announced the battle,
producing consternation at first on the summit of El Telegrafo ;
but the pieces were badly aimed, and accomplished little beyond
encouraging the Americans and calling forth a vigorous reply. 24
The Second Infantry and Fourth Artillery under Brevet
Colonel Riley of Twiggs's division now moved on toward
Santa Anna's rear and the Jalapa route, supported by the
brigade of Shields, which included the New York regiment and
the Third and Fourth Illinois. Learning of this activity in
the valley, General Vazquez ordered Colonel Uraga with the
Fourth Infantry and a 4-pounder to the minor crest of El
Telegrafo, and as Riley crossed the continuation of the spur he
was much annoyed by their fire. Four companies of the
Second Infantry were therefore detached as skirmishers, and
before long, in spite of Scott's orders and the protest of Lee,
who was conducting Riley's command, Twiggs, pawing the
ground somewhere out of range, ordered Riley's whole brigade
up the hill. Shields, however, proceeded along the route dis-
covered by Lee. The ground was rough and precipitous, and
the growth .of trees and thorny chaparral dense; but the
General a stout, soldier-like man with a heavy mustache,
black hair and brilliant dark eyes had a great deal of energy,
and in three straggling files his men pushed on. 26
During the artillery duel Harney's command lay under cover
on the summit of La Atalaya, listening to the harsh, bitter
shriek of the Mexican grape, which tore the bushes into shreds ;
but at about 7 o'clock a charge upon El Telegrafo was ordered. 25
As the troops measured the height, crowned with guns and
fortifications and topped off with a scornful banner, the attempt
seemed almost impudent; but that was the day's work, and
54 THE WAR" WITH MEXICO
it had to be done. First the "cursed Riflemen," as the Mexi-
cans named them, were diverted to the left, where the Mexican
Sixth Infantry could be seen approaching ; the bugles sounded ;
and then the Third and the Seventh Infantry, supported by the
First Artillery, dashed down the slope of La Atalaya. Here
and in the valley they were swept by a deadly shower of bullets,
canister and grape, and the front melted like snowflakes ; but,
as fearless Captain Roberts of the Rifles put it, " When dangers
thickened and death talked more familiarly face to face, the
men seemed to rise above every terror." The contest at the
palisade breastwork was hard, and the Mexicans dared even
to cross bayonets with Americans; but they finally gave way.
Here a little time was taken for rest, and then forward pressed
the troops, helping themselves up the slope, over craggy rocks
and loose stones, and through the chaparral by catching at
bushes and trees. The screen of woods and the steepness of
the incline protected them now. 26
Very different proved the cleared part of the hill, where
small trees, bushes and thorny cactus lay spread with tops
pointing down. Here progress was slow and concealment
impossible. But with deliberate fearlessness the men plodded
firmly on, firing at will, strong in that mutual confidence which
gives a charge its force. They "seem to despise death," cried
the Mexicans in astonishment. Here and there one was struck
down; here and there, breathless and exhausted, one dropped;
but no flinching could be seen. Like the wave of fire in a burn-
ing prairie, the line moved steadily up. "Charge, charge!"
shouted the officers ; and the men yelled and cheered, yelled
and cheered, yelled and cheered till sometimes it seemed as if
even the trees were cheering, till sometimes the roar of the guns
could not be heard ; and Harney red-headed, tempestuous
Harney of the steel-blue eyes at last in his element, led them
as they deserved to be led. Superbly tall, his athletic figure
needed no plume ; the sword in his long arm waved them on ;
like the keen edge of a billow rushing upon the shore his calm,
shrill voice rode the tumult. 26
Just below the crest a pause for breath ; and then the blue
stripe was up and over. At the breastwork the fighting was
sharp, for Santa Anna had sent up two more regiments; but
soon Vazquez fell ; with pistols, bayonets and clubbed muskets
THE BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO 55
the Mexicans were driven from the summit ; and in a moment
big Sergeant Henry of the Seventh had the Stars and Stripes
flying from the tower. Riley's men, pushing up through dense
thickets under a hot fire, had now taken possession of the spur ;
and while some of them hurried on to join Harney, others shot
down the gunners of the battery on the summit. In a twinkling
Captain Magruder turned the pieces, and poured a storm of
iron on the flying Mexicans. General Baneneli, commanding
the reserve just below, tried hard to charge, but his men would
not face the yelling Americans. The Grenadiers and the
Eleventh Infantry, hurried by Santa Anna in that direction,
were overwhelmed by the fugitives; Riley's advance plunged
down the hill toward the Mexican camp ; and an indescribable
confusion ensued. 26
Just at this time, after a fearful march of perhaps two miles,
Shields with his foremost companies emerged from the chaparral
on the Mexican left, and hastily prepared to charge. Three
guns of the headquarters battery, one hundred and fifty or
two hundred yards distant in their front, had been turned upon
Riley, but the other two let fly at them. Shields fell and his
men recoiled. It was no wonder. About three hundred raw
volunteers, without regulars and without artillery, stood before
cannon and an army ! Some two thousand fresh horse under
Canalizo, guarding that very ravine, faced them just at the
left of the battery, and the cannon kept at work. But their
mere emerging from the close chaparral at this point, in a
strength which the enemy could not measure, was of itself a
triumph. 26
"The Yankees! They have come out to the road!" cried
the Mexicans; "Every one for himself!" Some of Riley's
men shot down or frightened away the gunners of the battery,
and in another moment seized three of the pieces. At the
same instant a section of Shields's brigade, which had now come
up in more force, captured the other two, while a second section,
followed by the Seventh Infantry, struck for the highway.
Canalizo, afraid of being cut off, took flight, as many had
already done ; and all the rest of the Mexicans who could, either
followed him or, like Santa Anna himself, rushed headlong
down one or the other of two paths, narrow and steep, that
descended into the canyon of the Rio del Plan. Scott, who
56 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
had watched the charge "under a canopy of balls," as Major
Patten said, was now on the scene. Harney, his old foe, he
greeted in the warmest and friendliest of terms; and, as he
moved among the victorious troops with tears rolling down his
cheeks, he spoke to them noble and touching words, as not
merely their commander but their elder brother in arms, fully
sharing their pains, their pride and their joy. 26
While these brave scenes were enacted, the other flank wit-
nessed a burlesque of war. Naturally Scott planned to attack
the Mexican right in order to deceive Santa Anna regarding
his intentions, prevent the troops of that wing from going to
the assistance of the other, and perhaps accomplish something
positive in that quarter. 27 This piece of work was assigned
to Pillow's brigade, and although he objected to it as dangerous,
a hint about discipline brought him into line. As early as April
13, in view of Twiggs's plan, he and Lieutenant Tower of the
engineers had reconnoitred the ground, and this examination
had been continued on the fifteenth and sixteenth ; but the
General did not understand or did not remember what he saw.
It was clear, however, that a force attacking between A and
the canyon would have the enemy on but one side, and would
be as far as possible from the guns occupying B and C. With
Scott's approval this plan was adopted, and the 8-inch howitzer
was placed so as to command the flank and rear of the battery
at A 29
Pillow's orders were to set out on his march of about four
miles at 6 o'clock on Sunday morning, yet he did not reach his
position until almost 9. One reason for the delay probably
was, that in consequence of a manoeuvre, executed by his
order, the rear of the column missed the proper route. Another
reason also may be surmised. Aside from wanting confidence
in their general's military capacity, his troops had long dis-
liked him ; and his display of unfeeling harshness on the march
from Vera Cruz had given further offence. Under such cir-
cumstances things never can go well. 29
During the march he announced that he had changed his
mind, and would have the First Pennsylvania (Wynkoop)
supported by the First Tennessee (Campbell) attack on the
northern face of tongue A, and the Second Tennessee (Haskell)
supported by the Second Pennsylvania (Roberts) attack on
THE BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO 57
the southern face of B, which was obviously sure since it
guarded the old road to be held more strongly than either
of the other tongues. 28 This ingenious plan, moreover, divided
the American while tending to concentrate the Mexican strength.
By mismanagement he reversed both of his attacking regiments
a mistake that caused embarrassment and loss of time ; and
then on leaving the highway, about three miles from Plan del
Rio, and entering the narrow path leading to the point of
attack, he adopted this order : Wynkoop, Haskell, Campbell,
Roberts, which since it was necessary to advance mostly
in single file placed Campbell and Roberts a long distance
from the troops that each was to support, so that neither of
them reached his position before the fighting on this wing
ended. 29
On arriving at the appointed spot, where the orders of Mexi-
can officers at B could be heard very distinctly, Haskell began
to form his badly scattered regiment. "Why the Hell don't
Colonel Wynkoop file to the right?" shouted Pillow at the top
of his voice. A bugle in the front sounded instantly, and
within three minutes the Mexicans opened a heavy fire of grape
and canister. Some of Haskell's men, brave but not in hand,
bolted ; others took shelter ; and the rest, at Pillow's order,
charged pell-mell. Emerging into the cleared space they re-
ceived a murderous fire from all of the tongues. In less than
three minutes about eighty, including every field officer except
the colonel, were either killed or wounded, and all able to move
were in flight. Pillow meanwhile, squatting in the bushes with
his back to the enemy at a distance of about 450 yards, was
"shot all to pieces," as he said, by a canister bullet that slightly
wounded his upper arm ; and he retired at a run, leaving Wyn-
koop without the promised instructions. 29
A state of general confusion ensued. Campbell and his men
were anxious to charge; Wynkoop felt no less eager when it
was too late ; the Second Pennsylvania was demoralized ; all
were more or less under fire. Campbell, however, to whom
Pillow resigned the command, got the men almost ready to
charge upon tongue A ; but then Pillow, venturing back from
the rear, withdrew his brigade so far into the woods that, until
notified by Scott, he did not know the Mexicans in his front,
who found their rear was occupied by the Americans, had
58 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
surrendered. As for the 8-inch howitzer, it fired seven in-
effective shells; and then, at the critical time, as Pillow had
neglected to arrange a code of signals, Ripley, who controlled
it, suspended work. Evidently, as Polk said, gallant Ameri-
cans and such Pillow's men really were did not require
a commander ! 2S
A little before 10 o'clock the fighting was over and pursuit
began. Having little cavalry and no adequate subsistence
train Scott's powers in this respect were limited; but every
man had been expected to set out in the morning with rations
for two days, and substantially all the troops except Pillow's,
accompanied by two incomplete batteries, moved actively
forward. Patterson once more became well enough to act, and
took charge of the advanced forces. Frequently bands of
fugitives were seen at a distance, looking in their cotton or linen
jackets like flocks of sheep. The artillery had some fair long
shots, and occasionally other troops also came within reach of
the enemy. But the Mexicans fled even the cavalry
without stopping for ceremony, too much cowed to face even
a small party of Americans ; and the results were of little sig-
nificance. 31
Heat and exhaustion checked the most advanced pursuers
about four miles from Jalapa, but nothing could stop the
Mexicans. Like stampeded cattle, the fugitives thought only
of flying until worn out. No stand was made at Jalapa.
At La Hoya, the second line of defence, General Gomez, hear-
ing of the disaster, sent word to the rear, "All is lost at Cerro
Gordo, all, all!" and fled. In complete disorder, panting,
starving, falling by the way the horses of the cavalry in a
like state the men streamed on toward Puebla, plundering
when they could. Thousands also of those who surrendered
managed to escape at one place or another in the rough, wooded
country, and, as Scott could with difficulty feed his own army
and thought future opposition could be weakened by proving
the friendly sentiments of his proclamation, the remaining
3000 were released on parole. 30 More than 4000 stand of arms,
old and not worth using, were destroyed ; and about forty
cannon, which Scott had no means of transporting, were
rendered unserviceable and left at Cerro Gordo. The Mexican
casualties were estimated at 1000 or 1200, while the American
JALAPA OCCUPIED 59
loss during the two days amounted to only thirty officers and
387 men, of whom sixty-four were killed. 31
Next morning the Americans advanced again. For the two
last miles below Jalapa the highway ran between continuous
hedges loaded with blossoms and vocal with the songs of birds,
while bougainvillea flamed here and there on a cabin or tree-top
in a conflagration of purple, and the air was laden with de-
licious perfumes; and when the town was descried from an
eminence, it seemed like a delicate mosaic set in a massive
frame of rich emerald. Friends had been left behind forever,
but grief was offset by the joy of surviving ; and after dressing
ranks the troops began to enter Jalapa at about 9 o'clock with
bayonets fixed, colors flying and bands playing. Some of the
girls could not help laughing at the unkempt appearance and
nondescript costumes of the terrible and victorious Yankees;
but the people, who lined the streets, appeared neither hostile
nor afraid, and the bells rang out a welcome. 32 The soldiers
for their part soon felt they had reached Eden, and they were
none the less content on hearing of the dull saffron haze which
now hung over Vera Cruz a visible token that " King Death
in his Yellow Robe" had once more set up his throne there;
while Scott himself, wishing to tranquillize the army and
favorably impress the public, proceeded to hide the errors of
his subordinates with reports that misled the public. 33 As
for the future he cheerfully announced, "Mexico has no longer
an army." Apparently the United States had a very substan-
tial one ; but surprises were soon to occur. 34
XXIV
PUEBLA
April-August,- 1847
WISHING to take advantage of the Mexican panic, Scott
hurried Worth's division after the fugitives. Down the steep
hill on which Jalapa lies poured the men in blue, passing the
little plaza and the quaint cathedral ; and then without halt,
leaving the city of flowers and its groves of liquidambar, they
set out on a long, gradual ascent. What a march they now
had! "The most beautiful country there is," commented an
officer; and his remark was truer than he knew. Dominated
by the splendid snowy peak of Orizaba, there spread a vast
expanse of hills and gorges, mountains and valleys, here studded
with white villages, there gemmed with a silver cascade, yonder
brightened with fresh fields of corn and grain, always variegated
with the shadows of lazy clouds, and everywhere softly receding
into a deeper and still deeper blue ; and as the column wound
in and out through the clear, cool and fragrant atmosphere,
every turn revealed new beauties or displayed once more the
beauties already seen only a little nearer each time, or a little
more remote. 1
Gradually the ascent grew sharper and the air cooler, and
about a dozen miles from Jalapa Worth came to the Black Pass
the "terrible pass," wrote Scott of La Hoy a, where for
more than a mile the troops were squeezed between two steep
mountains, cleared to afford artillery a fair sweep, and partly
fortified ; but the seven or eight guns lay on the ground spiked,
and not an enemy could be seen. Then after making a sharp
twist they kept on winding and ascending for about six miles
till they reached the log houses of Las Vigas, much like those
of Russia and Sweden. Vegetation was luxuriant still; but
the trees on the steep hills at the left were evergreens, and the
flowers that brightened the overtowering walls, buttresses and
60
THE ADVANCE FROM JALAPA
61
JALAPA TO PUEBLA
Las Vigas
spurting arches of black lava were mostly dandelions and yellow
jarilla, for the Americans now stood a mile and a half above
the sea and almost three quarters of a mile above Jalapa.
Here the winds bit ; and now and then masses of thick vapor,
whirling up from an immense gorge and burying the column for a
time in wintry twilight, would sweep on ahead of it in rolling,
shining volumes of heaven-high clouds. 1
This was the final pass; and after marching some twelve
miles farther, one saw at the left edge of a sandy, gravelly plain,
set with occasional tufts of coarse grass, the dust-brown castle
of Perote and, seemingly just above it though in reality several
miles distant, the pine-clad mountain of that name. The
castle was a superb specimen of military architecture, capable
of accommodating more than 2000 men ; but it had long served
chiefly as a state prison, a
refuge for troops, an arsenal,
and a depot for the rich
convoys that went this way.
The American troops could
have passed by on the other
side of the plain, had that
been necessary; but it was
not. With only twenty-three
gunners and scarcely any
powder, General Gaona could
not have defended the place. Canalizo therefore ordered him
to evacuate it on the nineteenth ; and at noon on the twenty-
second Worth took possession of its elaborate bastions, more
than fifty cannon, more than 25,000 balls and shells and even
500 muskets, which the terror-stricken Mexicans had not cared
to remove. Throwing Garland's brigade and Duncan's battery
about fifteen miles in advance to facilitate the gathering of
subsistence, Worth now halted in accordance with his orders. 1
Scott meantime remained at Jalapa to study his problems
and make his preparations. The capital of Mexico, he be-
lieved, lay at his mercy, and this opinion seems to have been
correct; but unlike his critics, who merely had to deal with
legions of ink on areas of paper, he found that much needed
to be done before seizing it. The position of the Americans
depended vitally on military prestige, and it was therefore
62
THE WAR WITH MEXICO
Puebla
Orizaba Ht.
of the utmost importance to suffer
no reverse. His first care was to
make sure of getting up in advance
of the especially fatal rainy season,
which was expected to begin at the
latest by the first week of June,
the needful clothing, equipments,
ammunition, salt, medicines and
many other imported articles ; and
since the lack of cavalry and a due
regard for the health of the troops
forbade trying to keep the road
below Cerro Gordo clear of Mexi-
cans, this tedious work involved the
use of heavily escorted convoys, 2
and the exercise of unceasing vigil-
ance, energy and skill. 6
His next care was to gather pro-
visions, determine whether supplies
of breadstuffs, meats, rice, beans,
coffee, sugar and forage existed near
the proposed line of march, and
arrange for obtaining them despite
the hatred of the people, which
quite equalled their fear. 3 A third
care was to divine what Santa
Anna intended and was able to do,
for news came that he was now on
our flank and rear, preparing to
conduct guerilla war against the
American detachments and convoys.
Contrary to his expectation Scott
found subsistence and- forage scarce
at Jalapa, and as Quitman's brigade
came up without the extra rations
it had been ordered to bring, the
situation proved embarrassing. A
scarcity of funds aggravated it
alarmingly. An immediate advance
upon the capital was therefore out of
SCOTT'S DIFFICULTIES 63
the question ; but on April 30 Scott issued preliminary instruc-
tions, enjoining kind treatment of the people in the strongest
possible terms, as absolutely necessary if the troops did not
wish to starve ; and the volunteers were ordered to set out on
the fourth and fifth of May. 6
But now a difficulty that had been feared by Scott rose
directly in his path. Seven regiments and two companies of
volunteers were to be free at various near dates, averaging
about the middle of June. Polk, believing that many would
reenlist, had recommended that a bounty should be offered
as an inducement, and Congress had acted upon the suggestion.
April 26 General Scott received the law and promptly circulated
it ; but he soon found that Folk's expectations were to be dis-
appointed. 6
It would have been quite agreeable to linger at Jalapa,
strolling about this paradise of birds, gazing at the many-hued
blossoms of a perpetual springtime, feasting on the delicacies
of semi-tropical gardens, winning occasional glimpses of exotic
luxury through doors ajar, listening to ever-graceful senoritas
a few dazzling blondes as well as many sparkling brunettes
who played the guitar hour after hour in their grated win-
dows, and catching glances now and then from eyes of fire ;
but the soldiers had learned what campaigning really meant.
They had been allowed to go unpaid and unprovided for. They
had met with hardships and privations not counted upon at
the time of enlistment. Disease, battle, death, fearful toil
and frightful marches had been found realities. Besides, they
had now "seen the elephant," as they said ; they felt they had
won glory enough; and, as even Colonel Campbell admitted,
they "sighed heavily" for home, family and friends. In spite
of their strong desire to see the Halls of the Montezumas, out
of about 3700 men only enough to make one company would
reengage, and special inducements, offered by the General,
to remain as teamsters proved wholly ineffective. 6
One course now open to Scott was to march on, trusting that
new forces would arrive seasonably to replace the soldiers dis-
charged; but of this he had no assurance. Another was to
assume that even when legally free the volunteers would not
abandon him in the enemy's capital; but the evidence was
all to the contrary. More than once American troops had in-
64' THE WAR WITH MEXICO
sisted upon their rights without considering the needs of the
country ; and now five colonels declared in writing that " only
a very small proportion" of their men would "under any
supposable circumstances" remain in the service "for any time
whatever" beyond their term. Such was the sentiment of all
these volunteers. 6
Moreover, to advance, capture Mexico and so force the men
to sail from Vera Cruz in the midst of the pestilential season
would have been insubordinate as well as inhumane, for the
government had ordered most emphatically, with particular
reference to the yellow fever, that regard for their health must
outweigh all military considerations. 4 The returning volunteers
would also have been exposed, under inexperienced commanders
and without a proper complement of artillery, to Santa Anna
and the guerillas, and those remaining behind at the capital
would have been regarded by the Mexicans as destined prey.
On the other hand, should the entire army retreat after captur-
ing Mexico, the exultant people would have risen almost en
masse to starve, harass and slaughter them ; while even Worth
doubted whether Scott's whole force, could it by any pos-
sibility be persuaded to remain intact, would be strong enough
to hold the capital. Finally, as the sequel was to show and
as any well-informed person could have foreseen, merely captur-
ing and retaining Mexico City was not sure by any means to
end the war. The seat of government could easily move, and
Scott was correctly informed that it proposed to do so. Santa
Anna was in the field with a growing army; his moral and
physical resources had not been exhausted ; and more fighting
needed to be done. 6
Scott was called slow by some of his critics, but when the case
permitted he could make a quick decision ; and on the sixth
and seventh of May the volunteers referred to " with a
joyous and pleasant countenance upon every man," as one of
them wrote set out for home under Patterson. 5 Their
departure left the General with an army of 7113. As for early
reinforcements, he had recommended on November 29 the
addition of twelve regiments to the regular establishment, and
had said that about the first of May they would be indispen-
sable ; but at present he only knew that 960 recruits were on
the way. None the less he sent Quitman forward with three
MEXICAN ASSISTANCE 65
regiments of November volunteers, and on the sixth of May
instructed Worth to advance with his division and two of
those regiments, led by Quitman, against Puebla, leaving the
third regiment with a sufficient number of artillerists at Perote. 6
For the confidence with which less than 4000 men were thus
advanced beyond the reach of prompt assistance, to cope with
a strong city and the Mexican troops, there was a special
reason. The heads of the Roman Catholic Church in Mexico,
who did not feel all the religious intolerance which they deemed
it proper to exhibit in public, cherished no love toward Santa
Anna. For many years his rapacity had given them offence;
and one of his first acts on landing at Vera Cruz in August,
1846, had been to strike at their power. They had therefore felt
disposed to favor the continuance of hostilities, hoping that he
and his myrmidons would be destroyed. But when Moses
Y. Beach made it plain to them on the one hand that resistance
to the United States would be dangerous, and on the other
guaranteed the freedom and the property of Church and citizens,
they decided to support our efforts in behalf of peace, work
against Santa Anna as the chief obstacle, and arrange secretly
to have Jalapa, Perote, Puebla and Mexico City refrain from
opposing Scott. 8
At "unconquered Puebla," which was more fully under the
domination of the Church than any other Mexican town, circum-
stances favored the clerical design. Terrible stories had been
circulated there about the Americans. They were barbarians,
vandals, tigers; they had branded and sent across the Gulf
into slavery shiploads of Tampico people, and stuck little
children on their bayonets at Vera Cruz. But these tales had
now lost all credibility. Santa Anna had been found out.
Buena Vista no longer seemed a Mexican victory. The military
caste was not only hated but despised. News had come that
wherever the Americans took possession, odious taxes were
abolished and trade became brisk. Scott's treatment of the
people shone in comparison with Santa Anna's, and his soldiers
looked . angelic beside the guerillas. The defeat at Cerro
Gordo caused not only deep discouragement but even deeper
disgust, for the men and money of the state had been sacrificed
to the incompetence of the commanders. Besides, marvels
were told of the Americans. They could hew a man asunder
VOL. II F
66 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
at one stroke ; their horses were gigantic and incredibly swift ;
their artillery was unspeakably terrible ; and every one of their
bullets might split into fifty pieces, each of the pieces fatal.
Worth's division included 5000 of these warriors, an American
deserter stated. 8
With such popular support the clericals had Isunza, who was
closely connected with them, put in place of the vigorous
Ibarra as governor, and he not only took a stand for non-resist-
ance, but answered the appeals of the national government
with sharp complaints. Instead of preaching against the
Americans, the churchmen led pious processions about the
streets, to show that prayer and not the arm of flesh was to be
relied upon. The arms and ammunition were sent away for
safe-keeping. The governor would supply no funds for military
purposes. "Reason prohibits vain sacrifices," he remarked.
The comandante general decided that the city could not be
defended. The prefect ordered that after the arrival of the
Americans, not more than three citizens were to meet in public,
and that none should carry arms; while the ayuntamiento
announced that no unsigned placards would be tolerated.
"Men are not all called to play the role of heroes," observed
the Monitor del Pueblo. We can only "await with resignation
the terrible blow with which Providence chooses to afflict us,"
decided the city authorities. All the arrangements are com-
plete, Worth was notified by headquarters on the tenth of May.
The people are waiting for you, reported foreigners from
Puebla. 8
Scott, for his part, agreed to protect the citizens and espe-
cially the Church, and he put forth on the eleventh of May a
proclamation called by him "the crowning act of conciliation,"
which was drawn up under his direction by a representative of
the bishop of Puebla, and embodied the ideas and sentiments
deemed by the leaders of the clerical party most likely to be
effective. 7 The oppression under which the people of Mexico
lay crushed received in this proclamation brief but vivid treat-
ment, distrust regarding Santa Anna's abilities, honor and aims
was excited, and the Americans were represented as true
brethren of the Mexicans. Paredes, an unpatriotic usurper,
had forced us to take up arms in behalf of republican insti-
tutions and the welfare of the whole continent, as well as for
SANTA ANNA'S MEASURES 67
the maintenance of our proper dignity ; but we were anxious
now as ever, to live in peace and friendship with Mexico, even
though determined, if the war must continue, to do the work
of the sword thoroughly. 8
On the other hand Santa Anna was not idle. His first
thought on quitting the terrible field of Cerro Gordo was that
Canalizo's horse would stop at El Encero, and that he might
rally the flying infantry upon it ; but on moving in that direction
by the southern bank of Rio del Plan he found himself cut off
by the American pursuit, and turned abruptly to the left.
Always profoundly depressed after a reverse, he rode along grim
and speechless, as if stunned ; but the next day an enthusiastic
reception at a small town, aided perhaps by the marvellous
beauty of the district, lifted his head. In the early evening
of April 21 he reached Orizaba, and here the applause of the
readily excited townsfolk made him feel himself once more a
general and a President. 12
His low intellectual plane did not permit him to understand
his mental inferiority or to perceive the real strength of the
unpretentious and apparently careless Americans. 9 It was
impossible for him, looking abroad upon a vast and potentially
rich country with all the vanity of his people, to believe that a
handful of poorly dressed Yankees, imperfectly trained and
seemingly not very martial, could overpower its millions.
He felt that sooner or later his groping finger would touch
the right spring, as it had done so many times before, and the
nation would rise up about him. Pride, self-will and blind
passion, raging in his heart, inflamed his courage; and his
sense of a proprietary claim to the country inspired him with a
sort of patriotism. What has been lost after all, he said,
except a position and some cannon ? The nation is still mighty.
Let it but join me, and I shall yet be victorious. 12
Within his reach lay the brigade of Antonio de Leon a
little more than 1000 poorly armed men with two 6-pounders
just from Oaxaca, the presence of which in this quarter
had brought him to Orizaba, and also the National Guards
ordered before the battle to Chiquihuite. Larger and smaller
bodies of fugitives and irregulars, learning where he was, came
in. All the armed men of the vicinity, whatever their proper
function, he caught in his unsparing net, and he summoned
68 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
to the colors every citizen from sixteen to forty years of age.
Beyond the sweep of his arm far less animation reigned. One
disappointment more, one hope less now, was the mildest
frame of mind among the public. Canalizo, a faithful dog
that for the present had been kicked one time too many, sharply
resented Santa Anna's complaints. The scattering soldiers
and officers, denouncing him bitterly as well as exaggerating
the power of the Americans, discouraged the people. A popular
newspaper demanded savagely that he should be court-mar-
tialled. The charge of collusion with the invaders came back
to life. Many of the Indians, feeling that an American triumph
would help them, became restive. 12
But the government stood resolutely behind him, and he was
invested with plenary powers. Soto tried again to rouse the
people of the state. From a wider and wider circle fugitives
and laboring men were gathered. Small cannon and some
artillerists came within his reach. The stocks of horses and
mules that Scott had tried in vain to get from the region of
the upper Alvarado River were turned to account. Con-
siderable money and supplies arrived from the government,
and other funds and necessaries were taken without formalities
wherever they could be discovered. 10 By the first of May
he pretended there were 4000 men under his flag, and no doubt
he did have 2500. 12
By good fortune more than by design, too, he found himself
in an excellent position, within striking distance of Scott's
communications, rear and base; and even though not richly
imbued with the spirit of Napoleonic warfare, he laid his plans
accordingly. But fortunately for Scott, who might have
been seriously embarrassed u Santa Anna was more politician
than general. On May 15 the election of a President was to
occur, and the votes had to be counted at the seat of govern-
ment. His enemies and rivals were incessantly busy there.
A revolution had begun to brew, he understood. A suspicion
had got abroad that he intended to give up the fight and move
into Guatemala ; and news reached him that Mexico City was
to be surrendered. For these reasons and to obtain additional
supplies, all his forces were directed upon Puebla ; and at the
head of a motley and miserable army numbering he boasted
4500 men he arrived there on May 1 1 , 12
THE AMERICANS MARCH ON 69
His reception was not flattering. Aside from the fact that
everybody of much account felt ready to see Scott, the town
had suffered previously through Santa Anna's visiting it, ac-
counts of his exactions had come from Orizaba, his presence
was thought likely to result in hostilities, and the people feared
that he would compel them to take up arms. Many fled at
his approach, and many more wished they were elsewhere.
Not without excuse under the circumstances, his conduct was
arbitrary, insulting and extortionate. He cashiered all the
officers of the Vera Cruz garrison, raved at the indifference
of the authorities and people at Puebla, seized the horses,
made liberal demands for cash, and it was asserted - even
took ornaments of gold from the churches. Some funds, a
quantity of ammunition and some cannon were finally obtained
here; but Isunza furnished him less than two hundred men,
and perhaps the indignation of the people quite offset his
gains. 13
Close behind him, too, came the Americans. Already a
day's march apart, Worth's two brigades maintained that
interval for some time, followed by Quitman with the New
York and South Carolina regiments at an equal distance. For
six or eight miles from Perote the country was highly cultivated
and already brown with ripening wheat and barley ; but then
came a sandy, arid region where steep, conical hills of bare
limestone, calcined like those of the Rhone valley, shot up from
a wide, smooth plain in extravagant confusion, and appeared
to bar the way. Hacienda buildings that were crenellated
fortresses could be seen here and there ; but the only cheering
sights were glimpses of silvery Orizaba, a number of smaller
mountains with Italian profiles, forked lightnings at play
sometimes in the black clouds, and mirages of gardens, lakes
and sylvan shores that deceived even the most experienced. 14
At Ojo de Agua, about thirty-five miles from Perote, a
spring of water almost as large as the fountain of Vaucluse
gave rise to a creek, which watered palmettoes and extensive
meadows. Eight or nine miles farther on, the troops came
to dark Nopalucan, which lay reclining on a comfortable emi-
nence and viewing complacently its fertile valley. Then
some twenty-five miles of romantic scenery brought them to
Amozoc, a manufacturing town of 2000 souls ten or eleven
70 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
miles from Puebla, and here Worth, who had made easy marches
for two days in order to lessen the interval between him and
Quitman, halted his now united brigades at noon on the four-
teenth to await that officer, and to give his own dusty division
time to "brush up." 14
Santa Anna, after sending his infantry and artillery toward
Mexico early that morning, had moved off with some 2000
cavalry to surprise Quitman, supposing that he would be at
his usual distance behind Worth, and that Worth had con-
tinued his march. The consequence was that his troops, finding
themselves at about eight o'clock within half a mile or so of
Duncan's battery and under fire, scattered promptly up the
hills and into the woods. Divining correctly that he would
reassemble them to strike at Quitman, Worth despatched forces
at once to the rear ; but Quitman, who had set out in the night,
was now only two miles distant, and, warned by the artillery
fire, had prepared to meet the enemy. Santa Anna therefore
accomplished nothing more than to fatigue his men, and give
them a superfluous lesson in running away ; and after returning
with them to Puebla for the night, he evacuated that city
before daybreak the next morning with one more failure to his
account. 14
While at Nopalucan, May 12, Worth had addressed the
governor and the municipality at Puebla, saying that in three
days he should take possession of the city, and that he desired
to confer with the civil authorities before doing so, in order
to arrange for the maintenance of order and worship. Owing
to what was regarded as a lack of formality in this proceeding
and to Santa Anna's insistence that Worth should have ad-
dressed him, no reply was made. But when a second letter
arrived in the evening of the fourteenth, the ayuntamiento
appointed a commission to meet the American general, and the
next morning a conference took place at Chachapa, where our
troops arrived at an early hour. Generous pledges of civil and
religious protection were then offered and accepted ; and the
Pueblans, who adopted the usual jockeying tactics, drew from
Worth an agreement that Mexican law, to be administered by
Mexican authorities, should remain in force, although Scott's
General Orders 20 had thrown the protection of military law
round the American troops. 15 In short, said Hitchcock,
WORTH TAKES POSSESSION OF PUEBLA 71
the inspector general of the army, Worth - - not Puebla
surrendered ; and Scott found it necessary to rectify the error. 17
At a little before ten o'clock that day the American troops
-who had suffered badly from dust on the arid, stony hills,
consoled only by views of the great snow-clad volcanoes glitter-
ing behind Puebla approached the city. It was a proud
moment for them when, as their brilliant commander said,
"with all the flush and glow of victory in their hearts" they
entered the second city of Mexico in importance and the first
'n military fame. Almost the entire population of the town
looked on. Streets, sidewalks, windows and balconies were
thronged with holiday-makers. As usual, the appearance of
the victorious Americans fell sadly below expectation per-
haps only demigods in luminous mail could have reached it;
but the people showed an intense curiosity to scrutinize them.
Sometimes the troops had to work their way through the crowd ;
but no ill temper was displayed on either side, and finally,
reaching the main plaza, our men stacked their arms and lay
down to sleep as if at home. 17
Puebla, a fine city laid out in the rectangular style and in-
habited by some 80,000 persons, was chiefly noted for piety,
cotton mills, dolls and sweetmeats. The principal feature
was the cathedral with its two dark towers each of them
capped with a yellowish, incrusted dome bearing aloft a globe
and cross, and each filled with numberless bells of all sizes,
which singly performed special offices, and three times a day
rang together in a celestial chorus. Eight or ten altars, reful-
gent with sacred vessels of gold, silver and precious stones in
amazing profusion, lighted up the interior ; and there was also
a candelabra so big or was it so grimy ? that $4000 had
been paid a few months earlier for cleaning it. Near by, in
the arcades of the plaza, could be found the dolls and sweet-
meats ; and of course Poblana market girls, too, were there :
black eyes, black hair combed over the ears, huge silver ear-
rings, snowy chemisette partly hidden with a gray rebosa
(scarf), short red petticoat fastened round the waist with a
silk band and fringed with yellow, small shoes and large silver
buckles. 17
For almost a fortnight Worth now had an opportunity to
show the real breadth of his admired talents. With the eccle-
72 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
siastical authorities, for obvious reasons, no difficulties occurred.
He and the bishop exchanged calls promptly. Bells rang,
churches opened, and in some of them public rejoicings were
celebrated. But between him and the civil functionaries,
mainly in consequence of his excessive complaisance, there
sprang up not a little friction. His troops felt very much
dissatisfied, for his nervous and restless temperament was in
continual excitement about Mexican attacks, and once he
kept them standing under arms needlessly all day. Such alarms
came to be known as "Worth's scarecrows" ; and as the natural
consequence, had a real danger presented itself, the men would
have responded tardily and half-heartedly. 17
Worse yet, on evidence for which he himself could not say
much, he warned his division a little later (June 16) by means
of a circular, that attempts to poison them were to be feared,
adding gratuitously, "Doubtless there are among those with
whom we are situated many who will not hesitate, as is the
habit of cowards, to poison those from whom they habitually
fly in battle a resource familiar in Spanish history, legiti-
mately inherited and willingly practised by Mexicans." Of
course the circular was not likely to elude publicity, and its
indiscretion blazed. It gave the Pueblans a dangerous hint,
insulted all Mexicans, and reflected grossly upon Spain, whose
continued neutrality was highly desirable. 16 Evidently, though
quite able to criticise, Worth did not possess all the qualifications
of a commander-in-chief. 17
Happily a wiser mind and steadier hand now took charge.
Until May 20 General Scott had felt compelled to wait at
Jalapa for a heavy train, from which he expected much more
than he received. Two days later Twiggs set out, and on the
twenty-eighth Scott after leaving a garrison at Jalapa and
a smaller one at Perote reached Puebla with four troops
of horse one day in advance of the division. 18 As at Plan del
Rio his arrival brought confidence and tranquillity. Needless
alarms ended. Rumors of hostile forces were investigated
promptly by his Mexican Spy Company 19 or other trustworthy
persons, and the General fixed his mind on greater work than
trying to hunt down every party of irregulars that raised a
dust in the vicinity. The troops were drilled each morning and,
if the w r eather permitted, later each day, and after about six
THE AMERICAN SITUATION AT PUEBLA 73
weeks of this made a brilliant showing, when reviewed by
divisions. The engineer soldiers received special training for
the work supposed to lie before them; careful maps of the
district between Puebla and the capital were prepared; and
Scott frequently gathered the engineers and the heads of the
army at his quarters of an evening, discussing military affairs
or monologuing inimitably on the many interesting persons
and events familiar to him. 22
The Mexican government ordered that nothing marketable
should be taken into the city, but the Pueblans replied un-
answerably : There is no power to enforce that policy ; and if
there were, the result would be to starve us, not the Americans,
for they could supply their needs by the sword and we could
not. The markets offered, therefore, all sorts of articles and
at moderate prices. Indeed they were too abundant, for the
soldiers gormandized on fruits and sugar-cane brandy, and
these indulgences, added to the want of salt meat, the change
of climate and water, the rare atmosphere, the chilling winds
and the lack of suitable clothing, caused a great amount of
sickness principally dysentery and ague. On the fourth
of June more than 1000 Americans were on the invalid list,
and that number largely increased. 22
Sickness of mind prevailed no less. It depressed one to hear
the dead march almost every evening. Rumors of wholesale
plots to assassinate the officers and poison the men tried their
nerves. Renewed efforts to cause desertion excited alarm.
Whig speeches condemning the war and suggesting that bloody
hands and hospitable graves ought rightfully to be the welcome
of our soldiers in Mexico undermined confidence and courage.
Poverty chilled their marrow. Men had served eight months
and been paid for two. At the time when shoes and other
indispensable clothing 'had to be obtained at an exorbitant
cost, the army was already in debt and credit .was flickering. 20
Through an intercepted letter the Mexicans knew of Scott's
financial difficulties, and the Americans knew that they knew.
The expected revolution against Santa Anna did not break
out, and a pacific President was not elected on June 15, as
General Scott had almost expected. 22
To crown all other discouragements, we had a ridiculously
'small army, while news came repeatedly that Santa Anna's
74 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
forces were growing rapidly. With less than 5800 privates
not over 4000 of them available for an advance the
General had to face, not only the Mexican army, but a nation
of seven million inflammable persons, who might at any time
be roused to fury by some untoward event. Even the 960
recruits that had been counted upon did not arrive. June 3,
therefore, deciding to throw away the scabbard and meet all
odds with the naked sword, he reluctantly ordered up to Puebla
the garrison of Jalapa 21 and a part of the men left at Perote,
cutting himself off in the heart of the enemy's country. 22
Pillow, the great captain, wrote censures on this course to
Polk, and Polk, the consummate strategist, agreed with his
agent; but Scott understood that necessity is a supreme law
and courage the soldier's first axiom. A farther advance was,
however, impossible. To leave Puebla without a garrison,
allowing that strong city, reoccupied by the enemy, to menace
the rear and stand like a wall of stone across the path of rein-
forcements and supplies, was out of the question; and troops
were also needed to protect helpers and overawe enemies
among the civil population. If reduced by these deductions
the army would not have constituted a striking force. Nothing
could be done but stand at guard, and await new troops. 22
These, for a number of reasons, were delayed. Marcy's
report of December 5, 1846, presented to Congress at the open-
ing of the session, admitted that the regular army stood nearly
7000 below full strength, and it also recommended the addition
of ten regiments ; but the administration, feeling at sea about
its war policy, and not realizing how far the men on the firing-
line came short of their estimated numbers or how much time
would be required to place new troops there, took no decided
stand in the matter. On the twenty-ninth, however, a bill
authorizing the new regiments was presented in the House by
the military committee, and the President followed this up
some days later with a Message. A law offering a bounty of
twelve dollars to encourage enlisting, upon which the war
department acted promptly, was the next move; and on
January 11, 1847, the House, excited by news that Worth stood
in great peril at Saltillo, voted the new regiments. The Senate,
on the other hand, procrastinated until Marcy was in despair,
and Polk twice decided to address the country. Without
THE PROBLEM OF REINFORCEMENTS 75
much doubt partisan scheming and personal aims were chiefly
responsible for the delay ; but differences of opinion, more or
less honest, regarding the comparative utility of regulars and
volunteers, the expediency and proper terms of a land bounty,
and the rights of the Senate in regard to the choice of officers
caused much discussion, in which every issue touching the
inception and conduct of the war had to run the gantlet of
passionate vociferation. 25
Progress was also hindered in another way. Although Polk
had found it necessary to appoint Scott and had given that
officer to understand that bygones were to be bygones, he liked
him no better than before, did not wish the Whigs and their
possible candidate for the Presidency to win more glory in
the war, and realized the political wisdom particularly in
view of Calhoun's unfriendliness of pleasing the Van
Buren Democrats. There were also objections to the existing
arrangement that could be stated publicly. The number of
troops to be employed in Mexico was said to require a chief of
higher grade than a major general, and Polk took the ground
that the commander especially since he might be desired to
handle the question of a treaty should be in full agreement
and sympathy with the Executive. 25
For these combined reasons he offered to Benton the post
of lieutenant general, provided it could be established, before
Scott left Washington, and about the first of January requested
Congress to authorize the appointment of such an officer. 23
This precipitated a commotion. The Senator's harsh, domineer-
ing ways had made him unpopular, and grave doubts regarding
his technical and temperamental fitness for the place existed
not only in Congress but in the Cabinet. Calhoun and his
friends detested the idea of letting Benton gain so much prestige
and with it very likely the Presidency ; the partisans of Taylor
and Scott resented such treatment of their favorites; all the
Whigs, besides suspecting Polk of scheming to evade respon-
sibility and make Benton his grateful successor, rallied to the
support of their two most prominent men ; and, after serving
for some time as an embarrassment, the plan was rejected. 25
Finally, then, after a conference committee had adjusted
the differences between the two Houses, the Ten Regiment
Bill, though defeated once in the Senate, passed that body on
76 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
February the tenth, and received Folk's approval the next day ;
and as a loan bill had been worried through Congress at the
end of January, something was apparently to be done. 24 Since,
however, the officers were liable to be discharged on the con-
clusion of peace, it was not believed that many already in the
service could be induced by a slight advance in rank to enter
the new establishment, and for this and probably other reasons
few of the more than five hundred places were offered to the
army. The field was therefore clear for civilian warriors,
and their campaign opened at once. Not limiting their opera-
tions to Capitol Hill, applicants for commissions besieged and
assaulted the White House. "I have pushed them off and
fought them with both hands like a man fighting fire," wrote
Polk in his diary, but "it has all been in vain." "Loafers
without merit" came, and equally meritorious Congressmen
supported them. Not one in ten of the appointees was known
to the President, and their degree of unfitness was precisely
what might have been expected. A considerable number of
them had actually been run out of the service in some cases
for bad conduct before the enemy and many were found less
teachable than privates. 25
During February this beautiful exhibition continued, and
such were the only immediate fruits of the much debated law,
for it empowered no one to organize the new troops into brigades
and divisions or to appoint general officers, and the military
appropriations had not yet been made. Further Congressional
exertions, therefore, had to be put forth; but at last on the
second and third of March, after a loss of almost three months
at this crisis of the war, the deficiencies were supplied, and
enlistment shortly began. Vigorous efforts were made by the
administration to set the new regulars in motion, company by
company, and even squad by squad ; and finally on the nine-
teenth of April, since little more could be expected from the
November calls, requisitions for six and a half new regiments
of volunteer infantry and twelve companies of horse all
to serve until the conclusion of peace were issued. 25
On the fourth of June, then, about six hundred new troops,
commanded by Brevet Colonel Mclntosh, left Vera Cruz for
the interior, escorting a long train of loaded mules and wagons
and two or three hundred thousand dollars in specie. Mexican
THE AMERICAN ARMY . 77
irregulars, who knew the value of the convoy, soon attacked
and stopped it. Cadwalader, then waiting for a part of his
brigade, reinforced Mclntosh on the eleventh with about
five hundred men and took command. Fighting his way along
he incorporated the garrison of Jalapa commanded by Colonel
Childs, and on the twenty-first reached Perote. 27
Meanwhile Pillow, now a major general by the grace
of his former law partner, arriving at Vera Cruz and finding
there some 2000 of his men, had advanced with most of them on
June 18; and although Scott was in the most urgent need of
money, Pillow ordered Cadwalader to await his arrival at Perote.
Eventually, on July 3, the combined forces were in motion,
and five days later all of them including the recruits long since
expected passed the brown gate of Puebla. Of the rank
and file Scott now had 8061 effectives and 2215 sick. Next
Brigadier General Pierce with some 2500 men got away from the
coast about the fifteenth of July, 26 and after similar fighting
appeared at headquarters on the sixth of August with a heavy
siege battery, a long train of wagons and $85,000 in unsalable
drafts, but with none of the specie that had been expected
and regarded as indispensable. 27
Scott now had about 14,000 men, some 2500 of whom lay,
however, in the hospitals, while about six hundred were con-
valescents too feeble for an ordinary day's march. The cavalry,
led by Colonel Harney, included portions of the three dragoon
regiments under Captain Kearny, Major Sumner and Major
McReynolds. For artillery, besides the siege train, there
were the field batteries of Duncan, Taylor, Steptoe and others, 28
and the howitzer and rocket battery of Talcott. Brevet Major
General Worth's division of infantry, known as the First, con-
sisted of Brevet Colonel Garland's brigade (Second and Third
Artillery, Fourth Infantry and a light battalion) and the brigade
of Colonel Clarke, which included the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth
Infantry. The Second Division, commanded by Brigadier
General Twiggs, was composed of the regiments under Brevet
Brigadier General Persffor F. Smith (Mounted Riflemen, First
Artillery and Third Infantry) and Brevet Colonel Riley (Fourth
Artillery, Second and Seventh Infantry). Major General
Pillow, higher in rank than the brave, able and experienced
Worth, a professional soldier, had the Eleventh and Fourteenth
78 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
Infantry and the Voltigeur regiment under Brigadier General
Cadwalader, a polished veteran of Chestnut Street parades,
Philadelphia, and the Ninth, Twelfth and Fifteenth Infantry
under the gentlemanly Franklin Pierce, a social and political
hero of Concord, New Hampshire; while General Shields's
brigade (New York and South Carolina volunteers) and Lieu-
tenant Colonel Watson's, consisting of three hundred marines
and a detachment of the Second Pennsylvania, made t up the
division of Quitmani an excellent person and politician, who
had now reached the highest military grade. 29
The troops that had been waiting at Puebla were by this
time in fine training ; and the new men, besides receiving the
soldier's baptism on the way up, had learned at least the value
of discipline and skill. The former had become to a large extent
acclimated, and they felt an entire confidence in their com-
mander, which, fully accredited by his victories, extended
promptly to the reinforcements. The essential clothing had
been purchased or manufactured. Thanks to indefatigable
exertions a large stock of provisions had been accumulated,
and at a cost of 15 per cent funds for the march to the capital
had been raised. Although time had permitted the friendly
sentiments and reasonable arguments of Scott's proclamation
to leaven the people, and association with the Americans had
refuted the calumnies previously effective against them, our
officers and men expected hard fighting. Thoughts of distant
homes and of near perils were silvering many a fine head. There
were no good laughers in the army now. But in an equal degree
hearts were nerved. Mentally the cost of success, figured
without discount, was already paid. All felt eager to advance.
And when, anticipating Pierce's arrival by one day, Scott gave
the order, a soldier's joy lighted up their bronzed features. 30
XXV
ON TO THE CAPITAL
April-August, 1847
ALMOST immediately after Santa Anna left the seat of
government for the Cerro Gordo campaign, more than twenty
generals and several members of Congress were called together
at the palace by Anaya to consider the defence of the capital. 1
Apparently the problem could be solved without much diffi-
culty. Mexico lies in a rather shallow basin said to be the
crater of an ancient volcano about thirty-two by forty-six
miles in diameter. In the time of Cortez the site had consisted
of islands barely rising above the water, but the spaces between
these had gradually been filled, and the water had subsided.
Six lakes could still be counted, however; almost everywhere
else in the environs there were marshes traversed by elevated
roads or causeways; and the rim of the basin, as well as the
routes beyond it, seemed to offer advantageous points for de-
fence. 2
The sentiment of this council and of the city, though con-
cealed under a cloak of bellicose ardor, opposed resisting the
Americans in earnest, or at all events opposed inviting bombard-
ment ; and it was therefore decided merely to take precautions
against a raid, fortify certain points on the roads, and bring
out a host of irregulars to hang upon the rear and flanks of the
enemy. All men capable of bearing arms were summoned to
the colors. The states were called upon for aid. Hopes of
borrowing twenty millions imparted a sunny look to the situa-
tion ; and ecclesiastics, naturally passive in view of the agree-
ment with Beach to let Scott have the city, were deliberately
forced into the streets by the civil authorities to preach fanati-
cism and rouse the public from their apathy. Except perhaps
by this last method, however, little was accomplished. "Let
us unite, let us unite, and do you go and fight against the
79
80
THE WAR WITH MEXICO
French," some of the Spanish priests had said when their coun-
try was invaded by Napoleon. So things went now in Mexico,
and every one assigned to himself the duty of exhorting. Fine
ideas beamed forth, but everything of practical utility was
conspicuously wanting. Still, as the American volunteers
were considered "banditti, without the slightest knowledge of
military tactics, without any sort of training, without con-
fidence, and in general easily terrified," no keen sense of alarm
was felt. 2
The disaster of Cerro Gordo cast new and fearful shadows up-
on the scene. That defeat, said Anaya, " simply means complete
Guadalupe
Hidalso
Ayocingo
?m8.E,,g.Co..N.y.
ruin for the whole republic," and even his gratification that
Santa Anna's "interesting person" had not gone down in the
wreck seemed rather of an iridescent kind. Military con-
fidence, which had revived after earlier shocks, gave way en-
tirely. The prestige derived by Santa Anna from his alleged
success at Buena Vista was now torn to shreds by panting
fugitives from the south. About a thousand pamphlets, for
which no language was too savage or too true, poured light upon
his character and achievements, and the military men as a
class met with similar treatment. 3 To be sure, the government
POLITICAL CHAOS AT MEXICO 81
promised boldly to continue the war. April 20 Congress in-
vested the Executive with autocratic powers, and prohibited
all steps toward peace. 4 The Federal District, in which lay the
capital, was placed under martial law. Urgent demands for
troops were sent wherever soldiers could be supposed to lurk.
Once more the authorities called upon every citizen of the proper
age to take up arms. Quotas aggregating 32,000 men were
formally assigned to the states. Light fortifications, intended
to delay and perhaps block the Americans, were ordered to be
thrown up along the route ; and the heads of the Church
issued an appeal for concord and morality. 5
But all of these proceedings displayed more alarm than
courage, more desperation than intelligence. Many of the
defensive points were found valueless. Tools, funds, engineers
and laborers fell short. The meagre donations for continuing
hostilities evinced a total want of enthusiasm. The problem
of obtaining enough troops, provisions and artillery to defend
the town seemed more and more insoluble, and the danger not
only of bombardment but of sack more and more terrible.
Grandees got out their old travelling coaches, and even plain
citizens began to emigrate. The government itself decided
that against an army represented by American deserters as
more than 16,000 strong, fully equipped, shortly to be rein-
forced, and soon to advance, the city could not possibly be
held ; and the favorite plan of the administration, the most
promising that could be devised, was to buy up Scott's Irish
soldiers through the priest McNamara, recently conspicuous
in California, and facilitate their desertion by having Santa
Anna attack Puebla. Should this fail, submission and peace
appear to have been deemed inevitable. 5
With some exceptions rulers and people alike, wearied by
decades of dissensions, oppression, scheming, robbery and illu-
sory promises, discouraged by the passive opposition of the
clergy and the wealthy classes, overwhelmed by a series of
military disasters, convinced that incompetent and perhaps
traitorous generals led the armies, and powerless to discern
any happy omens for the country, felt neither hope nor spirit ;
and the kindness of the Americans, added to their invincibility,
had now overcome even the instinct of race. 5
To heighten the confusion, a state of governmental chaos
VOL. H G
82 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
reigned. An ay a had at most but little prestige or influence,
and friends of Santa Anna, angry because excluded from office,
created a friction between the two that weakened both. The
ministers could not cooperate harmoniously. General Bravo
was given command of all the troops in the Federal Distr ct
and the state of Mexico, and Santa Anna did not want him in
that important position. Congress devoted itself, when not
harassing the administration, to wrangling over a new con-
stitution, substantially that of 1824, which finally was voted on
the eighteenth of May. In conscious impotence the Puros
writhed and snarled ; and their enemies, the Moderados, after
having triumphed and brought Santa Anna to their side, now
boldly paraded their dislike of him, and, by showing no concern
except about retaining their power, excited hostility and
contempt. Common sense was no less wanting than patriotism ;
and when these two parties finally agreed to save the country,
their plan was to supplement the constitution with two more
articles. 5
Of all the discontent, resentments and ambitions the now
despised Santa Anna became naturally the target. Almonte
still plotted to be President. Arista and Ampudia, joined now
in disgrace as formerly in misfortune, felt thoroughly dissatisfied.
Gomez Farias could not forget his betrayal, and Olaguibel,
governor of the most important state, Mexico, loyally sup-
ported him. Bravo reciprocated Santa Anna's dislike. Valen-
cia aspired to the chief military command. All in favor of
ending the war who now had an organ, El Razonador
considered Santa Anna a bar to peace and even to the faithful
observance of a preliminary armistice; and some of them,
arguing that his extraordinary powers were cancelled automat-
ically by the adoption of a new organic law, advocated placing
him in the interior somewhere, ostensibly to wait for new troops,
and negotiating a treaty without his knowledge. The Puros
were expected to explode a revolution against him about the
twentieth of May, and for all sorts of personal or patriotic
reasons a host of minor individuals made ready to cooperate
with it. 5
But all these busy folks were only mice, reckoning without
the cat. On leaving Puebla Santa Anna proceeded to San
Martin, which lay on the direct road to Mexico where it began
SANTA ANNA AT THE CAPITAL 83
to ascend the rim of the Valley. Works had been erected
near, but it was found they could easily be turned and not
easily be provisioned ; and a council of war decided to occupy
the capital, since only there could large resources be counted
upon. May 18, therefore, the wretched army of 3000 or
3500 men arrived at Ayotla, fifteen miles from their destination.
Learning of this unexpected and undesired event, the hostile
elements undertook to "pronounce" at once, but could not set
the movement off. Three leading statesmen of the dominant
party then hurried to meet the General, and after arguing all
day persuaded him to write that An ay a might remain in office
and even decide whether Mexico City should be defended,
while he himself would retain his military command, or, if
dissatisfied with Anaya's decision, would resign. 6
But presently cunning Tornel and one or two others convinced
Santa Anna that a mere handful of enemies had spread this net
in order to drag him from power, and eliminate his influence on
the vital question of peace. Jealousy and fears inspired by the
favor that Valencia and Bravo were apparently enjoying, added
to the urgency of his officers, did the rest; and on the nine-
teenth, in spite of the understanding just agreed upon indeed,
only about an hour after his letter reached the palace his
troops entered the city. Anaya's rather sour and curdled
face flushed hot and bitter. He did not care to retain the
Presidency, for he believed a revolution would soon break out ;
but forcible ejection, in disregard of a written promise, was
another affair. He found himself powerless, however ; and the
next day, after inducing a council of generals to decide upon
holding Mexico, Santa Anna announced that he would sacrifice
his wishes, and resume the executive power. 6
The state of things that ensued was indescribable. Nothing
equal to it has been known perhaps, and nothing imagined
save the witches' caldron. One public man estimated the
number of bubbling intrigues as twenty millions. Nothing is
left us except vanity and dissension, but those we possess in
the superlative degree, wrote Ramirez. Congress had no
prestige, no power, no capacity; and its factions could see
nothing except opportunities to stab one another. Santa Anna's
breach of faith intensified the distrust and hatred of the Mode-
rados without gratifying the Puros. Hoping to win some pop-
84 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
ularity, he restored the freedom of the press, which had recently
been curtailed ; but his enemies merely took advantage of it.
"The man of La Angostura, of Cerro Gordo, of Amozoc, weary
of destroying Mexicans on the field of battle, comes home
tranquilly to find repose in the Presidential chair/' exclaimed
Almonte's organ. 6
A plausible and eloquent manifesto put out over Santa
Anna's name dropped cold on the pavement. No basis of
popular or political strength for even a temporary footing could
be discovered by his counsellors. Santa Anna himself felt
staggered by the opposition. His only chance was to place
the nation between the devil and the deep sea between
bayonets and chaos hoping it would again call upon him to
save it ; and so on the twenty-eighth, declaring that schemers
and revolutionists, who found him in their way, paralyzed his
efforts to serve the country, he made another sacrifice, and
resigned the Presidency. 6
Unhappily for him it soon appeared likely that Congress
would accept the sacrifice, while on the other hand certain
aspects of his outlook brightened. Busy Tornel induced a
fraction of the Puros, who realized their helplessness, to adopt
his cause. Valencia, though much to Santa Anna's repugnance,
had been given for his present portion the chief command at
San Luis Potosi, and so disappeared from the capital. Almonte
found himself in prison under a charge of conspiracy. Arista
and Ampudia were banished from the vicinity. Bravo retired
from his command. At the same time promotions fell copiously
on devotees; and the happy recipients knew these might
well cease to be valid, should their patron fall. Almonte was
said to have received a majority of the votes for President,
while Santa Anna had been supported by only Chihuahua;
but so much territory lay in American hands that a question
about the legality of the election arose, and Congress deferred
the matter. On the second of June, therefore, the arch-pres-
tidigitator laid himself once more upon the altar, and in order
to save the country from Scott and anarchy withdrew his
resignation. 6
"Mexicans, I shall be with you always to the consumma-
tion of your ruin," so the Monitor Republicano paraphrased his
ami ouncement ; and then it added : " What a life of sacrifice
SANTA ANNA STILL SUPREME 85
is the General's; a sacrifice to take the power, to resign, to
resume; ultimate sacrifice ; ultimate final ; ultimate more final ;
ultimate most final ; ultimate the very finalest. But let him
cheer up. He is not alone in making sacrifices. For twenty-five
years the Mexican people have been sacrificing themselves, all
of them, in the hope that certain persons would do good to the
country." But in spite of sarcasm and ridicule Santa Anna had
triumphed. Hated by many, disliked by most, distrusted by
nearly all, yet forging ahead because he was on the ground with
troops, because his combination of good luck, audacity and
cunning could not be matched, because the Moderado govern-
ment had proved incompetent, because a regime of dissension and
anarchy could organize no solid opposition against him, and be-
cause a group of selfish interests found in him a sharp, tough bit
of steel to fix at the head of their spear, he triumphed once more. 6
The victory threatened, however, to be fatal. In every
direction lurked pitfalls charged with gunpowder. In all the
history of Mexico dissensions had never been more bitter,
nor political and social chaos nearer. Congress annoyed him
until at length, by failing week after week to form a quorum
lest one faction or another should score an advantage, it fell
into abeyance and left him virtually a dictator. 7 In the hope
of obtaining funds from the Church, he gave deeper offence
than ever to the most prominent of the Moderados ; but the
prelates, in alliance with leading monarchists, continued to
plot against him. Newspapers waged a bitter campaign un-
til choked with an iron hand. His persecution of the generals
excited fierce resentment. A Puro chief, entering the Cabinet
and getting a glimpse of his ulterior aims, resigned in six days. 8
In short the administration had no political creed, and could
find no political support; and the assistance of that indis-
pensable villain, Tornel, who could be seen stealing to the
palace at the hour when the night-hawk begins to fly, covered
it with discredit. Executive authorities waged almost civil
war upon one another. Rumors, not without some basis, that
a formal dictatorship was in view, could not be stilled; and
the general want of confidence in the President's character and
aims rendered the most skilful appeals to patriotism vain.
Only by the utmost exertions could the fragile edifice of govern-
ment be kept balanced on the poirit of the bayonet. 8
86 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
Nor was the opposition against Santa Anna confined to his
immediate vicinity. The people of Mexico City had always
despised the outlying states; and not only was this disdain
repaid, but the capital, source of so many political and financial
ills experienced by the rest of the country, was looked upon by
a great number of thoughtful men as hopelessly corrupt
as a diseased part that required amputation. When restoring
the old federal system in August, 1846, in order to satisfy his
democratic allies and win popularity, Santa Anna apparently
did not foresee, as Consul Black did, that after realizing their
power and getting into touch with one another, the states
would take a firm position upon their prerogatives. In addition
to such difficulties, it was commonly felt that military men and
the army stood mortally opposed to democracy and federal
institutions, that success in the field might enable Santa Anna to
overthrow this principle and these institutions, and that a loud
cry for patriotism and war, combined with a systematic with-
holding of men and supplies, would compel him to fight and
ensure his ruin. 8
By evasions, therefore, or in some cases positive refusals
to obey the commands of the general government, substantially
all the states withheld support, frequently alleging that under
the regime of the new constitution its extraordinary powers,
conferred by the law of April 20, did not exist, and that all
National Guards, as well as all revenues assigned to the states in
September, 1846, were independent of the national authorities.
In this opposition Zacatecas naturally played a leading part,
but perhaps Olaguibel, an impressive, honest and able man,
who had travelled in the United States and Europe and
had filled his library with busts of the leading American
statesmen, was its foremost representative ; and the firm sup-
port of his constituents, who felt intensely jealous of Santa
f Anna, as well as the cooperation of Gomez Farias, rendered
: him a formidable person. Balked thus by constitutional
theories that not only flattered local interests and pride but
were noticeably economical, Santa Anna could obtain aside
from the troops brought by General Juan Alvarez and a few
others very little assistance outside of the Federal District. 8
That was hard enough, but still greater difficulties lay behind
it. In the far northwest Sonora, Sinaloa and Durango enter-
SANTA ANNA PREPARES FOR BATTLE 87
tallied the idea of uniting as a new republic, and six of the
central states were banded together in a Coalition. This
extra-legal, if not illegal, organization had been called into
existence in January, 1847, by the prommciamiento of the
Mazatlan garrison, which aimed at making Santa Anna dic-
tator. By the end of May it was in good shape, and had a plan
for troops of its own. Two weeks later the delegates, who
made Lagos their place of meeting, called themselves an
Assembly, and were buying arms; and by the fourth of July
they felt bold enough to declare null a decree of Santa Anna.
Of course the ostensible purpose was to protect independence,
nationality and federal institutions ; but, as the correspondence
of the state governors reveals, the real aims included the
establishment of a "new pact of alliance," a new confederation,
in which Santa Anna and that Babylon, the city of Mexico,
should have no part. With this Coalition a large number of
the Puros naturally sympathized. 8
In the face of it all, however, the futile strategist of Cerro
Gordo, with a truly superb wilfulness and a more truly pitiful
self-confidence, snatched up once more the bloody dice.
Cannon were brought from distant points, cast by the govern-
ment from bells and old ordnance at Chapultepec and else-
where, or manufactured by contractors. New muskets, of
which foreigners offered to deliver great stocks at Mexican
ports or by way of Guatemala, were purchased; old ones,
appropriated by deserters or stolen during revolutions, were
hunted up ; and all citizens were ordered, though perhaps with-
out great results, to let the government have what arms they
owned. Immense quantities of powder were produced at
Morelia, at Guanajuato, at Santa Fe near Mexico, and at the
capital; a great deal was imported overland from British
Honduras, and additional supplies came from New Orleans by
the way of Campeche. At various points mortars, bayonets,
projectiles and numberless other articles were turned out by
government establishments or private contractors. Forges
clanged on all sides ; and wherever the President's restless
and unscrupulous mind could have its way, there reigned a
feverish activity, cooled only by a want of funds. 11
At Mexico City, before his arrival, some 2000 regulars and
8000 National Guards, besides the officers, were in garrison;
88 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
and these with his army, five hundred from Queretaro, some
two hundred Irish deserters, an unknown number of able-bodied
loafers impressed at the capital, and larger or smaller accessions
from other sources, made up the Army of the East. The
Army of the South under Juan Alvarez, who commanded the
line to Acapulco with headquarters near Mexico, had on its
roll at the end of June 2748 officers and men ; and Canalizo,
comandante general of Puebla, who became reconciled to his
chief in June, was supposed to have a few thousands of National
Guards and irregulars. But as most of these forces were poorly
paid and a large part of them served unwillingly, desertion
in spite of the severest rules was common, and the numbers
fluctuated incessantly. 11
At San Luis Potosi, meantime, lay the Army of the North,
which contained the largest percentage of veterans. In May
Valencia, so long a rival of the President, had talked in a very
lofty style, as if already the military head of the nation, about
marching south and cutting Worth to pieces, and Santa Anna,
though anxious to get his troops, now wished him to remain at
a distance ; but in July, on account of Scott's approaching
reinforcements, it seemed necessary to bring down that army,
and it arrived at Guadalupe Hidalgo, a few miles north of
Mexico, on the twenty-seventh, numbering more than 4000
men with twenty-two guns. Just how many soldiers the
President then had cannot be stated, and in all probability
no one could have stated at the time ; but, such as they were,
there seem to have been fully 25,000 men and probably, as
reports and intercepted letters convinced many of the Ameri-
cans, 30,000, if not more. 9 Some were well dressed, well
equipped and well trained; but from that pinnacle the army
descended to mere off-scourings, whose rags were as the
President said, "a disgrace to the nation," and whose military
efficiency doubtless corresponded. 11
Of equally varied quality were the officers. The generals
best known to the country were nearly all out of the service
now, being under charges or at odds with the head of the
government. Valencia was a conspirator, a drunkard, a dolt
and a volcano. Alvarez, an ignorant mulatto from the wilds,
understood only half-savage, partisan fighting. Lombardini, a
strutting lackey, who commanded the Army of the East
THE MEXICAN PLANS 89
except when Santa Anna took personal charge of it, strove to
conceal behind a swarthy face, a heavy mustache and goatee,
and a ceaseless volubility the poverty of his intellect ; and the
great mass of the officers were well, they had already shown
their value. They were now ordered to be intelligent and brave,
to be zealous whether paid or not paid, to do their full duty and
something more, to cast behind them every thought of accepting
parole, and to say nothing against their superiors; but it lay
beyond the power of orders to make them what they could not
be, and the small number of excellent men were lost in the crowd. 11
Regarding the plan of operations a radical difference of
opinion existed. To not a few the idea that Scott was lying
comfortably at Puebla seemed almost unendurable. They
longed to have him attacked unceasingly; and they insisted
that, should the arrogant invader dare to march for the capital,
every step of the route should be contested. Santa Anna on
the other hand st'll believed in concentration, and though some
regard was paid to the apprehensions of the ayuntamiento, his
views naturally prevailed. The plan adopted, then, after
considerable vacillation in regard to details, was to protect
the entire perimeter of the city with fortifications, inundate
more or less the surrounding meadows, and prevent Scott from
seriously injuring the town with his artillery by erecting a
series of works at the most advantageous points of the environs.
These protected lines were to be held by the less reliable corps
National Guards, for example and the troops belonging
to the regular army were to be a mobile force ready to defend
the city at any threatened point. 11
The plan was thus essentially defensive, and it has been said
with much force that a system of this kind promises merely
negative results in the case of success, and positive ruin in the
case of defeat. But the present situation was peculiar. Sup-
plied with provisions for no long period, and without hopes of
early and strong reinforcements, the Americans were bound
to fail unless promptly and signally victorious, and their enter-
ing the Valley would then have meant destruction. "Scott is
lost," exclaimed the Duke of Wellington after the Americans
crossed the rim ; " He cannot capture the city and he cannot
fall back upon his base." Santa Anna's plan, therefore, did not
merit the criticism bestowed upon it. 11
90 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
Besides, Alvarez with nearly all the Mexican horse was to
swing in behind the advancing Americans, cut off their com-
munication with Puebla, follow, annoy and injure them in every
possible way, conceal his real strength so as to bring out and
overwhelm their cavalry, attack vigorously whenever Scott
should become seriously engaged before Mexican fortifications,
and be ready to prevent his retreat. Canalizo with his thou-
sands was to support Alvarez; and Valencia also, advancing
from Guadalupe Hidalgo to the, village of Texcoco, east of
Mexico, was to cooperate with him, and especially to throw
himself with all his energy into the attack on the American
rear or flank, whenever Scott should assail the outer works.
At the same time the people of the neighboring towns and
villages were to swarm about the invader like hornets, and
sting him day and night incessantly. In short the plan was
excellent only Santa Anna overlooked, as usual, several
possibilities. 11
As soon as he took up the reins of government the con-
struction of defences had begun, and now, under the technical
direction of General Mora, Manuel Robles and Juan Cano, it
was pushed with all the energy of an intense military despot who
stuck at nothing. Villages were depopulated, haciendas robbed
of their laborers, jails emptied, and the streets cleared of
vagabonds. Enforce obedience, the governor of the District
was curtly told when he reported that his orders had no effect.
Sunset no longer promised repose, and the church bells no
longer meant worship. Informed on July 18 that Scott would
leave Puebla on the twenty-first, Santa Anna rose above his
exemplar, Napoleon, and took for model the Creator. Within
eight days let all the works be completed, he decreed. But
engineers, laborers, tools, instruments, timber, provisions, time
and cash much of which was embezzled by high officers and
officials even at this juncture all fell short, and Santa
Anna's serviceable cannon were not enough to equip even the
works constructed. 11
Certain points, however, became quite formidable, and
especially Old Penon, a lofty, precipitous hill of rock standing
by itself, close to the Puebla route, seven miles from the city. 10
Stockades, breastworks, parapets and guns bristled on summit
and brow ; works at the base and in advance commanded all
THE PEOPLE ENTHUSIASTIC 91
dangerous approaches ; a trench full of water crossed the road ;
the meadows in front cut with ditches were inundated ;
and the swampy edge of Lake Texcoco guarded the opposite
side of the road. To the Mexicans, who always measured the
strength of a chain by its heaviest link, this position seemed a
wonderful protection ; and in general the people, if not the city,
were strongly fortified by the President's labors. 11
For other reasons also the morale of the inhabitants improved.
Characteristic light-heartedness made them turn from past
defeats to future triumphs. They were told that at Cerro
Gordo Scott had made his troops fight by opening a battery
upon them from the rear ; that his men, while they presumed
to think they could make "vile slaves" of the generous and
valiant Mexicans, were few, sickly, poverty-stricken, dis-
satisfied ; and that Polk, embarrassed by the expense of the
war, could send him but scanty reinforcements. Greed,
brutality and sanguinary ambition were charged against us at
this crisis by the London Times in its usual contemptuous
manner, and the Diario eagerly quoted it. The successes of
the guerillas against American convoys roused a lively enthu-
siasm. "Only a little, a very little" effort is necessary to beat
the hateful Anglo-Saxon, proclaimed the government; and a
review of the brilliant Eleventh Infantry, headed by its band of
twenty-five pieces, made that little seem easy and agreeable. 11
People who bore the names of saints as a matter of course
easily exploded Scott's Address of May 11. How absurd,
they cried, for the American general to pretend he is a Chris-
tian : there is no St. Winfield in the calendar ! The only hope
of the Americans lies 'n Mexican dissension, therefore let us
disappoint them, it was urged ; and to promote harmony all
the newspapers except the official organ were suspended on
plausible grounds. Santa Anna's activity and warlike spirit
had to be recognized by all. We must confide in him and
gather round him like a band of brothers, preached the Diario;
and when all political trials were ordered to end, and the Presi-
dent banqueted at Valencia's house, the fraternal era so long
hoped for seemed at hand. 11
Finally, on the ninth of August, at two o'clock in the after-
noon, a 16-pounder boomed portentously from the citadel.
The long roll was beaten. Bands of music patrolled the city.
92 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
Hands clapped. Vivas echoed through the streets. Rockets
flashed rosettes in the sky. " Blinded by pride the enemy have
set out for the capital/' proclaimed Santa Anna; "For this,
Mexicans, I congratulate myself and you." The government,
while savagely and contemptuously scoring the Americans,
announced a series of reforms to be effected by Santa Anna,
not as a constitutional magistrate, but as a Divine Providence ;
and the Diario echoed back, " Half a dozen of these measures
would change the face of the Republic." The President as-
sumed command of the army, and every citizen from sixteen
to fifty years of age took his place in the ranks. Amidst the
most fervid enthusiasm of crowds that filled the streets, bal-
conies and housetops, troops followed troops gaily toward Old
Pefion, and two days later the forces were reviewed there. 12
Tents gleamed under a splendid sun. Bands played as if
inspired. The soldiers marched with a quick, impatient step.
Anaya recently the chief magistrate, Gorostiza the primate
of Mexico's literary men, white-haired Herrera the most
honored of her political chiefs, and countless other dignitaries
did honor to the occasion. The rich vestments of the clergy
gave exquisite lustre and color, and their pompous benedictions
added a sense of more than human grandeur. All were happy,
radiant, brotherly. Every thought of peace, every thought of
opposing or even doubting Santa Anna appeared to be for-
gotten. In all his previous career so refulgent a day had never
been his. "Ecce Homo!" cried the Diario; "Behold the illus-
trious champion of 1821, the hero of 1829, the genius of 1838!"
For him the hill became a Mount of Transfiguration. Or rather,
perhaps, it was Mt. Sinai, where Deity appeared in thunders
and lightnings. You MUST, was the command to the
governor of Zacatecas this day. Let the state of Mexico send
me her troops, rang the message to Olaguibel. And Olaguibel
replied meekly, They shall go to-morrow. 12
Scott was in fact advancing. On the morning of Saturday,
the seventh, his camp was astir early. The base of Popocate-
petl seemed black, and the slopes a pale, silvery blue; but its
top, almost 18,000 feet above the sea, was a "Blazing Star,"
as some of the Indians named the mountain, and appeared
like an omen of victory. The Second Division was soon ready.
Twiggs faced it, waved his hat round his white head, and cried
SCOTT'S MARCH TO MEXICO 93
in the voice of Ajax, " Now, my lads, give them a Cerro Gordo
shout !" A simultaneous hurrah from twenty-five hundred iron
throats was the response; and at six o'clock, preceded by the
cavalry and the engineer company and followed by the siege
train while his band, mounted on splendid white horses,
played our national airs he began the eventful march. One
day apart, Quitman, Worth and Pillow followed him. Though
it was announced that no man unable to do three marches could
be permitted to go, hundreds of convalescents unequal to the
effort insisted upon trying, and, gradually falling out, rejoined the
garrison of Puebla. ' Feeble in numbers 13 for such an enterprise,
but confiding in their quality, their leader and their prestige,
the 10,738 men and their officers pressed boldly forward. 15
For a time the dust proved extremely annoying and the sun
scorched; but soon mountain air began to be felt, and the
troops entered a wide, blooming and scented valley, full of rich
fields, grazing herds, noble hacienda houses that were almost
palaces, and trim white churches that seemed like stragglers
from the great host at Puebla. In the rear shone Orizaba and
the nearer pyramid of Malinchi. On the left Popocatepetl
and his consort, the Sleeping Woman (Iztaccihuatl), deeply
blanketed in fleecy white, looked hardly a stone's throw distant ;
and after the sun had set, the air grown cold, and the valley
now less open filled with shadows, their purple tops glowed
like interplanetary lighthouses. 15
Soon after passing the ugly little town of San Martin, twenty
miles from Puebla, the troops began to ascend more rapidly.
Eleven miles more brought them to a mountain river, Tesme-
lucan, where the elegant aerial bridge that spanned the abyss
made them almost feel they were flying. The scenery now
became Alpine. Deep chasms, answered to peaks, and lovely
glens to precipices; and the cedar, the oak and the ash, as
well as pines of extraordinary height and straightness, reared
themselves on the slopes. At Rio Frio, about thirty-six miles
from both Puebla and Mexico, where an icy stream dashed
foaming down the rocks, the mountains closed in on the left,
and their crest, lined with deserted parapets, almost overhung
the road. 14 Then a stiff er climb of about five miles placed the
troops on a narrow plateau which formed the summit ; and they
were now 10,500 feet above the sea. 15
94 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
A few miles down the steep descent on the other side their
prospect opened, and below, girt round with singularly bold
mountains rough, dark and purplish, but softened here and
there with a wisp of shining vapor lay the Valley of Mexico,
which the pellucid atmosphere, transmitting colors and outlines
undimmed, brought wondrously nigh. Ten small volcanoes,
that had been crumbling for ages untold, stood clothed in
luxuriant verdure nearly to the summit. Six broad lakes
now laughed under the brilliant sun and now brooded in the
shadows of passing clouds. Velvet champaigns cut with
ash-colored roads, gleaming canals and straight lines of poplars,
and studded with walled haciendas, rambling towns and cozy-
looking villages were further variegated with highly cul-
tivated fields of many crops, with groves and orchards from
which peered steeples and bell-towers, with villa roofs of tiles,
red and cheery, and with whitewashed cottages that shone
like silver. Every possible hue of green and every possible
tone of light and shade blended into one harmonious effect.
And in the midst of this wonderful scene, as the climax of the
stillness and beauty, the focus of all eyes, the aim of all desires,
untarnished by smoke, seemingly without stain, bright with
sunshine, begemmed with many a palace, park and lofty
church, slumbered the capital of Mexico, Venice-of-the-
Mountains. Not one of the fascinated soldiers but held his
breath ; and not one, testified the commander-in-chief, but
said to himself or his neighbor, "That splendid city shall soon
be ours !" 15
Along this part of the route almost 13,000 trees had been cut
down for barricades, and some of them had been placed in the
road ; but the Americans were not materially hindered, and in
crossing the lower slopes they found little to do except admire
the wondrous variety and profusion of the wild-flowers. On the
eleventh, seeing Mexicans ahead for the second time, Twiggs
waited for Quitman ; but a few hours later, after passing a
cross-road, he went on about four miles, and occupied the adobe
village of Ayotla, half-buried in olive trees, while Harney's
cavalry took post at San Isidro, a mile and a half in advance,
and Quitman camped in the rear. The next day Worth's
division turned to the left by the cross-road, marched three
miles and a half to the squalid little town of Chalco, simmering
THE APPROACH TO MEXICO 95
at the margin of the shallow, marshy lake bearing that name,
and finally halted a little distance beyond ; and Pillow camped
at Chimalpa, not far beyond Worth. 15
But what had the enemy been doing ? The people along the
route, who were to have stung the Americans day and night,
recognized the difference between them and the Mexican irreg-
ulars, welcomed them cordially, and gave them all possible
assistance. Canalizo who seems to have been cowed by the
disaster of Cerro Gordo, and some time before this had fled
from San Martin, with six hundred men at his back, on seeing an
American officer, detailed to arrange an exchange of prisoners,
approach with a small escort felt no desire to fight, besides
which most of his troops revolted or deserted ; and Governor
Isunza not only failed to assist him with men and means, but
flatly refused him a particular corps, expressly demanded by
the Executive at Mexico. 16
Alvarez, well-nigh a brigand, had always fought for his
own advantage, knew that all the other chief leaders were doing
this now, and, in addition to cherishing resentments against
Santa Anna, probably felt no craving to play a strictly inferior
part. Though he did not have all the men for whom he seems
to have been drawing rations, his force was important, and in
three particulars he obeyed his orders. He stationed himself
at the designated point on the flank of San Martin, kept beyond
the reach of Scott's artillery, and scrupulously refrained from
attacking the Americans on unfavorable terms ; but while he
made excuses bravely, and proposed valiant operations that
Santa Anna forbade as inconsistent with his general plan, he
retired some ten miles from the route on the plea that his ex-
hausted horses required pasturage. For probably similar reasons
Valencia quibbled and shirked ; his train of heavy guns
which, though needed in the fortifications, he would not give
up impeded his movements ; and so the only hostilities were
a trifling skirmish with irregulars, in which one American
trooper fell a victim to his own rashness. Thus ended, to his
deep disgust, the first chapter of Santa Anna's hopes. 16
Four lines of advance now offered themselves to Scott. By
taking the cross-road to the right he could have skirted Lake
Texcoco, passing the village of that name, and approached the
north or the northwest quarter of Mexico. But the route would
96 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
have been long, deficient in water and fuel, and circuitous;
it was defended by Valencia with an ample supply of artillery ;
a movement in that direction would have made surprise or
even sudden attack impossible for him ; at a pass near Guada-
lupe Hidalgo stood fortifications; and a march round these
would have involved another long circuit on exposed and un-
known ground. This route, therefore, was not seriously con-
sidered. On the other hand, after the most thorough investi-
gation, Scott had planned before leaving Puebla to take the
cross-road to the left, march along the southern shores of Lakes
Chalco and Xochimilco, and reach San Agustin, some ten miles
to the south of Mexico ; and it was for this reason that he placed
Worth, who was to lead the movement while Twiggs was to
menace Old Penon, near Chalco. 17
On reaching the ground, however, unfavorable reports about
this road were given by Mexican spies ; and the General, partly
for that reason and partly to mystify the enemy, reconnoitred
the Penon and also a fourth route, which led to the village of
Mexicaltzingo, about five miles from the city. In regard to
the Penon his engineers who pushed their investigations with
the utmost intrepidity, studied every foot of the red ledges
dripping with crimson gravel, and even penetrated behind the
hill decided that it could be carried, but only at a severe
loss; while the evidence concerning the fourth possibility led
to a substantially similar conclusion, supported by the addi-
tional objection, that apparently success would place the
Americans on difficult and unknown ground. At about the
same time Scott obtained further information regarding the
Chalco route, which seemed to justify the opinion formed at
Puebla. Consequently the orders to attack Mexicaltzingo
issued either because at the time Scott thought he should march
that way or because he desired to mislead the cunning Mexican
spies, who even gained the confidence of high American officers
were suddenly rescinded in the night of the fourteenth, and
the next day, though Twiggs continued to threaten the Penon
until the morning of the sixteenth, all the rest of the army,
headed by the cavalry and Worth's division, set out for San
Agustin, distant from Chalco some twenty-five miles. 17
For about half this distance the road was little more than
a narrow lane, with a lake or more properly a watery marsh
TO SAN AGUSTIN 97
on the right and bold foothills close on the left. Spaces of
firm ground there were. At one time venerable olive trees
formed an arch over the road; once the troops camped in a
fine grove, and some ledgy, rocky spurs had to be crossed. But
for much of the way, although the weather had been remarkably
dry for the midst of the rainy season, the story, as Scott had
anticipated, was "mud, mud, mud." Now and then a man
would slip and sink to his waist in a bog-hole; in places the
track was quite overflowed ; the chilly, torrential rains of almost
every afternoon increased the difficulties; and the labor of
getting several miles of wagons and heavy guns along such a
route was almost incredible. Besides, the troops had to be
ready at all hours for attack frontal, rear or flank. But
early in the afternoon of the seventeenth Harney and Worth's
advance reached San Agustin, a delightful place full of handsome
gardens and orchards ; and the next day the rest of the troops
joined them "ready," as a soldier put it, "for anything
except a thrashing." 18
But again, where were the Mexicans ? With so many works
to construct, Santa Anna could hardly be censured for leaving
unfortified especially as both an inner and an outer line were
made ready against any forces using it a route that seemed
to be quite impracticable for an army train; but he might
have placed upon it a few light guns and a body of skirmishers,
who could have embarrassed the Americans greatly. This,
however, with his usual over-confidence and faulty judgment,
he neglected to do. Yet he was not idle. On the fourteenth
he knew the Americans were talking of a march to San Agustin ;
and though he suspected this language might be a blind, he
not only sent additional forces to that quarter, but ordered
Alvarez to follow Scott, should such a movement occur, and
be ready to fall upon him bravely should he attack a fortified
position ; and when the movement actually began on the follow-
ing day, though Santa Anna misinterpreted its aim, he promptly
took further defensive steps on that line. 18
One result was a slight brush between Alvarez and Twiggs
after the latter moved from Chalco on the sixteenth ; but
Alvarez soon found so many difficulties in the road pursued
by the Americans and so little food or pasturage left in their
rear, that he once more abandoned his appointed field of
VOL.. II H
98 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
operations. Santa Anna would not break up his general plan
by sending strong detachments from the southern line; and
consequently Scott's march was merely annoyed by a few hun-
dred irregulars, who fired at intervals, rolled great stones down
the slopes, and cut ditches in the road, but broke from cover and
fled like scared rabbits when C. F. Smith's corps of light infantry
ran leaping and shouting across the hillsides. Thus ended the
second chapter of Santa Anna's hopes. 18
Meantime a precipitate rearrangement of the Mexican forces
took place. The President, after reconnoitring the American
advance, hastened to place himself between San Agustin and
Mexico. Troops were despatched from the Pefion to various
points on the southern front, and Valencia was ordered to
proceed by the way of Guadalupe Hidalgo to the same quarter.
But the former status could no more be restored than one could
put back the smoke of an exploded shell. The strongest
fortifications had been turned and rendered useless; and any
one could see that on the side now threatened, where a number
of causeways approached the city, the defence of it would
almost necessarily be weakened by a division of the garrison.
After such enthusiasm and such impatience to meet the enemy,
retirement unadorned with laurels or with even the stains of
combat produced a humiliating reaction in all hearts. 19
At Mexico the returning soldiers found empty streets, un-
tenanted balconies and bolted windows ; and the silent, sombre,
fearsome aspect of a besieged city enveloped and oppressed
them. Doubts as to Santa Anna's competence or loyalty,
which had slept but not died amidst the recent glorification
and his confident promises of "a splendid triumph," awoke.
People recalled that precisely when the enemy were moving
against Vera Cruz, the Mexican army had been led off into the
northern deserts ; and they hotly demanded why the engineers,
the laborers, the troops and the cannon had been massed at
Old Penon, where Scott could nullify them all by a turn of
the wrist. As if in answer, it was publicly stated that an
outpost had found a treasonable communication addressed by
the President of Mexico to the American commander; and
so ended Chapter III of Santa Anna's hopes. 19
XXVI
CONTRERAS, CHURUBUSCO
August, 1847
WHILE grievously disappointed by the collapse of his efforts
at Old Penon, Santa Anna felt by no means despondent regard-
ing his new line. Toward the south ran the great highway of
Acapulco 'along which numberless cargoes of silks, teas
and spices had approached guarded at about a mile from
the city by the gateway or garita of San Antonio Abad. Three
miles and a half beyond that garita the highway crossed a
bridge over Churubusco River, here practically a drainage
canal running between high embankments planted with maguey,
with Mexicaltzingo about a mile and a half distant at the left.
On the farther side of the river, a fifth of a mile southwest of
the bridge, stood a massive convent and church, skirted by
the rambling hamlet of Churubusco. Passing the church at a
distance of three hundred and fifty yards the highway veered
slightly toward the east, and some two and a quarter miles
from the river came to a great feudal hacienda named San
Antonio, adorned with trim silver poplars and Peruvian pepper
trees along the front of its buildings. A scant mile then brought
one to the similar but far less pretentious establishment of
Cuapa; and two scant miles more to San Agustm. 1 At
the Churubusco bridgehead and convent and at San Antonio,
where the erection of defences had begun some time before,
laborers could now be seen working particularly at San
Antonio like bees ; and with all possible haste guns, as
well as troops, were brought over from the Penon. Here, said
the President, he " desired to have the battle fought." 4
To increase his confidence, troops not only occupied Mexi-
caltzingo on the left, but in even stronger force guarded the
opposite flank. About three miles toward the south from
San Cosme, the western garita of Mexico, the traveller, passing
the fortified hill of Chapultepec on the right, found himself at
99
100
THE WAR WITH MEXICO
VALENCIA'S MOVEMENTS 101
the genial suburb of Tacubaya. Keeping on in the same
general direction for nearly six miles and traversing Mixcoac
at about half-way, one came to San Angel, a pretty but narrow
town of some importance on the skirt of the foothills. Two
miles from here toward the east at Coyoacan, a garden spot
loved by Cortez and Alvarado, the fine brigade of Perez, which
consisted of about 3500 infantry, was now placed; and at
San Angel itself a high military officer, followed by some
5500 troops 2 from Guadalupe, drove up in a coach about noon
on Tuesday, the seventeenth of August. The man was of
average height but unusually broad, with a bull-neck deep in
his shoulders, as if some person had tried to force a good idea
into his head with a pile-driver, a hard, cruel, domineering
look about his blue eyes, small side-whiskers, and a heavy
mustache. It was Valencia, whose imputed schemes and
intrigues had of late been keeping every tongue busy. 4
Valencia's instructions were to block the way from Coyoacan
to Tacubaya with men and works; but he mounted at once,
rode on south by the turnpike, passed Ansaldo a farmhouse
buried in its orchard, two miles and a half or so from San Angel
and a strong half-mile beyond it paused. On his right,
open ground sloped gradually back into a rounded hill, some
three or four hundred yards from the road ; and below him on
the left flowed a small but lively stream at the bottom of a
deep, wide ravine, near the opposite side of which stood the
adobe buildings of Padierna farm. 4
From this point a mule-path, barely practicable for horses,
wriggled off in the direction of San Agustin, here about four
miles distant in a straight line ; and covering the whole
intermediate plain from San Antonio and San Agustin on
the one side to Padierna and San Angel on the other, from
Coyoacan on the north to the mountains on the south ex-
tended a pedregal or lava bed, which looked as if a raging sea
of molten rock had instantly congealed, had then been filled
by the storms of centuries with fissures, caves, jagged points
and lurking pitfalls, and finally had been decorated with oc-
casional stunted trees and clumps of bushes. After pursuing
the mule-path for some distance, ordering a camp and batteries
established on the slope of the rounded hill, and instructing
experts to reconnoitre the ground thoroughly, Valencia re-
102 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
turned to his post; and in the evening, on learning from the
experts that four other paths one of them available for
artillery led from San Agustin to San Angel, he summarized
the reconnaissances in a letter to Santa Anna, complaining that
he had neither room to manoeuvre nor time to fortify where he
was, asking leave to change his position, and calling for 2000
more men. 4
The next day, Wednesday, the eighteenth, Santa Anna,
writing back that Scott intended to attack San Antonio,
ordered Valencia to place his troops at Coyoacan, and send
his artillery to Churubusco, a mile farther east. Valencia,
who by this time had placed a strong outpost on the mule-
path and sappers on the rounded hill, replied that Scott, striking
both at San Antonio and at San Angel, would push his thrust
in whichever direction he should find the easier, and that he
could not conscientiously leave the second point unguarded by
obeying those orders. Notes worthy of the most finished and
effusive pirates were then exchanged; and in the end Santa
Anna, who longed to remove his insubordinate general but
dared not, authorized 'him to do as he pleased and assume, of
course, the attendant responsibility. 3 Accordingly on Thurs-
day morning Valencia advanced with trumpets, drums and
flags to the rounded hill, and proceeded to array his forces.
A long, low, earthen parapet with an angle at the southern end
already faced Padierna, and five guns were in battery; but
the summit of the hill was neglected. 4
During this time the Americans were not inactive. Early on
Wednesday Scott directed Worth and Engineers Mason and
Tower, supported by Garland's brigade of infantry and a body
of dragoons, to reconnoitre San Antonio. 5 The task was
accomplished boldly and thoroughly; and they found the
place heavily defended, not only in the vicinity of the white
castle which formed the headquarters of the hacienda, but for
a long distance eastward where, moreover, the water-soaked
ground almost forbade approach and saw countless laborers
toiling hard upon the works. The presence of at least one
24-pounder was demonstrated, and other heavy cannon were
believed to be there. In Worth's opinion, the cost of making
a successful assault by the narrow, gun-swept causeway with
fascines and ladders would cripple the army. 6
SCOTT FEELS HIS WAY 103
Questioning peons through an interpreter, the officers learned
of a path which began at the highway near Cuapa, made a
circuit on the left through the pedregal, and apparently re-
turned to the highway some distance inside the works, and
this received careful attention; but the conclusion was, that
while infantry could filter through it, artillery could not pass ;
and to advance by such a route in the presence of a strong,
unshaken enemy, whose front and other flank could not be
attacked or seriously threatened, appeared worse than hazardous.
Even Scott felt rather depressed on hearing the reports, es-
pecially as fortifications were said to exist north of the hacienda.
The men, wagons and guns, all covered with mud, that lay
scattered about on the wet ground, seemed little indeed like a
conquering army. Except for some cattle, the army had only
four days' provisions ; the hard bread was already musty, and
the horses lacked forage. 6
Later, however, Lee and Beauregard brought somewhat
more promising information. To the hacienda of Pena Pobre,
a mile and a quarter from San Agustin toward the west, they
had found a good road ; and then, after proceeding about an
equal distance by a mule-path to the top of a sharp ridge, they
had seen the path continue to Padierna and the turnpike,
which lay in full view nearly a mile and a half away, and they
believed it possible to make a road by that line. Their escort
had routed a hostile corps of observation, and some men had
been seen at work on a rounded hill beyond the turnpike, but
no other Mexican forces appeared to be near. Indeed, it
seemed probable that much less adequate defences had been
provided here than on the great southern highway, and in
this direction Scott resolved to strike. "An enemy that halts,
vacillates, declines the battle offered him, makes a circuit,
hunts for a position and finds none to suit him is an enemy lost/*
exulted the Diario*
The next morning, August 19, therefore while Quitman
unwillingly remained at San Agustin to guard the base, 7 and
Worth, with his engineers and troops, continued to reconnoitre
and threaten on the San Antonio side Scott ordered a force
of engineers to build a road in the other direction. Pillow's
division was to furnish working-parties, and Twiggs's to clear
away whatever Mexican detachments might undertake to
104 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
hinder the operations; and the implied instructions were to
gain and hold the San Angel turnpike, so that San Antonio
could be turned. Scott did not expect or desire a general en-,
gagement at this time ; but he directed Pillow to take command
and employ both divisions, if a battle should be opened, promis-
ing that in such an event he would soon appear on the field.
Under these instructions the troops advanced cautiously but
rapidly the first mile and a quarter, constructed a road to the
summit of the ridge, pulled up the guns with drag-ropes, and
looked over. As the returning tide makes a sea in the Bay of
Fundy, where only bare ground had been visible a few hours
earlier, Valencia's army had taken possession. It was now one
o'clock, and evidently road-building was over for a while. 11
Pillow, however, knew all about winning victories. From
a central hill, Zacatepec, where he stood, he could measure
Valencia's forces to a nicety, and he decided to brush them
away. By his order the Mounted Rifles, particularly the ad-
vanced companies of Roberts and Porter, deployed quickly,
drove the Mexican skirmishers in a handsome style from rocks
and fissures, and finally occupied Padierna. At the same time
and under his instructions Magruder tall, blonde and intrepid
advanced his field battery nearly a mile without cover over
that almost impassable ground, which the enemy had now
barred with stone walls, planted it under the slight protection
of a transverse ledge, and not long after two o'clock opened a
duel with Mexican siege guns, 68-pound howitzers and many
lighter pieces, more than twenty in all, at a range of about
900 yards, while brave Callender fought the howitzer battery
beside him, dashing little Reno set off rockets, and Smith's
and Pierce's brigades, which were presently to attack Valencia's
camp, furnished support. And Pillow knew also how to "bag"
a defeated enemy. So he ordered Riley's brigade to the ex-
treme right to cooperate with the frontal attack by checking
reinforcements and cutting off Valencia's retreat. Then he
countermanded this order, but not in season. 11
Zigzagging, scrambling, leaping, and sliding as best they
could over about a mile of pedregal, Riley's brigade crossed
the stream and the turnpike, formed in the orchard of Ansaldo,
routed small bodies of lancers, passed through San Geronimo
an Indian village lying amid trees and ravines a quarter of
THE BATTLE OF CONTRERAS 105
a mile west of Ansaldo and about three times as far from
Valencia had a stiff but victorious brush with Torrejon
and three regiments of cavalry, defied Valencia's cannon, some
of which now faced this way, found cover at length in broken
ground between the village and his camp, and waited for the
Mexicans to be routed. But the major general commanding
failed in the prime essential of his plan, for he did not induce
Valencia to retreat. Badly crippled, the American batteries
became silent after an hour or so, the brigades that had ex-
pected to charge saw clearly they could accomplish nothing,
and Riley found himself isolated. So ended wretchedly the
first phase of the battle of Contreras, 8 Pillow's phase. 11
But by this time a second phase was taking shape. Pillow
himself perceived that Riley had been thrown into imminent
peril, and sent Cadwalader's brigade, which was followed by
the Fifteenth Infantry, to his support. Smith, useless where
he was and probably feeling little confidence in Pillow or Twiggs,
decided to regard himself as the senior officer present, gathered
his men, except those employed in skirmishing, and, with a
yell of endorsement from them, proceeded in the direction that
Riley had taken not, however, primarily to intercept Valen-
cia's retreat or reinforcements, but with a direct view to
attacking his left flank. At about the same time probably
by half-past three o'clock Scott himself joined Pillow and
other officers on Zacatepec, viewed with his usual battlefield
equanimity the desperate state of things, now spread before
him like a map on a table, studied Valencia's batteries, the
heavy ranks of supporting infantry and the long lines of cavalry
in the rear, and soon fixed upon woody San Geronimo
marked at a line distance of about a mile and three quarters
by its white steeple as the key to the situation, since it both
flanked and isolated Valencia, and ordered Shields's brigade
also, which had followed him from San Agustin, to that point. 11
Smith, arriving at San Geronimo about an hour before sunset,
found all of the commands, except Shields's, that had been
ordered to go there ; and he also found that Santa Anna, after
hurrying from San Antonio through Coyoacan and San Angel,
had placed himself with Perez's brigade and seven or eight
hundred cavalry and artillery on low hills about one half or
three quarters of a mile behind San Geronimo, and though
106 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
checked by Cadwalader's brigade was making ready to
attack. Smith at once began preparing to dispose of him,
while the Mexicans on the hills, after four or five guns arrived,
indulged in vivas, music and a little harmless cannonading;
but both commanders finally concluded that the hour was
now too late for a battle. Santa Anna also decided that an im-
passable ravine separated him from the Americans, and that
he could not prudently expose his men and arms to the rain then
imminent; and therefore, leaving his cavalry and artillery
behind, he put the rest of his forces under cover at San Angel. 11
Night and a storm now set in, but behind the curtain of
darkness four striking scenes were presented. Scott, the
general who seemed to have lost half his army all at once
without a battle, sat at headquarters anxious and helpless.
Seven times he despatched an officer to his isolated right with
orders, and seven times the officer failed to get through. But
still he waited patient, considerate for those about him,
hopeful and alert, reflecting no doubt that brave men, skilful
officers and the natural strength of San Geronimo would count.
Valencia, on the other hand, feeling that at last he had proved
Santa Anna a blunderer, and had forced him into the position
of a mere assistant, was jubilant, boastful and literally in-
toxicated. He reported grandly on his "brilliant day," and
scattered promotions as if already head of the state. 11
Santa Anna, devoured by passions and perplexities, now
sent Jose Ramiro to Valencia by a circuitous route with orders
to retreat at once. Not long afterwards two of Valencia's
aides reached San Angel, bringing news that, instead of being
exterminated, thousands of Americans were established in
the San Geronimo woods. Don't talk to me, Santa Anna cried
to the aides, who endeavored to excuse the situation ; Valencia
is an ambitious, insubordinate sot; he deserves to have his
brains blown out, and I will not expose my men to the storm
for him ; let him spike his guns, make the ammunition useless,
and retreat. When Ramiro arrived at the camp, Valencia
would not listen to his message, and fiercely demanded am-
munition and men; but when his aides reported, he saw his
doom. 9 "Traitor, he has sold us!" he cried, storming like
a madman in the midst of his troops. Soldiers heard and
echoed the cry. Women shrieked. Frightened horses broke
THE BATTLE OF CONTRERAS
107
loose and galloped into the night. Americans with lights are
creeping in behind us, reported Torrejon. The army under-
stood. Scouts were feeling the way. The price had been paid
to Santa Anna. Their blood would soon be claimed. 11
BATTLE OF CONTRERAS
Scale of Yards
6 100 200 300 400 500 WOO
A Riley's first formation for attack
B After crossing first barranca, faced to right Jlank
to turn second barranca
C Change of direction
D One column, just deployed and advancing
F Magruder's Battery > A
G Calender's Battery 5 g ~
H American line of march
In ignorance of all these outside events the Americans at
San Geronimo, too exhausted to eat, bore the torrents of chill-
ing, beating rain without fires and in darkness as best they
could. Some found huts, but most of them lay in the mud or
stood up under trees. Smith's and Riley's men occupied the
lanes, and Shields's brigade, which stumbled in at about mid-
night, put up in the road and an orchard. Officers fared like
108 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
privates. In such a plight, the troops listened for hours to
the music and vivas of the enemy, and for their own part could
only reflect on the painful and fruitless exertions of the day
and on the prospects of the morrow. Without cavalry, with-
out cannon, without reserves of provisions or ammunition,
without hope of quarter, they felt that with some 4200 men
they might have to face 25,000 exultant Mexicans and any
amount of artillery at daybreak. But everybody believed in
General Smith. 10 "Here he is!" "Now we'll have them I"
Riley's soldiers had cried on seeing Smith arrive; and the
confidence was not misplaced. 11
During the afternoon a ravine leading toward Valencia's
rear had been found. Smith seized upon the hint at once,
and proposed to attack by that route before daybreak with
bayonets only; a conference of officers agreed to his plan;
it was decided to notify Scott, and suggest that a diversion
be made on Valencia's front at the proper time; Lee under-
took the almost impossible feat of carrying this message across
the pedregal; and Officers Tower and Brooks, whose lights
probably occasional matches Torrejon had reported,
were sent off to study the ravine, and prepare to be the guides.
As Santa Anna was expected to attack early, Shields accepted
the charge of building fires in the morning as if no Americans
had left the ground, and holding San Geronimo. 11
Two hours after midnight the troops were roused, and at
three o'clock Riley began to move. But it was tedious work
to marshal the scattered corps in the darkness and rain by touch
and whisper, and morning broke before the last were out of
the village. The ravine branched deceptively; it was full of
rocks, too; and the watery clay, a soldier said, slipped like
"soft soap." Finally, however, the units closed up at about
a mile from San Geronimo, and, partially hidden in a fog,
scrambled up to firm ground behind a low hill. As it was now
light, the firearms were put in order ; and with quick adaptation
to the topography, the present arrangement of the Mexicans
and their probable movements, General Smith marshalled and
instructed the troops. 11
Riley's brigade, about 1300 strong, was to be the storming
party. Cadwalader's in halves formed a wing on each side
to keep off cavalry. A part of Smith's, together with the
THE BATTLE OF CONTRERAS 109
engineer company, was directed to slip along behind elevated
ground, and fall upon the flank or rear of a Mexican force
posted in advance; and the rest of it, marching by the left,
was ordered to strike the camp and a large body of lancers
on the flank. Even the possibility of a rear attack from
Santa Anna, supposed to be still where he had been seen the
evening before, was provided against. Meanwhile the troops
that had remained in the pedregal, assembled as well as possible
by Twiggs and Lee during the latter part of the night, in
accordance with orders from Scott, watched and waited near
Padierna under Colonel Ransom of the Ninth Infantry. 11
Finally a slightly round-shouldered man, with blue eyes, a
sandy mustache and sandy hair, walked slowly to the front
and looked at his watch. It was about six o'clock. "Are
you ready?" he asked in a cheery voice. "Ready!" the
troops answered with a meaning smile. He gave them a keen
glance. "Men, forward!" he then ordered, for it was General
Smith. "Forward, forward!" flew the command through
the ranks, and ahead they went. 11
Struck on front and rear General Mendoza's advanced corps
fired without aiming, turned and bolted ; but Ransom's men,
darting across the ravine, gave Valencia something else
something he fancied more serious than Smith's approach
to think about. Only a pair of 6-pounders bore on Riley, and
they fired high. Soon the Mexicans at the breastwork, ex-
changing shots wildly with Ransom, found that bullets were
coming from behind, leaped over the parapet and fled. At-
tacked by Smith's men, the lancers gave way and upset the
rest of the infantry; and Riley's column, deployed as well
as time and the ground would allow, bore down like a flood.
All was now confusion in the camp : infantry, horse, artillery,
mules, women, laborers in a mob. Some of the gunners re-
mained at their pieces chained to them, it was said but,
like the infantry, they aimed little; and almost in a moment,
like a bag turned upside down, the camp was empty of all
the Mexicans who could get away. Again General Smith
drew out his watch. "It has taken just seventeen minutes,"
he remarked. 11
Riley's brigade halted to secure the prisoners and the spoils,
among which to the frantic delight of the soldiers were
110 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
the two cannon lost so nobly at Buena Vista; but the rest of
the victorious troops pursued the enemy to San Angel; and
the Mexicans fleeing by the turnpike toward Ansaldo, cannon-
aded from their own camp and running the gantlet of Smith,
Ransom and even Shields, who had moved down toward the
road, fared badly. Others, including Torrejon and a large
part of the cavalry, managed by taking rough paths to reach
San Geronimo and the hills. Valencia also escaped ; but Salas,
who tried to check the flight, was captured. Seven hundred
Mexicans fell, it was estimated ; over eight hundred were made
prisoners ; the captured cannon, including the best that Santa
Anna had, and the captured ammunition proved invaluable;
and the cost, as reported by Scott, was not over sixty Ameri-
cans killed and wounded. 11
Nor were such the only consequences of this lightning-stroke.
Santa Anna, having at length decided to rescue Valencia and
raised his forces to at least 7000 by drawing Rangel's reserve
brigade from the city, had set out at daybreak for his position
of the night before; but when in sight of Valencia's camp he
learned from flying soldiers that all was over, and that his
outer line of defences had failed. Angrily striking at fugitives
with his whip he turned back, and waited near San Angel for
a while, unable to decide anything. Then he sent Rangel to
guard the southwest section of Mexico, despatched orders to
evacuate San Antonio and Mexicaltzingo, and marched with
the rest of his forces to Churubusco. Here priceless time was
spent in raving against Valencia whom he ordered shot at
sight in a passion that almost crazed him. His dominant
idea now, so far as he could think at all, was to make the capital
a second Troy ; and, probably with that in view, he set Perez's
brigade in motion toward the city. 12
After a time, however, reason gained the better of despera-
tion, and seeing the necessity of protecting the retreat of the
San Antonio garrison, he ordered General Rincon, who was ably
seconded by Anaya, to hold the Churubusco convent as long
as possible, garrisoned the bridgehead with one of Perez's
regiments, extended two others far down behind the embank-
ment of the river eastwardly, used a part of the remaining two
as a line from the bridgehead to the convent, and stationed
the rest on the highway behind. 12
AFTER THE BATTLE OF CONTRERAS
111
The convent position included, besides the building proper,
a strong church with a parapeted roof, a high stone enclosure
provided on the inside with scaffolds for troops, a broad, wet
ditch, two outside bastions facing Coyoacan, unfinished but
strong breastworks on the west and south, two detached adobe
huts pierced with embrasures on their southwest sides, four
8-pounders, three smaller guns, and for garrison some 1500
or 1800 men, consisting of the Mexico battalions named Inde-
pendencia and Bravos, the San Patricio contingent of American
deserters or most of it, and some detachments of other corps;
BATTLE OF
CHURUBUSCO
while the bridgehead, a powerful, scientifically constructed
work, with four feet of water in the ditch and three heavy
cannon, appeared to defy attack. Surveying this excellent
position Santa Anna recovered some of his courage, and began
work actively to complete the fortifications near the bridge.
The untried militia at the convent w r ere almost in despair when
they found themselves in the forefront, but he promised to aid
them at the critical time. 12
Scott, for his part, left San Agustin before he knew how
Smith's plan had worked out, met the news on the pedregal,
kept on to San Angel, and near that place, amid tumultuous
cheering, took command of Pillow's and Twiggs's divisions. 13
112
THE WAR WITH MEXICO
The road to Mexico by way of Tacubaya lay open, but he
could not move now in that direction and leave Worth, Quit-
man, the artillery, the baggage, the stores and the sick to join
him as best they could, exposed as it was believed to
some 25,000 Mexicans. The first needful step was to capture
San Antonio and reunite his army. Worth had already been
directed, after the rout of
Valencia became known, to
attack and also turn that
position whenever he should
learn that Pillow and
Twiggs had gained its rear ;
and as a cross-road led
from San Antonio to Coyo-
acan, Coyoacan was the
proper point of concentra-
tion. Scott therefore went
there with his troops, and
sent Lee, strongly escorted
by dragoons and Mounted Rifles, to reconnoitre the enemy and
give the preconcerted signal for Worth's advance. Further
to assist that general, Pillow with Cadwalader's brigade was
now ordered down the cross-road. 14
Worth did not, however, wait for assistance. At about
eleven o'clock he sent Colonel Clarke's brigade the Fifth,
Sixth and Eighth Infantry and Brevet Colonel C. F. Smith's
battalion from Cuapa to turn San Antonio by the path on the
left hand and cut off retreat, and placed Garland, accompanied
by Duncan's battery, in a somewhat sheltered spot, as near
as possible to the fortifications, with orders to advance on
hearing the other brigade at work. Clarke's tortuous path
seemed to be three miles long, and as it lay for two thirds of
the distance in the pedregal, where the troops had to slide and
scramble in single file, two hours were occupied in the march.
The Mexicans, therefore, warned by seeing this movement
which they vainly attempted to check as well as ordered
by Santa Anna to retire, made the utmost efforts, after spiking
some of their guns, to escape with the rest of them. But the
garrison of San Antonio and the neighboring fortifications,
which consisted of the Hidalgo and Victoria battalions of
THE BATTLE OF CHURUBUSCO 113
Mexico and some other militia, were wholly unfitted to execute
a difficult retreat in the face of the enemy. Not far from its
middle Clarke struck their column; and while the first part,
led by General Bravo, kept on toward Churubusco bridge,
the second broke up and scattered. 15
By this time Garland, having found by pushing a company
forward that San Antonio had been evacuated, hastened on
to unite with Clarke. The enemy were quickly driven from
fortifications of a minor importance at Sotepingo, and the
division then rushed for-
ward after Bravo, while the
Mexicans a mass of cav-
alry, infantry and artillery,
Ditch
-so feet-
, mules, women, ser-
vants, carriages and camp-
followers made all pos-
sible speed. Owing to the TETE DE PoNT -
fv ,1 Profile of east curtain.
effects of the rains, two
Mexican guns and a number of wagons were mired on the
way; and near the Churubusco bridge Perez's brigade, hard
pressed by the Americans from San Angel, crowded in upon
the stream of fugitives. 15
So it happened that when Engineer Stevens climbed the
church tower of Coyoacan at about noon to reconnoitre, he
observed a large body of Mexican troops pouring along the
highway from San Antonio. Apparently Santa Anna was
drawing all his forces to the city. Dense fields of corn six feet
high or more almost hid the works at the convent. Perceiving,
however, the nose of a bastion, Stevens concluded there might
be one gun at that point, which he thought could be rushed;
and a prisoner mentioned only two guns. The entire American
army, reacting from the gloom of the previous evening, exultant
over Smith's victory, and almost intoxicated by the change
from storm to splendid sunshine, was now feeling invincible,
eager and over-confident. Stevens merely shared the con-
tagion; his report precipitate and misleading, as he fully
admitted later signified that without loss of a moment the
San Antonio garrison ought by all means to be intercepted;
and so Scott did what we know it had not been his intention
to do : ordered Twiggs immediately to the convent and high-
VOL. II I
114
THE WAR WITH MEXICO
way by the direct road. "Make haste, my sons," he called
to the troops, "or they will be gone before you reach them !" 16
At his instance and by way of precaution, engineers were
sent on to make investigations; but, as the case appeared
simple and urgent, the investigating and the fighting began
hastily together. In a haphazard way the Mounted Rifles,
or. at least a part of them, became engaged; then the First
Artillery advanced ; and soon
the rest of Smith's brigade
the Third Infantry besides
the engineer company and
Taylor's battery were thrown
in. Rincon, a gray-haired
Spanish veteran, deceived our
generals, for he desired to
save ammunition, and there-
fore did not open his artil-
lery fire till the Americans had come within musket range.
To pause after the conflict began would have chilled the
ardor of the troops and encouraged the enemy. Victory or
defeat were the only alternatives, and a defeat could not be
thought of. 16
Victory did not arrive, however ; so now the Second and the
Seventh Infantry, led by Riley, attacked the Mexican right.
Amidst the corn the American infantry became scattered, yet
in the same haphazard way fought on ; and Taylor, placed
in a very exposed position before the state of things was under-
stood, fired at short musket range with beautiful precision and
rapidity. But the Mexicans, inspired by good leaders and by
the example of the American deserters, who aimed the cannon,
stood their ground. From parapets and bastions poured sheets
of unceasing flame, sally followed sally, and guns at the bridge-
head cooperated. In an hour and a half Taylor drove the
enemy from the walls and from the roof of the church, but he
lost twenty-four men and fourteen horses killed and wounded.
The battery had to be withdrawn, and victory seemed almost
beyond reach. 16
Worth had now been attacking the bridgehead for half an
hour or more. Hurrying the troops along, without giving them
definite instructions, at a speed limited only by their wind and
THE BATTLE OF CHURUBUSCO 115
the obstacles in their way, he had left the Sixth Infantry on
the highway, placed the Fifth and the Eighth at the right of 'it,
and sent the rest of his infantry obliquely against the Mexican
left; and then, without a reconnaissance of the bridgehead,
the Sixth was ordered to charge whatever lay in its front. 15
Probably the army contained no better corps, but it recoiled
twice in confusion under a terrific storm of iron and lead.
Valor was not lacking, but the men were dumfounded to come
"butt-end first," as a soldier put it, upon such a fort so strongly
held, when they had supposed they were chasing a parcel of
rabbits; and their numbers were unequal to the task. Officers
as well as men showed every sign of panic. The regiment
could not be kept on the highway ; and the troops in the tall
corn on the right accomplished no more. The ground was soft
there ; and it was cut up with dikes and with deep, wide ditches
containing about three feet of water. The men fought, but
they fought in general disorder. C. F. Smith found himself
with not more than twenty of his battalion at hand. Even
the artillery, the backbone of the army, failed now, for Dun-
can's light pieces could not challenge the bridgehead squarely
on the highway, and the ground beside it was unsuitable for
them ; while occasional fire from the convent and the ex-
plosion of an ammunition wagon abandoned by the Mexicans
added to the difficulties. 15
At the same time, besides these two combats which Scott
had not expected, one planned by him was taking place. A
few minutes after sending Twiggs toward Churubusco he
ordered Pierce and presently Shields also to follow a
road leading north from Coyoacan, cross Churubusco River,
and move toward Santa Anna's rear, so as to protect the Ameri-
can flank and rear, favor the attack on the convent, and cut
off the retreat of the Mexicans. The route adopted by the
troops after leaving the road took them for a mile and a half
through cornfields and marshes, and placed them near the
highway, about three quarters of a mile north of the bridge-
head, not far from the hacienda of Los Portales. To parry
the blow Santa Anna at once moved in that direction with the
Fourth Ligero, the Tulancingo regiment and most of the
Eleventh Line, his finest corps, extending his men perhaps
2200 in all until they almost overlapped the Americans;
116 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
while some 1500 or 2000 cavalry, probably consisting of the
horse that had followed him to San Angel reinforced by that
which had escaped from Contreras, menaced though afraid
to attack Shields's left. 17
Precisely what occurred now cannot be stated, for apparently
most of the reporting officers were more anxious to conceal than
to disclose facts; but it seems clear that Shields handled the
men clumsily, that his own regiments fell into disorder when
charging and shrank from the devouring Mexican fire, and that
Pierce's brigade, composed of excellent material but officered
to a large extent with political favorites, actually skulked.
The Mexicans, on the other hand, finding two ditches along
the highway to protect them from the dreaded bayonet and
an embankment to screen them somewhat from bullets, fought
stiffly. Shields was therefore unable, with his six hundred
good men and two small howitzers, to make any impression,
and after a time his troops huddled wherever they could in
the shelter of some buildings. 17
But finally, between three and four o'clock, the spell broke.
Worth's men, though astonished and for a time dismayed, had
no thought of giving up. "Victory or death" was not a phrase
to them, but a conviction. Though dikes, ditches, bad ground,
corn higher than their heads, and the Mexican artillery fire
broke up their organization, personal courage and personal
leadership survived. In smaller or larger groups they fought
on. Santa Anna, by taking the Fourth Ligero from Perez
to defend the rear, deducted half the strength of his left wing,
and no doubt Shields's operations, very suggestive of the
American methods used in previous battles, tended to make
the troops at the bridgehead nervous. Gradually a part of
the unlucky Sixth and men of C. F. Smith's and Garland's
commands, working toward the extreme American right, out-
reached the enemy, crossed the river, turned the Mexican line,
and moved on toward the highway. This created great alarm.
The fate of Valencia was recalled. Many of the officers wilted.
Ammunition seems partially to have failed; and at length,
under a still galling fire, some of the Eighth Infantry, followed
by more of the Fifth, waded the ditch of the bridgehead -
twenty feet bread it was climbed over the parapet or pushed
through the embrasures, and settled the question hand to hand. 15
THE BATTLE OF CHURUBUSCO 117
At once Duncan planted two of his guns on the highway
near the convent, and for ten or fifteen minutes, aided by a
piece or two at the bridgehead, he fired with a judgment,
rapidity and accuracy that delighted the on-lookers. By this
time two of Rincon's guns at the right of the convent and
one of the other pieces had become unserviceable; the am-
munition, so lavishly expended, had failed the infantry; and
the loss of the bridgehead, which stood on higher and com-
manding ground, was recognized as a most serious blow. The
artillery commandant began to move a cannon from the front
side to the right. Only two guns were in play on the front;
and our Third Infantry, noting the slackened fire, dashed over
the parapet at the left of the convent. Still the American
deserters would not permit a white flag to be shown, and the
garrison retired sullenly to the interior of the building. But
Captain J. M. Smith, seeing that active resistance was over,
now put up a white handkerchief himself to prevent further
bloodshed. The signal of surrender stopped Duncan's work,
too; and the Mexicans, astonished by the consideration shown
them, laid down their arms. 18
Perez and Bravo with a large part of the troops were now on
the way to Mexico via Mexicaltzingo and Old Penon, and
others were taking flight along the highway, pursued by Worth's
division. Shields perceived what was occurring, and harangued
his brigade. "The South Carolinians will follow you to the
death," answered the "Tigers," as they were called by Scott.
Many, if not all, of the New Yorkers joined them; Pierce's
officers mustered pluck enough to guard the left; and once
more a charge was made. It proved no easy work, though, even
now. First and last more than a third of Shields's brigade were
killed or wounded. Brave, handsome Butler, commanding
the Tigers, and his lieutenant colonel went down, and Colonel
Burnett of the New Yorkers fell. But at last Shields carried
the day, captured nearly four hundred Mexicans, and met
Worth's cheering van on the highway. 17
All joined then in the pursuit, supported with a captured
6-pounder and a howitzer, and took liberal toll as they went,
until, after charging nearly two miles, they were halted by
Worth. Orders from the commander-in-chief to the same
effect soon arrived. Four companies of dragoons under
118 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
Harney were permitted, however, to keep on, and when the
sight of a battery led him to pull up, Captain Kearny of the
First resolved to charge the guns, and galloped ahead. 19
" Oh, what a glorious sight it was to see Phil Kearny riding
into them ! " wrote a soldier. His own troop were picked men ;
they rode picked horses all iron-gray that now seemed
endowed with supernatural strength ; and his other troop
were fit comrades. Standing quite upright in the stirrups they
looked like centaurs. Little by little the rear fours, hearing
the trumpet sound the recall, dropped off ; but the leader and
about a dozen others kept on like a swift vessel, dashing the
billows of humanity right and left. The battery, which stood
at the garita, fired upon friend and foe alike. Still the little
group arrived there, leaped from their horses to carry it, and
found that they were alone. The panic of the enemy,
however, saved them. Tearing loose and springing into the
saddle, they got away. But a grape-shot was faster than
Kearny ; and so, losing an arm but winning a brevet, he finished
valiantly the battle of Churubusco. 19
Santa Anna's total loss for the day the killed, the wounded
and especially the missing may be roughly estimated as
10,000. He admitted that he lost more than a third of his
men. After he was able to find where he stood (August 30)
the Army of the East contained 11,381 privates. Alvarez had
2447 privates (August 26) ; and, besides remnants of Valencia's
troops, there were doubtless many small bodies of militia.
Scott estimated the Mexicans killed and wounded as 4297,
and 2637 prisoners, including eight generals, were reported;
while the American ordnance was more than trebled, and the
scanty stock of ammunition enormously increased. Out of
-8497 engaged in the two battles, we lost fourteen officers and
119 privates killed, sixty and 805 respectively wounded, and
some forty of the rank and file missing, who probably lost
their lives'! 20
The high moral qualities displayed by our troops made the
day glorious, as Hitchcock said, "in the highest degree"; and
the army, naturally overestimating the numbers of the enemy,
felt exceedingly proud. Scott, riding about the field, gray
and massive, was hailed by the troops as the very genius of
power and command.
AFTER THE BATTLE OF CHURUBUSCO 119
" Never did mightier man or horse
Stem a tempestuous torrent's course,"
they felt; and when he addressed them with the eloquence of
a soldier's heart, it seemed as if the cheers that followed must
have shaken the "Halls." Nature, however, appeared to view
the situation differently. The mountains above Padierna
wrinkled their foreheads with still deeper furrows, or knit
them with still darker scowls. Dense black clouds, preceded
by gleaming heralds, rushed suddenly across the sky. Light-
ning flashed in sheets. Thunders rolled until the earth seemed
to tremble. Torrents of rain deluged the ground; and in a
little while, almost like something heavy and solid, night
swiftly and prematurely descended. 21
XXVII
NEGOTIATIONS
May, 1846-September, 1847
AFTER fighting ceased, the Americans found temporary
quarters wherever they could. Most of Shields 's command
occupied Los Portales "in a most deplorable condition," and
Worth's division remained at the same point or in Churubusco.
Some of Pillow's men retired to San 'Antonio, and there passed
the night without rations, blankets, fires or lights, while others
moved across to Mixcoac. A part of Twiggs's lay in a muddy
field without shelter, while the rest made their way to Coyoacan
or San Angel. Some of the troops, covered with sticky mud,
slept in a barn on straw, and acquired an extremely curious
appearance. For all it was a hard night, and perhaps hardest
for the officer on guard. The hours crawled. Thoughts of the
battle, the morrow and the distant home barely stirred his
leaden brain. Every instant, drowsiness threatened to become
stupor. Now and then a sentry's challenge, the snort of a horse,
the blast of a bugle roused him with a start. At last came a
streak in the east. He called the drummer, and ordered him
to " beat off." Instantly the sharp roll was taken up by others.
The bustle of men awoke; and the troops were alive again.
Joy and pride welled up in their hearts, but the sadness of
bereavement also and a sense of disappointment. They seemed
to have won the race but lost the prize. Why had they not
slept in the city ? 1
There were adequate military reasons for this. It was be-
lieved that Santa Anna still had some 20,000 men, and what
fortifications defer ded the interior of Mexico no one pretended
to say. Three surprises had met the Americans during the past
forty-eight hours. They had sick and wounded, prisoners,
wagons and captured material to look after. They were
120
AMERICAN EFFORTS TO MAKE PEACE 121
scattered, unmunitioned, spent. Not a few had become ill.
In spite of Scott's precise orders to carry rations a large number
had gone hungry for about a day, and many had fasted longer.
The stock of provisions had practically been exhausted. If
repulsed, the troops would have faced starvation ; if successful,
they would have been a disorganized mass of ravenous, in-
furiated soldiers in a hostile city. Almost all, even officers,
were eager for a revel in the "Halls" ; they would largely have
scattered for something to eat and something to drink ; many
would soon have been intoxicated; and fearful scenes, costly
alike to them and the inhabitants, would have disgraced the
victory and imperilled the army. 1
Besides, the aim of the United States was peace ; it appeared
certain that in view of the battle just won the Mexicans would
be disposed to offer acceptable terms ; and resident Americans
as well as neutrals had assured Scott that by taking the city,
breaking up the government, dispersing the sensible and sub-
stantial men who desired a settlement, and perhaps rousing the
people to desperation, he would be defeating his own govern-
ment. On the other hand, as the General had reckoned before
leaving Puebla, the presence of a victorious American army
waiting at the gate seemed likely to excite intense fears of
slaughter and sack, and prove a most effective argument
for negotiation. Consequently, though sure he could break
his way in, Scott deliberately sacrificed military glory, and
halted. The wish to end hostilities was the dominant con-
sideration ; and, fully to understand this, we must now place
ourselves at Washington, and then return to our present point
by a singularly winding route. 1
Both in his war Message of May 11, 1846, and later, Polk
announced that he would be ready to negotiate whenever
Mexico would make or even hear propositions ; and he sought
a listening ear with a persistence due to several causes : a real
des're to end the war, a naive ignorance of Mexican psychology,
the exigencies of home politics and foreign relations, a natural
predilection on his own part and on Buchanan's for schemes
and tactics, and behind all a sincere wish, in accordance with
pur long-standing sentiment and policy, for the prosperity
and friendship of the sister republic. Taylor was therefore
instructed to place himself on confidential terms, if possible,
122 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
at the Mexican headquarters with a view to bringing about
negotiations; and in line with this policy Worth, while at
Saltillo, offered pleasant sentiments -to Santa Anna on the
subject of peace. 2
T*he battles on the Rio Grande and the unwelcome effects
of the blockade tended to sober Mexico, as did the aloofness
of Great Britain ; and Marcy counted not a little on the settle-
ment of the Oregon question. Intimations were received
from Consul Black in June and July, 1846, that not only all
thoughtful citizens but Paredes himself desired to reach an
agreement. Bravo and his Cabinet, who temporarily assumed
the reins of government, felt more strongly in the same way,
and were more free to act; other signs also pointed in that
direction ; and it was hoped that Santa Anna, should he regain
power, would favor peace. T*he American administration,
on the other hand, felt much embarrassed by the unexpected
seriousness of the problems involved in the conflict. So on
the twenty-seventh of July Buchanan addressed the Mexican
minister of relations, waiving as undesirable all discussion
upon the causes of the war, and inviting negotiations in the
most conciliatory manner. 4
But the government of Salas, which received this overture,
had attacked Paredes for slackness in prosecuting the hostilities ;
and he now counted upon this issue for maintaining the power
it had given him. Besides, wrote Bankhead, the Mexicans
were still confident they could hold their own against the
United States ; and the war spirit ran so strongly that Santa
Anna, returning from exile to treat, remained to fight. 3 Rejon,
therefore, answering Buchanan in a lofty and cutting strain,
refused to ignore the causes of the war, and only promised
that Congress, on meeting in December, would take the matter
up. In other words, as an American newspaper observed, he
said in effect : We are sorry that you feel so tired of the cam-
paign ; as for ourselves, we are quite comfortable. The reply
was not one to fire the popular heart of the United States;
and without committing Mexico to anything, it required our
Executive to prepare for a long and arduous contest. Nor was
Salas reassuring when he laid the subject before Congress.
"If Mexico fights with constancy and courage, hers will be
the triumph," he proclaimed, and therefore the government
AMERICAN EFFORTS TO MAKE PEACE 123
has not desired to hear proposals of peace. Polk answered
Rejon by ordering the hostilities to be conducted more harshly,
and by announcing in his Message at the beginning of December
that an indemnity covering the costs of the war, as well as our
claims, would be required ; but the Mexican Congress did
nothing. 4
. About a week after Buchanan addressed the minister of
relations in July, Polk recommended to Congress a naive
measure admirably fitted to embarrass peace negotiations
as much as it was intended to facilitate them. This was an
appropriation of $2,000,000 to be used in that business for
"extraordinary expenses." Probably the measure, vigorously
though confidentially pressed by the Executive, would have
passed ; but. Senator Davis killed it by speaking against time.
In the following session a similar proposition granting three
millions came up about the middle of January, 1847, and on
.March 3, after every Congressman with a voice had talked
himself out, it was carried. The natural result followed.
Even at our Capitol there were open though false charges
that bribery was contemplated, and to the Mexican that design
seemed of course transparently plain. No public man who
cares for his reputation can vote for peace now, said the Diario. 6
The sentiment in favor of offering to treat with our weak
and unfortunate neighbor as illustrated by formal action
in Rhode Island and New York, for example was in fact
strong. Even the British minister at Washington recognized
that the feeling in the Senate was " entirely in favor of generous
and pacific measures towards Mexico." Such Whigs as Web-
ster and Winthrop demanded that a commission be sent;
Benton favored that idea; and about the middle of January,
1847, it was powerfully supported by Atocha, who presented
himself at the capital. This cunning and perfectly unscru-
pulous intriguer, who had been expelled by Santa Anna's
enemies in 1845 because he represented the dictator's corrupt
financial methods and then by Santa Anna himself in September,
1846, because he knew too much about the Liberator's dealings
with Mackenzie, readily proved his intimacy with leading
Mexicans, created the belief that he was the government's
peace agent, induced our administration to propose on January
18 a meeting of American and Mexican commissioners at
124 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
Jalapa or Havana, and was made the bearer of Buchanan's
despatch to the minister of relations. 6
Undoubtedly, though invested with no diplomatic functions,
Atocha was expected to do much personally; but in this he
totally failed. At Vera Cruz the people attempted to murder
him. At Mexico he was ordered to leave almost immediately,
and was prevented from talking with any person of influence ;
and such use as he contrived to make of the pen, in suggesting
terms of peace to Rejon, proved utterly fruitless. In short,
the American messenger was handled with tongs, and he was
back at Washington about the twentieth of March with an
offensively worded note, refusing to treat until all Mexican
lands and waters should be evacuated by our forces. Clearly
this was a most unhappy overture. 6
Many circumstances combined to inspire such boldness on
the part of our antagonist. Aside from the personal interest
of many public men in continuing the war, and the belief,
prompted by vanity and encouraged by specious arguments,
both domestic and European, that natural defences, latent
resources and the military ardor of brave citizens fighting for
their homes would enable her to beat untrained money-grub-
bers and "cowardly adventurers," operating far from their
base aside from all this, hatred of "the rapacious invader/'
a fear that peace would only lead to fresh demands and fresh
encroachments, and the fine theory that no people struggling
for their independence could be vanquished exerted a strong
influence. 7
The fact that an actual occupation of California would have
to be reckoned with could hardly be faced. To make peace
without first gaining a victory seemed humiliating, sure to be
disadvantageous, and likely to make dispirited Mexico the
sport and prey of the whole world; and Santa Anna in par-
ticular felt strongly on this point, because his personal future
as well as the cause of the nation required some show of success.
No peace is possible now except the peace of the grave
national and racial extinction it was insisted. Many
reasoned that Polk, to satisfy the United States, would have
to demand, as matters stood, a huge indemnity. Why regret
a war that is bringing so much gold into the country; a war
that will overthrow Santa Anna, the corruptionists, the in-
WHY MEXICO WOULD NOT TREAT 125
triguers, the military men and the sham patriots; a war that
will put an end to extortion and finally unite all the good ele-
ments of the nation, demanded not a few; and why make
sacrifices to stop it, when peace will bring civil wars, which are
worse ? 7
Better subjugation than surrender, cried some in desperation ;
while others believed that an American conquest and an-
nexation would extinguish privilege and monopoly, set up a
pure democracy, ensure stability and order, bring in a flood
of enterprising northerners, and make the country prosper.
The clergy in particular, anxious to preserve their property
and their ease, felt rather more than willing to accept such a
denouement. On the other hand, many believed that our
people neither would nor could bear for any length of time
the expense of the contest. This was the key to Rejon's policy,
as he told the Spanish minister. It was, therefore, only neces-
sary to protract the war a little meanwhile allowing the
wrath of Heaven time to pass away in order to reach the very
pinnacle of glory. 7
European journals offered much encouragement. Mexico
need only be obstinate, advised the London Times, and it
seemed a most agreeable prescription. The United States
cannot long maintain the necessary troops, predicted the
Globe. The Americans are tired of the war, need peace more
than Mexico, have no disciplined soldiers, cannot follow up
their successes, and with good reason dread British inter-
ference, remarked some of the French papers. Even more sig-
nificant were expressions coming from the United States.
Hold fast, and you can make "a brilliant treaty," said a letter.
All are disgusted with the hostilities, and in four years this
country will kneel and pray for peace, declared others. Per-
sistent American denunciations of the war as dishonorable
made the idea of submission look shameful to our enemies.
No nation as brave and numerous as the Mexicans have ever
been conquered, announced the New York Express. The
American treasury will soon be empty, predicted the National
Intelligencer; and that influential paper endorsed the view
that our antagonist could wear us out. Calhoun used all his
powers to show that it would be "folly" to push the war, and
ruin to push it successfully. Still more encouraging were the
126 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
Whig orators. In the voice of doom Webster threatened the
President with impeachment; and Corwin exclaimed, "Call
home your army ; I will feed and clothe it no longer." Reports
of a Whig revolution circulated at Mexico ; and the belief,
accepted by many in Europe also, that at any rate the Whigs
would soon come into power and reverse the policy of the
American government, was confidently entertained by our
foes. 7
But nothing proved so comforting, so cheering, as the con-
duct of our government. The call for 12-months volunteers
appeared to indicate the limit of our endurance, and invited
procrastination. Folk's assurances, following so many earlier
assurances from American Presidents, that for our own sake
we desired Mexico to be strong, prosperous and friendly, im-
plied that we did not intend to crowd her far. Our conciliatory
language and repeated efforts to negotiate were noted as clear
signs of weakness. The employment of an agent like Atocha
seemed a confession of impotence; and the appropriation of
three millions for secret expenses in order to obtain peace, as
El Republicano put it, looked like throwing up the sponge.
Polk wishes to exchange a bad war for a good bargain, sneered
Le Constitutionnel of Paris. An extension of our boundary
was believed to be one aim of the negotiations we urged ; and
the Mexicans felt, said Pakenham, that we should not think
of buying territory, if able to take it by force. The idea of
selling it under such circumstances was viewed as doubly
degrading. 7
Happily saved by his ignorance of Mexican character and
sentiment from the mortification of knowing all this, fully
conscious that the war was unpopular even with his own party,
and hopeful that Buena Vista and the capture of Vera Cruz
had affected Mexico, Polk favored the idea of a commission.
Benton, however, would not have Slidell on the board ; the
President could not well ignore Slidell unless a higher official
- the secretary of state himself should be made sole repre-
sentative ; and no first-class man could go to Mexico and dance
attendance on the whims, delays and insults of a government
that scornfully held off. Indeed, the nation could not afford
to place the head of our state department or a commission
of leading public figures in such a predicament. 8
TRIST APPOINTED PEACE COMMISSIONER 127
At length, however, Buchanan's resourceful mind thought
of sending Nicholas P. Trist, a protege of his own and now chief
clerk of the state department. Trist's dignity, it was doubt-
less thought, would not be too delicate ; his action, it seemed
evident, could be controlled ; and the glory of success, if a treaty
should be made, would belong to the administration par-
ticularly the secretary of state and not exalt the agent in
any dangerous political sense. Besides, the chief clerk was
a man of agreeable and impressive appearance, admitted
talents, unusual industry and the highest character; he had
studied at West Point; he knew diplomatic business; as
consul at Havana for a term of years, he had become acquainted
with Spanish-American traits; and he spoke the language of
Mexico fluently. He was therefore immediately appointed
as Folk's agent though officially styled "Commissioner
Plenipotentiary" - to be paid, not as a diplomatic representa-
tive, but from the appropriation for the contingent expenses of
foreign intercourse. 8
The appointment was not, however, entirely felicitous.
Trist, associated with Jefferson as law-student and as grandson
by marriage and associated with Jackson as private secretary,
had sojourned on Olympus and tasted the ambrosia of the gods ;
but he did not possess their divine constitution, and ambrosia
disagreed with him. It gave him queer feelings in the head
that were not exactly growing pains, and produced a state of
mind that was neither of heaven nor of earth. The Declaration
of Independence was always resounding in his thoughts, and
mentally he was always walking up the stairs of the White
House arm in arm with a hero, sage and prophet ; but he over-
looked the foundation of downright common sense on which
great men build, and lacked the humor that might at least
have kept him near the ground. 8
Aspiring, as he said, to influence the course of the world by
drawing supernal truths from the region of abstract speculation,
he resembled the gazing astronomer who walked into the ditch ;
and a deep, sticky ditch lay just before him. Cordial cooper-
ation with Scott was almost indispensable for the proper exe-
cution of his work ; but he thought he disliked the man, he knew
that Polk and the Cabinet disliked him, and his chiefs
probably afraid that he might be overpowered by the Whig
128 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
general took superabundant pains to brace him. Polk
urged him to consort with Pillow, whom he represented as a
Cincinnatus compounded with a Scipio Africanus; and Bu-
chanan, uprearing his big person impressively, expanding in
his courtly, diplomatic style, and beaming upon the artless,
ethereal chief clerk with his uncommunicative blue eyes, in-
timated that by faithfully carrying out the wishes of the govern-
ment he might become the next Democratic nominee for the
Presidency ! 8
Trist was equipped with a commission, credentials, letters
from the secretaries of the war and the navy departments to
Scott and Perry, a draft or projet of a treaty, instructions
directing him to inform our military and naval commanders,
if Mexico should make and ratify the treaty, and a sealed
despatch to the minister of relations, in which Buchanan
pointed out that an evacuation of Mexican territory would
be a surrender of all our costly gains, but announced that a
commissioner, ranking second in our state department, would
attend the army, and be ready at all times to negotiate. Osten-
sibly a mere bearer of despatches, the chief clerk hastened
incognito to New Orleans, reached Vera Cruz on May 6, fell
very sick there, and forwarded to Scott both Marcy's letter
and Buchanan's despatch, which was to be placed at once in
the hands of the Mexican commander. He was authorized
- not ordered, as he should have been to let the General
see his own instructions and his copy of the sealed despatch,
which would have explained the plans of the government;
but instead of doing this he merely wrote a letter of his own. 9
What that letter said was never disclosed; but we know
that it proceeded from a truly amiable but high-strung, "top-
lofty" man*, who felt expressly Called by Destiny to perform
a Great National Act and incidentally to put Winfield Scott
where he belonged.
The General's reply, on the other hand, is extant, and can
readily be understood. He was already in a state of mind
regarding the administration. Friends had warned him
against it since his departure from the United States, and the
warnings had seemed to be coming true. After Polk had
promised him confidence and cooperation, and after he as a
grateful return had assisted Polk with the Whigs, the President
NEGOTIATIONS OPENED 129
had immediately branded him before the world as unfit, and
outraged his natural pride as a military man, by trying to
have a civilian placed over him. Polk had infringed upon
his rightful power to discipline unruly subordinates ; his requi-
sitions for vessels, troops and supplies had not been met ; and
now, though general-in-chief, he was required to transmit
a despatch, doubtless bearing seriously upon the war, without
knowing its contents or using a proper discretion as to its
opportuneness a requirement that Marcy did not undertake
to defend ; and he read in the Secretary's letter these words :
"Mr. Trist is clothed with such diplomatic powers as will
authorize him to enter into arrangements with the government
of Mexico for the suspension of hostilities." This looked
mysterious and, in view of Polk's course toward him, alarming.
He believed that in a highly important respect the management
of the campaign had been taken from him, and he felt that he
was to be degraded before his army, the Mexicans and the public
at large by a clerk from the state department, of whom he had
known at Washington just enough to believe he disliked him. 9
It seemed unjust and insulting ; and being an irascible, over-
worked, over-worried soldier and master of language, seven
of whose regiments had just gone home unexpectedly, he
answered as might have been foreseen. Trist, angry, ill, con-
scious to his pen's point of every convolution, involution,
evolution, ramification and complication of his mental processes,
and unaware of Marcy's blundering phraseology, replied at
a length and in a tone that were enough to drive Scott wild;
and when he finally reached headquarters on May 14, though
Scott provided amply for his dignity and comfort, the two were
not on speaking terms, and further epistolary exchanges only
widened the breach. I fear Scott and Trist have got to writing,
groaned Marcy, who knew them both ; if so, all is over. As
for the sealed despatch, on the grounds that it was doubtful
whether the present circumstances warranted its presentation,
and that anyhow a proper escort for protection against guerillas
could not then be afforded, it was returned to the commissioner. 9
On the sixth of June, therefore, Trist wrote a letter to Bank-
head, explaining the character of Buchanan's despatch, asking
him to make known the existence of the despatch and Trist's
presence with the army, and inquiring whether at a proper
VOL. II K
130 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
time that minister would transmit the paper to the Mexican
government. Bankhead, as we know, strongly desired peace.
The interests of the British merchants at Puebla and the capital
and of consul-general Mackintosh, who not only was in
business but had made large advances to Santa Anna, lay
in the same direction ; and hence Edward Thornton, a mem-
ber of the British legation, called on Trist at Puebla five days
later. 10 Trist's verbal explanations of his government's aims
proved satisfactory, and soon the despatch arrived at its des-
tination. 12
The law of April 20 had forbidden, however, all negotiations
with the United States. Ibarra, the minister of relations, there-
fore, replied to Buchanan that his communication would be
laid before Congress, and Santa Anna promised Bankhead
that he would use his best efforts to have it considered promptly
and favorably. Meantime the public disputed fiercely whether
an American proposition should be heard. Many of course
denounced the idea, but others said it would place Mexico in
a better position to listen, than to reject a proffer of peace with-
out knowing its terms. The Diario that is to say, the
President - advocated this opinion, and the peace feeling,
represented by the most sober and intelligent citizens, especially
of the mercantile class, and supported by the sensible arguments
of El Razonador, showed no little strength. 12
June 24 Thornton visited Puebla again, delivered Ibarra's
reply to Buchanan, stated that Santa Anna had openly declared
in favor of negotiations, and added that Santa Anna felt as
did Bankhead that an immediate attack upon the capital
would be most unfortunate for the cause of peace. Trist,
therefore, perhaps having had pains in the head for some time
that were growing pains, addressed Scott on the subject, and sent
him the official documents that explained his mission. The
General replied in a friendly and high-minded style. The two
met. Each discovered that his impression of the other had been
radically incorrect. When Trist became very ill again, as he
soon did, Scott anxiously went through his personal stores
for guava marmalade ; and they became intimate and mutually
admiring friends. The commander-in-chief cordially proposed
to disregard for the sake of his country every thought of personal
glory, and he was ready to assume all needful responsibility. 12
SANTA ANNA'S EMBARRASSMENTS 131
In Mexico, however, a lubricant almost always had to be
applied in government affairs, and that lubricant was gold.
Knowing that the United States eagerly desired peace and had
already appropriated millions to gain it, not a few Mexicans
would have felt they sinned against nature and custom had
they been willing to oblige us for nothing. Santa Anna's greed
overtopped the mountains. Rejon was well understood to be
corrupt. Valencia, one of the loudest declaimers against peace,
had a large family, was old and was poor ; and in Santa Anna's
opinion he desired to be a little more comfortable. Numerous
minor figures, more or less prominent in Congress, also appre-
ciated comfort. The British merchants, with whom "arrange-
ments" were a regular feature of dealings with the government,
believed the Americans would have to apply the lubricant.
Such was Bankhead's opinion, and on his second visit Thornton
intimated as much. Scott, though he would not have attempted
to corrupt an honest person, considered it no worse to employ
a "statesman" than a spy, if the statesman desired to serve
him ; and he believed that without the use of money a year
of bloodshed would not force Mexico to sign an acceptable
treaty. He offered, therefore, to provide the requisite funds
for carrying out Thornton's idea, and Trist welcomed his
assistance. 12
Santa Anna doubtless felt eager to obtain peace provided
he could remain in authority, and that proviso was natural,
for otherwise he would have lost a position he loved, and exile
or death would have been his early portion; but it was not
easy to calculate the chances. Buchanan's despatch seemed
to many a fresh sign of weakness. Scott had less than half
the numbers that Marcy had promised, and many inferred
that no more good troops could be sent. For a nation to
succumb before less than 10,000 isolated men, poorly trained
and poorly supplied, seemed ridiculous and even irrational.
Trist's lack of prestige was another offence to Mexican pride.
The charge of collusion, supported by the known fact that an
American officer had visited Santa Anna in Cuba, manacled
him; his countless enemies were awake and implacable; and
he found it necessary to deny that he thought of treating. 12
The Coalition opposed all thoughts of peace. Fearful of
responsibility and paralyzed by personal and factional intrigues,
132 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
Congress would not assemble. Nobody of influence had the
courage to advocate what all knew to be necessary. Each
party held back, hoping the other would make a tactical blunder
of that sort. The law of April 20 towered squarely in the way.
A caricature represented Polk amputating Santa Anna's re-
maining leg, and the ether sponges were labelled "3,000,000
pesos." As the President and his friends could see no way
out of the predicament, he decided so the Spanish minister
reported to smash his army against Scott's, hoping that
a treaty would then be acceptable to the nation. But the loss
of his troops would have left him powerless ; and he confined
himself now to advising, as did the British, that Scott should
alarm the capital by advancing toward it. 12
At length, however, an arrangement for a meeting of Congress
was made by the factions, and on July 13 that august body
convened ; but it referred Buchanan's letter back to the adminis-
tration as executive business, declaring at the same time against
an "ignominious" treaty, and leaving untouched the law of
April 20 ; and then practically, though not in form, it broke up.
Santa Anna was now inclined to hold that Congress had
abandoned him, negotiate a treaty of peace as a military act,
and carry it through by means of the American lubricant.
Three days later, therefore, after discussing the matter with
Pillow and the commander-in-chief, Trist formally asked the
cooperation of Scott in providing $10,000 at once and promising
to hand over a million whenever a treaty should be ratified
by Mexico ; and Scott not only assented, 11 but paid the smaller
sum that day, as bread upon the waters, out of his fund for
secret expenses. 12
The outlook seemed favorable. Pedraza and Baranda, both
of them in favor of a settlement, were virtually decided upon
as the Mexican commissioners, and July 27 Santa Anna called
his generals together presumably to bring them round.
But Valencia arrived that day from San Luis Potosi with his
army, loudly declaiming for war and closely watching for a
slip on Santa Anna's part; Scott's delay about advancing
weakened the plan ; and so the council of generals did nothing.
Santa Anna now hesitated more and more. Both he and his
officers became encouraged by the accumulation of troops
and war material. Finally they concluded that a triumph
AN ARMISTICE 133
lay within their reach, and the idea of making peace lost its
attractiveness. Scott for his part allowed the negotiations to
have no influence on his military plans. He doubtless hoped
that a white flag and an offer to treat would meet him on the
way to Mexico; but as they did not come, those plans were
unflinchingly executed, and our arms triumphed. 12
Soon after the battle of Churubusco ended, he returned to
San Agustin, and as the initial step toward peace negotiations
wrote a note summoning Mexico City to surrender. But
Santa Anna did not wait for it. The town was in a dreadful
state of confusion and panic. Wounded or demoralized soldiers
could be seen everywhere. Many roamed about the streets,
crying out at the slightest alarm, "Here come the Yankees!"
Astounded by the American victories and utterly disheartened
by the incompetence, cowardice and quarrels of their leaders,
many felt that God had pronounced the doom of Belshazzar
against "this accursed Babylon." Hence, though Santa Anna
rallied troops as well as possible, he felt that an assault could
not be repulsed, and at about midnight had Pacheco, then
minister of relations, address a despatch to Buchanan proposing
the negotiations requested so many times by the American
government. 13 The purpose of the despatch, which Bankhead
transmitted open to Trist with an appeal from himself to heed
it, was to prevent the Americans from entering the city ; and
the Spanish minister, who was consulted with reference to it,
agreed that in view of Folk's repeated assurances it could not
fail to have that effect. 14
Thornton and Mackintosh also brought their influence to
bear ; and the next morning, while Scott was preparing to take
up battering or assaulting positions to warrant the summons,
General Mora met him at Coyoacan with a proposal for a truce.
The terms of this proposal were not satisfactory; but Scott
sent back by him an overture for a short armistice. This was
accepted by Santa Anna as a gift from heaven. Commissioners
to arrange the terms were appointed the next day, and on the
twenty-fourth ratifications of their agreement settled the
matter. The army, though its entire confidence in Scott
prevented all trouble, felt profoundly dissatisfied; but with
a total disregard of personal considerations the General took
what reasonably seemed to him the wise course. 14
134 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
Scott, who was now at Tacubaya with Trist, held his troops
at command Worth and the dragoons at Tacubaya, Pillow
at Mixcoac, Twiggs about four miles farther out, and Quitman
at San Agustin in such a manner as to be fairly safe himself,
and to threaten the western and southern approaches of the
city. The well men cleaned their clothes and arms, and the
sick and wounded soon found themselves comfortable and
cheerful. Several Mexican Congressmen among the prisoners
were set free. About half a million of needed specie was
obtained from the city principally and perhaps entirely
by cashing drafts on the United States government. A large
quantity of provisions, contracted for while the Americans lay
at Puebla, was brought out, and a train of wagons proceeded
for the same purpose to the valley of Toluca, where Olaguibel,
ostensibly the implacable enemy of the Americans, helped
them to obtain supplies. Apples, pears and peaches of an
indifferent quality were now ripe, and the soldiers lived fairly
well. 15
Santa Anna was even busier than Scott. Measures were
taken to collect all missing soldiers, reorganize and rearrange
the corps, maintain a state of defence, and revive morale by
removing disaffected officers as well as by punishing conspicuous
delinquents. All American prisoners in the city were freely
given up. Gamboa, a politician of Mexico state, caused some
trouble by critically reviewing Santa Anna's course during the
war, and formally charging him with treason. Far more
serious was the combination of Valencia who was still re-
garded by many as a martyr, had gathered a small army, and
had pronounced against Santa Anna with Olaguibel, who
stood on confidential terms with Alvarez; and to make this
combination still more threatening, it seemed to be supported
by Paredes, now at the head of a small force, by Almonte and
by Canalizo. All possible care was taken to guard against
the movement. Every officer known to have been associated
with Valencia was imprisoned or at least cashiered; every
hint of intrigue excited attention; and the government heard
with deep concern that somebody on a sorrel horse had carried
letters from Toluca to Queretaro. Naturally Santa Anna
did not fail to assemble the generals, and offer his place to any
one who would take it ; and of course none of them had the bad
NEGOTIATIONS 135
taste not to say imprudence to come forward. More-
over behind all the military disaffection, rejoicing over it as
a threat against Santa Anna, though unwilling to join forces
with the army in any cause, towered the Coalition, justly
regarded as even more dangerous. 15
But obviously the chief business of the government was the
negotiation with Trist. Here Santa Anna acted sincerely
as sincerely as the drowning man who clutches at a plank,
no matter how great a rascal he has been. On this point we
have a superabundant amount of evidence, and in particular the
full reports of Lozano, charge d'affaires of Spain, with whom
Santa Anna talked explicitly and at great length. Texas and
upper California could be given up, the General thought, as
territory already lost. The region between the Rio Grande
and the Nueces, it was hastily inferred from a vague remark
dropped by Trist at Puebla, could be made neutral, perhaps
under a European guaranty ; and with that barrier established
against smuggling and the dreaded encroachments of the
United States, and with millions of shining American dollars
pouring into the treasury for the benefit of those supporting
him and the treaty, Santa Anna felt he could meet all
opponents. In his own mind, though he intended to get
still better terms if possible, the bargain was as good as
made. He therefore placed on the commission superior men,
disposed to effect an amicable settlement, and not mere
partisans of his own: ex-President Herrera, J. B. Couto, a
man of the highest integrity and leader of the Mexican bar,
General Ignacio Mora, chief of the military engineers, and
Miguel Atristain, a lawyer supposed to represent British
commercial interests; and he put forth a manifesto entirely
satisfactory from the American point of view, in which he
declared openly for peace, and, holding that Congress on
being duly consulted had referred the subject back to the
Executive, brushed aside the law of April 20. 17
Trist, for his part, stated promptly the full demands of the
United States, which required that Mexico should not only
accept the Rio Grande line but cede New Mexico and upper
California ; and three or four days later, in the hope of remov-
ing difficulties, he decided to inform Santa Anna confidentially
that he would pay the highest sum authorized by his instruc-
136 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
tions. This course was proper for the representative of a
country that had always loved frank diplomacy, and felt no
need of jockeying in the present negotiations ; and it was also
prudent, for in tedious haggling and crafty special pleading no
Anglo-Saxon could rival the Mexicans. September 1 and 2
the terms were fully discussed. 16 Regarding certain minor
points that might have entered into an agreement a mutual
disposition to be conciliatory showed itself, but on the essentials
Trist held firmly. Much to his surprise, the pecuniary con-
sideration appeared to count for little in comparison with the
alienating of territory and its population, and the Mexicans
proved obdurate. At last, therefore, to save the only hope
of peace, Trist proposed that the armistice be extended forty
or forty-five days, and the decision of Washington be obtained
as to excluding nationality and population from the Nueces-
Rio Grande district. 17
The proposed extension of time Santa Anna, angry at what
he thought had been a deception on Trist's part with reference
to this district, rejected at once as a scheme to get provisions
and reinforcements, and so he found himself confronted squarely
by unexpected and unpalatable terms. Nor were these his only
difficulties. With light-hearted vanity the people still ignored
their long series of defeats. An intense fear prevailed that
Santa Anna, with what military forces remained and the
money coming from Washington, would sweep away republican
institutions, establish himself as autocrat for life, and wreak
vengeance on his enemies. All the standard objections against
ending the war marshalled themselves anew. Arguments,
protests and threats, official as well as unofficial, poured in. 17
Any sale of territory, wrote the governor of Queretaro, would
authorize a general secession. Negotiations not shared in by
Congress are treasonable, proclaimed Farias, Otero, Rosa and
other statesmen in concert. Rejon, who probably wished the
Americans to capture Mexico, install the Puros in authority
and make a treaty with them, added his loud voice to the
chorus. The Coalition and the Valencia-Olaguibel conspiracy
loomed up darker than before. States and citizens who refused
to support the war denounced Santa Anna for proposing to
end it. Many who longed for a treaty would not think of a
treaty signed by him. The friends of peace lacked organiza-
FAILURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 137
tion and the courage necessary to dominate the situation. The
members of Congress would not gather, and it seemed evident
that no popular asssembly would ever ratify the "sale" of loyal
fellow-citizens, which the New Mexicans were believed to be. 17
Apparently Santa Anna's one chance was to declare himself
dictator immediately, and, if he cared to make so distasteful
a bargain, ratify it himself ; but there were signs that his army
with Valencia and Paredes, long favorites of the military
caste, bidding against him would not support his authority
against such opposition in such a cause. Rascally but keen
Tornel, who called himself the Rainbow because he shone in
stormy times, but was likened by others to the bat, poured
self-interested counsels against peace into his ear; and from
similar motives Pacheco assisted Tornel. Santa Anna's nerve
weakened. Besides, an alternative offered itself. Had not
Scott lost a good part of his little army in the recent fighting,
and made the armistice in the desperate hope of receiving fresh
troops? Might not fickle fortune change in the next battle?
Whatever its result, could the Americans venture to demand
more than was now demanded ? Why not have another throw
of the dice, and then make the treaty, if it could not be
avoided? 17
As soon as Trist's persistence in our demands was made
known to him, therefore, although he still felt some hope they
would be modified, Santa Anna began to prepare a line of
retreat. Warlike instead of pacific reasons for agreeing to the
armistice made their appearance in public. Every thought
of negotiating a treaty was denied, and papers were drawn up
representing him as a bold and indignant champion of Mexican
rights. At first his orders had been to keep the agreement
with Scott inviolably ; but on finding that no acceptable modi-
fication of Trist's demands was in sight, he proceeded to
break it especially by preventing money and supplies from
leaving the city, and by having work done on the fortifications
of Chapultepec and appeals for troops, funds and materials
were issued. Scott, on the other hand, there is good reason to
believe, adhered to his pledges ; but he was alert, and his paid
agents in the city watched Santa Anna's proceedings. On
September 2 he relinquished all real expectation of peace, yet
he still clung to hope. 19
138 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
The Mexican leader also shrank from drawing the sword.
But on the afternoon of the 6th his commissioners, arriving late
and agitated at the rendezvous, presented Trist with a counter-
projet, which they knew he would reject, and an argumentative
note intended for the Mexican public. No discussion took
place. Evidently the time for words had passed. Scott then
sent a letter charging that Santa Anna had violated the armis-
tice, and announcing that unless complete satisfaction should
be made before noon the following day, hostilities would be re-
sumed. Santa Anna's ingenious reply was mainly a counter-
blast of accusations designed to rouse what he called "the
first city of the American continent" ; and again it was war. 18
Yet something had been accomplished. The word "peace"
had been uttered and seriously considered ; it was Trist's firm
belief that not only the commissioners but most of the Cabinet
were for accepting the American terms; in a measure this
attitude on the part of leading Moderados committed their
party; and the Mexican plenipotentiaries retired from the
meetings filled with cordiality and even admiration for Trist. 19
In the United States great disappointment was felt over the
issue of these negotiations. The general view of the armistice
was the easy, superficial one that all Mexicans were rascals,
and that Santa Anna had shamelessly tricked our good faith.
Marcy, not seeing that the counter-projet was a political ruse,
gravely pronounced it "extravagant and inadmissible." Polk,
whose knowledge of the Mexicans was revealed by his quaint
idea that an extension of the American segis over New Mexico
might be welcomed by them, condemned the armistice as if
peace had not been his avowed aim; and the administration
organ, besides representing Scott and Trist as dupes, described
it as contrary to the intentions of the government, when in fact a
commissioner had attended the army for the express purpose
of negotiating at the earliest possible moment. Mexico rejects
peace, proclaimed the Union; let us give her war. "Burn
the olive branch and whet the sword," was the popular cry;
let her be humbled in dust and ashes ! 20
To the army the respite of a fortnight proved a physical,
mental and moral blessing. San Agustin, buried in orchards,
umbrageous Coyoacan, cozy San Angel and lively Mixcoac
had each its charms; and Tacubaya, where the palace, em-
THE AMERICAN VIEW 139
bowered in blossoms and fragrance, crowned a hill gently
even pensively shaded by silvery old olives, was lovelier
yet, and afforded the noblest views. Here the brilliant sunrise,
first lighting up the distant white volcanoes that propped the
sky, and then stooping to brighten the near-by villas of the city
merchants, ushered in gorgeously the perfect day. After
noon black, jagged clouds could be seen gathering quickly in
the soft and luminous blue; the edge of one would melt into
a slender gray shadow, dripping to the earth; and in a few
moments the grandest artillery of the heavens would be at
work. Then sometimes a rainbow followed; the sunset was
fair; the moon rose clear and full; and the white houses,
massive towers and brilliant porcelain domes of the city ap-
peared to be afloat in a magical radiance toned with slumber
and with dreams. "Heaven help those at home," wrote a
soldier, " who think they know what moonlight is ! " 21
Amid experiences like these it seemed hard, almost impossible,
to contemplate war and bloodshed., But the troops felt
thoroughly angered by what they looked upon as Mexican
treachery first in pretending to negotiate, and then in violat-
ing the armistice; and they quickly nerved themselves, not
without satisfaction, for the coming struggle. All realized
that only triumph could save them now from destruction. 21
XXVIII
MOLING DEL KEY, CHAPULTEPEC, MEXICO
September, 1847
RATHER more than half a mile west of Chapultepec and still
farther north of Tacubaya stood a complicated range of low
stone buildings known as El Molino del Rey (The King's Mill).
They extended in a rambling fashion approximately north and
south more than 300 yards, and consisted essentially of a flour
mill and a foundry for bronze cannon. The heavy walls and
the parapets of the flat roofs, reinforced with sand-bags, made
these buildings almost a fort. Nearly half a mile from them
toward the northwest lay a very solid stone edifice, at one
time a powder magazine, called the Casa Mata, protected now
with a small, dry fosse and light, incomplete breastworks.
Along the west front of El Molino extended a somewhat ir-
regular drainage ditch, or series of ditches, at this critical time
free from water, which then made a bend, passed some twenty-
five yards from the south face of Casa Mata, continued in the
same direction nearly one fourth of a mile, and finally joined a
deep, wide ravine, that ran for a long way northeast and south-
west, and could not easily be crossed except (at X) near this
junction. For military uses the ditch gained strength from dirt
thrown up in front of it and a line of maguey growing some
thirty yards back. From it an easy slope, clear of trees but
somewhat obstructed with cornfields near the bend, rose toward
the southwest for about 600 yards and culminated in a ridge,
which overlooked Tacubaya ; while west of the ravine and a
mile or so from Casa Mata stood the hacienda buildings of Los
Morales. 1
Inferring from supposed signs of American activity, and also
from Scott's peremptory letter, that on the afternoon of Sep-
tember 7 a determined effort would be made to seize Chapul-
140
SCOTT'S PREPARATIONS
14 J
BATTLES
OF MEXICO
Scale of Yards
A Grand Ptaxa
Cathedral
C Palace
D Alameda
E English Cemetery
O Mexican Batteriet
(tome of them, not armed)
P American Batteries
Q Taylor'* Battery
R Steptoe'i Battery
142 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
tepee and attack the defences of the city, which had not become
very strong in this quarter, Santa Anna made special efforts
during the sixth to place his most serviceable troops on the
terrain just described; and the next day, taking command
there in person, he posted and instructed them with particular
care. Leon's and Rangel's brigades were stationed in El
Molino ; the best of Perez's brigade garrisoned the Casa Mata ;
Ramirez's occupied the intermediate space; four guns were
placed a little in front of the bend ; 3000 or 4000 horse under
Alvarez the first division commanded by him and the second
by Manuel Andrade proceeded to Los Morales ; reserves
of infantry and artillery lay in the rear, and the cannon of
Chapultepec were made ready to sweep the ridge and slope. 2
At the same time pains were taken to rouse Mexico City.
Suspicion of Santa Anna persisted, but his credit had been
improved not a little by Valencia's conduct, and the public
felt inclined to believe in him once more. The image of the
Virgin of Guadalupe, the Patroness of Mexico, now passed
through the streets. Under orders from Tornel the clergy
preached a crusade against the heretical invaders. Tales of
alleged American atrocities supplemented their exhortations.
People were ordered to sharpen their daggers, and make ready
to throw paving-stones from the azoteas. That Scott's hand-
ful only some 8000 available men and supposed to number
even less could beat 18,000 or 20,000 valiant Mexicans,
protected by strong defences, and capture ai city still occupied
by perhaps 200,000 persons, appeared increolible. Citizens as
well as troops grew confident. When the bells began to ring
at about half-past nine on the morning of the seventh, all
welcomed the alarm ; and when Santa Anna visited the chosen
terrain during the afternoon to issue his orders for battle, he
was received with applause. 3
Scott also prepared. September 7 the engineer company and
Cadwalader's brigade advanced from Mixcoac to Tacubaya, the
rest of Pillow's division and one of Twiggs's brigades moved
toward the city as a feint, and Twiggs's other brigade and
Quitman's division were ordered to concentrate at Mixcoac.
Captain Mason and Lieutenant Foster of the engineers daringly
reconnoitred the Mexican position, and, although Casa Mata
standing on low ground and partially masked by its earthworks
BATTLE OF MOLING DEL KEY
143
and the maguey was not adequately made out, they analyzed
the situation correctly otherwise. Then, to prevent errors,
Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Duncan and two engineers did the
work a second time ; and Scott and Worth also made observa-
tions. Information that he deemed thoroughly safe led the
commander-in-chief to believe that guns needed for the defence
of the city were now under construction at El Molino, and he
desired Worth to have a party destroy the works and material
during the coming night in his opinion an easy task and
immediately retire. At Worth's request, however, a daybreak
attack and, as the natural consequence, a broader plan were
decided upon. 4
Accordingly, the first gray light of September 8 found the
Americans waiting to assault the position. One cannon
BATTLE OF EL MOLINO
SCALE OF YARDS
<^:/m|r
A \/) _<, I/A i:-io] :-;.;
A Huger's Battery
B V/ri<jhfs Storming Party
C Smith's Licjht tSattalion
D Garland's Brigade
E Drum' s Battery 6-pdrs.{2)
F Duncan's Butt cry G-pdrs.U)
G Mclntosh's Brigade
H Sumner's Dragoons
I Cadwalader's Brigai,^..-., Pa]ace i
K Mexican Forces
L Advance of Mexican Cavalry
X Passage acros Ravine
Headquarters of
Gen. Scott
W:ns.Eng.Co..N.Y.
guarded the road from Mexico to Tacubaya. Brevet Colonel
Garland's brigade and Captain Drum of the Fourth Artillery
with his two Buena Vista 6-pounders were directly south of El
Molino, at a distance of about 400 yards from it, to ward off
a flank attack from Chapultepec, threaten the mill, and be ready
to assist as might be necessary. On the ridge, not far to their
left, stood Captain Huger with two 24-pound siege guns, Brevet
Major Wright's party of stormers twelve officers with five
companies of 100 men each, drawn during the night from the
144 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
six regiments of Worth's division and a supporting body com-
posed of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel C. F. Smith's light battalion.
Some 500 yards farther to the left and higher up the ridge the
guns of Duncan, who had charge of all the artillery, bore upon
the Mexicans near Casa Mata, about 700 yards distant, with
Colonel Clarke's brigade now commanded, on account of
Clarke's illness, by Brevet Colonel Mclntosh on the left of
the pieces and General Cadwalader's brigade, acting as a reserve,
at their right and rear. And finally, near the ravine, Major
Sumner of the Second Dragoons with some 270 mounted men
occupied our extreme left under orders to hold the Mexican
cavalry in check and cooperate wherever he could. In all
there were 3447 officers and men. 5
Apparently Worth's dispositions had been wisely planned,
and a scrutiny of the Mexican position, could it have been
made, would have confirmed the expectations of a quick victory.
Deceived by Scott's feint against the southern front of the
capital, Santa Anna had broken up his army during the night,
and now, with a considerable part of it and some of the guns,
he was fully two hours distant. No one officer commanded the
troops before Worth. Only a sharp, strong thrust was required. 5
As soon as Huger could make out the low, white walls of
El Molino, about a third of a mile distant, he opened fire;
and at the same time Engineers Mason and Foster advanced
some 350 yards. All was perfectly still in front. Both of them
believed the position had been abandoned, and Mason sent
Foster back to have Wright's party now deployed in line
advance. Consequently, instead of waiting, as had been the
plan, until the 24-pounders had perceptibly shaken the mill,
the stormers advanced and masked those guns when some ten
rounds had been fired. The Mexican pieces, which had been
moved nearer the mill during the night, at once opened furiously
with canister from an unexpected quarter, and soon a terrific
fusillade burst from the parapeted azoteas of El Molino. In
spite of it all, three of the pieces were taken, however. 5
But the American spearhead Wright's party was merely
glued fragments of steel, not a forged blade. A large part of
the men were separated from the comrades and officers whom
they knew and relied upon, and all from the colors they adored.
Mason, Foster, Wright and eight other officers out of fourteen
BATTLE OF MOLING DEL KEY 145
went down. The column broke. Nearly a third of the men,
whose comrades fought later in the engagement, under their
proper colors and officers, like heroes, absolutely bolted. The
enemy saw that only a handful were persisting, and promptly
rallied. Without orders brave Lieutenant Colonel Echeagaray
brought from Chapultepec the Third Ligero. "At them!"
he cried ; and instantly a counter-attack was launched. The
guns were recaptured. The Americans had to retreat. And
the pursuing Mexicans butchered and robbed our wounded. 5
Smith's battalion rapidly advanced, however, though possibly
not quite soon enough. Drum directed a quick, accurate fire
upon the Mexican battery. Garland moved up by a road
that sheltered his command until it came within some 200
yards of the mill. Drum followed him, stopping at intervals
to deliver canister. Cadwalader sent aid. Tall, swarthy
Leon crumpled suddenly with a bullet in his side; valiant
Balderas fell over into the arms of his son; and for these
ardent leaders the Mexicans had no substitutes. Ramirez
took flight. The Mexican reserves would not budge. The
Americans captured the enemy's guns, penetrated into the
buildings, and forced their way to the azoteas. Close fighting
then settled the issue; and before very long, under the fire
of their own pieces, as well as Drum's and one from Huger,
the Mexican left wing and the troops coming to its aid from
Chapultepec were in precipitate retreat. 5
Casa Mata, still held by the excellent men under Perez but
wholly destitute of artillery and feebly protected by its earthen
enclosure, might have been cleared of defenders by a vigorous
application of artillery. Duncan began work. But Worth
believed in brilliant operations, and ordered Mclntosh to
assault the position. With a smile that beautified his rugged
face, the old warrior set out; and soon, bleeding from two
wounds, he was lying on the slope. The second and the third
in command fell. Officer after officer was struck down. The
men toppled over by the wholesale. Wild with enthusiasm
some of the Mexicans leaped over the defences and came to
meet their assailants. 5
In spite of their well-aimed and murderous volleys, however,
they were soon punished and driven back. But what more
could be done ? The walls of Casa Mata had not been breached,
VOL. II L
146 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
and there were no ladders. So the Americans lay down behind
the embankment of the ditch, and coolly picked off Mexicans
at Casa Mata and behind the maguey. After a time their
muskets became foul. Their ammunition began to give out.
Somehow an order ' to retire got started ; and finally the
shattered remnants of the brigade fell back to the rear, followed
by miscreants who glutted their fury on our wounded. But
Duncan, whose guns had been masked by Macintosh's advance,
now resumed his work upon Casa Mata, and in a short while
the Mexicans were in flight, pursued by the unerring missiles
of the battery. 5
Yet there were still 3000 or 4000 horse at Los Morales.
These troops had been expected by Santa Anna to sweep the
field, and he had personally given their commander his in-
structions. But a mere partisan fighter like Alvarez did not
know what to do with two divisions of cavalry, an arm that it
requires distinctive qualifications and much experience to
handle well. Besides, his division included no artillery, and
he probably felt no more anxious than before to help the
President at his own expense. He followed but carelessly
Santa Anna's instructions. His orders to Andrade were more
or less confused and impracticable; and that officer, who
was at odds with his commander and felt that Santa Anna had
overlooked his achievements at Buena Vista, concluded to keep
himself and his men out of danger. 5
At length, however, while Mclntosh was charging, Alvarez
advanced in brilliant array with his own division. Sumner at
once dashed hotly across the ravine and at them, passing the
Mexican infantry within pistol range and losing forty-four men
and 104 horses in perhaps ten seconds. Duncan turned his
now unemployed guns in the same direction. One of Alvarez's
brigades, made up of untrained guerillas, broke immediately
under the cannon fire; and the whole division soon retreated
in disorder upon Andrade's men, fiercely pursued by the
riderless horses of Sumner 's command, as if to get revenge for
the loss of their masters. Later some of the cavalry undertook,
or so pretended, to cross the ravine at another point. But
Sumner dashed at them again, a part of Cadwalader's brigade
was now in that quarter, and both Duncan and Huger the
latter being at present near the American centre with one gun
THE GREAT PROBLEM 147
sent their compliments ; the Mexicans retreated ; and at about
seven o'clock the battle ended. 5
"A sad mistake," said Hitchcock, and he was right. A few
cannon moulds were found. The partial destruction of El
Molino and Casa Mata cancelled the military value of the
position, and facilitated later American operations; but such
operations were not contemplated at this time. A few small
cannon and a quantity of more or less valuable ammunition
fell into our hands, and a heavy gun at Chapultepec became
disabled. Probably 2000 Mexicans were killed or wounded,
and perhaps an equal number deserted. Nearly 700 prisoners
were taken. The loss of two excellent officers meant still more,
perhaps. Intrenching implements needed at Chapultepec were
lost. The want of cooperation among the Mexican generals
and especially the total failure of the cavalry to meet expecta-
tions disheartened the capital. But the casualties in the little
American army amounted to 124 killed and 582 wounded. The
confidence of the officers, if not the men, in their leaders faltered
at the evident mistakes of Scott and Worth. Each of those
generals blamed the other, and the discord between them,
which reached down to the private soldier, became worse than
ever. No American could find satisfaction in a barren victory
gained with such difficulty and at such a cost ; and the Mexicans,
believing we had aimed to accomplish far more, exulted over
their imaginary triumph. Scott faced the situat'on with un-
shaken fortitude, but those who knew him intimately saw that
he felt anxious. 6
However, the great problem before them soon occupied the
minds of all. Mexico, lying on a very slight elevation or
swell, could be entered on its western side by the garita of
San Cosme and at the southwest by the garita of Belen, to
each of which led a causeway from the fortified hill of Chapul-
tepec, about a mile and a half southwest of Belen. From this
garita a second causeway ran south about an equal distance
to the picturesque chapel of La Piedad, where it was crossed by
one extending eastwardly from Tacubaya to the San Antonio
or Acapulco highway, which it will be recalled led south
to Churubusco and San Agustin. Not far north of the latter
junction and about a mile from the city proper stood the garita
of San Antonio ; while, intermediate between the San Antonio
148 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
and the Piedad routes, the Nino Perdido causeway, coming from
San Angel, connected with Nino Perdido garita, which stood at
the edge of the city. Finally, a road leading nearly east from
San Antonio gateway conducted one to La Viga garita and
La Viga canal, a deep and broad waterway, which, since it
could not well be bridged in the face of the enemy, practically
bounded Scott's field of operations. There were thus four
garitas Belen, Nino Perdido, San Antonio and La Viga
in this order from west to east each guarding an approach
to the capital from the south. 7
Scott's expectation was to break the south front, and after
the armistice ended, his engineers, assisted to some extent by
himself and a Mexican officer in his' pay, reconnoitred it actively
and boldly except on the forenoon of the eighth. Had it been
feasible to strike immediately on the resumption of hostilities,
the enemy's lines would have been found poorly fortified and
armed. But this could not well be 'done with Santa Anna's
principal forces menacing our flank ; the American army was
not yet in position; and Scott desired first of all to destroy
El Molino. After the battle of the eighth half of his troops
imperatively required a breathing space. The wounded had to
be given attention. The army still needed to be placed. It was
necessary to protect hospitals, baggage and stores especially
since Governor Olaguibel and about 700 militia, supposed by
Americans to be Alvarez with his two divisions, were approach-
ing the rear, and according to reports Valencia had 8000 men
in that vicinity. Moreover Scott's information was not com-
plete. The eighth of September, following the twentieth of
August, had proved the danger of rashness ; and the fresh losses
made extreme caution absolutely necessary. Finally, Scott
felt a suspicion that the Mexicans expected and wished him to
attack their apparently unfinished works covering the south
front. 8
On the morning of the eleventh he inspected these once more,
and then had a conference of generals and engineers at La
Piedad. It was a solemn gathering. Before them lay the
fortified capital of Mexico, a hopeful army of perhaps 15,000,
a good equipment of artillery, nearly 700 trained gunners, and
a large population, somewhat disillusioned, but excited and
vengeful ; and in view of the American situation it was essential,
CHAPULTEPEC 149
as the commander-in-chief clearly indicated, to strike a vital
blow at once. 9
But where? Point by point Scott fully and fairly stated
the case : at the southwest the mighty porphyritic hill of Chapul-
tepec to carry, but a clear problem, hard ground, excellent
places for batteries, Huger's opinion that in one day the for-
tified college on the top of the hill could be demolished, in the
event of success a position from which to operate freely, and
at least a possibility that, after losing what was commonly
deemed its key, Mexico would listen to terms ; on the southern
front marshes, inundations, large ditches full of water every-
where, causeways already cut by the enemy, bridges destroyed,
a topography that made rear and flank attacks impossible, an
extensive series of well-planned and well-armed fortifications
crossing their fires and commanding one another, and an
enemy apparently eager to have the attack made here. Scott,
while disclaiming any wish to influence the judgment of others,
pronounced frankly for Chapultepec. 9
Then one of the engineers a tall, handsome young man,
with a positive chin, a strong nose, a dark, closely trimmed
mustache, dark hair clustering above his ears, and a fresh, clear
color in his face '- stood up and reported crisply on the work
of reconnoitring. His name was Robert E. Lee, and he rec-
ommended approaching by the southern front. Three other
engineers concurred with him. Four generals, doubtless in-
fluenced by these experts, took the same view. Twiggs and
Riley inclined the other way. The fifth engineer present was
then called upon, and he Beauregard in a long, technical
statement argued for the Chapultepec route. Pierce changed
his opinion. A silence followed ; and then Scott, drawing up
his magnificent figure to its full height, announced in his grand
way : " Gentlemen, we will attack by the western gates. The
general officers present here will remain for further orders
the meeting is dissolved." And so the die was cast. 10
The preparation of Chapultepec for defence had begun in
May, and Santa Anna had insisted upon it as of the "highest
importance"; but want of money hindered and at times
checked operations. During the armistice a little progress
was made, and September 9, under the direction of a competent
engineer and of the President himself, the work began in earnest.
150
THE WAR WITH MEXICO
But alterations in plan, a lack of implements, a shortage of
materials, the general confusion and the want of time naturally
made thoroughness impossible. Chapul tepee was therefore a
fort but not really a fortress. It stood alone, too, without the
supporting positions that a fortress must have ; and shot and
shell could penetrate the defences of the college on the summit
of the hill almost everywhere. Even the parapets were not
BATTLE OF
CHAPULTEPEC
I I Gen. Quitman's troops
BBB Gen. Pillow's troops
Gen. Worth's troops
ready ; and instead of the 2000 men required for an adequate
garrison of the buildings and works, only a few hundreds
occupied them. Their elevation merely hindered approach
not assault and artillery could largely offset that advantage.
To hold the grove was essential, for without it the garrison above
could not obtain supplies or even water ; and here the want of
adequate defences had a still worse effect, since large forces
could not be protected against artillery. 11
CHAPULTEPEC J 151
Yet for 7180 available Americans including those required
to make a feint against the southern front an "army" that
had to contemplate still harder work beyond, and could not
afford severe losses here Chapul tepee meant a great deal.
In general the position formed an approximate rectangle about
three fourths of a mile in length by one fourth of a mile in
width, bounded at its western end by El Molino and on the
other sides with high stone walls. In the south wall, at about
its middle point, there was an opening covered on the outside
by a sand-bag redan (B), unarmed. From the main gateway
in the eastern end the causeway of Belen struck off toward the
city, another road guarded here by a cut and by two bat-
teries ran toward Tacubaya, and a third, after running west-
wardly into the rectangle and a little way up the slope until it
arrived at a 4-pounder in a circular redoubt (C), flanked with
an infantry entrenchment (D), turned sharply toward the
northeast, and finally climbed to the summit. 12
Here on a rectangular level space or terre-plein, supported at
the eastern end by an almost vertical precipice and on the
other sides by high, parapeted walls, rose
the masonry buildings of the military col-
lege, skilfully though incompletely rein-
forced with sand-bags and screens of tim-
ber (blindage), supplemented with parapeted
azoteas, and surrounded with ten effective
guns, heavy and light. A deep, broad fosse
at the base of the western wall, mines below BLINDAGE AT CHA-
that, and finally, half-way down the slope,
a redan (E) strengthened this end, where the incline was
gentlest. In swamps at the western foot of the hill stood a large
grove of huge cypresses extending also toward the main
gateway through which ran an east and west road com-
manded by this redan (E) and also by the wall of the fort.
Beyond the grove came a north-and-south ditch, intended for
drainage, with a redan-breastwork (A) looking westward
at its northern end ; and finally, after traversing level and
open fields for about a quarter of a mile toward the west,
one arrived at El Molino. Placed so conspicuously in view,
150 or 200 feet in height, Chapultepec seemed to deserve its
popular reputation of impregnability, and the American soldiers
152 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
gazed at the white walls on the summit, transfigured in the
sunlight, with dread if not with consternation. 12
Late in the afternoon, September 11, Quitman's division
ostentatiously presented itself at La Piedad, but after dark both
his and Pillow's moved to Tacubaya, leaving Twiggs with
Brevet Colonel Riley's brigade and Steptoe's and Taylor's field
pieces behind. During the night two 16's and an eight-inch
howitzer under Drum were placed behind bushes on the road
from Tacubaya to Mexico, about 1000 yards from Chapultepec,
and a similar howitzer with a 24-pounder, masked in the same
way, south of El Molino under Hagner; and these batteries
(Nos. 1 and 2) opened fire the next morning (September 12).
Later in the day a 16-pound siege gun and an eight-inch howitzer
(Battery No. 3) and a ten-inch mortar (No. 4), planted nearer
the mill, joined in the work. Chapultepec replied; and, as
usual, the Mexican . artillerymen of whom there was a full
complement did well, occasionally knocking sand-bags from
the American parapets, while our own gunners, warned by the
burst of smoke, took shelter at each discharge. Meantime
Steptoe, in the hope of deceiving the Mexicans as to Scott's
purpose, made as much noise as possible opposite the San
Antonio garita. 13
During these preparations the Mexicans passed their days
in a state of fever. Reports that our army had only half-
rations cheered them, and Scott's deceptive manoeuvres were
attributed by many to indecision or timidity. On the eleventh
a review and a valiant proclamation from the President recalled
his "victory" of 1829 over the Spaniards. But a sense of
weakness and confusion, the loss of friends, the continual alarms,
the marchings and countermarchings, and the ominous clang
of the bells kept them sad and anxious. Santa Anna, for his
part, displayed as usual a remarkable activity and a remark-
able want of judgment and method. During the night of
September 9 he set perhaps 2000 men at work one hour
each on the southern fortifications, and the parapets rose
as if by enchantment. Not knowing where Scott would strike,
he broke his army into a number of detachments, and shifted
troops and guns frequently according to his notion of the proba-
bilities, while always maintaining a reserve. But he lost
himself in a maze of details ; and on the eleventh, deceived by
SEPTEMBER 12 153
the rather weak American feint, he unwisely drew men and
cannon from Chapul tepee and Belen. 14
Early the next morning, however, the reports of spies and
the roar of Scott's heavy guns enlightened him. Troops were
hurried to the real point of danger. With all speed he went
there himself, ordered his best engineers to work on the forti-
fications near the main gateway of the Chapultepec enclosure,
and posted troops close by. But there was little he could do.
More and more accurately the American batteries fired and kept
on firing. Two of the best cannon in the fort were disabled.
The buildings of the college suffered, the garrison suffered more,
and their morale suffered most of all, for except the engineers
and gunners the men felt utterly helpless. When Santa Anna
entered the rectangle unattended to reconnoitre, a shell burst
near him and covered his red pony with dirt. Toward evening
General Bravo, the commander of the position, came down,
reported to him that the garrison were cowed, and demanded
fresh troops ; but Santa Anna could see no use of sending them
forward to be destroyed on the way or else demoralized after
arriving. They should be provided, he said, at the critical
moment. 15
Scott saw, however, as the day waned, that Huger's expecta-
tions would not be realized that an assault would be neces-
sary. For this last resort preparations had in fact been made.
The troops and the ladders were now ready. Fearing the
Mexicans would repair the damages under cover of night he
thought at first of delivering the blow at once; but he con-
cluded that it was now too late in the day, that his guns could
soon dispose of repairs and reinforcements, and that a morning
attack would give many hours for pursuing the advantages
gained. Engineers proceeded to mend and improve our own
batteries, and the generals met for a conference. Here the
plans were finally decided upon. Quitman's division and a
forlorn hope of about 265 selected officers and men from
Twiggs's division, under Captain Casey of the Second Infantry,
were to advance by the Tacubaya road ; and Pillow's, preceded
by a similar party from Worth's division, led by Captain Mc-
Kenzieof the Second Artillery, was to attack by way of El
Molino and the grove. Then every one betook himself to his
post. But Pillow felt discontented. "We shall be defeated,"
154 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
said Worth privately ; and even Scott admitted to Hitchcock,
"I have my misgivings." 16
At daybreak about half-past five the next morning a
signal gun broke the stillness, and then our batteries opened.
For two hours or so they hurled shot and shells at the fort, and
then for some thirty minutes grape, canister and shells were
poured into the grove. At about eight o'clock, as if by common
consent, they stopped but only to burst forth again with new
fury. 17
That one momentary pause was the command to attack.
Colonel Trousdale, with the Eleventh and Fourteenth Infantry
and a section of Magruder's field battery under the " Stonewall "
Jackson of our civil war, moved some distance eastward from
near El Molino by the Anzures causeway along the northern
side of the rectangle, to prevent reinforcement and embarrass
escape in that quarter. Lieutenant Colonel Johnston with four
companies of the gray Voltigeurs advanced outside the south
wall, drove the Mexicans from the redan (B) and from the
wall, behind which they had been standing on platforms, passed
through the opening, captured the circular redoubt (C) and
the breastwork near it (D), and opened fire on the southern
parapet of the fort. Reno's howitzers, taken from El Molino
eastward into the fields, poured shells upon the grove and the
Mexican entrenchments (A and E). Four other Voltigeur
companies under Colonel Andrews, after crossing those open
fields, rushed with loud cheers into the swamp ; and the Ninth
and the Fifteenth Infantry, deploying into line, followed them
closely. Decorated with long, hanging moss, the venerable
cypresses, dear alike to Cortez and to Montezuma, seemed
like the fit guardians of some mystical and melancholy religion ;
but now hurrahs and sharp flashes and the terrible crash of
cannon-balls amidst the branches broke their shadowy silence,
and the Americans, wallowing through the mire, drove the
Mexican skirmishers from tree to tree, from the grove, and
at last from the battle. 17
Clearly it was time for Santa Anna to support the garrison.
Attempts had been made to repair the fort during the night,
but no adequate materials could be found there. A cannon
had burst. The dead and wounded lay about. There were no
surgeons, no medical supplies. The expected reinforcements
BATTLE OF CHAPULTEPEC 155
did not appear. Most of the students, gallant lads in gray
uniforms and gaily tasselled blue caps, withdrew by command.
Bravo thickset and erect, with deep eyes and a powerful
chin though he was cold and unenterprising, had flawless
courage, and he stood with folded arms or marched calmly from
post to post. But the infantry of the garrison hungry,
exhausted, stunned, hopeless cowered behind the parapets.
Many had to be driven to their places, and some had to be
fired on. Even the engineers and gunners felt despondent. 17
But Santa Anna could not see what to do. No doubt the
hill was to be attacked from the grove, but the enemy seemed
likely to assault by the Tacubaya causeway also, and Trous-
dale, he fancied, might come round by a road that skirted the
eastern end of the rectangle to strike his rear. Besides, the
officers and men showed no desire to challenge the American
artillery by marching up the hill, and he understood well
enough himself how few of them could probably reach the fort.
At length, however, he strengthened the forces on the Tacubaya
road, and sent most of the San Bias Activo battalion to Bravo.
At the circular redoubt this corps met the Americans, and not
many of them lived to go farther. 17
East of the grove, Andrews with his Voltigeurs and Reno
with his howitzers turned a little to the right and united with
Johnston. This left the Ninth a clear front. Colonel Ransom
had promised, the day before, that he and his men would go into
the fort or die. Proudly erect, sword in hand, the beau-ideal of a
soldier, he strode in front up the steepest part of the slope,
while the Fifteenth marched on his left. The breastwork (E)
was captured ; and then, coming in view of the fort its
buildings almost hidden in smoke, its parapets a sheet of flame,
the air filled with the hiss and shriek and roar of missiles he
waved his sword, shouted, "Forward, the Ninth!" and fell
dead with a bullet in his forehead. A terrible cry rose from
his men: " Ransom has fallen the Colonel is shot !" Wild
for revenge they all charged on, and a part of them reached the
fosse. 17
But there had been some mistake. The ladders had been
entrusted to raw men, it was said ; perhaps they had not been
started off in time; apparently some of the bearers had left
their places and hurried on; some had been killed and others
156 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
frightened. Anyhow the ladders did not arrive. Like the
Voltigeurs on their right, the Ninth and the Fifteenth sought
shelter behind rocks and stumps and fired at the parapet ; and
the tardy storming party, which was to have passed through
them, feeling no desire to get between the two lines of fire
and really unable to do anything without ladders, halted. 17
The men were fairly safe. Their muskets taught most of the
enemy to keep down behind the parapet. The rest of the
Mexicans fired very badly, and the Americans near the wall
could not be reached by the cannon. But the attack was making
no progress. Time passed five, ten, fifteen dreadful minutes,
and still no ladders could even be seen. The American batteries,
which had been firing over the heads of our troops, could no
longer do it safely. The ardor of battle was cooling. Low
mounds that looked like graves, but in reality were the mines,
lay under our men, and a Mexican lieutenant of engineers
had orders to fire them at the right moment. Santa Anna with
perhaps 4000 or even 5000 reserves so near might he not
come round the hill ? Scott's whole gazing army, back even to
Lieutenant Mayne Reid at Battery No. 2, was seized with a
horrible fear. Pillow, lying at the foot of the hill painfully
hurt in the ankle, sent for the whole of Worth's division,
which was supporting him as a reserve, and begged Worth to
make "great haste" or it would be "too late." 17
There was, however, a nearer source of help. When the
signal for attack was given, Quitman's division preceded by
forty pioneers under Captain Reynolds of the Marines, Casey's
forlorn hope, and 120 stormers from the volunteer division led
by Major Twiggs of the Marines advanced on the Tacu-
baya causeway until about 200 yards from the gate way batteries.
To support it, repel a body of Mexicans on its right, ward off
any force that might approach from the city, perhaps turn
those batteries, and if possible gain the Mexican rear, General
Smith struck off into the meadows and pushed on despite
the ditches; and Captain Drum and Lieutenant Benjamin,
each with a single gun, and Lieutenant Hunt with two of
Duncan's pieces advanced by the road, firing on those batteries
or at the hill and fort as opportunities offered. 17
On each side of the causeway ran a ditch that was almost a
canal and cramped the troops not a little; and a terrible fire
BATTLE OF CHAPULTEPEC 157
of artillery and musketry from the meadows, the front, the
wall of the rectangle and the fort on the hill-top greeted them.
Quitman had reconnoitred here the day before, and thought
he understood the problem; but the Mexicans had made
further preparations afterwards, and when he ordered a charge,
it was checked, and Twiggs and Casey fell. Ahead of him,
partly enfilading the road, blazed at least five guns, and some
of the best soldiers in the Mexican army commanded by
General Rangel occupied the stone buildings near them, while
others fired from behind the wall near the gateway. Under
this concentrated and awful storm the Americans recoiled, and
sheltered themselves near a bend in the road by lying down,
getting into the ditches or occupying some houses. Here, too,
the offensive was blocked; the attack failed. 17
But "the issue of battle lies in the hearts of men," and the
will of every American heart was Victory. Lieutenant Reid,
hurrying over from the battery with two companies, dropped
on the slope, but his men went forward. By Quitman's order
the New York and the Second Pennsylvania regiments left the
Tacubaya causeway, under a heavy fire waded the ditches on
the left and rear to the redan (B), and charged through the
opening, while the Palmettoes, finding a break in the same wall,
made a little farther east by an American cannon, enlarged it
with their bayonets and squeezed through. Shields and the
commanders of the New York and Pennsylvania regiments were
wounded, but the troops kept on. Clarke's brigade, sent
forward by Worth, hastened up the western slope, and when
Lieutenant Longstreet of the Eighth fell, Lieutenant Pickett
seized the colors. For some reason the mines failed to explode ;
and at last the ladders came up. 17
Shouting and yelling, the Voltigeurs, the Ninth and Fifteenth,
some of McKenzie's and the foremost of Quitman's men, all
closely intermingled, and brilliant with flags and the sparkle of
arms, crowded to the fosse. The first ladders, with all the bold
fellows upon them, were thrown down, but in a moment so
many more were placed, side by side, that fifty could go up
abreast. The blue Voltigeur flag, now full of holes, was planted
on the parapet. A tide of brave Americans overflowed the fort.
Resistance was vain. A little before half-past nine Bravo
gave up his diamond -hil ted sword, and the tricolor, that
158 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
had been waving placidly amidst the uproar, came down with
a jerk. 17
Fire was opened then upon the Mexicans at the gateway
below, and fearless Captain Roberts of Casey's storming party,
at the head of all the troops on the causeway and supported
by General Smith's brigade, carried the gateway batteries.
Many from Quitman's and Smith's commands rushed to the
summit, dealing with flying enemies as they went. Scott himself
came up the hero of Chippewa and Lundy's Lane. The
men pressed round him. He told them how glad he was, and
how proud of them ; and how proud their country, their wives,
their sisters and their sweethearts would be; and it seemed as
if such cheering had never been heard, anywhere in the world,
before. 17
Exultant but weary, the soldiers now looked about them as
they took breath. From this eyrie the whole wonderful Valley
of Mexico could be surveyed. All round the west the great
wall of rugged mountains closed it in, and two vast, snowy
peaks guarded its portal on the east. As if reluctantly the
mountains gradually subsided into verdant hills and a wide
plain, enamelled in a thousand soft hues. The broad, smooth
lakes gleamed like molten silver. The gold of ripening grain,
penciled lines of pale-green maguey, cottages radiant in the
sun like the sails of distant ships, country-houses and villas
half hiding in foliage, and many straight, converging avenues,
lined with trees, delighted the eye. In the midst, clear-cut as
a medallion, lay the city of Mexico, the capital, its roofs and
towers black with people; and there, just yonder, stood the
Halls of the Montezumas, the Jerusalem of these ardent young
crusaders. Unfortunately breastworks, redoubts, cannon and
a Mexican army were still to be reckoned with. Santa Anna
had probably lost not more than 1800 killed, wounded and
missing this day, and apparently Scott's loss had been about
one fourth as great. 18
But the Americans quickly prepared to advance -first of
all, Quitman. Naturally a certain discretion had been given
to the commanding generals, and he intended to make the most
of it. Looking from the hill along the Belen causeway, he
saw a wide avenue divided through the middle by a stone
aqueduct some eight feet wide and fifteen feet high, resting
QUITMAN'S OPERATIONS
159
on heavy arches and pillars of masonry. Owing to fine weather
the road was unusually firm. A small number of troops, fleeing
in the utmost confusion, could be seen upon it, but at only one
point fortifications. Borrowing all of Pillow's troops except
the Fifteenth Infantry, which remained to hold Chapultepec
and guard the prisoners, he quietly gave orders that his men
should assemble near the main gateway. At once the inspiring
words began to circulate, "Quitman's division to the city!"
and as soon as possible the Rifles, in their crimson sashes, were
leading the march forward. About a mile on, a two-gun bat-
tery, with a field redan at its right on the marsh, blocked the
way. For an hour or so Drum used a small gun upon it.
Then the Rifles, after creeping along the aqueduct from arch to
arch, took it by assault, and the march continued toward the
fortifications at the garita. 19
As at the other garitas, no gates existed here, but a ditch and a
parapet blocked one half of the causeway and a zigzag re-
doubt the other. Just at the north was the
stone house intended for guards and customs
officials, beyond which lay the wide Paseo
(Promenade). South, on the Piedad road,
were artillery and infantry that could fire
through the arches. Inside the garita,
buildings extending toward the east offered
shelter, and in open ground a little more
toward the north and about 300 yards dis-
tant, the extensive edifice called the citadel,
protected with a wall and a wet ditch, con-
stituted a serious obstacle. 19
Santa Anna, after acting like a madman
i y-ii i, f n ,i THE CITADEL IN 1840.
when Chapultepec fell, came to this garita.
General Terres, a brave old Spaniard, commanded here with
about 180 infantry and some artillerymen. Santa Anna gave
him three guns of medium power, and stationed General
Ramirez in the Paseo,' Brevet General Argiielles on the opposite
side, and General Perdigon Garay and Colonel Barrios in the
rear with substantial reserves. 19
On approaching this formidable position, Quitman en-
countered a withering storm of bullets, grape and solid shot
from both sides and the front, and suffered rather severely.
160 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
But Drum and Benjamin, iron men, bringing up as soon as
possible a long 18-pounder and a 24-pound howitzer on the
opposite sides of the aqueduct, dampened the ardor of the
Mexicans not a little, and splinters from the masonry did havoc
among the sheltered artillerymen at the garita. Some troops
already beaten at Chapultepec and at the intermediate battery
soon became demoralized. At about one o'clock rumors crept
in that Americans from the southern front were turning the
position. Ramirez, Garay, Argiielles and Barrios retired with-
out the formality of saying good-by; and Terres, whose
cannon ammunition had failed, withdrew prudently to the
citadel with two of the guns and about seventy panicky men,
the remnant of his garrison. The Rifles now dashed over the
parapet ; and at exactly twenty minutes past one a tall, slender
man with short, bristling, grayish hair stood on it, smoking a
cigar and waving a red handkerchief tied to a rifle. It was
Quitman, self-possessed but exultant ; and in a few moments the
Palmetto colors and the green banner of the Rifles, with its
blazing gold eagle, were flying at the portal of the city. 19
The advance then continued for some little distance, and, as
the ammunition of our two heavy guns had been exhausted,
the captured Mexican 8-pounder was made to do good service.
But Santa Anna, who had thought the position safe and gone
on to San Cosme, soon arrived with ordnance and troops.
The citadel was reinforced, and infantry and cannon were placed
at other points. Quitman's last artillery cartridges were used,
and under the enemy's fire no more could be brought up. Solid
shot cut down both Drum and Benjamin. Our infantry had
to retire to the vicinity of the garita. Attempts were then
made to strengthen the position ; but they did not accomplish
very much. Ammunition gave out entirely, and firing ceased.
The enemy grew bolder. Again and again they charged, and
though repulsed they did not appear to be discouraged. By this
time every member of Quitman's staff, Beauregard, his engineer
officer, and all his artillery officers had been killed or wounded,
and he longed anxiously for night. 19
Meanwhile, events had occurred on Scott's other wing.
Trousdale's command, supplemented with Jackson's guns,
pushed along the road and aqueduct on the north side of the
rectangle, and the latter distinguished himself by fearlessly
THE SAN COSME APPROACH 161
attacking a one-gun redoubt, which, supported by infantry
and by fire from the summit of the hill, barred the way.
To check Mexican reinforcements and threaten the enemy
particularly the troops in Quitman's front Scott now had
Worth, Garland's brigade, C. F. Smith's battalion, Duncan's
battery, the rest of Magruder's battery and Sumner's dragoons
pursue the same route. The one-gun redoubt was flanked and
occupied; and Worth's forces arrived at the northeast corner
of the rectangle in time to annoy the retreat of Rangel and other
departing Mexicans. 20
Here began the broad, straight Veronica causeway closely
similar to that of Belen which extended almost north for
nearly two miles (3530 yards) to the English cemetery, and
there joined the San Cosme highway at approximately a right
angle. Understanding the difficulties of the Belen approach,
Scott intended to make only a feint in that quarter, and let his
left wing break into the city. He therefore sent the brigades of
Clarke and Cadwalader and also Huger with siege guns to
Worth. To organize the attacking column, replenish the
ammunition, make other needed preparations, and sweep
away the resistance encountered at several minor fortifications,
especially near the cemetery, required time ; but at about four
o'clock Worth found himself on the straight highway about
half a mile from the San Cosme garita. 20
This entrance to the city had been included in the general
scheme of defence, but on account of its remoteness from press-
ing danger few workmen had been employed 'here; and when
Chapultepec fell, it lay entirely open except for a small parapet
without a ditch extending partly across the highway some
250 yards to the west. General Pena, however, coming this
way from Chapultepec, stopped at the parapet, and Rangel
placed at the garita such troops as he could assemble. Santa
Anna, who displayed on this occasion reckless valor and an
almost fiendish activity, sent three available cannon and brought
additional troops. The roofs of buildings in the vicinity were
occupied. A redoubt with embrasures was hastily erected at
the garita, the near arches of the aqueduct were stopped up
with sand-bags, and some guns in the Paseo were prepared to
cooperate. 20
On attempting to advance, therefore, Worth found the high-
VOL. ii M
162 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
way swept with bullets, canister, grape and shells. Garland,
however, was ordered to creep forward under the protection of
the arches, and endeavor to reach the south flank of the garita,
and Clarke to burrow through the continuous line of buildings
on the other side, and strike the northern flank. Lieutenant
U. S. Grant, who was reported as acquitting himself at this
time "most nobly," waded some ditches with a party of men
and a mountain howitzer, and planted the gun on the roof of
a church at the right ; and Lieutenant Raphael Semmes of the
navy performed a similar exploit on the left. Artillery fire com-
pelled Pena, who reinforced by Santa Anna with two com-
panies of the Eleventh Infantry was fighting gallantly, to leave
the parapet; and Hunt, of Duncan's battery, though he lost
more than half his men in dashing 150 yards at full speed,
landed a gun at that point, where he could load in safety and
then fire from the one embrasure. 20
By five o'clock these preparations were complete. On the
other hand Rangel had been severely wounded, and his principal
gun, a 24-pound howitzer, had become unserviceable. Sud-
denly, to his utter astonishment, Americans appeared on the
top of a three-story house that commanded the interior of his
redoubt, and with a single volley disposed of almost every
gunner and artillery mule. Then some of them hurried down
to the front door of the house, burst it open, and rushed into
the redoubt, where they met Americans just arrived by a
flanking movement from the other side of the highway. In a
panic the Mexicans fled, literally sweeping away Santa Anna
and a body of troops, who had come at all speed from Belen
to support the position. Many of them scattered, but with no
little difficulty others were conducted to the citadel. By six
o'clock Worth entered Mexico. Near the garita his forces
were safely housed, and by way of "good-night" and good
advice, Huger dropped a few shells in the vicinity of the
palace. 20
The end, however, was not yet in view. Santa Anna had
some 5000 Infantry and fifteen cannon at the citadel, with
probably about 7000 more troops not far away, and the Amer-
icans, besides having lost many in the day's fighting, were
now fearfully divided. Not only Worth but Quitman, who
p anted three heavy guns in battery during the night, intended
THE AMERICANS CAPTURE MEXICO 163
to advance in the morning, and apparently a day of carnage
was to ensue. 20
But Santa Anna probably began to feel the reaction that
always followed his great efforts. Funds and provisions were
scanty. The army was demoralized, and the mass of the
people felt disheartened. Within the town there were no forti-
fications, and it looked as if another battle under these conditions
might scatter the troops, and involve the loss of nearly all the
war material. Besides, leading persons in the city had always
been strenuously anxious to prevent bombardment and assault ;
and the President was urged now, as four months previously, to
spare it. Early in the evening, therefore, he briefly discussed
the situation with Olaguibel, the minister of war and three
generals. The Governor was for acting deliberately ; but Santa
Anna, declaring that honor had been satisfied and the city
could not be defended successfully, ordered immediate evacua-
tion; and by one o'clock the troops retired in a somewhat
orderly fashion to Guadalupe Hidalgo. About three hours later
a commission of the city council (ayuntamiento) offered terms
of capitulation at the American headquarters in Tacubaya.
These were of course rejected, for the town lay at our mercy ; but
Scott gave informally the usual assurances of good treatment. 21
So when the first thin streak of dawn glimmered forth
behind the gray volcanoes, and our cannon at Belen garita
were on the point of opening fire, a white flag and an invitation
to enter the capital reached Quitman. First making sure there
was no deception, he advanced ; and after stopping about
half an hour at the citadel he moved forward under a splendid
sun to the grand plaza, which fronted the palace and the
cathedral, with Smith's brigade, the Marines, the New York
volunteers and Steptoe's battery. As a triumphal procession
the command looked rather strange. Quitman and Smith
marched at its head on foot the former with only one shoe ;
and behind them came troops decorated with mud, the red
stains of battle and rough bandages, carrying arms at quite
haphazard angles. Not less astonishing looked the city, for
sidewalks, windows, balconies and housetops were crowded
with people. Except for the silence, the countless white hand-
kerchiefs and the foreign flags, it might have been thought a
holiday. Before the palace, which filled the east side of the
164 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
plaza, the troops formed in line of battle. Officers took their
places at the front, and when Captain Roberts hoisted a
battle-scarred American flag on the staff of the palace at seven
o'clock, arms were presented and the officers saluted. 22
Soon loud cheering was heard. A few squares away the
commander-in-chief, escorted by cavalry with drawn swords,
had reached Worth's command, which had stopped at six o'clock
by orders opposite the high ash trees of the Alameda. A
clatter of galloping hoofs followed; and in another moment,
amidst the involuntary applause of the Mexicans, General Scott,
dressed in full uniform and mounted on a tall, heavy bay
charger, dashed with his staff and Harney's dragoons into the
grand plaza his noble figure, gold epaulets and snowy plumes,
resplendent under the brilliant sun, fitly typifying the invisible
glory of his unkempt and limping army. Uncovering, he rode
slowly along the line of battle to the music of our national airs ;
the troops, presenting arms again, cheered and hurrahed
till it seemed as if the earthquake-proof cathedral must be
shaking, and the cavalry escort waved high their flashing
blades. 22
In stentorian tones the commander-in-chief appointed
Quitman governor of the city ; and then, dismounting in
the courtyard, he clanked up the broad stairway of the palace,
to indite congratulations on the "many glorious victories" of
his army. Presently cross-belted American Marines were
calmly patrolling the Halls of the Montezumas as if they
owned them, while the rest of the troops gazed with profound
exultation at the long pinkish facade and the endless balconies
of the upper story, and the people gazed silently at the troops.
"They are all and each of them heroes," commented a foreigner
present, and others in the world thought the same.
" Light up your homes, O fathers,
For those young hero bands,
Whose march is still through vanquished towns
And over conquered lands,
Whose valor, wild, impetuous
In all its fiery glow,
Pours onward like a lava-tide,
And sweeps away the foe ! " K
XXIX
FINAL MILITARY OPERATIONS
January, 1847-April, 1848
AT the north, after the Buena Vista campaign and the em-
barrassments growing out of it came to an end, Taylor probably
wished, in what an officer called "his easy dog-trot fashion/'
to advance as far as San Luis Potosi, and retained troops
urgently needed by Scott; but by the middle of June, 1847,
he doubtless realized that effective operations on so long a
line, especially through hostile and much of the way through
barren territory, were impracticable, and advised that Scott's
column alone should act on the offensive. A month later
orders of a corresponding tenor were issued at Washington,
and then some 3000 surplus troops of the northern army pro-
ceeded toward the capital, though too late, of course, to assist
in the decisive struggle. 1
Valencia, during his brief stay at San Luis Potosi in the
early summer of 1847, not only requested permission to move
against Saltillo, but planned that General Filisola, aided by
a brigade under Avalos, then lying at Matehuala, by Reyes,
the comandante general of Zacatecas, and by Urrea who still
commanded the "brigade of observation," and could easily
pass across the Sierra Madre from Tula should threaten,
if not attack, Saltillo and Monterey, and at least keep the
Americans on the defensive. Some disquieting movements
of these troops resulted ; but Valencia was soon called to Mex-
ico, and various difficulties, chiefly a lack of means resulting
from the American occupation, proved fatal to this ambitious
enterprise, besides hindering the Mexican preparations to
receive Taylor at San Luis Potosi. 1
During the winter of 1846-47 and to some extent later, the
garrison of Tampico was menaced by plans for an uprising,
165
166 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
to be assisted by outside forces, and sometimes it was feared
that a move to capture the city would be launched from Tula
in the hope of embarrassing Scott's communications; but the
Americans, though not strong in numbers there, were vigilant
and well protected by fortifications. Besides, the authorities
of Tamaulipas, now living on fairly good terms with the in-
vaders, had little wish to take part in active hostilities. They
quarrelled bitterly with Urrea, who naturally attempted to draw
supplies and money from the region, and in November, 1847,
with a view to bringing about harmony, that officer was re-
moved. Scott 's victories and especially the fall of Mexico had
no little effect in this quarter; the prospect of serious opera-
tions entirely disappeared; and early in November, 1847,
General Taylor, who had reached the conclusion some time
before that his country wanted him for President, and had
laid aside his old brown coat in favor of checked shirt sleeves,
set out for home on a leave of absence, which actually continued
until the close of the war. Wool took his place ; but nothing
occurred in this region except guerilla affairs, of which a due
account will be given presently. 1
In the northwest, meantime, Price, who commanded in New
Mexico and was disturbed by rumors of danger from the south,
decided on his own responsibility, ignoring instructions to do
otherwise, that he must assume the aggressive. Early in
March, 1848, the city of Chihuahua was therefore reoccupied ;
and on the sixteenth of that month, after a little brisk fighting,
the town of Resales, about sixty miles to the southeast, which
Angel Trias held with some 800 men, chiefly National Guards,
was captured by assault with a trifling loss. But this campaign
had no general effect on the war indeed, the treaty of peace
had already been signed and Price was ordered by Marcy
to retire. 1
In Scott's department the final military operations began
very promptly. Immediately after the Americans took pos-
session of the grand plaza at Mexico on the morning of Septem-
ber 14, a multitude of blanketed leperos crowded closely upon
them. Already these miscreants had tasted the disorder they
loved, for the palace had been left unguarded, and they had
sacked it; and now they showed signs of turbulence. The
plaza was cleared, however, and no further trouble seemed
FIGHTING IN THE CAPITAL 167
likely. But when our troops began to march away to their
quarters, a shot was heard. A bullet probably intended for
Worth struck Garland, and almost instantly firing from street
corners, windows and the tops of houses became general, though
not systematic. Thousands of convicts from the jail supported
the populace, and in one way or another not a few of the
better class cooperated. By Tornel's order paving stones
had been taken to many of the azoteas with a view to resisting
the invader step by step, and these, like every other sort of
weapon, were now used. 2
Though surprised, the Americans promptly accepted the
challenge. Skirmishers drove back the mobs. Grape and
canister swept the streets. As a rule, every house from which
a shot flew became a target for our heavy cannon, which seemed
to shake the very foundations of the city, and when breached
was immediately sacked ; and sharpshooters worked effectively
on towers and roofs. Scott threatened even sterner measures ;
and the city authorities not only put up notices, embodying
his threats and imploring the people to desist from a vain and
imprudent contest, but interceded personally with them in
the streets. By about noon the Americans held all the points
of vantage, and as evening approached, the firing died away.
A fearful night ensued. It was dark and cold. No lights
relieved the gloom. Wild mobs ran shouting through the
streets, and the hoof-beats of American patrols resounded from
square to square. 2
Santa Anna, finding it impossible on the morning of the
fourteenth to subsist his army at Guadalupe, had ordered the
infantry and heavy guns to Queretaro under General Herrera,
and proceeded with four small pieces and the cavalry to San
Cristobal, a point about fourteen miles northeast of the capital.
After seeing the people of Mexico view with indifference his
efforts of the previous day, he expected nothing of them ; but
on learning of the outbreak he marched back to Guadalupe,
and at a late hour sent into Mexico a small force of cavalry
and infantry to investigate and assist. This met Duncan 's
battery and retreated; but Santa Anna, assured that on the
next day there would be a rising en masse, erected a breastwork
at the Peralvillo garita on the north side of the town, and
waited. 2
168 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
As soon as day broke, gloomy and wet, the shooting was
in fact resumed, at least in the northern quarters. But he
soon perceived that no general movement was taking place,
and again marched away. This disheartened the people still
more; the efforts of the authorities influenced them greatly;
and by the end of the afternoon, realizing that much was to
be suffered and nothing gained, they generally abandoned hope.
During the next day or two scattering shots could be heard,
but real fighting was over. Extravagant hopes of destroying
the small American army were still entertained by lightheaded
men. "You will soon behold the banner of the haughty in-
vader trailing in the dust," wrote one of these, and attempts
were made by military officers to organize a real conspiracy;
but lack of courage, means, confidence and mutual trust as
well as the watchfulness of the Americans made success
impossible. Scott repeatedly warned his troops to be vigilant
and orderly, to keep together, and to refrain from drinking.
As the danger grew less menacing, however, they became less
careful, and for probably a month assassinations were frequent.
From first to last several hundred Americans perished in the
hostilities, and no doubt far more of the enemy. But by the
middle of October the city was tranquil. 2
The concluding field operations in Scott's department re-
sembled for the most part the fighting just described, for they
had to do chiefly with guerillas. That style of warfare suited
the national character. It had figured prominently in the
Spanish struggle against Napoleon and in the Mexican war of
independence; and when the public began to see clearly that
battles could not stop the Americans, it was invoked
even though by universal military practice in Europe those
who robbed and fought at will, while pretending to be in-
offensive, were considered brigands and assassins as the
one hope. 3
Thoughtful persons like J. F. Ramirez and General Mora
pointed out serious dangers : the impossibility of discipline,
the relaxation of morale, the destruction of all standards, and
the certainty that a spirit of violence and rapine would grow
by what it fed upon ; and they recognized the improbability
that such methods could prevail against the strength, equip-
ment, compactness and skill of the Americans. But the obvious
THE GUERILLAS OF THE NORTHEAST 169
advantages of the guerilla system, which it required far less
intelligence to perceive and appreciate, counted powerfully
on the other side. How much the Spanish themselves had
suffered from their irregulars during the hostilities against
Napoleon was not understood, and patriotic pride in the war
of independence had tended to draw a veil over its horrors. 3
The dagger, said the official newspaper, was the favorite
weapon of the people. Unarmed men could burn wagons
and intercept communications, it was pointed out. Even
women and children could help. A thorough knowledge of
the country, its mountains and its by-paths, would evidently
constitute an enormous advantage. Light corps of the abste-
mious rancheros, embarrassed with no baggage, could travel
quickly day and night, concentrate in large numbers against
an American detachment, strike, vanish, and then, when least
expected, reappear, making the most of all neglects, all mis-
takes, nullifying superior strength by avoiding it, and
nullifying discipline by fighting in a style that had no need of
discipline. Situated even more favorably than Spain for
such warfare, the Mexicans were to outdo her example. 3
This is what will save us, proclaimed in effect the legislature of
Mexico state. "Let the echo of our mountains repeat the cry
of War and Liberty," exclaimed the congress of Vera Cruz. .
Santa Anna endorsed the plan. Salas organized the " Guerillas
of Vengeance," which were to make "war without pity" "in
every manner imaginable"; and in April, 1847, the govern-
ment, pinning its faith to the system, set it on foot in earnest.
Scott, the "cowardly tiger," was to be routed after all. 3
In the north February, 1847, was the golden month of the
irregulars, for the approach of the Mexican army under Santa
Anna encouraged the rancheros to lay aside the habits of peace.
Canales boasted of 161 Americans killed that month, and
Urrea with his combined force of regulars and guerillas, besides
engaging in other operations, captured a train of wagons at
Agua Negra, and horribly slaughtered a large number of guards
and teamsters. To avenge this butchery a party of Rangers,
teamsters and other civilians murdered twenty-four men in
a village not far distant. Upon this Canales declared what
he called martial law, announcing that every American, armed
and unarmed, and every Mexican living peaceably would be
170 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
shot ; and many were led by fear or a lust for plunder to take
up arms. 4
The American trains in particular seemed likely to be
easy prey. As they commonly stretched out for some two
miles and were guarded only for so the character of the road
usually dictated at the ends, the Mexicans, trained to charge
at full speed through an ordinary thicket, could readily attack
them from ambush at about the middle point, create a stampede,
and do a great deal of mischief. Infantry could not pursue
the guerillas with success, and the number of our mounted
men was always comparatively small, for every Mexican
ranchero had at least one smart pony. In September, 1847,
a band even attacked Mier. Governor Aguirre of Coahuila
exerted himself particularly to organize forces of this char-
acter, and not only alcaldes but priests aided the cause. 4
The American leaders, however, pursuing a course that was
now conciliatory, now severe, and in many instances technically
unjust, succeeded in coping with a system that was itself unjust.
Taylor levied on the people of Nuevo Leon a tax of $96,000,
the estimated value of the goods destroyed at Agua Negra,
but suspended it indefinitely, when representative authorities
proved the substantial innocence of the population and begged
for mercy. Cavalry patrols and detachments pursuing culprits
fairly wore out their horses. Villages, if even suspected of
harboring the "banditti," were burned. Contributions were
imposed wherever connivance appeared probable. By April,
1847, Canales was in despair. 5
Then Wool determined to stamp out the evil, and announced
in July that any guerillas caught by him would be executed.
In December, 1847, he issued his famous Order 11, which not
only made the Mexican authorities and their towns responsible
for all damages done, but required them to hunt down the
"brigands." Aguirre attempted to retaliate, but in vain.
The Americans had power enough to carry out threats, whereas
he had not; and he admitted his failure. Besides, the mass
of the population were indolent in mind as well as body, and
looked upon submission as preferable to danger. In February,
1848, finding the guilty rancheros were anxious to give up the
business, Wool enabled them to resume peaceful occupations
by declaring an amnesty, and in the following May he stated
GUERILLAS IN VERA CRUZ STATE 171
that the country had never before been so free from highway
robbery. 5
In the south, Vera Cruz, a state of mountains, gorges,
thickets and forests threaded with blind paths, was the chief
home of the guerilla, and it looked as if Scott's line of com-
munication might be virtually destroyed. Not only many
hardy, hot-blooded and unscrupulous natives, but a great
many desperadoes hailing from Cuba were ready to enlist.
After the fall of Vera Cruz, and still more after the battle of
Cerro Gordo, a large number of regular officers, to say nothing
of privates, could scarcely find bread, and some men, like the
ex-divinity student, ex-Carlist, Jarauta whose small, close
beard, fierce black eyes, braided jacket, graceful cloak and gold-
laced sombrero gave him a romantic air had acquired in
Spain a taste for this adventurous, reckless life; but a vastly
greater number were prosaic felons, liberated from prison under
a pledge to rob and murder. Nominally J. C. Rebolledo, a
fine looking man of rather humane instincts, was the chief in
this district, but the 800 or so persons belonging to many
small bands, while occasionally acting more or less in concert,
were mainly independent. The decree under which all goods
coming from points occupied by the Americans were lawful
booty opened possibilities of large gains, and Rebolledo's
capture of ten loaded wagons in April, 1847, set the people
aflame with cupidity. 6
Brevet Colonel Mclntosh and his inexperienced officers,
who left Vera Cruz for the interior it will be recalled -
about the first of June, 1847, with a well-advertised convoy
including a large amount of specie, dependent on wild mus-
tangs under raw, half-mutinous drivers largely ignorant of
English, received the full benefit of this ambitious feeling.
Near Tolome and at Paso de Ovejas he lost men, wagons and
pack-mules; and at the national bridge there was a genuine
skirmish, in which a number of Americans were killed or
wounded. Out of about 130 wagons twenty-four had to be
abandoned in the low country ; and a little way above Jalapa,
though strongly reinforced, the troops had to fight again.
General Pierce, who left Vera Cruz about six weeks later than
Mclntosh, had similar experiences. Early in August Major
Lally set out from the coast with a few more than 1000 soldiers,
172 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
two 6-pounders and sixty-four wagons. He lost no merchandise,
but his four fights cost him nearly 100 men killed, wounded
and missing ; and Captain Wells, who followed Lally with some
200 recruits and additional ammunition, lost forty and had to
retreat. These and other affairs proved that irregulars, favored
by the geography of the region, were capable of doing substan-
tial harm. 7
But in Vera Cruz, as in every other quarter where they
operated, though perhaps nowhere else in so marked a degree,
the lack of morale, which enabled the guerilla system to exist,
proved the cause of its failure. Poor arms, poor ammunition,
poor marksmanship, and the want of artillery might have been
remedied, or at least might have been offset by the counter-
balancing advantages ; but this defect was fatal. The Mexican
guerillas were very different from what the guerillas of Spain
had been. They fought like savages without the excuse of
savages, for they knew better. Infuriated by their treacheries
and cruelties, the Americans were persistent and unsparing
in severity. Patrols who seemed never to sleep hunted out
their nests in the mountains. On the march, flanking parties
would force their way through the woods five miles or more
from the road to catch them between two fires. The torch
was applied with much liberality on suspicion, and sometimes
on general principles, to huts and villages; and in the end a
black swath of devastation, leagues in width, marked the
route. 8
Scott ordered that in every case of outrage the nearest alcalde,
if he failed to deliver up the guilty, should be fined at least
$300 for a murder or the value of the stolen property for a
robbery, and that any robber or murderer and any person
belonging to a* known party of such miscreants might, when
caught, be summarily tried by three officers, and either flogged
or executed. This plan, however, did not quite satisfy those
on the ground especially the Texas troops. Captain
Walker, on his cream-colored horse, and Colonel Hays, in his
blue roundabout, black trousers and black leather cap, im-
pressed themselves on the Mexican imagination as the agents
of diabolical wrath ; and in general it was a tale of merciless
atrocities followed by merciless reprisals. 8
At the same time this lack of morale deprived the guerillas
GUERILLAS OF THE CENTRE 173
of Mexican support. By taking bribes for letting merchandise
pass up to the interior and sometimes even guarding it, they
violated the laws on which their existence rested. Mostly
they were brave only where they felt safe. When laden with
booty they would scatter to their homes, no matter how im-
portant the business in hand. Rivalries and even hostilities
between parties operating in the same district arose. Co-
operation could seldom be reckoned upon, and hardly any
would face the climate far above Jalapa. Soon learning that
it was more wholesome to waylay Mexicans than Americans,
they plundered their fellow-countrymen without ceremony;
and they would rob even old women or young children of their
needful clothing. Sheafs of complaints against them piled
up in the state and national archives. People organized to
fight them, and sometimes appealed to the Americans against
the very men who were to have been their champions. "The
Mexicans have sown to the storm, they are now reaping the
whirlwind," said an American officer. 9
In the states of Puebla, Mexico and Oaxaca also guerillas
were organized, and in Puebla all these parties could find an
opportunity. General Rea, a pupil of Morelos and the Mexican
revolution, had the discredit of the chief command, though
Bravo, who stood at the summit of the social scale, was mainly
responsible for their iniquities, since during his brief term as
comandante general of Puebla he issued a great number of
patents to unfit leaders. What Rea did particularly in this
regard was to combine individuals and small groups, and
place them under some kind of supervision. He loved to
answer critics by saying that his guerillas were in the field
because honorable men were not ; and that, had not the govern-
ment condoned their crimes, they would have served the
Americans as counter-guerillas. After a time his officers
adopted a set of rules which aimed to regulate operations, but
even this measure seems to have accomplished little. The
guerillas robbed the people, seized funds belonging to the
, state, and pillaged even churches. Some gangs were large
enough to attack haciendas. One party called themselves
the "Lancers of the Poisoned Spear." 10
Soon after Scott left Puebla for Mexico early in August,
1847, these banditti and every individual ruffian of that vicinity
174 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
hurried to the city. Mexicans and even foreign residents
were robbed and outraged, and about the first of September,
in the hope of more booty, the Americans also were attacked.
Two thousand soldiers were needed for a garrison, and Colonel
Childs, the civil and military governor, actually had 2193 ;
but 1800 of these were in hospitals. His effectives consisted
of about fifty cavalry, 100 artillery, 250 of the First Pennsyl-
vania volunteers, and a small spy company of Mexicans. 11
Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Black of Pennsylvania
and the main body of troops occupied the "cuartel San Jose/'
a large rectangular building on the eastern side of the town,
which had a plaza of its own opening toward a public promenade
called the Tivoli. To this position five howitzers were allotted,
and within a hundred and fifty yards of it all the sick were
placed. Half a mile or so from the town on a hill stood Loreto
fort, a stone affair equipped with two 12-pound field guns and
a 10-inch mortar, where Major Gwynn of the Sixth Infantry
commanded ; and not far distant, on a higher point of the same
hill, was Guadalupe church, now protected with mountain
howitzers, a ditch and an earthen wall, under Captain More-
head of the Pennsylvania regiment. But the chief element
of the defence was the large, robust, finely-featured Childs,
a skilful and veteran officer, cold in manner, clear in judg-
ment, and inflexible in courage. September 13 the "siege"
began in earnest, and from that day on there was a continual
small-arm attack, particularly at night, upon San Jose, which
replied with a musket and howitzer fire that kept the assailants
at a respectful distance. What was more serious than guerilla
shooting, all supplies were now cut off. Such was the state of
things at the second city of Mexico when Santa Anna retired
from the first. 11
Santa Anna's real intention was probably to seek an asylum
in Guatemala. But many of his friends urged that he could
make himself dictator as the sole hope of the country, and it
was clear that, if he should recover Puebla and cut off Scott,
he would still be able to boast of a triumph. His cavalry,
though greatly reduced by desertion, included some 2000 men
backed with four light guns. Alvarez, who was ordered to
Puebla, still had about 600 foot and horse. Rea, Santa Anna
understood, commanded 600 irregulars ; 2500 National Guards \
THE " SIEGE OF PUEBLA 175
lay near him with two field pieces, it was reported ; and the
Pueblans were described as eager to fight. Six thousand men
and six guns appeared quite enough to dispose of " six hundred
sick Yankees," as Mexicans described the garrison; and he
therefore presented himself at Puebla on September 21. Two
days later Alvarez arrived there. But between these two
events Childs appeared at a second-story balcony, "winking
and smiling all over his face," as a soldier expressed it, and
announced that Scott had taken the capital. Evidently,
therefore, the Mexican President was not greatly to be feared. 11
After looking about, Santa Anna concluded that it would
not be easy to capture the American positions by assault, and
appealed to the minister of war wherever that official might
be for 1000 infantry, a 16-pounder, a 12-pounder, ammuni-
tion and supplies. He now had ten cannon, but all of them
were light; owing to desertion his force included only some
4000 men; and the citizens had no arms, he reported. Prob-
ably, too, the annoyances and outrages inflicted upon them by
him and his troops, and his appointing the guerilla chief mili-
tary commandant of the city dampened whatever ardor they
had possessed. 12
On September 23 and 24 unsuccessful attempts were made
at Guadalupe, and the next day Santa Anna summoned
Childs, describing his army as 8000 strong, and graciously an-
nouncing that "for the sake of humanity" the Americans
might retire "within a limited time" with the honors of war.
Childs replied as was proper, and then, riding to the posts,
gave notice amid cheers that no surrender need be expected.
To add the touch of humor that soldiers love, an American flag
was manufactured out of an old Mexican uniform, and raised
aloft ; and the garrison settled down to severe duty, stern dis-
cipline, short rations and incessant watchfulness at all hours.
The Mexicans tried to approach San Jose by throwing up suc-
cessive breastworks at night in the streets leading that way,
but shot, shell and rockets from Loreto kept them back.
September 30 Santa Anna learned that no ammunition could
be provided for the heavy cannon demanded of the minister,
and resolved apparently to make a bold effort. With two
6-pounders he fired all day on the weak, plaza face of San
Jose. But Childs, anticipating such a manoeuvre, had brought
176 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
a 12-pounder from Loreto the night before ; and this, protected
with bags of tobacco, made an assault impracticable. 12
A new factor now entered the military situation. About the
middle of September General "Jo" Lane, one of Taylor's chief
officers at Buena Vista, arrived at Vera Cruz from the Rio
Grande, and on the nineteenth his brigade set out for the
interior. Aware of the situation at Puebla but not aware
what was to be encountered on the route, the General had not
made adequate preparations, and on meeting guerillas at
the national bridge he was obliged to send back for ammu-
nition and supplies. By October 1, however, he managed to
leave Jalapa. 13
It was a hard march that ensued. Torrents of rain deluged
the troops. Sometimes the road lay deep under water. For
dinner they had a thin slice of beef, a couple of "crackers"
and some coffee ; for supper, after darkness fell upon them with
tropical abruptness, the same without the beef; and perhaps
mud for a couch. But Lane, a hearty westerner with a stout
frame and unbounded vigor, led on unshrinkingly in his black
hat and old blue overcoat, and the rest followed him eagerly.
October 5, after incorporating additional troops at Perote,
he left that place with a force of about 3300 and seven guns,
and marched on across hot plains, where water sold for five
dollars a drink, and men died of sheer fatigue. 13
Santa Anna, informed by spies that 1000 Americans were
approaching, and anxious, not only to prevent them from join-
ing Childs, but still more to win the glory of routing them,
had set out from Puebla four days earlier with perhaps 3500
men, leaving Rea to continue the fighting. Desertion played
havoc with his command, especially when the strength of Lane's
force was ascertained ; but, after sending back a large part
of the faithful in order to keep control of them, he took possession
of El Pinal, where the national highway passed between a
precipitous mountain and a ravine, with .about 1000 cavalry
and six guns, and made preparations to ambush Lane's rear.
This done, he moved to Huamantla, a sizable town eight miles
distant, and waited. 13
Early on October 9 the drums and bugles awoke Lane's
troops at the hacienda of San Antonio Tamaris, approximately
ten miles from Huamantla and twelve from El Pinal; and the
THE FIGHT AT HUAMANTLA 177
men, leaping from the damp grass and buckling their muddy
belts, found the white walls of the hacienda, the church towers
of neighboring villages, the dark woods on the hillsides, and
the distant, snowy peaks all aglow under a splendid sun. Never,
perhaps, did soldiers feel more like having an adventure. Santa
Anna had just marched from Huamantla to conceal his force
at El Final, leaving behind him with no scouts or outposts
his six guns, a very small guard for them and a party of ir-
regulars; but a spy reported to the Americans that he was
at Huamantla, and Lane moved off to attack him. First rode
four mounted companies, and at their head a rather short,
slender, spare, slouchy man, with reddish hair, a small reddish
beard, mild blue eyes and a quiet, kindly manner, whom no-
body would have picked out as a fearless, indomitable fighter,
the scourge of the guerillas, but in fact he was Captain Walker ;
and then marched Lane with five guns and some 1800 men. 14 ;
When about three miles from their destination, Walker and
his 200 cavalry, seeing a party of Mexican horse approach the
town, dashed ahead. Entering Huamantla they formed in
fours, and then with a yell, a flash of sabres and a thunder of
hoofs they swept through to the plaza. The Mexicans had,
time to get four of the guns away, but the others were captured^
and most of the American troopers, concluding their work
had been finished, scattered to drink, loot or hunt for cannon
and ammunition. But now Santa Anna, who had observed
Lane's movement from a church tower near El Final, appeared
with his full command. They were a beautiful sight gallop-
ing horses, red and green uniforms, brilliant pennons and a
billowy sea of flashing lance points; but they were enemies,
and the Americans accepted their challenge. 14
"Take it cool, my boys, but run like the devil !" cried Lane.
Every nerve was taxed. Blood gushed from nostrils. The
Mexicans, lashing their steeds into foam, reached the goal
first, however, and the American troopers found themselves
attacked on all sides. Walker was shot from a house, and soon
expired ; but he lived long enough to give a final order :
"Don't surrender boys; the infantry will soon be here."
And so they were "with a shout and a bound," said one of
them. The tide was quickly turned, and giving up the town,
"Peg-Leg," as the soldiers loved to call Santa Anna, passed
VOL. II N
178 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
the night some distance away. So ended the Tale of Hua-
mantla or The Biter Bitten, which received no little applause
at the time. 14
While these events were taking place, the garrison of Puebla
continued to be hemmed in, starved and harassed. Their
casualties numbered in all only fifty-two, but they felt severely
the effect of so long a strain. Though a number of sorties were
made, and their persecutors had to retire from several annoying
positions, the Americans were not strong enough to do more.
Their day of deliverance was approaching, however. October
10 Lane moved forward, dogged and somewhat annoyed by
Santa Anna. Two days later his men saw the spires of Puebla,
dominated by the sombre towers of the cathedral, and set off
by white volcanoes veiled with clouds. And now and again
the numberless bells of the city, great and small, pealed forth
harmonious tones of many colors, that seemed to blend and
interweave in rich and varied tapestries of sound, hung out
in the mediaeval style to honor their triumphal approach. 15
At about one o'clock, announced by the bells of Guadalupe,
they entered the suburbs not a few of them at a run. One
column then advanced by the main street, while another flanked
the town by the left. For two hours there was considerable
firing from houses, though Rea's guerillas had begun to leave
their posts the night before ; but at length Lane extended his
"rough paw" to Childs, with a sunny smile on his rather hard
features, and the garrison joyously welcomed their deliverers.
In the main plaza a bugler played "The Star-Spangled Banner, "
and all sang the chorus :
"The star-spangled banner, Oh, long may it wave
O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave !" 15
Now followed the punishment of Rea. Some twenty-
five miles from Puebla toward the southwest lay beautiful
Atlixco, a defensible point that not only reconciled the climates
of the temperate and the cold zones of Mexico, and controlled
a region fertile in grains, flocks and herds, but, while fairly
remote from the Americans, gave convenient access to important
roads. Here, in the midst of flowers, fruits and snowy moun-
tains, the government of Puebla had found a refuge, when the
Americans under Worth approached the state capital ; and to
POLITICAL CHAOS IN MEXICO 179
this asylum Rea now withdrew. De facto, at -least, the guerilla
chief was the most important person on the ground. The
authorities did not relish his prominence; they detested his
men and his methods; and on October 18, tired of spending
money fruitlessly on the National Guards for Rea to command,
they dissolved the corps. But many of the irregulars proposed
to make the best of what appeared to be a good situation, in
which they could live on plunder, if not paid. 16
October 18 Lane, who apparently never slept nor expected his
followers to sleep, ordered them to be ready in the morning for
an expedition. Many of the soldiers were barefoot, but they
borrowed shoes; and at about nine o'clock, cheered by the
fife and the drum, some 1500 men set out round the base of
Popocatepetl under a hot sun. At about four in the afternoon,
after making twenty miles or so, they came in sight of the enemy,
and a running fight began. Blistered feet and parching tongues
were now forgotten. The Mexicans, holding some good position
and protected by chaparral, could make a stand against cavalry,
but when the infantry came up they always fled. Shortly
after sunset Lane reached Atlixco, which stood on the slope
of a lofty hill. As it was unsafe to risk a street fight in an un-
known town at night, he ordered the artillery to open. The
moon was full. Marks were easily selected. By their burn-
ing fuses the shells could be traced until they fell amidst the
shadows ; and then a burst of red fire, the crash of roofs and
walls, and the cries of the people told the rest. 17
After about an hour of cannonading, the troops advanced
into the town ; which surrendered at once and there slept
as best they could. Rea, with two guns and the disordered
remnants of his force, retreated to Izucar de Matamoros, about
thirty miles farther down the valley; but from that point
he was routed a month later. These and other exploits of Lane's
discouraged as well as dispersed the chief guerilla forces of the
plateau, and in February, 1848, Rea asked permission of the
Mexican authorities to leave the country. 17
Neither in these affairs nor in any other military operations
did Santa Anna figure at this time, and there was a good reason
for his inactivity. Officially he no longer existed. As General
Scott had feared, our entering the capital had resulted in the
destruction of the Mexican government. September 16 Santa
180 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
Anna resigned, explaining that it was advisable to preserve
the chief magistracy from the hazards of war, and fix it near
the centre of wealth and population, whereas he proposed to
continue the hostilities wherever that should be possible. The
same proclamation or decree assigned the executive power to
a triumvirate : the president of the supreme court, General
Herrera and General Alcorta, and Santa Anna then ceased
actually to exercise any civil authority. 18
But as Congress was not in session to accept his resignation,
some doubted whether it became effective; the presidency
of the supreme court was vacant on account of the incum-
bent's death ; the appointment of Herrera and Alcorta needed
to be made, or at least confirmed, by the council of govern-
ment, a body no longer acting ; and it was denied broadly that
Santa Anna had the power to issue such a decree. Pena y Pena,
to be sure, was regarded as a member of the court, and, if he
was, he could claim by right of seniority to act as the chief
justice; but the legality of his membership was questioned,
and the presidency of that body was really an elective office.
Pena was old, feeble and even timid ; his ill-success as Herrera's
minister of relations doubtless weighed heavily upon him ; and
he was now living, almost as a recluse, in the country. Indeed
there was really no organic law even, for the amended constitu-
tion of 1824, though formally adopted, had not come into effect.
In short, chaos reigned, and the states were officially "resum-
ing" their individual sovereignty. 18
But a number of good and able men, particularly Cuevas
and Couto, determined to ward off ruin, and awakened others.
Pena, drawn from his retirement, consented for patriotic
reasons to override all the technical difficulties ; and on Septem-
ber 22 he announced formally that, in order to give the nation
a head, he would act as the Executive until an interim President
could somehow be chosen. At the small city of Toluca, capital
of the state of Mexico, just outside the Valley, this fiction of
a government pitched its tent; and perhaps it gained some
feeling of security from the vast bastioned, battlemented ridge
between it and the Americans, from snowy Mt. Miguel towering
above the city, and from the peacefully shining lagoons of the
intervening meadows. What was more important, Herrera,
Olaguibel and many others of the best men rallied to the sup-
SANTA ANNA ELIMINATED 181
port of Pena, the representatives of neutral governments
recognized him, and the states began to concur. Early in
October, however, he removed to Queretaro, a safer yet central
place, and with Luis de la Rosa as sole minister addressed him-
self to his task. 19
The programme that he announced was honorable and straight-
forward. My tenure of office will be extremely brief, he said
in effect, for Congress will be assembled as soon as possible;
I will usurp no powers, but will not be turned from the path
of duty by insurrections ; the closest economy will be
practised, the necessary taxes laid fairly, and all interests
respected ; union and harmony will be the watchwords, and the
national rights will be maintained. His most urgent problem,
of course, was to deal with Santa Anna, who not only held the
chief military command, but insisted that he could resume
the Presidential authority by simply withdrawing his resigna-
tion ; and in this matter the government showed a decision that
earned it no little prestige. All Santa Anna's protests against
political effacement were disregarded, and on October 7 he
was instructed both to give up his troops and to submit, as did
other unsuccessful commanders, to a military trial. 20
At about the time this order overtook him, the Huamantla
affair occurred. From a military point of view he was now
prostrate. He saw it himself, and knew that the country would
see it. Evidently his countless political enemies would make
the most of his complete failure, and he was doubtless aware
that his military reports had offended many officers. His
chief executive merits decision and activity had led only
to a useless expenditure of life and money, it was now pointed
out, and his ostensible patriotism was attributed to passion
and obstinacy. Even his confidence in himself broke down.
Unable to understand why failure had attended all his efforts,
he fell into a sombre depression, and without a struggle he placed
his troops at the orders of General Reyes, who joined him on
October 11 with about 1000 men. His part in the war was
over; and in the following January, realizing that nothing
could be gained through intrigue or conspiracy and fearing the
Americans would make him a prisoner, he asked for permission
to leave the country. Both his own government and our
authorities consented. And after giving a dinner at El Encero
182 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
to the American officers of that vicinity, who had treated him
with distinguished consideration, he sailed once more, about
the first of April, from what he regarded as an ungrateful
country. 21
Santa Anna being now eliminated, the government had to
face its military difficulties without his assistance. In general
the problem was to make bricks with neither straw nor clay.
Almost every good cannon had been taken by the Americans,
and the muskets had nearly all been captured, thrown away
or sold. Ammunition was almost wholly wanting. The
engineering material had been lost or destroyed. Vast sums
of money were needed to provide fortifications as well as re-
place all this equipment, and the government could hardly
obtain enough, day by day, to cover its minimum expenses.
Even officers had to sell their shoes for bread. 22
As for an army, Santa Anna and Alvarez together had some
2000 troops the first week of October, Reyes had about 1000,
about 3000 from Mexico City concentrated at Queretaro under
Herrera, about 1000 from Jalisco were on their way to the
same point, and small detachments existed at various other
places. But nearly all of these men were utterly demoralized.
"Almost useless," they were officially termed; and the army
as a whole felt the crushing weight of general contempt. He-
rrera, the commander-in-chief, became so disgusted over the
uncontrolled excesses of the troops that he resigned. Rincon
declined on the ground of ill-health to serve. Arista, when
summoned to Queretaro, declared he would not command a
soldier until exonerated for his conduct on the Rio Grande.
No officers of high distinction, indeed, were available except
the aged, torpid and infirm Bustamante and "the old woman,"
Filisola, as Bancroft described him. 22
Attempts were made to lay plans of campaign, but an expert
summed up one of them by saying it appeared excellent only
it was based upon things as they should have been, not as they
were ; and all the others had the same defect. Schemes were
devised to reform, reorganize and build up the forces, and quotas
amounting to 16,000 were assigned to the states; but Mexico,
which had been expected to furnish nearly a quarter of these
men, promptly answered that she could not, and other states
did not even reply. In fact, the regular forces decreased instead
THE AMERICAN POLICY 183
of multiplying, for sometimes a general could not feed his troops,
and frequently, when soldiers were let out of the barracks on
service, they vanished ; and the people, instead of helping to
support the Mexican troops, even dreaded to see them ap-
proach, for their coming was liable to draw an American
attack, and more than liable to mean extortion, outrage and
robbery. Nowhere on the military horizon could a glimmer of
light be seen. 22
Over against this pitiful government stood the United States
- wealth against poverty, strength against weakness ; and
the antithesis was complete, for while the Mexicans could only
plan, that was the hardest thing for us to do. The idea of
retiring to a defensive line still persisted. Taylor himself
adhered to it. But in addition to the other overwhelming
objections to this project, it seemed improbable that a majority
in Congress could agree where to draw the line. Even Calhoun,
though qualified to make a better argument for an untenable
proposition than any other man in the country, was unable to
present this policy in such a manner as to satisfy either the
friends or the opponents of the war. Some advised holding,
in addition to the territory thus to be cut off, the chief ports
of Mexico; and some advocated retaining the capital also,
and the line to Vera Cruz. Others favored the occupation
of still more cities ; and many were for subjugating and holding
the entire country. 23
To this last plan, however, even had it been practicable to
levy all the costs upon Mexico, there were tremendous objections.
It would have involved keeping under arms 80,000 or possibly
100,000 young men, seriously needed at home for the most
part, in order to be sure of having effectives enough at the front.
The troops in Mexico would have become corrupted both
physically and morally; and the commanders would have
acquired the ideas and vices of proconsuls. It seemed to be
almost an insoluble problem. No final decision was made.
But the government determined to occupy the capital, hold the
line to Vera Cruz, retain the chief ports, and extend our holdings
according to circumstances. 23
To Scott, however, the lack of a definitive plan signified
littte. Not one reinforcement entered the capital until after
the first of November, and even at the end of that month he
184 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
was barely able to garrison Mexico and Chapultepec. Decem-
ber 4 his army included only about 8000 privates, of whom a
quarter were sick. During the next three weeks Generals
Patterson, Butler and Gushing, Colonel Hays, Lieutenant
Colonel Johnston and Major Lally, each with troops, arrived ;
and the forces then numbered about 11,000 effectives and 3000
sick. 24
Scott therefore announced, with no doubt a strategic purpose
as well as a rhetorical flourish, that our army was "about to
spread itself over and to occupy the Republic of Mexico."
What he really intended was to take possession successively
of the principal mining regions those of Zacatecas and San
Luis Potosi and the capitals of such important states as
lay within easy reach. Even for the former purpose, however,
two columns of some 5000 effectives each were needed, and
the men as well as clothing for them could not be provided.
The only immediate operations, therefore, aside from the
establishment of new posts on the road to Vera Cruz, were
the peaceful occupation of Pachuca, a mining town about fifty
miles northeast of Mexico, Toluca, about thirty-eight miles
distant in the opposite direction, and Cuernavaca, the key
to the Acapulco region, a little farther away toward the south-
west. 24
February 6, 1848, an expedition of more consequence marched,
by Scott's orders, from Vera Cruz. Most of the guerillas who
infested the road to the interior lived and found a market
at or near Cordoba, a city about sixty-five miles to the south-
west, and Orizaba, sixteen or eighteen miles beyond it in the
same direction ; and Bankhead was instructed to occupy those
towns. Very different from Lane's rough trips on the plateau
was this march. Near Cordoba flourished such genuine trop-
ical wonders as the bread tree, the butter tree, the milk tree,
and a kind of palm called "the traveller's friend," which
covered the wayfarer's head with a tent, and quenched his
thirst with abundant sap. Going on, one found enormous
masses of vegetation thick, matted, boundlessly prolific
- moulded into astonishing yet harmonious forms by the
bays and promontories of the rapidly mounting foothills;
terraces of luxuriant foliage piled on sheer cliffs, castles
on the terraces, and cathedrals on the castles; verdure,
THE REMOVAL OF SCOTT 185
verdure everywhere, dripping, flowing, spurting, tumbling
in every hue and shade of green, with a dark, velvety mist
in the gorges that became clear sapphire when the sun touched
it, and here and there a cascade letting fall its crystal thread
from a mossy crag. 25
Then came the rich Orizaba valley, hemmed in with jungles,
and winding off between sombre, precipitous mountains until
lost in the dreamy distance ; and aboye it the sparkling snows
of the vast peak sent down a torrent of gray glacier water, that
leaped into mid-air, and then, gathering itself below, wound on
through splendid, odorous trees full of parrots, canaries and
mocking-birds, hurried past fragrant orange groves and still
more fragrant blossoms, poured through the arches of a noble
old bridge, and buried itself in the woods. But the Americans
did not forget their orders. Both cities were occupied without
resistance, and both were garrisoned ; and the guerillas now
found their proceedings considerably hampered. 25
The final military operations of Scott seemed thus rather
tame, as was natural; but Polk executed one that could be
termed startling, if not exactly brilliant. His principal assist-
ants were Pillow, Worth and Duncan ; and in different ways
each had excellent qualifications for the work. Pillow was
not "The Lie Incarnate," as Trist believed, nor even "a perfect
ass," as many thought; but vanity, ambition, lack of probity,
and a gift for dark and cunning methods characterized him.
His instincts and talents, indeed, were those of the criminal
lawyer who minds nothing about his case except the verdict.
When the President's brother shot a man down in the street
at Nashville, Pillow got him off. With reference to his work
in helping bring about Polk's nomination at Baltimore he
wrote, "The fatal blow was given, but it was not seen nor
known what produced such a result nor where the blow came
from." "I feel as boy ant as the air," he said in December,
1846, when great dissatisfaction with Taylor prevailed at
Washington, because I know "that I have done the work. . . .
I have paid him in full" for his treatment of me. And one
could seldom get a finger on Pillow's back, when he was not
wriggling actively toward some object of selfish desire. 26
Without a particle of real military ability or success to his
credit, he now stood second in our army, and hence logically
186 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
enough saw no reason why he might not, by some devious
path, arrive at the first position and even at the Presidency.
"Modesty," said Burke, "does not long survive innocence/'
To plant such a person, with urgent recommendations, at open,
big-hearted Scott's right hand, to win his confidence, to spy
upon, criticise and undermine him, and inevitably to scheme
for his place, was indecent ; but Polk did it. 26
Very unlike Pillow was the courtly and fascinating Worth;
but his mind was intense, narrow and self-centred. After
the battle of Monterey he exclaimed, "I am satisfied with
myself. The most vindictive foes crouch at my feet, and my
friends choke with joy and delight." And there is one sin
of which even angels are capable, we have been told. All his
military recognition he owed to Scott, but probably the debt
weighed heavily on his proud and restive nature; and, while
apparently reciprocating the genuine affection of his chief, he
had inwardly rejected Scott's principles and methods nearly
thirty years before the Mexican war. Regarding his friend,
fellow New Yorker and brother Democrat, Marcy, an adroit
politician, he felt very differently. "I would not give an
ounce" of his wisdom, he wrote in June, 1846, for all Scott's
glory ; Scott " is determined to sink and draw his friends down
with him." 27
At Vera Cruz the commander-in-chief, relying on their long
intimacy, told Worth frankly that he believed the adminis-
tration intended to ruin him, and the subordinate officer evi-
dently determined not to be drawn down. At the same place
a brother officer suggested to Worth a higher position than was
even the highest in the army. The suggestion appears to have
struck root. All military men believed the next President
would be one -of them, and what commander had acquired a
more brilliant reputation? The New York Sun recommended
him for the place ; and the idea of his candidacy was favorably
received by many. This prospect naturally turned him still
more against his old friend, for either Scott or Taylor seemed al-
most certain to be the Whig nominee. Through a series of
clashes, for which little if any justification can be seen,
and in spite of Scott's efforts to conciliate him, Worth proceeded
then to gain emancipation from his burden of gratitude, and
place himself in open antagonism to his former patron. 28
THE REMOVAL OF SCOTT 187
Duncan's motives were different again. He was intimate
with Worth ; and Pillow, who offered to marry the Colonel to
a rich and handsome widow, doubtless promised him the post
of inspector general. At any rate he urged Polk to make the
appointment, hinting at other reasons than mere qualifications,
and it was made; and we know that Duncan gave himself
much trouble to assist Pillow as a partisan supporter. The
power of such a combination, headed by the President himself,
to gather adherents from the many ambitious officers hardly
needs to be pointed out; and finally there were, of course,
jealous and envious men. "Since we cannot attain to great-
ness, let us revenge ourselves by railing at it," said Montaigne
for the benefit of such persons ; and many of the officers knew
that greatness was beyond their powers. None of them could
monologue as Scott did ; none could look in a cocked hat as
he looked ; none had won the Mexican war ; and, moreover,
he was the sole general-in-chief. 29
The result was a powerful movement against the prestige
and authority properly belonging to Scott. Pillow's reports
on the battles of Contreras and Chapultepec tended to repre-
sent the General as a nonentity; and Worth not only did
somewhat the same, but referred to the Commander in terms
of ridicule and contempt. A letter, doubtless written directly
or indirectly by Pillow over the signature of "Leonidas,"
extolling Pillow shamelessly and belittling Scott, was trickily
worked into the New Orleans Delta of September 10, 1847;
and another letter, containing a passage intended to show that
Worth and Duncan had saved Scott from choosing the wrong
approach to the capital, appeared in the United States, then
in a Tampico newspaper and finally at Mexico City. Both
letters were grossly improper, especially since the army lay
in the enemy's country ; and Scott found it necessary to act.
As he well said, "The general-in-chief who once submits to an
outrage from a junior, must lay his account to suffer the like
from all the vicious under him," and "even the great mass of
the spirited, intelligent, and well affected, among his brothers
in arms, would soon reduce such commander to utter imbecility,
by holding him in just scorn and contempt " for his recreancy
to himself and the country. 30
On November 12, therefore, he issued his General Orders
'188 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
349, which aimed to stigmatize these offences in such a way as
to prevent a recurrence of them. Duncan then assumed in
a plainly defiant manner the paternity of the Tampico letter,
although in fact the offensive passage had not been written
by him. His primary object in doing this was evidently to
give Worth a handle, and the handle was promptly seized.
One thing led to another ; and in the end formal charges were
brought by the commander-in-chief against Pillow, Worth
and Duncan, and by the two generals against him; appeals
insulting to Scott were made by Pillow and Worth to
the government; and the technical "arrest" of the three
officers followed. 31
The government then stepped in. Scott had no doubt given
it offence during the campaign, for his letters had plainly
enough revealed a conviction that Polk had broken faith with
him, and purposely thrown difficulties and annoyances across
his path; but the circumstances had appeared to warrant
his complaints, and Marcy had at least "got even" by ad-
ministering liberal censures in reply. The balance in fact
aside, perhaps, from a mere acerbity of language was against
the administration. Besides, having served the country well
and saved the government from disaster, Scott was entitled
to some indulgence for irritation caused by the peculiarly trying
circumstances that surrounded him. He was a large man,
had done a large work and merited large treatment. But
there was nothing large about the administration. The confines
of mediocrity hemmed it in. Pillow and Duncan were there-
fore by its orders relieved of arrest; Worth was not only re-
leased, but assigned to duty according to his highest brevet
rank ; and " in view of the present state of things in the army,"
chiefly or entirely caused by Folk's agent and Marcy's friend,
Scott was deposed. He had performed his task, said Robert
E. Lee, and now was "turned out as an old horse to d'e."
April 22, 1848, amidst the lamentations, cheers and blessings
of the army as a whole trembling himself with emotion
he took his leave, and Major General Butler, who was a Demo-
crat and looked well on a horse, bore sway at headquarters. 32
XXX
THE NAVAL OPERATIONS OF THE WAR
1845-1848
IN January, 1846, the United States had available for naval
hostilities one ship-of-the-line, seven frigates and razees, fifteen
sloops-of-war, six brigs, one schooner and three steamers
that is to say, thirty-three war craft. As ships-of-the-line
carried more than seventy guns, frigates about forty-four to
fifty, sloops twenty, brigs ten and other vessels in proportion,
this fleet had 1155 cannon. Two of the vessels, under Com-
modore James Biddle, were on the coast of Asia; several
occupied the Brazil station ; and five cruised in African waters
to check the trade in slaves. The Pacific squadron, com-
manded by Commodore John D. Sloat, comprised on July
1, 1846, the frigate Savannah, the sloops Portsmouth, Levant,
Warren and Cyane, the schooner Shark and the storeship Erie,
to which the frigate Congress, the razee Independence and the
sloops Dale, Saratoga and Preble were added later in the year,
while the Levant went home ; and substantially all the rest of
the fleet, known as the Home Squadron, attended to the West
Indies and Gulf service, under Commodore David Conner. 1
The appropriation for the year ending with June, 1846, was
a little less than ten millions, but only about six and a half
millions were expended. The war bill of May 13 permitted
the completion of all vessels then building and the purchase
of others; and by November, 1847, after suffering a number
of losses, the navy had in commission five ships-of-the-line,
one razee, four frigates, thirteen sloops, six brigs, eleven
schooners, four bomb-vessels, twelve steamers and six store-
ships. 1
The peace establishment created by Congress in 1844 provided
for 7500 petty officers, seamen, landsmen and boys, and in
189
190 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
August, 1846, this number was raised to 10,000 for the period
of the war ; but owing to the remarkable activity of the mer-
chant marine and the consequently high wages, men could not
easily be obtained. During the most important year
November, 1846, to November, 1847 not over 8000 were
in the fleet at any one time. The whole number of seamen
employed in the course of the war did not exceed 7000; and
hence plans to strengthen our forces in the Gulf and the Pacific
had to be curtailed. The service, too, did not enjoy unqualified
popularity. In the sailor's decalogue appeared this command-
ment :
"Six days shalt thou work
And do all thou art able,
On the seventh thou shalt holystone
The deck and scrape the cable" ;
and the cannon had to be rubbed with fragrant "sea pitch "
from the bottom of the ocean until they shone like Japanese
lacquer. Discipline, therefore, not reinforced by the enthu-
siasm and the necessities of war, fell considerably below its
reputation, and the crews were eager to be free when their time
expired. The officers, even, had become lax after thirty years
of peace, and in too many instances their standards of conduct
had given way. 2
In the administration of the navy, also, the effects of a long
peace could be seen. The control of matters had fallen, though
not by accident, into the hands of shrewd officers deeply in-
terested in themselves and their friends. Supernumeraries
abounded. Those who drew the most pay often rendered
the least service. The pet ambition was for a safe, quiet and
easy position. Shore billets were too numerous. No field
officer of the Marines had cruised since his promotion, and one
of them had been in the service more than a generation with-
out going to sea. Secretary Bancroft, eager for distinction,
undertook to eliminate the abuses, but only succeeded in
eliminating himself. He had taught Greek, and was ridiculed
by the naval men as undertaking to play the pedagogue over
them. Having no dominating force of character nor even a
commanding presence, he could not stand against the govern-
ing clique. The requirements of the war, which might have
assisted an abler administrator to win the day, only increased
PRIVATEERING 191
his difficulties. The Senate refused to confirm some of his
appointees; and early in September, 1846, he became our
minister to England. 3
J. Y. Mason, who succeeded him, was a fat, easy, agreeable
man, quite innocent of the desire to achieve reforms. Nobody
disliked him, but nobody felt obliged to obey him ; and as
late as the twentieth of February, 1847, suddenly discovering
that Scott had mentioned certain designs of the army against
Vera Cruz, he awoke to the fact that his department had
failed to give the anticipated assistance. Just what could
be expected of the navy under all these prejudicial conditions
was, therefore, in some minds, a little uncertain. 3
One of the most serious duties imposed upon it was to guard
against privateering, for not only our commerce but the supplies
required by our troops depended upon free lanes. About
the middle of 1845 the government issued orders that any
activity of such a kind on the part of Mexico should be
considered the signal for war; and as a deterrent it was
announced by the newspapers, though incorrectly, that pri-
vateersmen were to be regarded as pirates. Crews not pre-
dominantly composed of Mexicans, it was often asserted, could
legally be "strung up to the yard-arm," since we were under-
stood to have treaties that sanctioned this principle with most
countries. 4
After the war actually began, a great deal of danger was
apprehended. Desperate characters were believed to be
waiting at New Orleans, and "piratical gangs" in the ports
of Cuba, where Almonte seemed to be at work. News arrived
early in August, 1846, that privateering regulations had been
issued by Mexico, and suspicious craft soon appeared off Key
West. In December the Mexican minister of war openly
avowed that great hopes of injuring the United States in this
manner were entertained. Blank certificates and commissions
reached Washington; information regarding efforts to set
vessels at work in various quarters arrived there; and finally
the Carmelita of Bangor, Maine, was captured near Gibraltar
by a felucca named El Unico, fitted out at Oran, Algeria, and
run by Spanish desperadoes. 4
Mexico had not in reality,, after studying the subject with
deep interest, much expectation of accomplishing any large
192 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
results by issuing letters of marque, and the regulations of July,
1846, were "intended principally or wholly to annoy this country ;
but in September and October she took the matter up rather
seriously. A new law provided that any foreigner entering
her naval service might become a Mexican at once, and blank
naturalization papers as well as thousands of privateering
commissions, duly signed but not filled out, were carried by
agents to the West Indies, Great Britain, France and Spain.
Almonte did his best at Havana. J. N. Pareda, appointed
Mexican charge d'affaires at Madrid, appears to have circulated
the documents actively in the Peninsular ports; and another
privateer, a Spanish steamer named La Rosita, put out from
Oran. 5
On the other hand, the representatives of the United States
insisted upon our treaties and the obligations of neutrality.
Polk's annual Message of December, 1846, denounced the
Mexican plan as inviting "all the freebooters upon earth,"
who felt like paying for the privilege, to cruise aganist American
commerce, announced that our own courts would say whether
such papers could protect them from the pirate's doom, recom-
mended that Congress provide at once for the trial of Spanish
subjects caught in such business, and suggested American
privateers intended mainly to recapture vessels taken
under Mexican letters. An American force hastened to the
Mediterranean, and our squadrons were expected to seize all
the rovers putting out, as well as intercept all prizes on their
way to the enemy's ports. These precautions looked rather
discouraging to enterprising desperadoes. 6
In England there was a feeling, as will appear later, that
Mexico should be allowed the utmost license against us, and the
Mexican minister at London received many applications for
letters ; but Great Britain did not really wish her supplies of
cotton to be endangered, and all the seas to be filled with
corsairs preying upon the trade of the world ; and in Octo-
ber, 1845, her minister to Mexico was instructed to prevent
that country, if he could, from issuing letters of marque indis-
criminately. Bankhead protested also, as did the Spanish
minister, against important features of the regulations. Palm-
erston himself, though he acted in a languid fashion, and
gave notice at Washington that British subjects, found on
THE BLOCKADE 193
Mexican privateers, could not be treated as pirates, announced
that his government would faithfully do its duty. 7
France was prompt and active in responding to our demands.
Spain, placed under stringent obligations by the treaty of
October, 1795, promised full compliance with its requirements,
captured El Unico, punished its crew, pursued La Rosita, and
ordered O'Donnell, the captain general of Cuba, to act as her
obligations required ; but she accepted Pareda, the colporteur
of what was piracy under her agreement, as consul of Mexico ;
and the captain general, while he convinced the American
representative of his good-will and in fact would not permit
an open violation of the treaty, suggested to the Mexicans
ways fortunately impracticable of evading his own rules.
But the risks of privateering under so many embarrassments
and the virtual impossibility of converting a prize into cash,
prevented all attempts except the feeble ones already mentioned.
In this field, consequently, our navy, though incessantly watch-
ful, could acquire no laurels. 7
Another aspect of the situation concerned it more seriously.
On the day Congress passed the war bill (May 13, 1846) orders
were issued to blockade the ports of Mexico. Several definite
aims prompted this action. Primarily, of course, it was de-
sired to prevent supplies of all kinds from reaching the enemy,
and to deprive them of the almost indispensable revenues
obtained in peace by taxing imports ; but there were also hopes
that loss of business would induce Great Britain and France,
which had a profitable trade in that quarter, to urge upon Mex-
ico the acceptance of our terms. The blockade was therefore
to be enforced vigorously. At the same time neutrals were
to be treated with all reasonable indulgence. Theoretically
only their war vessels had the right of entering closed ports,
but practically the intention was to broaden that narrow door
considerably. Toward itself, however, the United States
determined to be strictly faithful in observing its declared
principles. Merely those ports where the order could become
effective were in view. The announcement of blockade was
to be made as public as it could be; and in particular the
government required that a full warning should be given to
neutral ships. 8
For the work thus imposed upon him Conner had ample
VOL. II O
194 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
time to prepare. As early as August, 1845, he was directed
to blockade the Gulf ports in case of war; early in 1846 he
knew of Mexico's attitude regarding Slidell ; before the end of
March his vessels occupied convenient positions ; and promptly
on the outbreak of hostilities a b ockade was announced at
the chief harbors. By July, with some assistance from the
revenue service, it extended from the Rio Grande to the
Goatzacoalcos. 9
But the difficulty of making it continuously effective proved
to be extraordinary. There were not vessels enough of the
proper kind ; occasionally a more or less complete concentration
became necessary; and accidents of many sorts occurred.
Uncharted shoals and rocks, currents of unknown direction
and force, the frequent haze, and the darkening of the light-
houses made extrerre caution imperative. The suddenness
and violence of the storms almost surpassed belief. At Vera
Cruz the Scmers was blown over and sunk before Semmes,
her able commander, could take steps to avert the disaster.
Even at the anchorages one would suddenly hear on a calm
afternoon the clarion orders of the speaking trumpet ; the ship
would quiver and reverberate as the cable of the heaviest
anchor ran swiftly out ; in a moment the storm would burst ;
and for days it might be a question almost hourly of going
ashore. At such times all sailing vessels on patrol duty had
to make instantly for the open sea, and before they could
return to their stations a lurking blockade runner could per-
haps enter the port. Owing to such difficulties Alvarado
and Frontera, for instance, could not be watched continuously. 9
Embarrassments also of a minor yet serious character had to
be encountered. Our vessels, unlike those of England, were
designed exclusively for war, and long confinement impaired
the efficiency of the men. The government supplies of eat-
ables needed to be eked out from New Orleans huckster boats
and European merchant ships. Water could not be obtained
readily from a hostile shore. At the Antigua River, in July,
1846, the boats going up with casks were fired upon, and such
affairs had to be expected. Vessels were despatched long dis-
tances occasionally to obtain fresh provisions, but even then
scurvy of a most serious nature broke out in the summer of
1846, disabling some of the largest and most efficient ships for
OFFENSIVE NAVAL OPERATIONS 195
several months. The Raritan had more than 200 cases. Nearly
all on the Potomac suffered. The Falmouth had to go as far
north as Boston to throw it off. Swampy shores and kelp
rotting under the torrid sun produced myriads of poisonous
as well as otherwise annoying insects. During a brief stay
in the river off Tampico nearly all the officers and men con-
tracted ague, and the yellow fever scourged a number of the
vessels. More than two thirds of those on the Saratoga had
the latter disease. In August, 1847, the Mississippi left her
station with some 200 men suffering from it. 10
Being strangers and enemies, the Americans labored under
peculiar disadvantages. The people gladly assisted blockade
runners in every possible way. Spanish captains in particular,
having friends on shore and pilots thoroughly familiar with
the coast, could not be prevented from reaching harbor at
night or in thick weather by way of the shoals. Sometimes
it looked, for one or another of these many reasons, as if our
officers were careless or incompetent. Army observers, not
well informed regarding the conditions, felt disposed now and
then to pronounce the blockade a humbug, and naturally
some foreigners did so. This opinion had neither truth nor
probability in its favor. But naturally, in view of all the
circumstances, it proved more satisfactory to occupy the ports,
and open them to commerce on the basis of a reasonable con-
tributory tariff. 11
Besides cruising to watch for privateers and hovering off
the chief harbors to maintain a blockade, our fleet was expected
to share in the general offensive. For one thing Bancroft
ordered Conner to seize all the Mexican war vessels that he
could reach. But here a singular difficulty arose: none of
that sort existed. The navy of Mexico, aside from small
craft in the Pacific, included nine vessels amounting to about
3200 tons. The most important were the steamers Guadalupe
and Moctezuma, built in England, which made up nearly two
thirds of this meagre total ; but as these had never been paid
for, they were easily transferred to a British firm, and in con-
sequence of a calm succeeded in escaping to Havana. The
rest of the vessels a small brig, which changed its name too
often to have one, and six even smaller craft took refuge
early in the Alvarado River. The commander sank three of
196 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
them to obstruct the channel, and when Hunter took Alvarado
in April, 1847, the rest were burned. 12
Conner's only chance for offensive work, therefore, aside
from capturing a merchant vessel occasionally, was to engage
in shore operations ; and while the officers and men felt eager
to get a nearer view of the scenery, as they said, and rival the
glories of the army, they found themselves embarrassed by
the same difficulties that attended blockading and by others
also. The want of tenders and storeships proved especially
serious when hostilities were in view. Each vessel had to
obtain supplies at the Pensacola navy yard; the round trip
cost a month or so ; and that base lacked the needed equipment.
Once it spent about four weeks in supplying the Potomac with
bread for a three-months cruise, and in July, 1846, the yellow
fever broke out there. A point of capital importance was
to reach the small harbors and cut off all trade ; but until the
last of September, 1846, Conner had not a vessel that could
cross the bars, tow boats over, and operate in the rivers ; and
the first load of coal reached him two weeks later. A shortage
of officers and men hampered operations ; and Mason, besides
failing to anticipate such a case, failed to be awake when it
occurred. By December, 1846, the Home Squadron included
a substantial flotilla of small craft, mounting from one to four
guns each ; but the difficulty of obtaining supplies and making
repairs on a hostile coast in a season of storms almost paralyzed
it. 13
Another embarrassment existed. Conner was a brave, able,
accomplished, excellent man, but for a generation his business
had been that of a navigator. His duty had been to go his
rounds in safety, and he did it well. Nobody could handle a
frigate better in a storm. He looked carefully after the health
of his men, too. In thoughtfulness, prudence, judgment and
fidelity he left nothing to be desired. But his constitution
had never been robust, and the effects of an old wound, thirty
years of service in a southern climate and the torture of neu-
ralgia had now made him a confirmed invalid, worn and wasted,
and subject at intervals to almost maddening pain. His
powers both of thought and of execution were impaired. Natu-
rally such a man did not wish to risk either men or ships ; and,
lacking the vigor for quick decisions and powerful action, he
THE HOME SQUADRON 197
could not wisely involve himself in dangerous complications.
On the outbreak of war he should have retired ; but he knew
that he stood high in favor at Washington, Bancroft had assured
him that he could retain the command indefinitely, and no
doubt he failed to realize the situation. More or less well,
however, shore operations were carried on, and our next business
will be to trace them from the beginning. 14
Owing to the state of our relations with Mexico the Home
Squadron concentrated at Vera Cruz in February, 1846, and
later, in accordance with instructions to cooperate with Taylor,
Conner presented himself at Point Isabel in time to safeguard
that position during the battles on the Rio Grande, and assist
in occupying Burrita. When the war bill passed, his forces
consisted of the steamer Mississippi, which could tow a number
of small craft at full speed, the steamer Princeton, a swift
vessel designed by the celebrated Ericsson, the handsome
frigate Raritan, which flew the broad blue pennant of the
Commodore at the main, the frigates Cumberland and Potomac,
the sloops Falmouth, John Adams and St. Mary's, the brigs
Porpoise and Somers and the schooner Flirt, with probably
some 2700 men. Leaving the Brazos about the twentieth
of May Conner sailed with a part of the squadron for Pensacola,
while other vessels did blockade work or scouted along the
coast as far as Yucatan. In June Captain Saunders of the
St. Mary's, lying off Tampico bar, opened fire twice on
the Mexicans, who seemed to be erecting works, and made a
bold, well-planned effort against three gunboats anchored inside
the mouth of the Panuco, which only circumstances defeated.
By August the composition of the squadron and its distribution
changed somewhat; three small schooner-gunboats had ar-
rived ; but there was no material difference in strength. 15
Meanwhile Conner had in mind the small, handy Mexican
vessels then lying in Alvarado River, which did nobody any
good there, and were capable of assisting in his work materially.
It seemed very proper to seize or at least destroy them. From
residents of Alvarado, who traded with the Americans, useful
information was doubtless obtained; and the master of a
captured launch, well fed and well frightened, gave correct
details regarding the bar, channel and shipping. A redoubt
stood near the beach, but it contained no large guns; and,
198
THE WAR WITH MEXICO
although warned by the questioning of the launch's master,
the Mexicans gathered no forces except some 200 militia in
the town and about as many more several hours distant up the
river. The situation invited a bold stroke. 16
Accordingly the Mississippi and Princeton, two frigates
and the schooner-gunboats each of these mounting one piece
dropped anchor in line opposite the fort at eleven o'clock in
the morning, August 7, 1846, and the steamers opened a fire,
to which the lightness of the Mexican ordnance permitted no
reply. The bombardment continued more or less actively for
about six hours, but without effect. Owing to the swift current
of the river, swollen by heavy rains, it seemed hardly possible
to row up to the town, and finally the gunboats were placed
within musket range of the shore some distance north of the
fort. Apparently the intention was to land under the pro-
tection of our artillery. The Mexicans therefore opened a
small-arms fire from the sand-hills, to which our cannon and
the muskets on the gunboats replied; but in about half an
hour darkness put an end to the operations. Bad weather
came on immediately; the open roadstead was unsafe; and
after nightfall, although it had been proposed to resume the
attack the next day, Conner withdrew with his disgusted men
to Anton Lizardo. 16
The following month one of the bureau chiefs gave him to
understand that the administration wished something done
for the newspapers to make a "noise" about, and another
attempt upon the same position was planned. By this time
the enemy had improved the defences, and mounted a heavy
pivot gun on a high knoll;
and a letter from one of our
sailors, picked up on the
beach, gave them ample
notice of the attack. These
facts did not signify mate-
rially, however, for the
Americans realized they
must positively win a victory this time, and braced them-
selves for whatever might occur. A little after sunrise,
October 15, the Mississippi, the Vixen (a small steamer
carrying threejjguns which had recently joined the squadron),
Semi-circ.btitter],
for 11 guna
2. Redan for 5 gum
lfo.3. Redan for 8 yum
Jfo,4. Redtmfor 3 gun
.5. Triany. battery
for7yuna
OPERATIONS AT THE SOUTHEAST 199
the McLane (a steamer loaned by the revenue service), the
three gunboats, the Nonata (a prize schooner mounting four
guns), and a revenue schooner named the Forward arrived off
the bar. The plan was to have the Mississippi cannonade
with shells, and the other steamers, towing the gunboats,
ascend the river. 17
Everything went wrong, however. The Mississippi produced
no effect. Owing to the strength of the current it seemed
necessary to have wind, and Conner waited in vain until about
2 o'clock for the usual sea breeze. The bar stood higher than
it ordinarily did ; and although he, aboard the Vixen, crossed
with two gunboats, the McLane grounded, and her section
the larger section of the force was thrown into the utmost
disorder amidst the breakers. Not only did the Mexican fire
prove serious, for a shot struck near the wheelhouse of the
Vixen, but up the river could be seen another fort, and also
Mexican vessels carrying more metal than Conner now had
available. He therefore retired across the bar, touching
twice ; and when at length his other section found itself ready
to try once more, he deemed the hour too late. Besides, he
now believed the McLane would be unable to go up the river
with even one gunboat in tow. Again bad weather came on,
and again the expedition withdrew. Officers and men were
angry this time as well as disgusted ; and although the Mexicans
on the ground realized that accidents had saved them, a shout
of triumph and encouragement rang through their country. 17
The Mississippi now bore the red pennant of Matthew
C. Perry, who was to have command of the squadron on Con-
ner's retirement, and meantime, feeling anxious to serve, con-
tented himself with the dignity of a vice commodore and acted
as a captain; and since not only the Vixen but coal to make
her effective were at last on hand, Conner despatched his
energetic lieutenant southeastward, on the next day after
the second Alvarado fiasco, with all the vessels employed in
that affair except one of the gunboats. After seizing on the way
an American barque, found in communication with Mexicans,
Perry entered Tabasco River on the twenty-third, took posses-
sion of the town (Frontera), and the next day transferring
men from his flagship, which drew too much water for the bar,
to the captured Petrita, a small but swift American-built steamer
200 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
- he proceeded about seventy-five miles up the rapid and
winding stream through heavy and splendid forests, disabling
the guns of a small, deserted fort on the way, and reached San
Juan Bautista, capital of the state of Tabasco, and seat of an
active commerce in munitions and other goods, that reached
as far as Mexico City. Here five merchant vessels fell into
his possession. But now, unfamiliar with Mexican tactics,
Perry blundered into peremptorily summoning the town, which
J. B. Traconis, the comandante general, refused to give up. 18
San Juan Bautista was a small, dull city of broad streets
and one-story brick houses, lying in a wide plain. In spite
of scandalous desertion Traconis probably had about 400 men
supported by two small guns. These forces he broke into a
number of parties and placed in the outskirts. Perry opened
fire on the town with cannon, and after a time sent a party
ashore. A skirmish followed, but nothing decisive could be
accomplished, and after sunset, fearing the sailors would be
shot down in the streets during the night, he recalled them. 18
On the following day the foreigners protested against the
bombardment. Negotiations were then tried ; but the Co-
mandante General, who cared much for his dignity and nothing
for the people, insisted on playing out his role of the fearless
patriot. Since it was impracticable to garrison the town,
Perry decided to retire. But as one of the prizes grounded
near the shore and a party of the Mexicans although a white
flag could be seen on the Vixen and other vessels fired on
the Americans who were aboard, causing the death of one and
injuring two more, he resumed the cannonade. Of course
the enemy gracefully withdrew ; and then Perry did the same,
leaving Traconis to magnify his triumph. The McLane and
Forward were left at Frontera to blockade the river and protect
neutrals ; and after burning four vessels and capturing one more
on the way, Perry rejoined Conner on the last day of the month
with nine prizes. In its real aim the expedition had succeeded ;
but the affair at San Juan Bautista had been so indecisive and
murderous that even American soldiers, eager to claim credit
and inured to the chances of war, felt humiliated. 18
The fortnight of activity and excitement cheered the men
of the squadron a great deal, however, and then followed the
capture of Tampico, which delighted Secretary Mason beyond
PERRY SUCCEEDS CONNER 201
measure, and gave the newspapers genuine material for a
"noise." When this affair, including the trip up the Panuco,
ended, Conner despatched his lieutenant southeastward in
the Vixen, accompanied by two gunboats. December 21, at
the town of Laguna on El Carmen Island, Yucatan, Perry
seized a couple of small forts, garrisoned by a few timid soldiers,
and disabled the guns; and after reinforcing the blockade
of Tabasco River, looking into the coastal waters, and making
two prizes on his return voyage, he joined the squadron two
days after Christmas. A visit of Conner's to the same point
the following month ended important operations in this quarter
for some time. The occupation of Laguna checked a thriving
illicit commerce by the river that entered the Gulf here. 19
All this while the haughty, outstanding challenge the
scalp-lock, so to speak of Mexico, the fortress of San Juan
de Ulua in Vera Cruz harbor, remained secure. The capture
of it, many of our citizens felt, would wrap the Gulf in a blaze
of American glory; and young Porter, young Farragut and
other possible Decaturs had plans of attack ready. But older
men thought the enterprise impracticable for the navy alone.
At the beginning of the war Bancroft expressly notified Conner
that his forces were not deemed adequate for such an under-
taking. Not only had the fortress been strongly and shrewdly
constructed, but the channel that led to it was narrow and
winding, so that a mishap would have endangered all of the
attacking vessels. The French had taken it in 1838, but only
by good luck and a sort of treachery, and since that year it
had been greatly strengthened. Conner and Scott agreed
that it could not be captured by the fleet. But in March,
1847, misfortune overtook Ulua, for Scott, supported brilliantly
by the naval forces, laid siege to Vera Cruz. 20
To the Home Squadron and its commander as well as to the
"castle" this event signified a great deal. In fact it brought
Conner both to the climax and to the tragedy of his professional
career. It enabled him to display in the debarkation his real
abilities; and then precipitated him on the eve of a triumph
into oblivion. His regular term as commander had expired
in November, 1846, and Perry notified him that a successor
was ready. But Conner held Bancroft's promise of an indefi-
nite continuance in his position; he doubtless felt that after
202 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
long withholding needed means, the department owed him a
chance to do something worth while ; and when he found that
Scott was to move against Vera Cruz, he saw his opportunity.
Unfortunately for him the change of secretaries, the complaints
and bold proposals of young officers, and the clamor of the
public, ignorant both of what had been possible and of what
had been accomplished, had undermined his position. 21
In January, 1847, Slidell informed the government that Con-
ner had lost not only his physical and mental vigor but the
confidence of his men. The following month Perry, whose
ship had gone to Norfolk for repairs, visited Washington fre-
quently ; and how that ambitious, coarse-grained, wilful man
talked, one can readily imagine. Besides, while Perry's outfit
of Christian graces was noticeably defective, it could not be
denied that he possessed energy and a fighting temper. The
government therefore decided that Conner had not "shown
himself equal to the crisis." March 3 a change of commanders
was ordered; and when the denouement of the operations
at Vera Cruz approached, instead of gracefully permitting
Conner to finish what he had begun, "Old Bruin," as the sailors
called Perry, insisted upon his rights. March 21, therefore,
his broad blue pennant went up on the Mississippi, and in a
few days his name shone forth in the capitulation of Vera Cruz
and Ulua. "Poor Commodore Conner," said Marcy. 21
Only one important fortified place on the Gulf, Tuxpan,
now flew the tricolor, and it was a point of pride to capture
the town, for guns from the Truxtun our finest brig, wrecked
on the bar had been mounted there, and the strength of the
position challenged our squadron. The city stood on the left
bank of a river bearing the same name and about six miles
from its mouth. On the lower edge of it rose a steep eminence,
Hospital Hill, with a 9-pounder not far from its base and a
32-pound carronade pivoted at its top, both of them bearing
upon the river. Nearly a mile and a half below, at the junction
of a tributary, stood a water battery of two 18's called Pal-
masola; and some distance farther down, on a bluff about
sixty feet high jutting into the stream, two 32-pound carronades
and a long nine in La Pena redoubt commanded the stream
for perhaps two miles. In and near these forts were stationed
some three or four hundred Mexicans under General Cos. 22
TUXPAN CAPTURED 203
Early on April 17 a large American force, including the
"Two Follies/' as forecastle wit or experience had christened
the Spitfire and Vixen, concentrated off the mouth of the river.
Perry had the channel of the bar sounded and marked with
buoys, and the small steamers lightened. The next morning
at high tide near ten o'clock in spite of serious misgivings
the flotilla got through the surf into the placid river. The
Spitfire, commanded by Tattnall and carrying Perry, the
Vixen and another small steamer named the Scourge, then took
in tow three armed schooners and some thirty rowboats, which
contained four light guns and almost 1600 men ; and this fine
procession, adorned with brilliant pennants and ensigns, wound
upward in admirable order between the low and verdant banks. 22
Perhaps two miles below La Pefia the river, here two or three
hundred yards in width, straightened, the current became
swifter, and the banks rose into thickly wooded hills. When
the flotilla reached this point, a curl of smoke burst from the
redoubt. "Go ahead fast!" signalled the Commodore. The
steamers dropped their tows. The sails of the schooners filled,
and hundreds of oars flashed in the now declining sun. 22
It was a race, but more than a race. The shore artillery
spoke loudly and well. The Spitfire suffered repeatedly.
Tattnall was wounded. With boom after boom steamers and
gunboats replied. As the Americans approached it, La Pefia's
fire died out. "Land and storm!" ordered Perry. "Ay,
ay, Sir," was the response. Amidst the thunder of cheers
it was done, but the Mexicans did not wait for their visitors.
Dropping rammers and sponges they ran, and the Stars and
Stripes flew up. A fire from the woods was quickly silenced.
No less promptly yielded the other forts; and "at a gallop"
the town was captured. In all, the casualties numbered only
fourteen. A few prizes fell into Perry's net above Tuxpan;
the forts were demolished ; the Truxtun's guns were shipped off,
and leaving two vessels to blockade the river, he sailed away. 22
After this Perry and his officers cruised for prizes, and invited
a number of small ports to raise our flag an invitation al-
ways accepted with alacrity if not enthusiasm but his at-
tention was chiefly fixed on the southeast. Yucatan and to
a certain extent her neighbor, Tabasco, endeavored to carry
water on both shoulders. The former province, which was more
204 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
industrious and prosperous than any other part of Mexico,
had always demanded and usually been accorded under both
Spanish and Mexican rule a position of semi-independence.
In recent years difficulties had arisen between her and the
government, but her sympathies were entirely against the
United States. Both from policy and from a sense of humanity,
our desire was to see her remain neutral and to spare her the
rigors of war; but Yucatan, without appreciating either our
wish or our conduct, aimed simply to preserve her export
commerce, her no less valued business of importing American
flour, and her trade especially in foodstuffs and munitions
with Mexico, escape all the burdens and losses of the conflict,
and run no risk of later Mexican vengeance. 23
To accomplish so difficult a task her cunning and unscrupulous
politicians veered and turned, put out statements, and organized
revolutions according to the exigencies of the moment. Her
two chief cities, Merida and Campeche, now joined hands and
now seemed or were antagonistic. Local rivalries complicated
the situation further; and on our side, owing to the distance
between Washington and the Home Squadron, there could
not be perfect cooperation. The blockade was therefore
imposed and lifted, imposed and lifted by turns. At length,
in May, 1847, Perry took possession of Laguna and El Carmen
Island, appointed a naval officer as governor, and authorized
commerce under the contributory tariff ; but at the same time
our efforts to prevent all contraband trade, both there and
by Tabasco River, continued. 23
In June Perry decided to attack San Juan Bautista again.
On the thirteenth he reached the bar at Frontera in the Mis-
sissippi, and the next day he proceeded up the river, with a
flotilla of one brig, one schooner, four small steamers, three
bomb-vessels and a fleet of rowboats. After easily silencing
the fire of two breastworks on the way, he found obstructions
in the river opposite a third, and fearing the steamers might
not be able to pass them without delay, landed quickly with
ten guns and more than 1100 men, and under an almost insup-
portable heat routed a hostile party. The steamers, however,
passed on, driving the enemy from the breastwork, and by
the sixteenth San Juan Bautista once more became ours.
The fortifications were destroyed, and the guns put aboard. 24
OPERATIONS ON THE PACIFIC COAST
205
S.Juan Bautista
Perry decided to hold the place, and on retiring left there
nearly two hundred men besides four small vessels and their
complements. But this proved another mistake. The Mex-
icans were driven from the vicinity, but when our force went
back to the town, they immediately returned to blockade it;
and on July 22, after the
climate had laid low more
than a third of the Ameri-
cans, our garrison abandoned
the place. From this time
on, Perry found occupation
enough in watching Tuxpan
River, protecting against
Mexican irregulars the ports
where American custom-
houses existed, and patrol-
ling the coast. 24
During these operations of
the Home Squadron signifi-
cant events had been taking
place also on the other coast
of Mexico. Its enormous
length made a strict block-
ade practically impossible;
but on the nineteenth of
August, 1846, the magnifi-
cent Stockton covered it
completely with a procla-
mation. It was not that he
intended to declare a paper
blockade, but only that he
did not, like finite creatures,
realize the necessity of ade-
quate means. About three
days later Du Pont in the Cyane and Hull in the Warren
left California for the south. During their cruise fourteen
or fifteen prizes were taken including the Malek Adel, an
armed brig and so all probability that our commerce and
whalers in the Pacific would be molested happily vanished.
Guaymas was cannonaded a little (October 6), and Mazatlan
ing of
Forces
Wooded
Country
A PART OF
TABASCO RIVER
Devil's Bend to S. Juan Bautista
Showing the Landing and
March of Com. Perry's Korees
June 16, 1847
206 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
suffered a rather nominal blockade of about four weeks. That
period ended on the eighth of November, and for almost three
months no American vessel appeared there. 25
In February and March, 1847, the Portsmouth watched the
port for about five weeks, but then it was left wide open again.
England refused to recognize such a blockade. The United
States admitted its ille-
gality; and on the sixth
of March, 1847, Commo-
dore Biddle, now com-
manding the squadron,
cancelled Stockton's proc-
lamation. During the
spring of 1847 Mazatlan,
which had almost a monopoly of the commerce, was again
blockaded for a time, and after May the summer hurricanes
interdicted commerce. Since Mexico had no armed vessel of
any importance in the Pacific, naval operations then became
unnecessary. 25
In July, 1847, Shubrick succeeded Biddle. As the blockade
of Mazatlan had been raised, he issued on August 6 a fresh
notice, covering that port, Guaymas and San Bias, and about
the middle of October sailed from Monterey, California, in the
Independence, accompanied by the Cyane. The rest of his
active squadron which had preceded him southward or was
to join him in that quarter consisted of the Congress, Ports-
mouth, Preble, Dale and two storeships. On the twenty-ninth
near Cape San Lucas he met Lavallette in the Congress, and
learned that after an hour's cannonading caused by the
disobliging refusal of General Campusano to surrender
Guaymas had been occupied nine days before. November
10 mountains lighted by a declining sun and canopied by a
turquoise sky rose from the Gulf of California before him on
the east; and soon, approaching a long, curving line of white
beach, he dropped anchor near the lioness-hill of Creston Is-
land, which crouched, grandly recumbent, with her fore paws
extended, watching over two islet cubs that slept in front of
her. Here, on the mainland, was Mazatlan. 26
For nearly eighteen months the port, second only to Vera
Cruz in the value of its commerce, had been controlled by
OPERATIONS ON THE PACIFIC COAST
207
PLAN OF MAZATLAN
>V SCALE OF MILES
&S$r'
Wms.Eng.Co..N.Y.
Colonel Rafael Tellez, a happy-go-lucky insurgent of convivial
tastes, oriental convictions on the subject of seraglios, and
aboriginal ideas touching honor. In finance he succeeded, for
it was only necessary to put
his fist, whenever it felt
empty, into the till at the
customhouse; but as a
warrior he proved hardly
equal to the crisis. In
short, he retired promptly
and contented himself with
partially blocking the port,
which our forces occupied
on the eleventh. Novem-
ber 20 an attempt of the
Americans to cut off an
annoying Mexican party
some ten miles from the city failed ; but the town was presently
fortified in such a way that it stood in no danger. Early in
January, 1848, San Bias was blockaded. Manzanillo's turn
came on the seventeenth of that month; and numerous ex-
peditions, which scoured the coast and went short distances
inland, seized light craft, destroyed fortifications, and captured
ordnance. 27
In tracing all these operations in the Pacific one receives
a certain impression of tardiness and inefficiency. Acapulco,
a point of slight commercial importance
but one distinctly in the view of our naval
commanders, escaped entirely; and other
ports, especially San Bias, were apparently
neglected. But the American vessels had
no base near at hand. Few safe harbors
could be found. Long voyages were nec-
essary to obtain provisions and to send or
pick up despatches. The sailors often found
themselves compelled to do the work of
soldiers ashore ; and in particular vexatious
duties had to be performed by the navy in Lower California. 28
January 11, 1847, J. Y. Mason informed Stockton that both
Calif ornias were to be retained; and in the course of fifteen
LOWER
CALIFORNIA
Cape San L
208 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
days, beginning with March 30, La Paz, San Lucas and San
Jose, the chief towns of the peninsula, were occupied by our
squadron. The authorities readily submitted, and the people
seemed to concur. An intensely hostile spirit showed itself
before long, however, and, with the aid of leaders and re-
sources drawn from the mainland, bitter attacks heroically
resisted were made upon our feeble posts at San Jose and
La Paz during the fall and winter. Some American troops
from upper California rendered great assistance ; but Shubrick's
watchful cooperation was constantly requisite, and the spirit
of resistance could not be exorcised until the end of March,
1848. 28
The naval operations on both coasts failed to win loud ap-
plause, but there were obvious reasons. The high expectations
of the public, based upon the war of 1812, could not possibly
be satisfied, for our navy met with no enemy on its proper
element. Its work had to be plodding and monotonous. Due
preparations for that had not been made, and even the best
informed landsmen understood but very imperfectly the
difficulties that were encountered. Under such circumstances
to conduct the blockade with as much efficiency as was actually
shown, depriving Mexico of revenues and to a large extent
of munitions, giving general satisfaction meanwhile to foreign
interests more than willing to complain, was no slight achieve-
ment ; and to play at the same time so effective a part on land,
especially in the conquest of California, merited far higher
encomiums than were bestowed. 29
The conduct of naval men in occupied territory crowned
their services. At Mazatlan, for example, Shubrick announced
that he would exert himself to benefit, not injure, the people.
Religious freedom, the protection of person and property,
firm support of the city authorities, a low tariff and unre-
stricted commerce except in munitions and with Mexican
ports were granted. Vexatious taxes that burdened the poor
disappeared, and a wise, economical fiscal system took their
place. The sale of ardent spirits to men in our service was
prohibited. The Americans mingled freely with the people
and, as the local historian admitted, "behaved like gentlemen."
After six weeks of this regime Shubrick was formally requested
by the merchants to stay there. At Guaymas a similar policy
REVIEW OF THE NAVAL OPERATIONS 209
produced similar results, and the people felt anxious to have
Campusano's forces leave the vicinity. Laguna became
under our authority more prosperous than ever before.
The naval balls and parties were extremely popular; and
even after peace came, the Commodore was "most earnestly"
requested by the people to let our forces remain for a while. 30
VOL. II
XXXI
THE AMERICANS AS CONQUERORS
1846-1848
FOR a considerable time large parts of Mexico were occupied
by our troops, and it is quite worth while to know something
of their life and behavior there. Conquering soldiers in a foreign
land, especially when the enemy is deemed cowardly , treacherous
and cruel, are not likely to be angels ; and we may count upon
meeting here with disagreeable as well as complimentary facts.
But we must face these as brave and honest men who love the
truth, believe in our country, and are not foolish enough to
expect perfection of human nature. It will be some consolation
to recall Napoleon's maxim, "The conduct of a general in a
conquered country is beset with difficulties," and to remember
that no nation, if well acquainted with its history, will think
of pointing the finger at us.
The purpose of the United States was to treat non-combatants
as friends, and protect them in all their rights of person, prop-
erty and religion. 1 Civilization prescribed this course, and
policy emphasized it. Both for immediate military success
and for the restoration, after the war, of mutually profitable
relations, it seemed highly desirable to strike only at the gov-
ernment and the army of Mexico, and to avoid angering the
great body of the citizens. 2
Accordingly Taylor was promptly supplied with a proclama-
tion, to be distributed in both English and Spanish, which threw
upon Paredes the odium of the conflict, assured the Mexican
people that a government of "usurpers and tyrants" had in-
volved them in its losses and miseries, and promised that no
one behaving as a neutral would be molested ; the General was
instructed that his "utmost endeavors" must be put forth
to make good the pledge ; and an active policy of conciliation
210
DISORDERS AT MATAMOROS 211
was urged upon him. As will be seen later, the course of the war
and the attitude of Mexico eventually suggested a programme
considerably sterner in certain respects ; but such was the real
desire of our government, and it went so far that in order to
prove we had no intention of attacking the religion of the
Mexicans, Roman Catholic priests were engaged to accompany
our army. 2
Taylor, besides resting under a strict obligation to obey his
orders, doubtless concurred fully in this view of the matter,
and for a time good conduct on the part of our troops pre-
vailed. The authorities of Matamoros were respected ; the
people felt contented, and viewed the war with indifference;
persons of the upper classes began to show themselves ; and the
town seemed on the way to being a smart little New Orleans.
But the arrival of the volunteers in force gave the situation
a new aspect. 3 Even men of umblemished reputations appeared
to feel that becoming soldiers exempted them from every law,
both civil and moral. 6
When in camp below New Orleans the troops were guilty of
some "sky-larking" that is to say, plundering; and when
they entered the enemy's country they became, said a regular
officer, "the living embodiment of a moral pestilence. Crime
followed in their footsteps, and wherever they trod, they left
indelible traces of infamy." To meet their wishes, disorderly
establishments of every kind sprang up, 4 and the streets were
constantly filled with drunken, brawling, insolent officers
and men carrying arms. One of them drew a pistol on the
British consul because his cane was black ; many depredations
were committed ; and before the tenth of July at least five or
six harmless persons were shot down for amusement. 6
Although it would seem as if Taylor, with some 2500 regulars
at his back, might have enforced order, he declared that he
could not, and soon gave up the effort. Unwilling to bring
offenders before a military court, he endeavored to have the
Mexican judges act in some cases, but of course they dared not ;
and he shipped a few of the malefactors to New Orleans, where
they could not be held a moment for crimes perpetrated abroad.
The result was practical impunity- "perfect impunity,"
wrote the British consul for the worst of crimes. At the
beginning of August, however, the General prohibited the
212 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
importation of liquor by the Rio Grande; and as the army
was then moving on, Matamoros became comparatively quiet. 6
Later commanders undertook with considerable success to
keep it so; but even in January, 1847, robbery and violence
were not unknown there, and the non-commissioned officers
as well as the soldiers were forbidden to leave their quarters
with arms unless on duty. Discharged volunteers on their
way down the river did great harm, 5 and Taylor wrote in June,
1847, "There is scarcely a form of crime that has not been
reported to me as committed by them.". Above Matamoros
determined efforts were made with partial success to keep
liquor from the troops, and the conditions were better. Here
and there Americans would "muster in" some fruit or fowls.
"Soldiers who have to fight their enemy in the enemy's
country will never go hungry as long as there are any
chickens about," wrote one of them; and in fact, said an
officer, it was a patriotic duty for Uncle Sam's men to keep
their souls and their bodies together. But the rule in such
cases was to compensate the owners, and probably no serious
resentment lingered. 6
During the battles of Monterey there was enough shooting
to satisfy any reasonable person, and the quiet beauty of the scene
should soon have banished thoughts of carnage. The tranquil
mountains that stood about the town on three sides, receding
as the clouds enveloped them in shadow or approaching as the
splendor of the sun brightened every point, the statuesque
aguacates clothed in foliage like dark green velvet, the fan-like
palmettoes, the feathery date palms, the delicious oranges and
pomegranates, the murmuring streams, and the lilies that
brightened many a pool invited to repose; yet no sooner was
battle over than murder began. 10
The chief criminals were the Texans,* who felt that barbarities
committed by the Mexican on their soil during the revolution
warranted the cruelest retaliation. At Matamoros they had
been the fiercest of the volunteers, and now stationed for
a while at the town they found a still better opportunity. 7
Other volunteers aided them. To say nothing of robberies
* These men have to be called Texans because they hailed from that
state, but it should be remembered that nearly all of them had come
from other parts of the Union.
AFFAIRS AT SALTILLO 213
and minor outrages perpetrated "in the broad light of day,"
it was thought, noted a regular officer in his diary, that not
less than one hundred Mexicans were slain in cold blood, and
out of about 7000 still in town, 5000, more or less, fled. A
citizen cannot take his hat off, wrote a Mexican, without some
American's saying, "That is mine"; and if the owner denies
it, he gets a bullet. Strict regulations 8 were soon framed,
however, and under Worth's command the volunteer learned
what they meant. 10
To a large extent, if we leave the Texans out of the account,
the Mexicans themselves were responsible for the worst out-
rages of Monterey and the vicinity. They sold liquor to the
troops persistently, and retaliated indiscriminately for the
excesses that resulted. The Americans then took vengeance,
and in the end some ghastly deeds on rather a large scale oc-
curred. Singularly enough, too, the punctiliousness of our
officers contributed to the same end. They would not convict
a Mexican without legal proof of his guilt, and when soldiers
saw a man, who was almost certainly the murderer of their
comrade, let off because a drove of Mexicans testified to an
alibi, they were likely to steal out after him or make some one
else pay his forfeit. 9 Still, the many injunctions to be fair
and kindly toward the people were not without effect. One
soldier used to sit cross-legged in the square of Monterey, and
play his rickety accordion for the benefit of the populace. 10
At Saltillo strict police regulations were made. As had now
become the general rule, to provide soldiers with intoxicating
beverages, except by special permission, was forbidden, and
fifty lashes were made the penalty for disobedience. The
troops had to seek their quarters at retreat, and the Mexicans
go home when the ten o'clock bell rang. But in spite of every
precaution the "lawless volunteers," as Worth called them,
were guilty of many offences, and with the perhaps excessive
emphasis of a high-minded regular officer he wrote to his
daughter, "The innocent blood that has been basely, cowardly
and barbarously shed in cold blood, aside from other and
deeper crimes, will appeal to Heaven for, and, I trust, receive,
just retribution." 12
Here, as at Monterey, Worth made an admirable governor,
sitting four hours a day to hear complaints, and administering
214 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
substantial justice without reference to legal technicalities;
and his successors were much like him. 11 A sergeant was
discharged for treating a Mexican unjustly. An American
"doctor" was expelled for disorderly conduct. Soldiers were
not allowed to endanger the people by riding fast in the streets.
Property stolen or destroyed was paid for by the army, and
this rule was made to work the other way also. The town
prospered ; and although some of the soldiers would now and
then help themselves to fruit or snatch a piece of candy from
a stand, and cases of outrage on the one hand or assassination
on the other occurred at intervals, the people notably
hostile at first became friendly, the windows were always
full of laughing girls, and the women in their rebosas, red
petticoats and blue cloth slippers went every evening to the
fountain in the plaza with their tall earthen jars, unmolested
and unafraid. 12
Tampico, to say nothing of the drills and parades, offered
enough interesting sights and amusements to keep the soldiers
out of mischief, one might have thought. The many strange
and beautiful trees; the mullard and sea-trout, schools of
yellow jackfish, huge, pearly tarpon, and many other denizens
of the rivers and lagoons; the buzzards coasting on air, the
grunting ravens, and forty other kinds of birds; the long,
slender pirogues of red cedar constantly bringing luscious
fruits to the market ; the many vessels coming and going :
these were only a few of the attractions. But in reality the
town was a hard problem, for its nearness to the United States
and its commercial relations made the exclusion of all unde-
sirable visitors impossible. So-called restaurants bearing
popular American names flourished, and, in spite of the pro-
hibition against importing liquor, strong drink was about all
they offered except hard beef ; while the existence of gambling
houses was proved by the severe and repeated orders against
them. Almost every volunteer, said a regular officer, celebrated
his arrival with a "frolic," 13 and according to the Mexican
accounts, threats, insults and small depredations were not
infrequent. 14
But in Tampico as elsewhere, the people had much less to
suffer, in all probability, than from the Mexican troops who
formerly had garrisoned the town, and the big United States
AFFAIRS AT TAMPICO 215
flag set up in the plaza near the Panuco represented substantial
benefits. Many new kinds of manufactured articles made
their appearance, and all such things were sold at low prices.
Business became active. According to tradition the paving
of the city dates from this time. A theatre was built. Prepa-
rations were made and presumably carried out for the extension
of the mole. An American newspaper appeared. Mexican
visitors had to give an account of themselves, and there were
no riots and no dirks. Patrols marched up and down the broad
streets; sentries with fixed bayonets were on hand at every
gathering, even balls; and the very happiest of frolics were
pretty sure to end before morning with a nap on the guard
house floor. 14
Some of the Mexicans thought our volunteer officers were
afraid of their men, but Gates, Shields and the other commanders
do not seem to have been. The assistance of the leading
Mexicans in maintaining order was invited ; many of the citizens
fraternized with our men ; and in general a high rate of mor-
tality was probably the only serious consequence of reckless
tendencies. The residents thought the American volunteers
careless, badly dressed and poorly drilled ; but some of them
admitted they had never felt so safe before. 14
Clearly our troops improved in conduct as time went on,
but none the less their early excesses had serious consequences.
For a long while there had been a tendency in the northeastern
parts of Mexico to secede. The primary scheme had been to
join Texas; and after our absorption of Texas ended it, the
idea of an independent republic, with American protection
or annexation to this country in view, gained much support.
Early in 1846 the authors of this project were in communication
with Taylor and the American government. Whether such a
plan could have been executed or not, there were reasons for
our wishing to have the people cherish it. In such a mood they
were bound to be our friends instead of enemies, and the paralyz-
ing influence of their temper would have extended into other
provinces. 15
Accordingly Taylor was instructed to favor the idea. But
reports of the outrages committed by our volunteers penetrated
to all quarters; the Mexican authorities, who understood the
popular tendencies, were doubtless active in spreading the
216 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
reports ; and the disposition to view us with cordiality received
a shock from which it never recovered. "People near Mata-
moros, previously inclined to favor the Americans," declared
the comandante general of Nuevo Leon in a broadside, "have
written these weighty words : ' The domination of the Grand
Turk is kinder than that of the Americans. Their motto is
deceit. Their love is like the robber's. Their goodness is
usurpation ; and their boasted liberty is the grossest despotism,
iniquity and insolence, disguised under the most consummate
hypocrisy/" As an offset, the bad conduct of Mexican officers
and troops did not signify. That was a family affair. 15
The blackest shadow in the picture, however, was New
Mexico. Armijo had compensated the people for his tyranny
and robbery by permitting them every sort of license in their
social relations. Virtue was little known and less valued.
Even women fought duels with dirks or butcher-knives.
Dances, at which all classes mingled in the revelry, were the
chief amusements; the church bells announced them; and
at mass one heard the same music, played by the same musicians.
Gambling and cock-fighting stood next in esteem, perhaps;
and then came other vices that seemed more precisely neces-
sities than ornaments of existence. 18
To throw into a small and isolated community of that sort,
without books or society or proper diversions, a large number
of young and reckless frontiersmen greatly above the average
in physical vigor, was to make it a seething caldron of gross
passions. The soldiers were not willing to do what little work
there was, and they scorned regulations. "The dirtiest, row-
diest crew I have ever seen collected together," was a responsible
British traveller's description of the American forces ; and a
soldier wrote in his diary, "A more drunken and depraved
set, I am sure, can never be found." To be liked, an officer
had to be lax, and to be unpopular was liable to mean as
good officers learned a pistol or a sabre in one's face. Half
the captains, a letter said, could be found every night in bad
places. The disorder of the governor's Christmas dinner
party disturbed the whole town. There was probably no
deliberate oppression. Gross outrages appear to have been
few. But the drunken, brawling, overbearing volunteers
despised the men about them and showed it ; and the latter,
AMERICAN RULE IN CALIFORNIA 217
flouted at every turn, and in particular robbed of their women,
scowled and brooded with all the ferocity of an indolent but
passionate, jealous race, and plied the knife when they dared. 18
Kearny might perhaps have ridden the tempest, but a" local
politician like Price could only be swept away. A few of the
better Americans got up a prayer-meeting, but that was just
a dewdrop in Tartarus. One began to be ashamed of one's
nation, wrote a good officer. To enhance dissatisfaction, the
Indians continued their depredations as if no treaties had been
made. A well-meant code of laws was drawn up, but it con-
tained certain troublesome provisions about land titles; and
some taxation had to be imposed. The people took fright.
"We have come for your good ; yes, for all your goods," began
to be their interpretation of Kearny's assurances. 18
Naturally an insurrection occurred. Price now showed
energy, and the troops courage. In a brief campaign, January
and February, 1847, the malcontents were put down. But
the people, though cowed, loved the victors none the better,
and the victors trusted and respected the people none the more.
The conditions became perhaps worse than ever. 16 Supplies
were uncertain. Discipline became lax again, and the Indians
were now more rapacious than for twenty years. Dissipation
resulted in much sickness and many deaths. Moreover the
people felt wronged because political privileges bestowed by
Kearny in excess of his authority had to be withdrawn. For
most, if not all, of the time it was impossible to obtain the
money required for the administration of civil affairs, and the
civil authorities clashed with the military. 17 Undoubtedly
serious difficulties were inherent in the situation, but nothing
could excuse our government for permitting such a state of
things to continue for so long a time. 18
Very different was the scene in California. Soon after the
treaty of Cahuenga was made Stockton returned to his naval
duties, and Fremont, appointed by him under the law of nations,
assumed the governorship. 19 In February, 1847, however,
orders that had been issued at Washington early in November,
directing that the chief military officer should take command,
reached San Francisco, and about the first of March Kearny
became the executive. In general he was inclined to be less
indulgent than Fremont or Sloat, but he intended to be fair and
218 THE WAR WITH- MEXICO
kind. "The Americans and Californians," he proclaimed with
the same exaggeration of his authority as at Santa Fe, "are
now but one people ; let us cherish one wish, one hope, and let
that be for the peace and quiet of our country. Let us as a
band of brothers unite and emulate each other in our efforts
to benefit and improve this our beautiful, and which soon
must be our happy and prosperous home." 21
At the end of May, 1847, he returned to the east, and Colonel
R. B. Mason of the First Dragoons, whom the government had
sent out for the purpose, became governor and commander-
in-chief . Mason was an excellent executive, able, experienced,
sensible, strong and faithful. Some thought his character
hard, but probably all clear-headed persons realized that it
was just. He believed in firm though kind methods, avoided
entanglements, and bore sway successfully till the close of the
war. 21
The restless faction of the Los Angeles district, free from
the restraint of a large American element, still existed, and at
intervals caused considerable anxiety. Indeed it is clear from
Mexican sources that a hope of troops from the south was
fondly cherished there for a long time. The approach of the
Mormon battalion, which after suffering many hardships
on the route from Santa Fe arrived at San Diego under
Captain Cooke in January, 1847, excited the people, for that
sect was loathed in California. A great deal of trouble about
land titles arose, for the surveying had been poorly done, the
boundaries overlapped in many instances, and few had the
proper documents. Fremont's volunteers, expecting large
pay, refused to be mustered into the service under the law of
May 13, 1846, and were discharged in a very angry frame of
mind, April, 1847, with no pay at all ; and very little was done
toward compensating the people for the spoliations committed
by the volunteers. 21
The government, though tempered by the maintenance of
the alcalde system, was necessarily a military one; the old
alcaldes, familiar with the customs of the land, would not serve ;
the new ones, though generally good men, could not always
give satisfaction ; and the growing American element, disgusted
with so unsystematic a system, demanded self-government
and written laws. No funds could legally be had for the ex-
AMERICAN RULE IN CALIFORNIA 219
penses of war and civil administration except those derived
from the customhouses, and the Americans were so deeply
committed by their promise of low duties that Mason felt
compelled to reduce the tariff explicitly ordered by the govern-
ment. There were jealous differences of opinion on many
points between the Californians and the Americans, between
the various nationalities of the foreigners, and between the old
and the new immigrants ; and finally the people were disturbed
by serious quarrels between the Stockton-Fremont party and
the Kearny-Mason party, and by the old fear that eventually
the Americans would sail away, leaving them to settle with
Mexico as best they could. 21
For troops, besides Company C of the First Dragoons,
Kearny's escort from Santa Fe, there were Company F of the
Third Artillery, which arrived in February, 1847, the Mormon
battalion, and a regiment of New York volunteers under
Colonel J. D. Stevenson, who came in March, 1847, and were
expected to remain in California as settlers after the close of
the war. 20 Apparently the Mormons were to be a source of
weakness rather than strength, and the antecedents of the New
York regiment inspired little confidence. Stevenson's men
did in fact begin promptly to "sow wild oats." They were
not disposed to work on the fortifications, and they were in-
subordinate. But under Mason's control they soon learned
to do well, and he reported that at the close of the war "one
common cry of regret arose [from the Californians] at the order
for their disbandment ; [and] the little petty causes of complaint
were forgotten in the remembrance of the more substantial
advantages they had enjoyed under the protection of the
military." The conduct of the Mormons was always exem-
plary and they won the esteem of the people. 21
Imported articles became cheap. Real estate and all the
products of the soil, particularly at the north, increased in
value. Commerce trebled in a year. All damages caused
by men recognized as in the service of the United States were
repaired, and the offenders punished. The return of Jose
Castro without means or hopes at the beginning of 1848 pro-
duced an excellent effect. Gold-digging became more at-
tractive than conspiracies. And although a certain number
of irreconcilables cherished regrets and grievances, the official
220 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
news of peace and absorption in the United States which
came on the evening of August 6, 1848 greeted a busy and
hopeful community. 21
So much for the north, and we pass now to the regime of
Scott. After learning of the atrocities perpetrated on the Rio
Grande, that "scientific and visionary" officer drafted and laid
before the secretary of war a martial-law order, to be enforced
in Mexico until action should be taken by Congress. But
the idea of putting constraint on the free American voter
probably struck Marcy with terror. He started at the title,
said nothing, and after a while returned the paper without
comment. Scott then sent it on to Taylor, and was informed
that the General threw it aside almost instantly, calling it
" another of Scott's lessons." The crying need of some adequate
method for punishing American soldiers in foreign parts com-
pelled Marcy in December to recommend that Congress author-
ize a military tribunal; but that body also doubtless had an
eye to votes, and took no action. 25
Scott, however, though an aspirant for the Presidency, did
not shrink from his duty, and on arriving in Tampico he issued
General Orders 20, which threw the pale of martial law round
all United States forces operating in Mexico, and provided for
the punishment, through "military commissions," of offences
committed by, in or upon them. 22 Orders 20, republished at
Vera Cruz, Puebla and the capital and widely circulated in
Span'sh, were supplemented by issuing safeguards, under
which one or more soldiers, bearing a proper document signed
by a corps or division commander, could be quartered at any
place which it was especially for the interest of the army to
protect. 23 In occupying towns the rule was to billet no officer
or man, without consent, upon any inhabitant, and to quarter
the troops in barracks and other public buildings already used
for the purpose by the Mexican government. 24 These arrange-
ments, the practice of paying for everything used by the army,
the principle of treating non-combatant Mexicans as fellow-
citizens, and a strenuous endeavor to enlist the cooperation
of all the decent men of the army in the suppression of outrages
constituted the system of Scott. 25
At Vera Cruz misdeeds were perpetrated, of course, but the
culprits who could be detected paid a price for their sport that
SCOTT'S POLICY 221
put the fear of the Lord or at least of Scott into the
hearts of others. One tipsy fellow, who nearly killed a Mexican
woman with kicks and blows, was strapped over a wagon,
given twelve good lashes, and then placed at labor in a fort
with a ball-and-chain for the rest of the war. A second ruffian,
for a worse offence against a woman, was promptly and pub-
licly hanged. 26 On the other hand preventive regulations 27
concerning liquor, gambling, roaming about the city and the
like soon went into force. 30
But the American measures were not simply negative.
Worth, who became governor as soon as the town surrendered,
distributed free rations among the people, and prevented
extortion by establishing a fair scale of prices for eatables.
A large force of laborers was employed at liberal wages to clean
the streets and the Augean castle of Ulua. Assured of protection
the shops reopened promptly. In ten days the general effects
of the bombardment appeared hardly noticeable. Freed from
the exactions of their officials and military chiefs and rapidly
gaining confidence in our intentions, the people seemed like
new men. Commerce, favored by the low American duties,
took on fresh life. Although anti-Catholic sentiment was
raging in the United States, Scott and some of his principal
officers attended mass and even marched in the processions;
and the soldiers were bidden to salute not only the tasselled
cane of the magistrate but the cassock of the priest. 30
Worth soon moved on with Scott's army ; but his successor
was described by the British consul as deserving "all praise."
Those who followed him did perhaps equally well; 28 all
branches of the public service were maintained ; the good-will
of the citizens was acquired and held ; and Lerdo de Tejada,
one of the best statesmen and historians of Mexico, has declared
that Vera Cruz had to suffer scarcely anything from the Ameri-
can occupation except the humiliation of foreign rule, while
profiting substantially in several respects. 30
These results were achieved, too, under serious and almost
crippling embarrassments. In some regards the city was
highly agreeable. Fish more resplendent than gems lay al-
ways in the market. A long list of delicious fruits and vege-
tables graced each its proper season. Often a duet of the
military band and the mocking-birds enchanted the ear. To
222 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
sip a sherbet at noonday all the curtains drooping over the
balconies, the blue sky gray with excess of light, the black-
birds panting with beaks wide open and wings partly spread,
the lepero drunk with sleep in the shadow of a wall, a hush
over the docks, a stillness in the market had an exotic
fascination; and an evening stroll round the plaza or along
the beach at Vergara, where the principal camp lay, with the
soft, languid, lingering breeze of the Gulf on one's face and
every star asking to be counted, was a delight one could not
soon forget. 30
This region, however, was a favorite hunting-ground, not
only of the yellow fever, but of diseases even more fatal. 29 A
few slices of the fragrant Cordoba pineapple, washed down
with a glass of the almost irresistible brandy, left one hardly
time to make a will. Through the long day a huge ball of fire
called the sun poured down an intense heat, and at night the
mosquitos were numberless. The story of the invalids was
long and sad ; and sadder yet the tale of many a gallant soldier-
boy, full of thoughts of the loved ones, who breathed his last
sigh in the crowded wards of a hospital alone. 50
At Cordoba, where the lanes blazed with small red roses,
the sentiment was intensely Mexican, and the authorities
ordered that on the approach of the American forces as many
of the inhabitants as possible should leave town with every-
th'ng belonging to the state that could be of service. But the
people were mostly satisfied with shutting themselves up
during the brief stay of General Bankhead, and the merchants
did not go so far as that. The legitimate rights of the con-
queror were asserted, but the American commander perhaps
made full compensation for this by requiring the city council
to reduce the expenses of administration. Care was taken to
provide for the punishment of all disorders, and in particular
for all interference with religious observances. After Bank-
head left, hearing that some of the garrison were plundering,
he threatened to send an entire battalion, if necessary, to
apprehend the culprits. 31
On higher ground farther west lay Orizaba, sombre yet
beautiful amidst its orchards, gardens, palm groves, orange
trees and rich fields of tobacco and sugar-cane, like a proud
Span sh dowager surrounded by her grandchildren. Here the
THE STATE OF THINGS AT JALAPA 223
troops helped themselves occasionally to fruit and cane, injured
trees and committed some graver offences. The consequence
was that soldiers were forbidden to leave the town except on
service and the officers commanding guards in the outskirts
had to arrest every man guilty of such acts or pay for the
damages, and in either case were held responsible for diso-
bedience and neglect of duty. 32
Of all the p'aces occupied by American troops in Mexico
the most delightful was Jalapa. In fact, probably a more
del'ghtful place is nowhere to be found. For natural attrac-
tiveness it surpasses even Taormina, Kandy and Nikko,
the beauty-spots of Sicily, Ceylon, Japan. The abundant
water was excellent, which could rarely be said of Mexican
towns, and ice from Orizaba Mountain could be had to
cool the abundant refreshments. The mercury never stood
high and never low. Spring was almost the only season.
The foliage always looked new and exuberant, and blossoms
were constantly opening as if with ever fresh surprise. 34
From the plaza one gazed into a broad valley tapestried
with many-hued verdure. Here palms, live-oaks, magnolias,
tamarinds and aguacates often enmeshed with beautiful
and sometimes with aromatic vines gracefully sheltered
the azalea, the verbena, the poppy, the jasmine and countless
varieties of geraniums and roses. Here such exquisite plants
as the vanilla, heliotrope and tree-lily exhaled with unceasing
generosity their delightful odors. Here, amid ancient forests,
gorges curtained with exotic ferns and orchids extended to
mysterious depths teeming with all manner of strange, fasci-
nating growths. And when, after long surveying this Eden,
or descending to wander far in its mazy paths, one's eye rose
to a broad belt of pines and firs clothing jagged sierras, and at
last, above their rich green, beheld a slender but enormous
pyramid of snow, the peak of Orizaba, heaven-high and re-
splendent against the deep, tropical blue, it seemed as if nature
had lavished on this chosen spot the whole diapason of her
beauty. Music hath charms to soothe; and such loveliness,
grace, perfume and grandeur, combined, were splendidly suited
to still the passions of war. 34
Scott and the first American troops proved worthy of this
paradise. Nobody was molested. The officers lodged only
224 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
in vacated houses. The soldiers tried to make friends among
the townsfolk. Our generals attended the funeral of a worthy
Mexican officer killed at Cerro Gordo. Gold and silver flowed
in streams brighter than " Abana and Pharpar, rivers of
Damascus" -that reached the humblest cottage. Many
of the people wept when Scott marched away. 34
But some later commands, untamed volunteers who stopped
there for a brief time, left a different impression. Lally's men
seem to have been a scourge, and Wynkoop's proved so lawless
that even Lally's were glad to see the last of them. During
their stay the shops were closed, and all business came to an
end. Seven officers left their accounts unpaid at the hotels*
and some of them carried away towels or the shirts of brother
officers. In a word they were natural thieves. Other mis-
deeds could be traced to the lack, for some time, of pay. But
the main cause of trouble was liquor. Against this evil, as
against gambling and the rest, adequate regulations were issued ;
but sometimes commissioned officers, anxious to be popular,
would force hotel keepers to let their men have drink. At the
bottom of everything lay the selling of liquor by wholly un-
authorized persons. " Let the municipal authorities unite with
me to put a stop to that infamous traffic" wrote one American
governor of the city to the first alcalde," and I will answer for
it that there will be no disturbances or outrages committed
by the soldiers." 34
Another feature also of the American occupation came out
with especial clearness at Jalapa. Not only were offences, ex-
tending to robbery and murder, committed against our troops,
but it was found on scrupulous investigation that often definite
stories of misdeeds charged to our men were plausible only till
the other side came out, and that many claims for damages
were deliberately invented or grossly exaggerated. 34
Against all real offenders the successive governors par-
ticularly Colonel George W. Hughes, who remained in office
a considerable time were as a rule severe. Stern orders,
biting rebukes, earnest appeals to represent our country
worthily, precautions like patrols and frequent roll-calls, and
at need exemplary punishments were not lacking. One day
four soldiers received thirty lashes each, had their heads shaved,
and were drummed out of camp, with the word "ROBBER"
THE AMERICANS AT PUEBLA 225
pasted on their backs, for breaking into a house. 33 But at
the same time careful measures had to be taken for the pro-
tection of our men and our government. Happily the people
in general seem to have understood that some pilfering and
occasionally other misdemeanors were unavoidable, and to
have appreciated our efforts to defend, conciliate and please
them, to maintain in cooperation with the town officials
the municipal service, to provide for the charities of the city,
and to ensure respect for woman, religion and civil authority.
Vigne, a French traveller, says the Americans were much liked
at Jalapa, and probably they were nowhere treated more
pleasantly. 34
At Puebla, August 1, 1847, the Robert Anderson of Fort
Sumter wrote: "We have been now in this large City since
May 15th, with a soldiery gathered from many Nations, many
of them undisciplined, and yet, I will venture the assertion,
without fear of contradiction, that, in no City of the same
size, either in our own blessed Country or in any other, is
private property, or are private rights, more secure and better
guarded than here. . . . Not an instance, I am certain, has
been elicited, or brought to light, of one of our soldiers killing
a Mexican. . . . 'Tis truly Wonderful, I cannot understand
it." 35 The people are all contented, said a letter to El
Republicano, for business is good and taxes are low; and, he
might have added, an American band plays for us in the park.
It is "almost incredible," admitted a writer n El Nacional,
a newspaper of the state, how well the American soldiers treat
our priests and women. How are they able to wear the mask
so long? The common people, not seeing through the trick,
accept their conduct in good faith. 37
After the siege ended, some of our men were arrested for
plundering houses from which they had been fired upon, and
there was a little pilfering at the fruit stands ; but Furlong, the
Mexican prefect, urged the people to give the war no further
thought, and friendly relations very soon returned. Street
lanterns were still punctured occasionally by tipsy and facetious
Americans with their bayonets, but they were paid for. When
Lane's brigade of volunteers arrived, complaints began in
earnest, and a committee laid the situation before Scott ; but
there was no case of such importance that amends or even
VOL. II Q
226 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
invest'gat'on was demanded. 36 The city council stated to the
prefect that Childs had saved its authority, improved the
condit on of the town, aided the Mexican officials, and given
them willing audience in order to concert measures for the
public good. One measure in particular was the re-establish-
ment of the chamber of commerce, destroyed by the state
government; and, as the bishop admitted, Childs did all in
his power to prevent and remedy abuses. 37
At Mexico City there were "some outrages naturally/'
reported Doyle, charge d'affaires of England; and emphasis
can fairly be placed on his last word, for the troops, entering
the town excited by desperate fighting and crowned with
victory, were fired upon by the populace, and found themselves
hunted at every turn by robbers, assassins and their confeder-
ates. 38 Doyle added that "even from the beginning a great
deal of forbearance" was displayed by the Americans; and
the correspondent of the London Daily News wrote, "On the
whole I must confess that General Scott and his troops have
acted with unexpected moderation." Indeed, they "have
shown an exemplary clemency," admitted a Mexican letter
printed by a Mexican paper. 43
The restaurant-keeper who furnished a meal and got rather
less than he expected or the janitor who tried to keep soldiers
out of their assigned quarters and got rather more, had little
reason to complain. Indeed, both had reason to be content,
for in a city full of leperos and escaped felons property and life
depended upon our protection. "We must endure the pres-
ence of the Americans or suffer worse things," said a Mexican.
No allowances were made by Scott, however. 39 "Revelling
in the halls of Montezuma" means now, a soldier wrote home,
that if the patrol finds you in the street after eight o'clock in
the evening you are taken to the guardhouse, and if noisy,
you are handcuffed ; and for more serious offences the punish-
ments were extremely severe. Quitman, the first governor of
the city, 40 and P. F. Smith, who succeeded him, ably seconded
the commander-in-chief. 43
Under such auspices the shops began to open within a week
after the capital surrendered, and business was soon brisker
than ever. The clergy were somewhat refractory, and on
September 19 all the churches were found closed; but Quit-
AMERICAN RULE AT THE CAPITAL 227
man immediately sent word that should they remain closed,
the United States flags would be removed from their towers
as a sign that our army had withdrawn its protection. No
further hint was needed, for millions in gold, silver and gems
lay within their dark walls; and soon the relations between
army and church became entirely satisfactory. 43
The troops then felt at liberty to make themselves at home.
The American Star, "a neat and saucy little sheet," whose
proprietors and editors had followed the troops from Vera
Cruz, and set up their press wherever Scott made a stay, ap-
peared on September 20, and later was followed by the North
American. 41 The cafes and eating places took on strange
names : New York Restaurant Eagle Hotel, Old Kentucky
House and the like. "American Dry Goods," read one sign;
"Mince Pies for sale Here," another; "Mush and Milk at All
Hours," a third. Officers formed an association called the
Aztec Club. An agitation for an American railroad to Vera
Cruz began. An American sermon was preached at the palace
in the splendid Ambassadors' Hall, on the text : " Only fear
the LORD, and serve Him in truth with all your heart; for
consider how great things he hath done for you"; and other
sermons followed. American citizens, temporarily soldiers,
made all the shows prosperous, and a complimentary benefit
was given to Senora Canete at the National Theatre by "The
Chiefs and Officers of the American Army." As cold weather
came on, stoves, chimneys and smoke made their appearance
to the intense astonishment of the natives, total strangers
to such abominations ; and finally that proud Spanish insti-
tution, the bull-fight, succumbed in this manner : 43
"The Publid are respectfull informed thoh the secind Bull Fihk nill
take place, this Evening, Wednesday, lOte instant, cohen nill bi introduced
a variez of new performanas, by the Compay of Bull Fighk, and fa which
occasia has been obtaind. Some of the mest fusian Bulls in the Countri.
THIS WSDNESDAY. NlGHT 10 NoVEMBRE 1847."
Unfortunately, under such names as "Contreras," "Churu-
busco" and "Old Chapultepec," American drinks of established
fame arrived. Music halls and dance houses, familiarly known
as the Hells of Montezuma, were crowded. Relieved now from
the anxiety and tension of the campaign, the gallant volunteers
could not be sti 1 a moment. Generally they were rather
228 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
brusque and rowdyish, and to the polite Mexicans they ap-
peared even more so than they really were. They loved to
present themselves at a show with trousers tucked into their
boots, drape their legs over the backs of the seats, and yell
for American patriotic airs; and they seemed to be always
eating except when busy with a glass. 43
Gambling became a rage, and in its temples were other
priestesses besides those of Chance. Of La Bella Union, the
chief resort, it was said, What is unknown "is as well as what
is known." Eager for popularity and advancement many
officers would not interfere, and in fact some of them sank
almost as low as their men. One consequence of such dissi-
pation was illness, 42 and another was robberies, quarrels and
fights. The arrival of reinforcements fresh volunteers
and recruits quickened all riotous tendencies. So far as
personal morals went the conditions of Santa Fe were ap-
proached by not a few, and to crown all two volunteer officers,
involved in what seems to have been a gambling-house fracas,
were convicted of murder. Conqueror as well as conquered
must pay his penalty. 43
Most, however, shrank from such a life, and many tried to
render the American stay a fine experience for themselves
and for others. It was not in vain. Their nobler tastes
found congenial soil. The turquoise sky, the pictured facades
of the houses, the handsome gray old palaces curiously and
lavishly sculptured, and embellished with precious tiles in blue
and white, the Alameda with its grand trees and its fountain,
the amazing richness of the churches and their wondrous
gilded carvings, the embroidered gold vestments of the priests,
the perfume here and there of an ancient garden stealing out
through a broken wall, the red conflagration of sunrise behind
snowy mountains, the distant, mellow clang of a convent bell
as evening shadows gathered, the brilliant round moon turning
the peaks into gigantic veiled watchmen and setting massive
domes and spires a-quiver with a mystical sort of life these
things helped introduce our finer spirits to the heart of the land,
and fill them with sympathy and good-will. Mexico has
never been without strangers to love her, and she found such
among her conquerors. 43
Here our survey of the ground ends, but a few .vertical
AMERICAN METHODS 229
sections will be instructive. While always having it understood
that our authority was paramount, the American local governors
desired to let the alcaldes and ayuntamientos (city councils)
look after municipal affairs, and were disposed to cooperate
in a liberal fashion with them for the good order, the efficient
and economical administration and even the improvement
of the towns. 46
Naturally enough those officials, exposed to the criticism
of both sides, found their positions irksome. Usually, though
not always, they were permitted to resign if they chose to do
so, and new officials were then elected by the people or appointed
by the governor. Shields extinguished the ayuntamiento of
Tampico for incompetence and malfeasance in office, and
selected their successors. At Mexico a refractory council was
dissolved by Scott, and a Puro body, friendly to the Americans
and anxious to make the city government democratic through
our aid, was chosen in a somewhat irregular way. When
provisions, mules and other such things were needed, it was
usual to call upon the town authorities to furnish them at liberal
prices. A threat that otherwise the needed supplies would be
taken by force and nothing paid, often accompanied the re-
quest ; but this was in most cases only designed to justify the
authorities, in the view of the people, for complying. 46
Attention was paid by the governors to the care and lighting
of the streets, proper sanitation, the maintenance of schools,
hospitals, prisons and public works, and especially to the
police. At Cordoba the city guards were allowed to carry
only clubs, but such a restriction was not usual. Worth had
regulars for policemen at one time. At Puebla after the siege
a guard of 100 volunteers patrolled the streets all night. Gen-
eral Smith enlisted at Mexico a picked body of four hundred
American soldiers. Shields, while governor of Tampico, placed
an officer of the regulars at the head of this department. The
police were firmly supported by the governor, if they proved
reliable ; if not, a change occurred. The Americans held that
peaceable citizens lost none of their political rights during
our occupation, and on election days our troops were kept in
their quarters or marched out of town. 44 So, too, Mexican
tribunals were entirely free in dealing with Mexican affairs,
though no one connected with our army could be tried by them ;
230 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
and their decisions were enforced by our commanders. 45 When
Mexicans were placed before an American military commission
they were permitted to bring counsel, but occasionally some-
what unusual methods had to be employed, because men ready
to make any sort of an oath in defence of a fellow-countryman
could always be found. Our protection extended, of course,
to the subjects of foreign powers. 46
Social relations between the Mexicans and our armies were
hindered by the old impression that Americans were haughty,
taciturn and insolent, by the fear of receiving actual insults
and injuries from our soldiery, and, when this fear wore off,
by a dread that any association with Americans would later
be punished by fellow-citizens as proved to be the result
at Victoria, for example. The relations of Scott and his
officers with churchmen were generally good, but as a rule
the educated and wealthy moved away on our approach or shut
themselves up. In the case of Tampico, 47 however, officers
were able to secure the presence of Mexican ladies at a steam-
boat excursion and a ball. 50
As a rule, Parras was hospitable throughout the war. At
Jalapa the two nationalities mixed somewhat freely. Governor
Hughes became intimate with the leading clergymen, and he
stated that on account of the general cordiality shown by the
Franciscans the head of that order was banished from the
capital. A handsome ball was given there to Childs when he
left the city. It was at Mexico, however, that social relations
were best established. 48 Society decided rather promptly to
appear in public as usual. Even common soldiers were often
able to make friends of respectable persons, and officers
became intimate in many families. What was more surprising,
a figure in public affairs like Alaman opened his door. 50
The women, usually so ardent in their patriotism, were
noticeably cordial. The Mexican men were as a rule es-
sentially feminine, and the downright virility of the northern
breed made itself deeply and quickly felt. Less than three
weeks after the capture of Monterey Private Kingsbury naively
wrote, "The women are very kind. ... I enjoy myself much
in company with the fair Senoras." Conversation was
probably somewhat limited ; but a great many soldiers made a
dash at Spanish, and while some concluded the people did not
AMERICAN RULE BENEFICENT 231
understand their own language, others achieved results that
were at least interesting. 49 Our officers, it hardly need be
said, never lagged behind their men. 50
A fandango on hard ground beside a winding river with man-
dolins and guitars softly singing and moonlight sifting down
through gently waving palms, was not despised, and to go from
leaky canvas to a gilded ball-room for a whirl with a black-eyed
beauty who could waltz with a full glass of water on her head,
was a strong argument for treating Mexicans kindly. The
dark senoritas of Jalapa in particular, and still more their
celestial cousins of the golden hair and blue eyes, loved to
dance, chat and intrigue, and now their wit and their fans
had the opportunity of a lifetime ; at Puebla, the full name of
which meant The City of Angels, "bewitching glances" often
made our officers feel "aguish," said one of them; and the
capital stood first in this as in all other respects. Romance
never had a more brilliant or a deadlier course. Many a brave
heart was thrilled by a mysterious invitation that meant per-
haps a kiss and perhaps a stab, and many a fearless gallant
made a wild ride into the night. That woman's subtle power,
added to the influence of our gentlemanly and highly educated
officers in social intercourse, had important effects on public
sentiment cannot be doubted. Still, fear of their own country-
men prevented people from associating openly with Americans
to any gseat extent. 50
In short, as this phase of the subject is reviewed, one finds,
much that was deplorable and in the case of a foreign war
should always be guarded against. But that is not strange.
War is ugly business ; and since all of us begin conscious ex-
istence as savages, and many rise little above that stage, we
should not be surprised if some of our soldiers, deprived to
such an extent of uplifting influences, reverted more or less
toward it. Besides, a grain or two of lawlessness is after all
a normal and useful ingredient in human nature. 52
On the whole there was a vast deal to admire and praise.
Scott, a man well versed in the history of campaigns, asserted
that his troops displayed "the highest moral deportment and
discipline ever known in an invading army." Doyle, after
making careful inquiries all the way from Vera Cruz to the
capital and viewing the case as a practical man, reported with
232 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
reference to our troops that "Even from the account of the
Mexicans themselves they seem to have behaved very well/'
Gutierrez de Estrada, a Mexican of high standing, said to his
people that the Americans occupying their country ensured
them security of person and possessions and all proper satis-
factions better than their own governments had ever done. 52
And when one considers also the relative fewness of serious
outrages and the comparatively small number of individuals
affected, the great sums of money paid for supplies and labor, 51
the reduced prices of almost all manufactured articles, the
prevention of brigandage, insurrections, and civil as well as
military extortions, tyranny and excesses in the territory that
we held, the promotion of commerce and trade, the good ideas
of municipal administration frequently exhibited by the govern-
ors of towns, and the fine examples of subordination to author-
ity, both military and civil, exhibited by all grades of our troops
from the private up to General Scott himself when these
things are considered, one may well feel that our occupation
was a blessing to the people. Yet they would rather have
had Mexican abuse than American benefits. 52
XXXII
PEACE
October, 1847-July, 1848
IN the end peace came, for sooner or later it had to come ;
but nobody could have imagined the extraordinary course of
events that was to bring it about, and for a long while it seemed
impossible.
All the men of sense in Mexico recognized that she had neither
physical nor moral strength enough to continue the struggle,
but the majority of the nation were not sensible. The old in-
fluences operated still. Some could not forgive the outrages
perpetrated by our volunteers ; some wished so lucrative a
war to continue; some dreaded the demoralizing effect of the
millions coming from the United States, of which every politi-
cian and every military chief were sure to want as much as
possible. Incorrigible vanity still ignored failures and offered
iridescent hopes. Pride revolted against making terms while
the invader's foot pressed the sacred earth of the fatherland,
and against the inevitable surrender of territory. At least,
said not a few, we must wait until we make ourselves look for-
midable, so as to command respect ; and this meant indefinite
postponement. 1
Our army still appeared insignificant ; many of our troops
were deserting, and some of the generals hated one another.
Most of the people saw an American soldier or heard a word of
English seldom, if at all. Almost everything went on as be-
fore. The people confessed their sins to the same priests, an-
swered for their misdemeanors in the same courts, bribed the
same officials, paid taxes to the same embezzlers, and were
bullied by the same policemen in the same uniform. Evi-
dently the Americans dared not use their advantage. On the
other hand they were eager for peace. Doubtless they
knew the war had few apologists in the United States, thought
233
234 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
many, and .realized that soon a change of administration would
end it. 1
A large section of the Puro party a section which may be
called for the present purpose Eventualists felt, even though
Santa Anna's fall had removed one great objection to peace,
that it was highly desirable to have the war continue until the
old army should be virtually exterminated, or desired that at
least we should hold the country until the military, clerical,
political and social reforms desired by^the Puros could be effected
and public tranquillity be ensured. A larger number than ever
craved annexation to the United States as the only guaranty of
order and prosperity ; and still others dared not advocate peace,
lest they should be charged with lacking patriotism or touching
" foreign gold." Besides, had not the government, since the
fall of the capital, announced that all damages resulting from
hostilities would have to be made good by the United States?
That did not seem like throwing up the sponge. 1
In addition to these embarrassments many facts appeared to
show that sensible, concerted action, even if generally desired,
would be impossible. Political organization seemed to be dis-
solving. News of riots and insurrections came on every wind.
Even the governor of Mexico state was made a prisoner by
malcontents. Many believed with reason that, like the
Texas war, the present conflict had been used as a pretext for
official extortion, and refused to pay taxes. The central govern-
ment was regarded not infrequently as a common enemy.
Unruly, vicious, greedy men especially the unpaid army of-
ficers plotted incessantly. Signs pointed to Indian uprisings,
which the presence of the Americans encouraged. State decrees
against an ignominious peace, and state governments that
had not experienced the ills of invasion, barred the way of
negotiation. 2
Secessions looked highly probable. The Coalition of Lagos
agitated constantly. The legally obliterated state of Aguas
Calientes threatened to take up arms. Zacatecas made trouble
about internal affairs. The Eventualists, or a large part of
them, felt ready to smash the federal union into bits. The
monarchists labored, not without success, to prove that a
European king and European troops could save the nation.
The Santannistas hoped to make the Prince of Spoilers dictator.
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS REOPENED 235
Many of the Puros felt ready to join them in order to regain a
share of the power, and a dull, subterranean rumbling satisfied
not a few that Santa Anna would soon be supreme. Almonte,
the implacable foe of peace, though now regarded by nearly
every one as a cunning, selfish adventurer, seemed to many a
useful tool; and his Presidential hopes found strong support. 2
Among the Americans officers pessimism reigned. In point of
time, wrote the commanding general, we may not be half through
the war. Bankhead could observe no sign of peace. "Mexico
is an ugly enemy. She will not fight and will not treat/'
said Webster. The venerable Albert Gallatin, scanning the
horizon from his watch tower, discovered "hardly any hope"
that peace would be concluded by Polk's administration. With
the capture of Mexico City the real difficulties of the Americans
begin, thought Le Correspondant of Paris; and the London
Times declared that we should have to drop the war or annex a
country that would cost us more than its value.
The conditions threatened a long, expensive, demoralizing
occupation of Mexico, leading almost inevitably to either our
absorbing millions of undesirable aliens or our becoming in-
volved in a general state of irritation and hostility liable to end
in a national outburst of hatred and fury against us. To avoid
these deplorable alternatives Polk thought of practically setting
up a government with which to make peace. But such an
organization even if really feasible, which Polk himself
doubted would have required protection for a length of time
that no one could forecast, would very likely have ended in the
same dilemma as undisguised occupation, and, if at all success-
ful, might have given the world a pretext for saddling Mexico's
future upon us. How to escape from the predicament Polk
and his advisers discussed anxiously but without success. 3
President Pena y Pefia, however, supported by his Cabinet,
by a group of true, honest patriots and by the Moderado party
in general, determined to end the war ; and Trist, who under-
stood their sentiments, reopened the subject on the twentieth
of October. Within a fortnight he was informed that Mexico
desired peace, and would appoint commissioners in a few days.
November 2 Congress met. Letters in favor of concluding the
hostilities poured in upon the members and had their effect. The
Puro-Santannista league attacked the government promptly
236 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
on the ground of remissness in conducting the war, but a resolu-
tion calling upon the ministry to state what military steps it had
taken failed by more than two to one. Senator Otero offered
a motion, forbidding the authorities to consider the cession of
any territory held without question by Mexico before the war ;
but this was rejected, to the surprise of all, by a vote of 46 to 29.
Senor del Rio then summoned the administration to state
whether negotiations with Trist had been resumed, and he also
went down. 4
On the eleventh came the election of an interim President,
and again the peace party triumphed. The opposition which
had found Almonte too unpopular, especially among the San-
tannistas gave their votes to Cumplido, on the basis of an
understanding that Santa Anna should neither be reinstated
nor be put on trial, but Anaya was chosen by 42 against 31.
About a week later the representatives of seven states met at
Queretaro by invitation of the government, and after a desul-
tory but illuminating discussion of nearly ten days agreed, with
the exception of San Luis Potosi, to support a movement for
peace. Even the war party felt the strength of the current. 5
Some action in that sense looked almost sure ; and, as a new
Congress was expected to assemble at the beginning of the
year, the present members, partly in consequence of intrigues
and partly from a fear of responsibility, slipped away in such
numbers as to conclude the session, leaving the government a
free field. The opposition then came to a head in an insurrec-
tion at Queretaro. But Anaya brought out artillery and some
reliable troops, particularly 200 American deserters, and an-
nounced that he would not only fight in deadly earnest but make
examples of the chief rebels. To the insurgents these ideas
were novel and shocking, and they declined to play the game
out. The road to peace then seemed to be open. 5
But the marplot had been at work. Finding he could not
control Scott's policy with reference to the armistice and prob-
ably wishing to undermine the general-in-chief, Pillow had writ-
ten to the President. Exactly what he said cannot be stated, but
probably he described the armistice as a gross blunder, and ac-
cused our peace commissioner of acting as a tool of Scott for the
injury of Polk's friends especially Pillow ; and on October 4
Polk ordered the recall of Trist. In his despatch Buchanan in-
TRIST RECALLED 237
timated that our envoy's presence might encourage the Mexi-
cans to insist upon insulting terms, like those tendered by them
on September 6, and ; probably with a view to hardening our
conditions announced that Mexico must sue for peace at
Washington. By the twenty-first came news that Scott had
entered the capital, and that Trist had fallen short of obedience
by intimating that possibly we might not insist upon the Rio
Grande line. Folk's feelings grew hot as he reflected, and on the
twenty-fifth a special messenger set out with a reprimand and
a repetition of the order to leave Mexico. Both despatches
reached their destination on the same day, November 16. 6
On receiving them Trist decided to inform the Mexican au-
thorities of his recall and go home at the first opportunity. In-
deed it seemed to him the best policy to return and lay before his
government some of the information it lacked. But a special
escort could not be spared, and, as no train was to go down until
f December 4, he could be deliberate. By Thornton, therefore,
who was temporarily in charge of the British legation and set out
for Queretaro the next day, he sent merely an informal notice
of what had occurred, with a request that some proposal be sent
on to Polk. By the day Thornton arrived (November 21) Mex-
ican peace commissioners had been appointed ; and Pena,
minister of relations under the interim government, listened
to his news with signs of emotion painful to witness. No
Mexican felt ready to sue for peace at Washington, and Polk's
demand signified the failure and political ruin of the peace men. 7
Pena took the ground that Trist's proposal to reopen the
negotiations bound his government, and implored the charge to
urge upon him the sincerity and the difficulties of the Mexican
authorities. He also begged Thornton for an intimation, to
be used against the war party, that England could not be
counted upon for assistance ; and the charge complied promptly
with both requests. Fortified also by the action of Congress
and the sentiment of the governors, and believing that in view
of Mexico's present attitude the United States would shortly
cancel its orders of recall, Pena then officially notified Trist that
negotiators had been appointed. 7
Our commissioner now found himself in a most extraordinary
position. Buchanan's letters of recall proved that peace was
desired and the situation misunderstood by our Executive, but
238 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
these facts could not obliterate certain others. Trist was not
merely a private citizen but a discharged official under the frown
of his government. Dealings with Pefia could be described as
traitorous. A warning against confidence in Mexican pretences
and a notice that harder terms would now be exacted by the
United States had been served upon him ; and what those terms
would be he could only imagine. Yet he fully believed in the
sincerity of Pefia and his associates. Thornton confirmed this
opinion, and adjured him to improve the opportunity. No one
on the ground could see any other way to peace. General
Scott favored negotiating and probably expressed the opinion
to Trist, as to Mexicans, that, should he make a treaty, it
would be accepted by the United States. But on him, Nicholas
P. Trist alone, it depended to say whether two nations were to
be miserable or happy, to keep on cutting at each other's throats
or enjoy the blessings of peace ; and on him it rested to assume,
should he take humanity and patriotism for guides, a most*
arduous task at the gravest personal risk and with no sub-
stantial profit in view. At noon on December 4 he decided
aright, and it was a truly noble act. 8
Trist now had it intimated to the Mexican commissioners,
that if they were disposed to accept a boundary line traced up
the Rio Grande to thirty-two degrees of latitude and thence
west, he would meet them privately to make further arrange-
ments. The outcome was a strong recommendation from the
Mexican commissioners, presented and urged by Thornton, that
Pefia consent. Pena did so ; but he pointed out that it would
be necessary to defer action until the new Senate should con-
firm the nomination of the commissioners. Encouraged, how-
ever, by advices from Thornton, Trist revoked his official notice
that Polk had recalled him, and waited, with feelings that can
be imagined, for the waters to move. 9
The negotiations stood in fact at a graver crisis than he
thought. News that leading Whigs talked of settling with
Mexico on terms far easier than Trist proposed caused hesitation
at Queretaro, and fresh hopes of English assistance had a still
greater effect. But fortunately Doyle arrived at this juncture
to take charge of the British legation, and promptly directed
Thornton to state that nothing more than good offices
could be expected of his government. The support of these
THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 239
British diplomats, one at the capital and the other at Queretaro,
proved most helpful ; but then came Folk's Message, which en-
couraged the Eventualists by saying that, should Mexico con-
tinue the war, our protection might be given to any party able
and willing to set up a republican government and make peace.
Trist grew more and more anxious, and on the day after Christ-
mas expressed his desire to proceed. In consequence of Doyle's
attitude all Mexican scruples about the confirmation of the
commissioners vanished. On January 1 their full "powers"
reached the capital; and, beginning on the second, Couto,
Cuevas and Atristain met there secretly with Trist almost every
day. Rincon, the other member of the board, did not serve, 9
Trist was prepared to stimulate his colleagues with news that
a sentiment in favor of pushing the war through without de-
lay had now become pronounced in the United States. At the
same time his letter of September 7 provided them with a most
convenient position, for it maintained that all the districts
now held by American troops were ours by right of conquest,
and that by accepting our terms Mexico, instead of selling lands
and population, would recover a large amount of both. He gave
them, too, an agreeable surprise by proposing substantially the
same terms as during the armistice. 10
They for their part knew California and all of Texas were
lost; but their instructions were exacting, and they struggled
for all conceivable advantages. Foreign arbitration and a Eu-
ropean guaranty of the boundary were promptly demanded, and
were as promptly refused. It was proposed that on the signing
of the treaty all American forces in the country should retire to
within fifty leagues of the coast ; but this and other unreasonable
conditions met the same fate. Anticipating sharp and cap-
tious criticism from opposing lawyers in Congress, the Mexicans
devoted the most wearisome care to phraseology. Cordiality
prevailed, however. Trist's good-will, self-sacrifice and cour-
tesy received full recognition, and he seems to have been rather
intimate with Couto, the ablest of his colleagues. Doyle and
Thornton, though always respecting the line of strict neutrality,
assisted materially in removing difficulties. 10
Trist felt intensely anxious to save time, and for good reasons.
Orders might arrive any day and eventually did arrive
making it absolutely impossible for him to act as an American
240 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
representative. Scott was placed by his orders under a mili-
tary obligation to drive the government from Queretaro, and
though he granted a de facto truce, thinly disguised by occupy-
ing a few places and intimating a desire for new instructions, a
positive despatch might at any hour end that state of things. 11
Yet day after day passed. The Mexican government and
commissioners felt obliged to stick at everything and to confer
often by letter. January 8 Anaya's term expired by limitation ;
and, as Congress had not assembled, his predecessor became
once more the provisional executive. Four days later an abor-
tive insurrection at San Luis Potosi frightened the timid Pena
nearly out of his wits, for it seemed like the prologue of
a revolution, and he demanded . that before signing a treaty
he should have sufficient American funds to provide adequate
support against malcontents ; but at length his commissioners,
insisting that such a proposal would be indecorous, eliminated
this difficulty. Finally the government stopped short at the
financial consideration. It asked for thirty millions, and our
commissioner, in view of the expenses already caused by the
protraction of the war, would give but fifteen. On the twenty-
ninth of January, therefore, Trist, in very considerate but very
positive language, officially declared the negotiation ended. 11
By arrangement, however, Doyle informed the Mexican com-
missioners that enough time to communicate once more with
Queretaro would be given. Through the same channel they
received a hint from Scott, that he would protect the authori-
ties against the dreaded revolution, should a treaty be signed,
but would otherwise have to dislodge the government, and
thenceforth hunt it like a deer on the mountain. Doyle talked
with British directness and good sense. The commissioners
brought all this pressure to bear on their government. It
yielded; and, on the second of February, at the suburb of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, seat of the most venerated shrine in Mex-
ico, in the profound secrecy that had shrouded all these nego-
tiations, the treaty was at last signed. 12
By its terms Mexico appeared to sacrifice, independently of
Texas, an immense area ; but she really suffered little, for she
had no grip and deserved to have none upon California
and New Mexico. Indeed she had found those distant regions
merely embarrassing. Nor did she really cede any territory.
A TREATY SIGNED
241
As Trist contended and our Supreme Court has in effect decided,
the only cession was that made by the United States in surren-
dering districts then in our hands. Our real title was conquest
conquest from those who had taken the country by conquest
from its conquerors. What Mexico granted us was peace
and an acknowledgement of our title. In return we gave her
not only peace, which meant vastly more to Mexico than to us,
but extensive lands, the renunciation of all American claims
antedating the treaty, and fifteen million dollars in money -
TERRITORY ACQUIRED FROM MEXICO
SCALE OF MILES
50 100 20U 300 400 500
m. Eng.Cc,..N.Y.
6- ULF Of
MEXICO
a wealth of gold that her treasury had never seen before. On
both sides the treaty conferred benefits ; on our part it was mag-
nanimous; and to settle the matter in this way gave the
United States a feeling of satisfaction worth all it cost. 13
The wish of the Mexican government had been to open the
peace negotiations by making an armistice. To the Americans
this could offer little advantage, for the only enemies they now
had to fear were guerillas, and these recognized no laws. To
Peiia, on the other hand, it meant security from hostile expedi-
tions, larger revenues, diminished expenses, Congressional elec-
VOL. IT R
242 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
tions in the territory under American control, and hence the
political support of those who felt the burdens of war. But
Scott, while ready to grant a virtual immunity from attack
during the negotiations, was neither authorized nor willing to
sign an armistice at that stage ; and to have done so, indicating
that peace was contemplated, would have endangered the plans
of the Mexican government itself. In order, however, to bring
about the execution of the treaty our commissioner had to de-
mand of Scott a pledge that he would send out no more expedi-
tions until new instructions, issued after the arrival of the treaty
at Washington, should reach him. In short, he requested
the General to disregard the orders of a government eager
to put him in the wrong; and Scott, placing the public weal
above all personal considerations, promptly consented. 14
The second article of the treaty provided expressly for a sus-
pension of hostilities, and in view of its previous anxiety to ob-
tain that concession, the Mexican government was expected to
act in the matter at once ; but it procrastinated so much as to
excite suspicions of bad faith at the American headquarters.
This conduct, however, was merely owing to its constitutional
apathy ; and on the twenty-second of February, 1848, Generals
Mora and Quijano opened negotiations with Worth and Smith
at the capital . True to the Mexican practice, followed on almost
every occasion since the first of our dealings with Mexico, they
began with what Doyle fairly characterized as "exorbitant"
demands. For example, they asked for the evacuation of the
capital, Puebla, Jalapa and Vera Cruz, and for concessions
incompatible with the treaty of peace itself. 14
But Worth and Smith, assuming promptly a just and firm
attitude, as our civil officials ought to have done from the be-
ginning, refused to consider such demands, and the Mexicans
then withdrew them. Everything within reason, however, was
granted. Doyle called the armistice, indeed, "very favour-
able" to the weaker side, and the ratification of it on March 4
and 5 by the Mexican and American eommanders-in-chief sup-
plemented happily the treaty of peace. Not only that, but it
stopped for the time being every attempt at revolt, for under
one of the articles insurgents were to be opposed by the armies
of both nations. Paredes and Almonte found it wise to be
quiet, and as we have observed Santa Anna sailed away. 14
AMERICAN IDEAS ABOUT MEXICO 243
The treaty, conveyed with extraordinary speed, reached the
White House on February the nineteenth, but whether it did
well to arrive so soon or even to arrive at all appeared
extremely doubtful. As we have learned, a strong appetite
for territory had existed in the United States before the war,
and Mexico had looked inviting. In January, 1846, Baker of
Illinois suggested in Congress the absorption of that country.
By the following July a somewhat organized annexation party
existed at New York, and later Senator Dickinson became its
champion. The wish to acquire soon became strong. Per-
haps Moses Y. Beach visited Mexico in this cause. Certainly
Mrs. Storms, who accompanied him, worked actively for it,
and his paper ardently recommended annexation as not only
advantageous for the United States but sure to benefit
Mexico. 15
Other papers warmly took up this idea, arguing that Provi-
dence called upon us to regenerate her decadent population.
"The Spanish have ceased to rule in Mexico," announced the
Democratic Review as its watchword in February, 1847. Seces-
sionists like Simms of South Carolina thought the proposed
confederacy would need that country to give it bulk; and
by a different route Senator Hannegan of Indiana, representing
the strong expansionist sentiment of the West, arrived at the
same point of view in regard to annexing Mexico. 15
The recall of Trist, which seemed to give the United States a
free hand, and also the plan to extend our occupation of her
territory, which logically pointed that way, strongly pro-
moted the idea, for besides the obvious tendency of these meas-
ures they were supposed to mean that Polk had that end in view.
The attitude of men high in the administration circle produced
a similar effect. Bancroft held that we should "rescue a large
part of Mexico from anarchy." Cass used language that sug-
gested rescuing the whole, and followers of his talked that way
explicitly. Apparently he thought he could win the next Presi-
dential election on this issue; and the war party at his back
offered Mexico as a reward for supporting its views. Bu-
chanan, at first opposed to the acquisition of any territory,
trimmed his sails to the rising breeze, and wrote that if Mexico
did not conclude the war, it would be necessary for us to "fulfill
the destiny" assigned to us by Providence. Walker, who knew
244 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
more about the far southwest than any other man at Washing-
ton, favored annexation strongly, and even tried to drag the
subject into his annual report. Indeed, the financial editor of
the New York Herald saw in him the regenerator of Mexico ; and
very likely he himself, as head of the treasury, dreamed of
winning immense economic triumphs in that field. 16
Soon after 1848 came in, the annexation cause began to put
on a bold front. Naturally the younger element in the party
and the country felt inclined to take it up. Crocodile tears
were shed over the "poor foundling" though a future heiress
- placed by Divine Providence at our threshold. The danger
that England or France might ravish it away from us came to
the fore. Conquest was pronounced in the Senate a legitimate
method of expansion. Orators in both Houses pointed more
plainly toward an extension at the cost of Mexico. Declara-
tions in the contrary sense indicated the force of the current.
Senator Niles believed that substantially all of the Democrats
among his colleagues would fall in with the plan. Enthusiastic
citizens acclaimed it. Speculators fancied it would help their
schemes in various ways. Capitalists believed that by stimulat-
ing enterprise it would enlarge and continue the demand for
money. Manufacturers and high tariff men argued that it
would increase the national expenses and therefore the duties.
Army officers could see a wide field for them ; and the opponents
of slavery, led by the National Era, felt that Mexican planta-
tions would draw away the negroes now understood to be
unprofitable of Kentucky, Tennessee and Virginia. Public
meetings became excited on the subject. The country is going
mad for Mexico, inferred Buchanan; and Walker believed
that only a systematic newspaper agitation was needed to en-
sure success. 17
Polk moved in the same direction. In September, 1847, he
concluded that, should the war continue, he might demand
Tamaulipas and the line of thirty-one degrees, and reduce the
compensation to fifteen millions ; and before the end of January,
1848, he felt inclined to throw aside entirely the terms offered
through Trist. Besides, he loathed the treaty on account of
the man who made it and the man who gave assistance. After
his recall, considering himself a private citizen, Trist reported
with a free hand, criticising the President's recent Message as
THE QUESTION BEFORE POLK 245
encouraging the Eventualists, and expressing his opinions on
the business without much reserve. Naturally Polk the Medi-
ocre, guided by Pillow the Cunning, totally misconceived the
spirit of Trist and Scott. In his eyes they had contrived a
wicked political "conspiracy" against Him, His administration,
His party and His Pillow. Both had proved " utterly un-
worthy," and on January 25 the "arrogant, impudent" and
"very base" Trist was ordered to leave headquarters. To
accept, approve, endorse, recommend and support the work
of such a scoundrel seemed impossible. 18
But Polk had professed to be considerate and forbearing
toward our erring sister, and to seek only redress, indemnity,
security and peace. His terms had been officially stated ; and
while his Message of December, 1847, had suggested that a
continuance of the war might be expected to modify them,
no real fighting had occurred since then, and although Polk
had known for about six weeks that negotiations on virtually
the old basis were afoot no modification of them had been
announced. That Message had expressly disclaimed all thought
of making " a permanent conquest " of Mexico ; and on the fourth
of this very February Sevier, chairman of the committee on
foreign relations, had stated in the Senate that Polk was anx-
ious for peace, desired only indemnity, and wanted to preserve
Mexican nationality. 19
Trist had substantially embodied Polk's terms in the treaty,
and had even anticipated his thought of reducing the
compensation. Congress had voted men and money on
the basis of Polk's professions and terms; and, should he
now raise his demands, all his enemies would say their charges
of greed, falsehood, injustice, o'ervaulting ambition and
bloodthirsty wickedness had been proved. Hostilities might
continue, the Whigs might carry the election, the war might
end in disaster and ignominy, and all the gains now embodied
in the treaty might be lost. Even should these perils be
avoided, it seemed extremely doubtful whether Mexico would
ever accept by treaty a more encroaching boundary, and
quite possible that an endeavor to obtain it would open a long
vista of expenses, guerilla warfare, foreign complications and
Heaven only knew what. Extension toward the south was
liable to kindle the fires of an anti-slavery agitation and
246 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
perhaps disrupt the Union. The treaty and the victories that it
consummated meant enough glory for any President. Finally,
Polk, now moving about with dragging steps, dry, brown face,
gray hair and sunken eyes, perhaps felt weary of battling both
abroad and at home ; and at the very least, should he endorse
this paper and lay it before the Senate, his responsibility
would cease. 19
Buchanan and Walker opposed the treaty ; but the former,
as well as Polk himself, recognized that any personal miscon-
duct of Trist, a mere agent of the Executive, had no proper
bearing on the question. The rest of the Secretaries favored
placing the document before the Senate. On February 22,
after full debates in the Cabinet, Polk did this, recommending
by implication the acceptance of it; and so a paper which
had been simply a memorandum drawn up by a private Ameri-
can citizen and several Mexicans holding official positions, be-
came a real treaty, merely awaiting confirmation. 20
Among the Senators the treaty met with jeers and scowls.
" Great Jehovah !" exclaimed Lieutenant W. T. Sherman on
learning its terms ; it is "just such a one as Mexico would have
imposed on us had she been the conqueror"; and so thought
a number of the Senators. It is a mere piece of waste paper,
cried many; the impudent, perhaps traitorous, work of a dis-
credited agent, whom the President had ordered out of Mexico ;
and it would be undignified, ridiculous, degrading, to accept such
a thing. The war party opposed it. The annexationists op-*
posed it. The no-territory men opposed it. The Little Un-
ionists, who thought the country too big already, opposed it.
Not a few hated to think of letting Polk elude them so easily. 21
But suddenly the head of John Quincy Adams, as he sat in
the House, dropped. He was borne to the Speaker's room.
"This is the last of earth; I am content," murmured the
venerable statesman. For two days he lingered, unconscious ;
and then he passed away. This tragic event had a deep
effect. There fell a hush, as when snow descends upon the
city pavement. The sessions of Congress were suspended.
Senators were prevented from announcing their positions
hastily. And when discussion began once more, it was re-
sumed with a new feeling of seriousness, a new sense of re-
sponsibility. 21
THE TREATY BEFORE THE SENATE 247
If the President could put up with Trist and his work, surely
the Senate could, one began to think ; and in every way Folk's
virtual endorsement gave the paper enough respectability.
Politics played a leading role in almost every mind, but after a
little it seemed like bad strategy to vote against the glory and
the territory ensured by its terms. The committee on foreign
relations, which decided to throw the treaty aside and send an
"imposing" commission to do the work over, dropped the
scheme when Polk told them bluntly this would be " worse
than an idle ceremony." Benton, thoroughly angry at the
administration because Fremont, his son-in-law, had been con-
demned for insubordination in California; Berrien, wedded to
his "no-territory" idea ; Corwin, anxious perhaps to have more
Americans find hospitable graves in Mexico; Webster, who
asserted that California and New Mexico were "not worth a
dollar" ; and certain other Senators, committed for this or that
reason, were beyond argument ; but all their hopes failed. 22
The deep current set against them. "What better can we
do?" became an unanswerable argument for the treaty. The
people wanted peace. They desired no more bloodshed, no
more costs. One could not be sure of obtaining another treaty
from chaotic Mexico, or sure that any treaty differing from the
present one could have as good a chance in the American
Senate. To reject the work of Trist was understood more
and more clearly to involve, perhaps, not only interminable
fighting, but a train of moral, political, industrial, commercial
and financial ills of which no one could see the end. Already
enough generals had built up reputations, thought many of the
politicians. It would be of priceless advantage, urged some of
the finer men, to supplement our military triumphs with a
great act of magnanimity. By March 7 ratification, which had
been for a time extremely doubtful, appeared probable. Hous-
ton of Texas, a leading opponent, concluded to visit New Hamp-
shire. And on the tenth by 38 against 14 a narrow margin,
since a majority of two-thirds was requisite the treaty won.
A transfer of four votes from the affirmative to the negative
would have defeated it. 22
There were a few amendments. Article X, which might
have revived extinct Mexican claims to lands in Texas now
occupied by bona fide settlers, went overboard at once. The
248 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
provision of security for the Roman Catholic church in the ac-
quired territory (Art. IX) fell out as unnecessary, as reflect-
ing on the good faith of the United States, as suggesting govern-
ment interference with religious affairs in this country, and as
tending to confirm the Mexican pretence that we entertained
hostile feelings toward that communion. The Senate refused
to agree that California and New Mexico should be made into
states "as soon as poss ble" (Art. IX), regarding that as a step
to be taken with deliberation, and only when, in the judgment
of Congress, all the prerequisites of statehood should exist. In-
stead of allowing Mexico to choose between payment by instal-
ments and payment in securities convertible at once into cash
(Art. XII) it was decided to offer only the former method, as a
veiled hint that an infraction of the treaty would cause a sus-
pension of the instalments. Another amendment permitted
the Indians to have firearms, which, as they lived by the chase,
had to be done. A further modification, intended to hasten the
conclusion of peace, authorized the exchange of ratifications at
Queretaro whenever Mexico should accept the amended treaty ;
and it was also provided by the Senate that evacuation could
then begin. Finally a secret article, which permitted Mexico
to consummate the ratification of the agreement at any time
within eight months, instead of the four months of Article
XXIII, was cancelled, because it seemed to encourage pro-
crastination, and allow her time to escape from the treaty,
while compelling us to bear great expenses. But none of these
changes touched the essentials. 23
It now became necessary to have some one explain the
amended treaty to Mexico, bring about her acceptance of it,
and, should it be confirmed, exchange the ratifications. This
gave Po k a chance to prove himself a large man. Scott, though
not without serious grounds of offence against Hitchcock,
Harney and Quitman, had forgiven and honored them, because
they deserved well of the country. Trist, the bringer of peace,
the negotiator of its terms, high in the favor of the Mexican
government, and able to exert much influence on the Mexican
Congress, deserved the appointment. If the treaty represented
a great national service and had merit enough to be accepted,
its maker had merit enough to be recognized. But the Presi-
dent was only Polk the Mediocre after all. His plumage had
THE TREATY IN MEXICO 249
been ruffled ; and instead of giving Trist this high and lucrative ^/ e
post, he relegated the peacemaker to a dishonorable oblivion, ^^
and would not even pay him for the time actually spent in the mc<?
negotiations. To think that a President of the United States &*
could be so small ! 24
Aside from this petty meanness and spite, however, Polk
selected a man worthy, both personally and officially, of the
position. This was Sevier, chairman of the Senate committee
of foreign relations and leading champion of the treaty in that
body. Then, as Sevier became suddenly though temporarily
ill and no delay could be risked, Clifford, the attorney general,
was appointed associate commissioner with equal powers ; and
eventuaFy the two both arriving at Mexico by the fifteenth
of April acted in concert. 24
Mexico now became the scene of action again. February 6
the government announced what had been done about peace.
Knowing how loud an outcry had been raised against even con-
sidering a treaty, one can imagine what occurred, now that a
treaty had been made. The old objections were reiterated.
Trist's lack of authority was dwelt upon. Secret, despotic, il-
legal, treasonable, shameful, ruinous, were a few of the everyday
epithets that bombarded the government. It had no power to
alienate Mexican territory. It should have waited for the
American friends of peace to act. Even "the sepulchral com-
fort" of temporary subjugation was described as preferable to
such a peace. "Approval of the treaty, " exclaimed Rejon, "is
the political death of the Republic." Another insurrection
broke out at San Luis Potosi, and all the comandantes general
were notified to expect revolts. 25
The peace men, however, stood firm. Honor has been saved,
they insisted. The United States has recognized Mexico as an
independent nation. There has been no suing for terms at
Washington. Territory has been regained, not sold. To speak
properly, indeed, this is a "treaty of restitution"; fifteen mil-
lions are to be paid for injuries done us ; the territory acquired
by the United States costs her more dearly than Louisiana ; and
full rights have been secured for all Mexicans adopted by an-
other government. Whatever harshness can be found in the
conditions is due to the circumstances, not the government.
War has no respect for justice. Besides, in case of need a nation,
250 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
like an individual, may find amputation expedient, and be the
stronger for it. Above all, the administration has merely done
its duty in treating according to its best judgment. It has de-
termined nothing, settled nothing. The facts of the case will be
laid before Congress, and the representatives of the people shall
decide. 25
Here, then, came the real crisis : would Congress ratify the
treaty ? At Washington, in spite of some encouraging reports,
the impression gained ground that it would not. The amend-
ments appeared to cause little excitement, but they were not
the real issues. Opponents of peace had the speeches of Ameri-
can statesmen printed, and hawked them about the streets.
Prudent Mexicans demanded an end of the uncertainty, disorder
and chaos that was paralyzing the country; but so had they
always demanded it. The government exhibited little activity,
while the Puros and the friends of Santa Anna did not sleep.
The especially important elections in the occupied territory did
not end until April 23, and by that date one could see that some-
thing else was to be feared even more than opposition. As on
every other occasion demanding a patriotic stand, most of the
decent men felt afraid to assume responsibility. Another diffi-
culty was that money for their travelling expenses had custom-
arily been advanced to the members by the government, and
now it had no money for the purpose. Finally, however, said
an American who did not precisely understand the affair, mer-
chants at the capital subscribed a large sum to hunt up the
Congress and feed it long enough to ratify the treaty ; severer
measures also were taken to ensure attendance; and early in
May a quorum of shaking legislators convened. 26
In opening Congress Pena stated the grand question ably.
Honor, union, independence and the hope of national prosperity
and felicity have been saved, he pointed out ; the United States
made the proposals, and Mexico has obtained all the advantages
possible under the circumstances ; we have given up some terri-
tory, but the foremost nations of the world have done the same
at one time or another ; every one sees that we should have ad-
justed our difficulties in 1845, but it is now possible once more to
settle them, and the opportunity to do so shou'd not again be
lost. The ministers of war and finance presented statements
proving the impossibility of continuing the war successfully,
THE TREATY RATIFIED BY MEXICO 251
and the peace commissioners justified the terms of the treaty.
The prospect of recovering the Mexican customhouses and re-
ceiving the American millions looked highly attractive. No less
telling, doubtless, were the preparations of the United States to
resume hostilities with fresh energy, and to tax Mexico rigor-
ously. The most efficient American army that had yet been
seen in the country awaited Butler's orders, and large reinforce-
ments had been voted by Congress. No responsible men in
their senses could resist such arguments. The treaty, as
amended by the American Senate, was promptly ratified, and
by June 9 Washington had the news. With all speed it ran
from city to city, from town to town, from vale to vale ; and
everywhere it was greeted with quiet but heartfelt rejoicings. 27
By an arrangement already made, Sevier and Clifford, after
learning what had been done by the Mexican Congress, pro-
ceeded to the seat of government. It was a tiresome journey of
about 145 miles ; but at last, from the summit of a high ridge,
they saw domes and spires two miles or so distant, glittering on a
low eminence in a fine valley, which was enclosed by parallel
ranges of mountains. The town was Queretaro ; and on May the
twenty-sixth, in the President's rather plain reception room,
dignified with crimson curtains and with chairs of state, Clifford
presented their credentials. 28
Pena, tall and benign though sadly worn, Rosa, the minister
of relations, rather short and swarthy but with large, thoughtful
eyes lighting up his countenance, and Anaya, the minister of
war, tall and gaunt, with high cheek bones and a face of Indian
stolidity, received them with all due courtesy. "Sister repub-
lics, may the two countries ever maintain the most friendly
relations," was the American greeting; and Pena replied, "As
the head of this nation, I desire nothing more ardently than that
our treaty may prove the immutable basis of that constant har-
mony and good understanding which should prevail sincerely
between the two republics." Conversations and formalities en-
sued, and on May 30 an exchange of the ratifications concluded
this momentous business. 28
In the execution of the treaty a few misunderstandings arose,
but none of serious importance; and the minister of relations
attested the good faith of the United States. 29 Orders for the
evacuation of Mexican territory were promptly given to our
252 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
commanders in the various fields of operation, and were promptly
obeyed. 30 Even before the last formalities occurred, in fact,
Butler called in his outposts, and as the sun rose on the twelfth
of June it shone upon the arms of his rejoicing troops, drawn
up facing the palace in the grand plaza of the capital.
Housetops, balconies and the near streets were full, but perfect
order and stillness prevailed except for the sharp commands of
our officers. Thirty guns saluted the American banner on the
palace, and then it w^as lowered. The Mexican flag took its
place on the staff and received the same honors. An
American band struck up gaily. The unconquered ranks
wheeled, marched and left the city. Herrera, the new President,
returned to the chair from which Paredes had ejected him, and
the proud capital rejoiced to be free once more. But it rejoiced
soberly. "I question," said U. S. Grant, "whether the great
majority of the Mexican people did not regret our departure as
much as they had regretted our coming." 31
The plan of evacuation was to let the troops wait near Jalapa
until transports could be provided and their baggage go aboard,
and then march to the unhealthy coast and sail away as quickly
as possible. For some time General Smith had now been mak-
ing preparations at Vera Cruz with his characteristic efficiency ;
and soon the army, the sick, the wounded and the many who
attended to their needs, took ship rapidly for New Orleans. By
the twelfth of July more than 25,000 embarked, and on the last
day of the month all the fortifications of Vera Cruz and frowning
Ulua, the symbol of Mexican pride, were given up. Stirred by
feelings deep and strong, the departing soldiers looked round them
with a farewell gaze at the low white walls, at the exotic vege-
tation that had now come to be familiar, and at the gleaming,
snowy peak of Orizaba, towering above its belt of dark evergreens.
They had trodden the soil of that wonderful country with the
stern, proud foot of the conqueror, but they now left it full
of sympathy and good wishes ; and one of. the number put his
feelings into terse and soldierlike rhymes :
"The stranger parting from the shore,
Thy glories to behold no more,
Bids thee farewell with swelling heart
As his swift bark leaps o'er the sea,
And, as the truant tear-drops start,
Prays God that thou mayst yet be free. " 32
Vr , af+er -^ew ^iooj.u.^j-ctt f0/C /7a/W/7^ef
v
XXXIII
THE FINANCES OF THE WAR
1846-1848
MEXICO, as we have learned, entered upon the contest with
neither money nor revenues nor credit. From nothing, nothing
comes; and many supposed she was too poor to fight. But
she did fight or at least men fought in her name and
one cannot help asking how they contrived to do so. In full
the question cannot be answered, but some of the facts lie within
our view, and these are not only valuable in themselves but
highly suggestive. 1
Aside from loans, the income of the government in 1844 was
figured roughly as follows : import duties, seven million dol-
lars; duties on commerce in the interior, four and a quarter
millions; profits from the monopolies of the mints, tobacco,
stamped paper, playing cards, national lottery, post-office,
etc., two and a quarter millions; miscellaneous taxes and
revenues, three millions; total, sixteen and a half millions
net. But the American blockade cut off nearly fifty per cent
of this income at one stroke; and not only our progressive
occupation of territory, but the dislike of the people for national
taxes, their growing dissatisfaction with Santa Anna's regime,
and their increasing destitution caused a rapid shrinkage of the
residue. 2
It was proposed to contrive a general plan of taxation for
the emergency ; but probably the interests principally threat-
ened put a stop to it, and at all events it mysteriously disap-
peared. The government was given ample authority, but
could do nothing. A war tax was laid on house-rents, for
example ; but it could not be collected everywhere, and prob-
ably its net proceeds amounted to little. In November, 1846,
it was decided to issue drafts for two millions, to be accepted
by the clergy and then purchased by designated citizens ; but
253
254 . THE WAR WITH MEXICO
the scheme, though actually decreed, proved a failure, and the
famous laws of January 11 and February 4, 1847, were no more
successful. June 17, 1847, a special tax of one million was
assessed upon the entire population ; but only a small fraction
of this appears to have been paid. In November, 1847, the
government offered to deduct one half of the pending national
taxes levied before May 1, 1846, if citizens would pay them
by February 1, 1848 ; and this indicates clearly how the people
had been acting. A few of the states, besides maintaining
National Guards, erecting fortifications and manufacturing
cannon, remitted some cash to the central government; but
when we find the richest of them all, Mexico, boasting that
she had sent the insignificant sum of about $160,000, we have
reason to place a rather slight value upon this kind of assistance.
Moreover, accepted drafts on that state, payable in one, two and
three months, could not be sold even at a discount. 3
The clergy gave nominally a million and a half, but they
appear to have taken up indirectly, at a discount of forty per
cent, the drafts of which this donation consisted. Citizens
provided a large part of the new ordnance, but aside from this
we hear of few substantial gifts. Just after the battle of Molino
del Rey, in order to obtain' bread for the army, the government
requested the bakers of the capital to meet, but only a part of
them came. A "positive supreme order" then brought them
together, and they promised contributions; yet the promises
were not kept. 4
Every possible effort was made to borrow. Once the treasury
offered a national loan of two and a half millions, but it fell
flat in the states that might have paid the most. Just before
the battle of Cerro Gordo there was a door-to-door canvass at
Mexico ; but only small sums can have been picked up. About
three months later the government imposed a forced loan, of
which more than $280,000 were assigned to the capital; but
the Mexicans had learned to evade such extortions, and it proved
hard to collect the allotted amounts. In July, 1847, the British
consul general, Mackintosh, loaned $600,000 in exchange for
the ratification of an arrangement negotiated with the British
bondholders. In four loans the clergy furnished some three
millions, all told. The President raised money, it was reported,
on public and private securities, sold bonds freely at very low
THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL OUTLOOK 255
rates, and borrowed in effect by giving contracts on terms favor-
able enough to make the transactions worth while as gambling
propositions. The principal mint, for example, was turned
over to the British consul general for a period of ten years
in February, 1847, in exchange for some $200,000 in cash and
a promise to pay one per cent on the amount coined ; and on
similar principles arms and other necessaries were sometimes
obtained. 4
All of these financial operations were at least ostensibly
lawful, but Santa Anna did not pause here. Wherever money
could be found, he seems to have taken it, holding that the
exigency outweighed all rights and all pledges. Funds belong-
ing to the tobacco revenue were illegally seized, for instance;
and a large sum due the Academy of Fine Arts fell into this
voracious maw. Not only cash but everything needed for
the army went the same way. At Jalapa early in April, 1847,
for example, all the owners of horses received orders to bring
them in. Grain, forage, lead, lumber, arms, ammunition,
tools, cattle, mules and laborers were taken by force ; and
sometimes military officers exhibited the burglar's predilection
for a midnight hour. Here was a kind of finance that saved
the expenses of accounting, and without it even the low cost
of the Mexican soldier would not explain Santa Anna's holding
out so long. 5
The United States, happily, stood far above this level, but
not so far that probably mere good luck did not save us from
grave trouble ; and it was easy to foresee many dangers
all the worse because they naturally made capital timid
when the hostilities began. The total receipts of the treasury
for the fiscal year ending with June 30, 1845, were nearly thirty
millions and the ordinary expenditures $22,935,828. It was
estimated that during the next year the receipts would fall
about three millions, and Walker allowing the munificent
amounts of something more than two and a half millions for
the army and something less than five for the navy < expected
to reduce the total disbursements a little, anticipating for the
period ending with June, 1847, a further saving of more than
four millions. The receipts for July-September, 1845,
proved to be more than two millions below those of the corre-
sponding months of 1844, and the customs income for the fiscal
256 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
year 1845-46 was $815,445 less than for the preceding twelve-
month. In a word, shrinking revenues and curtailed outlays
were the prospect. 6
In th's condition of things, not only had the unpredictable
costs and embarrassments of war to be faced, but those of war
in a distant land. Money was to be sent out of the country,
never to return, and the bills for supplies to be increased by
the burdens of marine transportation, insurance and losses;
while risks from privateers and European complication^ could
be seen. Before such an outlook business men shrank from
large enterprises. People with money felt disposed to keep it. 7
Where, then, were funds to come from ? The currency had
been inflated by the paper issues of many banks. Stocks were
selling far below the prices of twelve months before. Even the
business men who did not endorse the tariff of 1842 had adjusted
their affairs to it, and now everybody understood that a new
scale of duties, based upon free-trade ideas, lay on the treasury
anvil. Calls for the government funds held and used by state
depositories and for the specie of all the banks were feared.
The banks cannot support a loan, and even in peace our capi-
talists have never done so, remarked the financial editor of the
New York Herald, probably the best newspaper authority. 7
The government must look abroad, concluded the editor,
and in Europe no light could be seen. By 1842 our state debts,
mostly held there, had amounted to nearly $200,000,000.
Mississippi, Michigan, Arkansas and Florida sank in the mire
of repudiation. Pennsylvania, Maryland, Indiana, Illinois
and Louisiana became delinquent. The bonds of South Caro-
lina fell below par. Missouri passed a stay law. Sidney
Smith, when he met a Pennsylvanian at dinner, felt like divid-
ing the man's raiment among the British guests, most of whom,
if not all, had probably suffered by the "dishonor" of the
state. Indeed, the bondholders were disposed to throw off
half of the interest rate, if our national treasury would assume
the debts; but a proposition to do this failed in Congress. 8
As early as 1841 even our six per cent national bonds would
not sell in Europe, though money commanded less than half
as large a return there. "Who will lend on American securi-
ties?" asked the London Spectator the very month we began
war upon Mexico. Our credit then grew worse instead of
NEW FISCAL LAWS 257
better. The war bill precipitated a panic in Wall Street, and
soon business in the west and south was described as prostrate.
Bad as such a financial outlook was in itself, too, it involved
a consequent ill. Evidently the administration would have
to pinch ; and, as Madame de Sevigne once remarked, " There
is nothing so expensive as want of money." {
Tlie Democrats, however, were committed against the pro-
tective tariff of 1842, now in force, and Polk as a party man
felt that something must be done about it. Walker no doubt
shared this opinion; and, having gained immense prestige in
the south by his brilliant advocacy of the annexation of Texas,
he very likely hoped that by now carrying into effect the fiscal
ideas prevalent in that section, he might supplant Calhoun.
Probably, too, he sincerely believed in these ideas. To him
the existing scale of duties appeared to be the cause of the
shrinking revenues ; and he stated boldly that war, which had
been recognized for some time as a possibility, "would create
an increased necessity for reducing our present high duties in
order to obtain sufficient revenue to meet increased expendi-
tures." 9
Soon after hostilities began, therefore, a tariff bill came
before Congress. It was bitterly and stubbornly fought. In
the Senate its defeat appeared sure ; but Crittenden and Clay-
ton, believing it could only prove a discreditable failure, had
a Whig support it in order to gain party advantage at the
expense of the nation, and by this unworthy trick and the
casting vote of the presiding officer it passed. In company
with it went a warehouse bill and the restoration of the sub-
treasury system, which divorced the government from the
banks, and required the treasury to accept and pay out only
specie. About the first of August, 1846, this entire system
became law. "Our administration seems enamoured of ruin,
and woos calamity for itself," exclaimed the Whig North Amer-
ican; our credit is threatened by the sub-treasury plan; our
industries are deprived of protection ; " while an expensive
war is eating out our vitals, our revenue is to be diminished" ;
and a direct tax will have to be laid. 9
The new tariff became effective on the first of December,
1846. As of course importers waited for it, a lean period pre-
ceded that event, and the heavy receipts that followed it,
VOL. n| [s
258 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
providing Walker with an apt retort, did not prevent the total
for the year ending with June, 1847, from coming short of his
estimate by more than four millions. Without waiting to
acquire this unwelcome fact, however, the government found
itself compelled in June, 1846, to revise at a sharp angle upward
its predictions of the expenditures. Over and above their cal-
culations of the previous December the war and navy depart-
ments now called for $23,952,904, which Polk informed Con-
gress was "the largest amount which any state of the service"
would require up to July 1, 1847. The secretary of the treasury
had expected to find on July 1, 1847, a surplus (virtually that
estimated for the previous year minus half a million) of at least
$4,332,441, and had confidently hoped for a substantial gain
in revenue ; but he admitted that it was now requisite, since
a working capital of four millions for the treasury and the
mints had to be kept on hand, to provide $12,586,406 of addi-
tional income. 10
The proper method of handling our war finances was, in the
first place, to increase the existing taxes not only to obtain
funds promptly, but as a firm support for the nation's credit
and a basis for those temporary loans which are a wise expedi-
ent at the beginning of a war ; and Walker expected the pro-
posed tariff to answer this purpose. But the question how to
raise these twelve and a half millions remained. Excise and
direct taxes, the administration believed, would not be prompt
enough, and would not seem to the public warranted by the
circumstances. It was therefore recommended to Congress
that both treasury notes and a loan should be resorted to ; and
on July 22, 1846, without much debate, the issue of ten millions
in such obligations, to be sold at not less than par, was author-
ized. 11
Treasury notes could not really serve the government's
purpose well, for they were soon to be paid, the expense of hand-
ling them fell upon the treasury, and, as they were receivable
for duties, they were sure to pour into the customhouses instead
of real money whenever they should be cheaper than specie.
The treasury, bound by law to pay out only the latter, would
then have to buy coin at the market price presumably, as
Gallatin said, with depreciated notes. These would then fall
still more, and so the process appeared certain to continue.
BONDS ISSUED 259
But notes were the most convenient and readiest, if not the
only way of quickly anticipating revenue; they were partic-
ularly suited to the nature of the government's expenditures ;
they provided an easy method of transmitting the large sums
that would be needed in the south on the war account; and
financial critics at New York approved of them. Not all
were of that opinion, however. About the middle of September
the appearance of notes for half a million was announced by
one journal under the heading, " Extensive Paper Money Manu-
factory"; but the government persisted, and by the ninth of
December, 1846, nearly four millions of them were out. This
with the balance more than nine millions handed over
by the previous fiscal year, made up for the lean customs re-
ceipts of this period. 12
Meanwhile attention was given to the more substantial
resource of a loan. At the end of September the secretary
of the treasury disappeared mysteriously from his accustomed
haunts, and to Folk's acute distress of mind wandered for
more than two weeks in the perilous jungle of Wall Street.
His experiences there were in fact rather hard. The capitalists
looked with favor on the project of a loan and had plenty of
money, but believing the government would require a large
amount, and therefore that a loan made now would be likely
to depreciate, as well as actuated by their characteristic spirit
of thrift they stood out for six per cent. The New York
and Boston banks, it was thought at the White House, were
in league against the administration. Besides, the public
had little information about the way money was being spent,
and felt apprehensive of extravagance and a huge debt. Many
believed the war had cost half a million each day. Not a few
distrusted Walker. He had engineered Mississippi into bank-
ruptcy, and had become insolvent personally. In the Senate
his reputation had been that of a needy adventurer, intensely
ambitious, clever in debate and intrigue, but not of solid ability,
and especially not a financier. At present nobody denied his
real talents or his extreme devotion to work, but he was charged
with inaccuracy and with sophistical reasoning. 13
Apparently five and two fifths per cent was all he felt ready
to offer, and special reasons could be given for halting there,
since it was feared that issuing a six per cent loan at par would
260 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
injure the United States sixes, now held at 106, and also the
credit of the government. But finally, with the approval of
the President and the Cabinet, he advertised, October 30,
for bids on a five million loan for ten years at six per cent.
November 12 the -tenders were opened. For a small fraction
of the amount a slight premium was offered, and for the rest
par. No doubt the rate, in comparison with European stand-
ards, had to be regarded as high, but on 'the other hand this
was our first specie loan, and was said to be the only war loan
ever taken without a discount. 13
Plainly, however, more needed to be done. It was already
extraordinarily difficult to pay the comparatively small ex-
penses of the war, wrote the British minister at this time.
Congress had not fully provided for even the minimum needs
recognized by the sanguine, if not sophistical, Walker; and
early in December, 1846, his annual report intimated that on
July 1, 1848, with a due allowance for the working capital of
the treasury, there would be a deficit of twenty-three millions.
Apparently a loan was requisite, and he advised making the
term twenty years. Then, with no little anxiety, the ad-
ministration waited. At the end of December Bancroft wrote
privately, "If we can raise the ways and means," we can sur-
mount the other difficulties. On the eleventh of January,
1847, a bill virtually embodying Walker's recommendations
was thrown into the House, and a long, acrimonious debate
ensued. The treasury "languishes," announced the organ of
the government; needed volunteers could not be called out;
but the legislators had irrepressible things to say. At length,
however, on January 28 the bill providing $23,000,000 became
a law. Though it primarily contemplated treasury notes,
it permitted the Executive liberty of action ; and a large
amount of six per cent bonds were sold. 14
But Polk was by no means out of trouble now. Walker's
estimate made no mention of great outstanding purchases,
for which the contractors had not yet sent in their accounts.
Not only the customs duties but the sales of public lands were
coming far short of his expectations. No allowance appeared
to be made for the effect of bounty land scrip that was likely
to reduce them still more. The Vera Cruz expedition and a
possible march to the enemy's capital were in view. Indeed,
A TARIFF FOR MEXICAN PORTS 261
the real war had only begun. Besides, the temper of Congress
had already threatened trouble and made it. Not only to
ensure additional revenue in general, but in particular it
would seem to strengthen the credit of the government by
showing how the interest on its obligations would be taken care
of, the Secretary brought up again the suggestion of his annual
report, that a duty of twenty-five per cent should be placed
on tea and coffee, which although the free list had been re-
stricted in the tariff of 1846 had been left untaxed. In fact
it had been intimated by him at New York, even if not actually
promised, that such a step would be taken ; and a few days
before Christmas, 1846, he notified the committee on ways and
means that probably without this assistance a satisfactory
loan could not be made. Yet Congress rejected the proposi-
tion by a great majority. 15
A plan of Benton's also to grade the public lands on the
basis of their attractiveness, and reduce prices accordingly -
which would have increased the income of the government,
failed to pass, though endorsed by Polk, Walker and the gen-
eral land commissioner. Pessimists were happy. With Polk,
the war, the weather, the sub-treasuries "and perhaps the
Devil" to struggle against, wrote a correspondent of Martin
Van Buren, soon not an ingot would be "left standing," and
there was "no calculating, no prophesying" what would be-
come of the nation. 15
Apparently to offset the failure of the tea and coffee tax,
Walker's active brain produced another scheme, designed not
only to bring in revenue and reassure the capitalists, but also
to please the shipping men of the United States and neutral
countries. This was to open the Mexican ports controlled by
us, and permit merchandise to enter there under a moderate
scale of duties. During March, 1847, assisted by Senator
Benton and the attorney general, Polk satisfied himself that
under his powers as commander-in-chief he could impose and
collect the duties as military contributions, for by the right of
conquest he could either exclude commerce or admit it on his
own terms, and contributions were legitimate under the laws
of war. Said Vattel, "A nation [at war] on every opportunity
lays its hands on the enemy's goods, appropriates them to itself,
and thereby, besides weakening the adversary, strengthens
262 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
itself, and at least in part, procures an indemnification, an
equivalent, either for the very cause of the war, or for the
expences and losses resulting from it" ; and a low scale of duties
was an extremely mild application of this principle. 16
Moreover, it was quite as legitimate under our Constitution
also, though not expressly mentioned, as to blockade or bom-
bard Vera Cruz, respecting which the organic law was equally
silent. Indeed, to have left the ports wide open or allowed the
high Mexican tariff to remain in force would, in addition to
being harmful to us, have required as great an exercise of
authority. Finally, Scott and some of our naval commanders,
moved by the evident proprieties of the situation, fixed duties
and used the proceeds at their discretion, and it was mani-
festly better to arrange the business in a uniform, well-consid-
ered manner. 16
It might have been expected that substantially either our
own or the Mexican tariff would be applied, but neither would
have answered. Mexican imports were very different from
ours ; specific, not ad valorem, duties had been customary there ;
and competent appraisers could not be found. On the other
hand the unreasonable Mexican duties, besides preventing
commerce to a large extent, encouraged fraud and smuggling.
In March, 1847, therefore, a special tariff was prepared by
Walker, lowering the Mexican duties on imports more than
one half, and substituting for all port dues and charges a uni-
form tax of one dollar per ton ; and on March 31 Polk ordered
the system to be put in force. Mexico retorted that goods
paying the American duties especially goods prohibited by
her laws would be confiscated, and this attitude caused
some uneasiness in France; but it seemed fairly evident that
the United States would protect neutrals accepting our policy,
and not only the foreign merchants in Mexico but the neutral
governments felt highly pleased with our course. 17
The authorities at Washington, however, did not rejoice as
much. The real difficulty lay, not in landing merchandise
at the ports, but in placing it before Mexican customers, and
comparatively few of the latter could be reached. Persevering
efforts were made to solve the problem on both coasts. Some-
times, for reasons not fully understood, the Mexican govern-
ment issued licenses for the passage of goods to the interior,
GOOD FORTUNE HELPS US 263
and for a consideration local authorities in the northeast did
the same ; but even these documents were not always valid
against officials and military men whose "patriotism" had not
been "sweetened." European merchants could see this diffi-
culty. Up to October 20, 1847, only one small cargo from that
direction entered the harbor of Vera Cruz, and Walker admitted
privately that a very small part of the few imports was dis-
posed of for consumption beyond the coast. In a word, this
vaunted plan gave no substantial help on the problem of sup-
porting the war. 18
But by this time the good luck which has been supposed to
keep an eye on the United States of America had intervened.
In 1846 came the great Irish famine. British provision laws
were suspended. Faced with starvation people cared little
what they paid, if they could obtain food. Our agricultural
products, which had fallen heavily in market value since Octo-
ber 1, 1845, rose with astonishing buoyancy. Western grain
that had scarcely been worth transporting frequently not
worth it became precious. A ship could earn thirty per
cent of her cost in one round trip, yet hardly enough vessels
could be found. So abrupt was the turn that a financial
editor who had predicted on December 17, 1846, a speedy
return to the distress of 1837, declared on January 30, 1847,
"We are on the high road to an unprecedented prosperity."
The abolition of the British corn laws ensured our farmers not
only temporary relief but a permanent market. Cotton, too,
and even cotton goods were in active demand abroad; and
a famine in Germany gave us additional support. 19
Every vessel from the other side brought more of the specie
that had been expected to disappear from circulation here.
Between the first of January and the middle of July, 1847,
approximately twenty-four millions came in, besides about
five millions in the pockets of immigrants. Everybody who
did anything or had anything shared in the general increase
of wealth. Hoarding went out of fashion. All were spenders.
In particular, a craze for dress demanded great quantities of
European fabrics. The warehousing plan also stimulated
importation. For the quarter ending with September, 1847,
the customs duties amounted to more than eleven millions
almost half the total of the preceding year and for the week
264 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
ending with October 1 they were nearly double those of the
corresponding week in 1846. In a word, gold rained upon us ;
the languishing treasury revived ; and the credit of the govern-
ment revived with it. Later, in the autumn of 1847, to be sure,
the financial downpour abated, but it had already done its
work. The ship of state rode now beyond the bar. 19
Yet Polk still had to cope with difficulties. Early in Decem-
ber, 1847, when Congress assembled, he found it necessary to
present large estimates and to admit that a deficit of nearly
sixteen millions was to be expected by July 1, 1848 ; and there
seemed to be little hope that Congress would provide addi-
tional revenue. Borrowing was inevitable, and Walker's
report of December 8 proposed a loan of $18,500,000. Noth-
ing was done, however. The banks of New York and Boston
endeavored to force upon the government a fiscal policy more
acceptable to them, and a strong element in Congress, of which
more will be heard in the next chapter, not only entertained
a similar desire, but seemed willing to impair the credit of the
administration. At length, on the nineteenth of January,
1848, a bill was introduced, and after a further delay another
long debate opened. "How is the loan bill getting on, Sir?"
inquired a newspaper correspondent of a Representative of
the People after it had been on the tapis for about a month.
"Oh, they are spouting away, spouting away, Sir," was the
careless reply. But on the last day of March a six per cent,
loan of $16,000,000 was authorized on substantially the same
basis as the previous loans. The treaty of peace had been
signed on February 2, and the new bonds brought a premium
rising in some instances to $4.05 on a hundred. 20
In the same report (December, 1847) Walker announced,
though evidently a little chastened in spirit, that relief would
soon come from Mexico. What he chiefly counted upon at
this time, however, was not customs duties. As early as the
nineteenth of September, 1846, Polk, justly offended by the
enemy's disdainful treatment of our olive branch, decided that
instead of endeavoring longer to conciliate the Mexicans by
paying liberally for supplies, we should bring them to terms
by levying contributions or taking needed articles without
compensation, and this course was promptly recommended to
General Taylor ; but he replied, as we have seen, that such a
THE MEXICANS TAXED 265
policy was impracticable. Shortly after the capture of Vera
Cruz General Scott received instructions of the same tenor,
and he made a similar reply. Early in the autumn of 1847,
however, as Mexico had again rejected the olive branch, this
change of system was pressed upon Scott with fresh urgency,
and before long explicit orders to make all the revenues and
resources of Mexico available, as far as they could be,
followed. 21
Scott, however, knowing the laws of war and the wishes of
his government, began operations without waiting for these
later instructions. Almost immediately after entering the
capital he laid upon it an assessment of $150,000, and set on
foot an examination into the general question of drawing
revenues from the country, which eventually showed that nearly
twenty-three millions a year could theoretically be collected,
should we take possession of the whole territory. November
25, he directed that no rent should be paid for houses and quar-
ters except so far as contracts existed. About three weeks
later, notice was given that in the districts held by the Amer-
icans all the taxes and dues previously paid to the Mexican
government would be required of the authorities for the sup-
port of our army ; and at the end of December an assessment
equal to four times the direct taxes paid in 1843 was laid upon
the states. Scott's action was of course taken by Wool, now
commanding in the northeast, as a pattern. 22
But again Walker's hopes were disappointed. The most im-
portant of the monopolies, tobacco, had to be given up because
the American product could not be excluded, and for adminis-
trative reasons the other monopolies also were surrendered.
Owing to the dangers of waste, corruption, extortion and resent-
ment, the business of collecting taxes had to be entrusted to
the state authorities, and they possessed wonderful dexterity
in the arts of evasion. State assessments were actually made
on Mexico and Vera Cruz only. The owners of occupied build-
ings were in many cases friends, and could not well be deprived
of their rents. Contracts or agreements that stood in the way
had to be respected. Gold and silver were clandestinely ex-
ported. Smuggling across the northern border could not be
stopped. Brigands exacted their toll. The time required
for investigation and planning, and in certain instances for
266 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
correspondence with our government, militated against prompt
action. We strongly desired to settle with Mexico and evacuate
the country, and hence especially after the peace negotia-
tions began it would not have been wise to run the risk of
exasperating the nation for the sake of a few dollars. In short
the net proceeds, including $106,928 turned in by naval officers,
were only $3,935,676. 23
Some of this money went directly to supply needs of the army
and navy, but by far the greater part of those needs had to be
met in other ways. During the first nine months of 1847, it
was figured that the United States exported more than $12,000,000
in specie to Mexico. Many drafts on the principal American
cities were sold there, and those on the quartermasters at New
Orleans, Philadelphia, Washington and New York amounted
to nearly $8,000,000 before December, 1847. Payments were
also made in the United States on the certificates of officers
acting in the field ; and about the first of August, 1847, Bel-
mont, the New York agent of the Rothschilds, arranged with
our administration to place funds in the hands of any pay-
master or quartermaster named by Scott. In general the
large financial operations made necessary by the transfers of
money were skilfully, honestly and safely conducted. Some
$24,000,000 were distributed by the pay department through
its thirty-five officers, for instance, and nothing was lost by
accident, robbery, theft or capture. 24
The total money cost of the war on the American side has
been given at very low and at very high amounts, and none of
the estimates inspires much confidence. The excess expendi-
tures of the army and navy appear to have been $63,605,621 ;
of which $49,000,000 were raised by selling bonds and treasury
notes, and were substantially added to the national debt.
But these figures by no means answer the question. To the
apparent cost we must add twelve millions paid later to Mexico,
the American claims of which we relieved her, the war expenses
of the treasury department, bounty lands, pensions, valid
claims for damages, and other liabilities of many kinds gradu-
ally discharged after peace returned ; and from the total must
be subtracted the bonds and treasury notes then available for
issue and the actual worth of ships, ordnance and other materials
required for the war and left over. Evidently it is not feasible
THE COST OF THE WAR 267
to reach a satisfactory conclusion, but as a very bold guess
one may suggest a hundred millions. 25
Even were that a close estimate, however, it would mean
little. On the one hand lives, physical and mental sufferings,
personal losses of every description, much national obloquy
and a thousand minor factors would need to be considered, and
on the other our gain in territory, in recognized power, in mili-
tary and naval efficiency, in national self-consciousness and in
particulars not so obvious. One thing, however, is clear. The
war cost far less money than its opponents' had expected.
Webster solemnly predicted in December, 1846, that should it
end the following spring, our debt would be a hundred millions,
but on the first of July, 1848, the debt was less than sixty-six
millions. 26
XXXIV
THE WAR IN AMERICAN POLITICS
1846-1848
IN Mexico the war had far more intimate relations with poli-
tics than it had in our own country. Here invading troops did
not scatter our civil authorities, Presidents did not rise and
fall, cabinets did not organize and melt away, revolutions and
revolts did not hover continually at the door. Every part of
the country contributed to the result. Supplies were voted,
and troops assembled according to law. We have there-
fore studied Mexican politics in connection with events as
these occurred, and reserved American politics to be surveyed
more comprehensively ; but this does not imply any lack of
significance in the second topic. 1
At first the war seemed extremely popular. The rush to
volunteer showed that. A tone of opposition prevailed in New
England, but it was quiet hardly perceptible. May 21,50,000
people gathered in front of the city hall at New York and called
for vigorous measures. Hostilities appeared to be regarded by
all as a just punishment for the long series of Mexican insults,
barbarities and outrages. The country called; patriotism
responded, and other considerations helped. Democratic poli-
ticians believed their party would gain prestige and strength.
A great and common purpose would bind it firmly together.
Many offices and appointments would follow, and almost every-
body would gain some profit in a business way. Taylor's "vic-
tories" on the Rio Grande intensified the enthusiasm. "Upon
the duties which the present crisis invoked," exclaimed the
Philadelphia North American, "our country has but one heart,"
and an invasion of the enemy's territory "will meet the appro-
bation of the entire American public." Accordingly the first
session of the Twenty-ninth Congress pushed its work far into
the summer of 1846 even after 'Senator Fairfield wrote, "All
268
THE WAR SOON UNPOPULAR 269
nature [is] hissing" and embodied the government's policy
in laws. 2
But this mood changed surprisingly. When Congress ad-
journed, it was in bad humor, and the country sympathized
with it. News of the occupation of California produced little
enthusiasm, for it had been expected. The fighting at Mon-
terey excited interest, but it was followed at once by a long
armistice, and it had no permanent effect on the downward
course of public sentiment. Instead of glorying in the war, the
Democrats now defended it feebly, and a great many regarded
it as a grave political blunder. The fall Congressional elec-
tions went strongly against them. Every reverse could be ex-
plained, of course in Pennsylvania a heavy storm, in New
York the opposition of "every most pestilential and reckless form
of law-hating faction," apathy here, lack of organization there
but the National Intelligencer, chief organ of the Whigs, brushed
explanations aside, and coldly remarked, "We presume that our
President and his Cabinet are by this time convinced that they
have forfeited the public confidence the confidence, that is,
of their own party ; that of the other they never possessed";
and by mid-winter the political outlook for the war seemed ex-
tremely dark. 3
The reasons for this change were complex and interesting.
The people Democrats and Whigs alike knew they did not
want Polk for chief executive. To the millions demanding,
"Who is James K. Polk?" the answer had been given, "He is
President of the United States"; but this excellent retort si-
lenced instead of satisfying. Disagreeable ideas prevailed re-
garding the methods of his nomination and his election. Many
viewed him as an Accident, an Unpleasant Surprise, a Surrepti-
tious Incumbent ; and his unpopularity not only was a disad-
vantage in itself, but colored the interpretation placed upon
everything he did or said. 4
Besides this initial difficulty, he was not considered a
large enough man for the place, and the Cabinet seemed too
much of a piece with him in that respect. The public did not
hear Polk's confidential declaration, "I intend to be myself
President of the United States." They were not aware that he
risked a great deal to avoid having Calhoun and Flagg, a New
York man of unusual ability, in his official family. But they
270 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
felt like the Washington correspondent of the Boston Atlas, who
said, They are "little fellows," and "were they all thrown in
a bag together, it would make little difference which came out
first"; and they suspected that Polk aimed to eliminate all
possible competitors. Many, indeed, believed it should be so.
"Who would not regret/' asked Senator Mangum, "to see the
choice of this great and free people thrown into shadow by over-
topping talent?" The President was inaugurated on a cold,
rainy, cheerless day, and sentiment, among those who counted,
resembled the weather. 4
The policy of the administration confirmed these impressions.
Polk had no great ideas, no inspiring imagination, no kindling
enthusiasm, no moving eloquence, no contagious humor, no
winning personality. He was not exactly a "burning bush"
of patriotism, hallowing the ground about him, and forcing men
to put off their grimy, everyday shoes of selfish designs. To
sway the nation or even the Democrats in any grand way lay
beyond him. He was a partisan, to be sure, but without a party.
His trumpet note has shed "American blood upon the Ameri-
can soil " came from a newspaper. Almost his only resource,
therefore, was patronage, and the business of trading offices
for support is essentially a mean one. It makes intrigue a pro-
fession, creates many enemies while it creates few friends and
renders confidence well-nigh impossible. Without calling the
President " mendacious," one can understand how J. K. Paulding
came to say, that he possessed no honesty of purpose, no frank-
ness of heart. Tossing out a plump lie now and then would
have given less offence than continual secretiveness and evasion
caused. Polk described the cunning Pillow as "one of the
shrewdest men you ever knew." That gave Polk's measure,
and political necessities developed his natural disposition.
" This little mole," Blair called him. Blair was prejudiced ; but
for a different bete noire he would have chosen a different
name. 5
New York state affairs had an especially bad effect on Polk's
reputation and influence. Knowing that he had played the part
of Jacob, the Supplanter, to Van Buren's Esau at the Baltimore
convention, and not expecting to be forgiven, Polk probably
felt thoroughly distrustful of the Locofocos from the beginning.
Silas Wright's declining positively to run for the Vice Presidency
POLK DISLIKED 271
on his ticket doubtless gave offence. His bad faith in refusing
to accept Flagg, apparently to save himself from being over-
shadowed, after virtually agreeing to do it, seemed inexcusable.
His taking Marcy into the Cabinet at the behest of an active but
rather unscrupulous remnant of the "irregular" Conservatives
heightened the dissatisfaction of the substantial elements. The
defeat of the New York Democrats in the fall elections of 1846,
which was charged by the regulars to treachery on the part of
the Conservatives, created still further trouble. Making fac-
tional appointments, and especially choosing for a high post at
New York City a "poor, stupid dutchman by the name of
Bouck," as an extremist called him, seemed to the faithful nothing
less than party treason. In thus alienating the ablest and best
Democrats of the state, who were trusted and admired by the
party as a whole, and supporting a faction that had no national
standing, the President made a great mistake. He " has proved
himself to be a poor devil/' said one of Van Buren's corre-
spondents ; even Tyler's name was less execrated than " Jim
Polk's," wrote one of Judge McLean's ; and for thus weakening
the Democrats in the Empire State, he was naturally blamed in
all quarters. 6
A variety of minor yet serious complaints helped fill up the
measure. Polk was equally anxious and unable to harmonize
the party, and as he tried to satisfy clamorous malcontents, it
came to be said that he was always ready to hang an old friend
for the sake of gaining two new ones. Ranking low in ability
to judge of character, enjoying but a limited acquaintance, and
placing an unreasonable value upon experience in Congress, he
too often appointed unfit men when he meant well, or put the
right men into the wrong places. Naturally office-seekers
dogged his footsteps, and numberless disappointed aspirants
bore grudges deadlier than stilettos. His wriggling out of em-
phatic declarations in favor of our broad Oregon claims excited
profound wrath in the west, and made a bad impression in other
sections. Senator Hannegan proclaimed that if the President
accepted the line of forty-nine degrees, he would be consigned to
"a damnation so deep that the hand of resurrection" would
never be able to "drag him forth" ; and he did accept it. 7
The veto of a river and harbor bill that offered captivating
opportunities for looting the treasury brought upon him the
272 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
woes of Tyler. The government, said the aggrieved, "is fast
degenerating into a mere quadrennial elective despotism";
Polk " wants the purse of the nation for his own schemes of presi-
dential ambition." Finally, the apparent hampering of Taylor
and Scott, and the playing off of the one against the other seemed
to a multitude of citizens unworthy of a President, unpatriotic
and mean; and then partisans accused him of letting Whig
generals have all the glory, lest a Democratic warrior should gain
the Presidential nomination in 1848. Truly, "deep and dismal
was the ditch," as B. F. Butler said, into which Polk fell. 7
Moreover a whole sheaf of arrows, not directly aimed at him,
struck his administration. The annexation of Texas rankled
still in many bosoms, and the extremists were implacable.
Lowell did not shrink from recommending secession :
" Ef I'd my way I would ruther
We should go to work an' part,
They take one way, we take t'other,
Guess it wouldn't break my heart. "
John Quincy Adams contemplated the same extreme remedy,
and Giddings went so far as to write, " Ohio is now a party to no
subsisting Union." Those opposed to the measure felt hostile
to the President who had favored and consummated it; the
great number whose theory had been that it would not lead to
war felt obliged to argue now that Polk had brought about a
conflict unnecessarily; and everything in our relations with
Mexico was viewed through a fog of prejudices and animosities
rising from that gory political battlefield. Not a few appoint-
ments to high military positions had seemed to rest on political
expediency, and the battles near the Rio Grande had been fol-
lowed by a long period of inactivity, charged by many to the gov-
ernment. Volunteers not accepted for the war had remarks to
make, and troops returning from the front often used expres-
sions hardly coherent enough to be termed remarks. The six-
months men called out by Gaines belonged in the latter class ;
and although Marcy did nothing respecting them save to obey
the plain requirement of the law, citizens of Louisiana applied
language to him that might have kindled sympathy for Judas
Iscariot. 8
The government's fiscal system, though of course accepted by
DENUNCIATIONS OF THE WAR 273
many, excited sharp resentment. Overwhelming the country all
at once with such a combination of new laws a warehouse act,
a sub-treasury bill and a "free-trade" tariff was denounced
as an unspeakable outrage, and each of those measures amounted
in the opinion of many to a crime. Gideon Welles thought the
idea of reducing our tariff during the war an "insane project" ;
and the measure as framed, a compromise between theory and
expediency, satisfied hardly any one. Real free-traders com-
plained because their principles had been sacrificed, and the New
Englanders because those principles had not been sacrificed
enough. The iron and coal state raged and wept by turns :
she had been betrayed, and "her groans were music" to the
arrogant low-tariff section cherished by the government. Only
corruption and intimidation could have carried such a monstros-
ity through Congress; and, worse yet, "Sir Robert Walker"
had been truckling to England. "British all over," scribbled
the American Sentinel on the warehousing system; and the
tariff was trailed to a British lair packed with British statesmen,
British capitalists, British manufacturers and British merchants.
To please them our wheels of production were to stop, our
banks close, and the industrious North fall in despair at the
feet of an implacable South. "'To your tents, O Israel!"
cried the National Intelligencer. 9
In countless eyes the war itself soon lost its glamour. Imag-
ining that our advance to the Rio Grande had been the cause
of it, many felt bound to denounce it as unauthorized, unconsti-
tutional, unjust, aggressive ; and not a few, in dense ignorance
of the history, character and views of the Mexicans, thought, ./ ^
like Professor Kent of Harvard University, that it was "de- ^ * _^
moniacal" to make war upon those poor innocents, as if jhey
had not been shooting one another pretty continuously and also
aching to shoot us. Not reflecting that nations begin to think
olf indemnities as soon, at least, as they begin to fight, and that
legitimate advantages might accrue from occupying Mexican
territory, people viewed suspiciously the operations of Taylor,
Wool, Kearny, Stockton and Stevenson, threw up their hands,
and exclaimed, "Conquest!" as if the ground they stood upon
and half the world besides had not been gained by the sword.
"Cormorants of territory!" hissed a Thersites. "Sages and
Heroes of the Revolution, lo, the consummation of your labors !"
VOL. II T
7
274 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
wailed a Cassandra ; Mexico is to be absorbed, and " the original,
moving, burning stimulus" of the crime is the wish to manufac-
ture glory for Polk, and gratify him with a second term. To
be sure, the nation had officially endorsed the war ; but multi-
tudes were eager to have the nation disgraced, if they could only
disgrace Polk. 10
Toward the future as well as the past frowned the critics of
the administration. Territory seemed likely to be acquired, and
it was feared that slavery would plant its black hoof upon the
soil. In Massachusetts a group of young men, who doubtless
believed in freedom unselfishly, believed also that it was the
coming idea, and might carry them ahead of such conserva-
ative leaders as Webster and Winthrop. Sumner was one of
these; and he, without offering proof that slavery stood
behind the war, pushed through the legislature some blood-
curdling resolutions against the "gigantic crime"; while
Lowell, not stopping to ascertain whether negro servitude
could thrive on the Pacific, sounded an appeal to sectional
feelings :
"They jest want this Californy
So's to lug new slave-states in
To abuse ye, an' to scorn ye,
And to plunder ye like sin. " u
From the increased political power of the South, northern
agriculture, commerce and manufactures would suffer. New,
sparsely settled states would have the same authority in the
Senate as Massachusetts or Pennsylvania. The augmenting
of Western strength would prove an injury to older sections.
New Orleans would gain ground financially and commercially
at the expense of New York. Annexing new territory would
lessen the value of lands already in the Union. The war would
increase the power of the Executive, and bring home an army
of "heroes" to monopolize the offices. It was most likely to
be interminable and costly, for in the autumn of 1846 Mexico
showed no signs of begging for peace and Taylor no signs of ac-
complishing anything decisive. Privateers might ruin our com-
merce, and the blockade might lead to European interference.
The nation, debased by dwelling upon scenes of devastation and
violence, and by the absorption of aliens low in the scale of hu-
manity, would become barbarous, cruel, rapacious, bloodthirsty.
POLICY OF THE WHIGS 275
Taxes, debt, waste of public funds, corrupt elections, a great
standing army, despotism, fanaticism, civil war, disunion, the
reprobation of mankind and the retribution of heaven would
follow. 11
Under these circumstances the gyrations and contortions of
Whig politics, viewed as a whole, were curious to observe. At
first the party joined in shouting and voting for stern hostilities.
"Doubt, division, reproach will be unknown/' announced the
North American. But the Whigs presently saw, as the New
York Tribune pointed out, that a full share of the burden would
be theirs, while most of the glory and profit would fall to the
other side. Moreover, these criticisms of Polk and the war, even
when not suggested by the Whigs, seemed like yellow fields of
ripening party advantage. Very soon, therefore, they withdrew
to a respectable, intrenched position : they would support the
war, but on its conclusion Polk and the Democrats would be
called to a strict account. "I have no doubt we shall
much Capital out of it," wrote a Whig Congressman.
ently, however, it looked as if the conclusion of the war might
lie beyond the next Presidential election, and most of the party
sallied forth impatiently, sickle in hand. 12
Castigating Polk was the most obvious opportunity for the
harvesters, and they used it with due zeal. Some of the jibes
were good-natured. Playing on the powers legally his, the
National Intelligencer happily exclaimed, "Here, there, every-
where at once, civil, military, judicial and executive, dove of
peace, thunderbolt of war, and a perfect serpent of diplomacy,
who was ever so various or so amazing?" Bracketing the
President of the United States with a famous dwarf of the day
as "Tom Thumb's cousin, Jim Thumb," was another merry as
well as able fling. To remark, however, when he sent in a Mes-
sage, that he came " puffing and blowing into Congress," went
a trifle too far, perhaps ; and other pleasantries exposed them-
selves distinctly to that criticism. The Boston Atlas described
the war Message as "perfectly characteristic of its author;
weak, wheedling and sneaking," while some thought it better
to sail on the other tack, and picture "His High Mightiness,"
the arrogant, domineering tyrant of the White House, as plant-
ing "his foot upon the charter of our liberties." 13
Despatching Taylor to the Rio Grande was called "a well-
276 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
nigh fatal blunder," even though suggested by the "demon,"
who was commonly thought rather shrewd. Letting Santa Anna
go back to Mexico seemed to different Whigs like treason,
treachery, folly and idiocy. Polk " takes his ease on some sixty-
eight dollars per day," while the soldiers he has driven to the
field subsist on fare that "his very slaves would loathe/' the
Whig Almanac luckily discovered. Bribery, duplicity, false-
hood, imbecility, cowardice and infamy were a few of the other
good things found in the President's conduct; and the chief
Whig organ undertook to lay him finally at rest on the greensward
in this elegant fashion : " Why, the very savage of the court-
yard in other times that most brutal of mankind, the bully
of the bailiwick, who chewed up an ear or nose, or scooped out
with thumb a prostrate adversary's eye was generous in
comparison." 13
In attempting more serious criticism the Whigs met with em-
barrassments. The majority of them, whose argument had
been that immediate annexation of Texas would necessarily
mean war, could not with inward peace declare that Polk had
brought on the war by sending Taylor to the Rio Grande ; and
the great number whose contention had been that Mexico still
owned Texas could not well deny that annexing her province by
an Act of Congress, which amounted on their theory to a consti-
tutional declaration of war, had created a state of things which
made it entirely proper for Polk to send Taylor there. "Swin-
dlers of 1844, with your ' peaceable annexation,' do not skulk!
Here is the fruit of your doings ! Look it in the face ! ' ' exclaimed
the New York Tribune when the war bill passed, but it soon
appeared more tactful to ignore this aspect of the matter. 14
Other embarrassments remained, however. It was very
well for northern Whigs to indulge in what Carlyle might
have called a "running shriek" against "a pro-slavery war,"
but they were cautioned to let no echoes of it cross the
Potomac. When a Senator greeted the war Message by saying
he would later read the documents that accompanied it, and
for the present would merely observe that Polk's course was
"utterly unjustifiable," Ritchie paraphrased Master Dogberry
at him : " By virtue of mine office I do suspect thee to be a
thief." While some papers denounced the government for
not settling with Mexico by negotiation, others admitted that
EMBARRASSMENTS OF THE WHIGS 277
Mexico had refused to treat. When Delano announced for the
sake of buncombe that he was " ready to go shoulder to shoulder
with all those who supported the honor of the country," Thur-
man replied that it seemed a strange method of supporting one's
country, to declare like Delano, after war had begun, when it
existed both in law and in fact, that it was "illegal, unright-
eous, and damnable." Abraham Lincoln, wishing to distin-
guish himself before the home folks, did this feat in the House
by revealing, in a manner suited to his years, that since Mexico
had exercised jurisdiction on the northern bank of the Rio
Grande, the first American blood must have been shed on
Mexican, not American, soil ; but unhappily the fact remained
that Connecticut had for some time exercised effective juris-
diction over northeastern Pennsylvania, yet did not own the
territory. 15
Those who raved against Polk and his " tribe" for driving the
war bill through Congress had to face Winthrop and a galaxy of
other Whigs, who admitted that war did already exist. Con-
gressmen denouncing the Executive for sending Taylor to the
Rio Grande were unable to deny that notice of his march from
Corpus Christi had been given on the floor of the House (March
23) long before the outbreak of hostilities, and nothing had been
done about it; that on May 12 Whigs of the Senate, led by
Crittenden, had recognized that American territory extended to
the Rio Grande ; and that after the army could safely have with-
drawn from that vicinity no serious attempt had been made to
bring about its recall. Partisans of the unoffending Mexicans were
startled to hear the impeccable Boston Atlas confess in a moment
of candor : " The conduct of that government towards us has
been such as might have justified the extreme resort to war" ;
and those eager to berate Polk for unconstitutional aggressive-
ness had to digest a similar lapse on the part of the National
Intelligencer, which conceded that Congress had thrown round
him a mantle of indemnity by a vote " implying confidence in the
rectitude of the President in beginning this war." 16
While Polk was roundly taken to task for appointing so many
Democratic generals, Whig journals boasted that most of the
leading officers belonged to their party. The military operations
afforded numerous opportunities for invectives against the ad-
ministration, but ere long a number of the invectives came
278 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
home to stay. Taylor, it appeared, had recommended the ad-
vance to the Rio Grande ; he protested against embarrassing the
prosecution of the war by discussing its genesis ; and the small-
ness of his army at the critical time, his waiting so long after the
occupation of Matamoros, the terms given at Monterey, his
peril at Buena Vista, Kearny's off-hand annexation of New
Mexico, Scott's discharging volunteers after the battle of Cerro
Gordo, and his famous Jalapa proclamation, all brought up
against the administration, proved in every case chargeable to
the Whig commanders. 16
Orators caused as much pain as generals, perhaps. " Black
Tom" Corwin's brilliant advice that American soldiers in Mex-
ico should be welcomed to hospitable graves, though it gained
high rank in the nightmare school of literature, overshot the
mark. It scandalized the nation. It staggered patriotism.
It shocked humanity. Most of all it infuriated the troops,
battling for their country in a foreign land. The speech
arrived at Buena Vista soon after the struggle with Santa Anna.
A rude effigy of Corwin was made up of the vilest materials,
dressed in a Mexican uniform and burned ; and over the ashes
these lines were posted up :
" Old Tom Corwin is dead and here he lies ;
Nobody's sorry and nobody cries ;
Where he's gone and how he fares,
Nobody knows and nobody cares."
The soldiers had friends at home, and of course made their sen-
timents known. The speech sounded the knell of its author's
great political hopes; and there is reason to believe that its
reception frightened into dumbness a number of his colleagues,
who had arranged to follow his lead. 17
But other styles of oratorical attack were still feasible. Just
before Congress met in December, 1846, the Whigs hung out at
the Chinese Museum, Philadelphia, their Great Blue Light. In
other words a powerful orator, a powerful lawyer, a powerful
statesman Daniel Webster by name after studying on the
problem for half a year, undertook, if one may quote an admirer,
to "knock the sand" from under the government. Hour after
hour he talked on, till he mortgaged fourteen columns of the
United States Gazette, and the reporters fled ; but he came far
short of making out a case. Other efforts of his proved no
WHIG ORATORS 279
more successful. Before the Whig convention at Springfield he
argued in a tedious, prosy, court-room style. This is "a war
of pretexts" three of them, he asserted : first, that Mexico
invaded American territory ; secondly, that she would not re-
ceive Slidell ; and thirdly, that she would not pay our claims.
Did Webster fail to see that a pasus belli recognized almost
unanimously by our Executive and Congress was for this country
at least more than a "pretext"? Did he fail to see that his
other "pretexts" had not been offered by Polk as grounds for
passing the war bill ? And how could he say the pretexts were
" all unfounded "? Did he suppose that Mexico had paid our
claims ? Did he suppose that she had welcomed Slidell ? Of
course not ; but he was the attorney of New England Whiggism,
trying to make a good case out of a poor one. 18
His really effective contributions to the polemics consisted,
not of arguments, but of impressive hints : " I am greatly de-
ceived, Mr. President, if we shall not ere long see facts coming
to the light, and circumstances found coinciding and con-
curring, which will fix on the government" its alleged guilt;
and a President bringing on war in the manner charged against
Polk, would commit " an impeachable offence," as if Polk might
have been impeached after Congress had assumed the respon-
sibility for his acts. But unhappily Father Ritchie offered
another citation, "Well, well, we know; or there be, and if
there might; or if we list to speak." 18
And not only did W T ebster disappoint, but he mortified Whig
friends. Texas had been an independent state as early as 1840,
he said ; our annexing it gave Mexico no just ground of com-
plaint ; she was " entirely unreasonable and senseless" in reject-
ing our offer to treat ; if she preferred war to peace we could but
fight; and now the war must be vigorously prosecuted. He
squarely refused to call the invasion of her territory unjust.
He seemed to approve of his son's going to the field in the "un-
holy" cause of his country. He admitted that Whig policy in
Massachusetts was in some respects "quite narrow." "I am
tired and disgusted as much as you possibly can be, with
the fanaticism and narrowness of some of our People," he wrote ;
and no doubt it made him still more tired to hear Lowell's cap-
tivating but wayward muse advise young fellows, on grounds of
personal advantage, to keep out of the army, and suggest that,
280 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
should they get seduced by some "strutting" sergeant into
taking up arms for the country, insubordination and even deser-
sertion would become them.
" Thrash away, you'll hev to rattle
On them kittle-drums o' yourn,
'Taint a knowin' kind o' cattle
That is ketched with mouldy corn." 19
While such were the troubles of waking hours, the bedchamber,
too, of many Whigs had its troubled moments. Ghosts walked.
John Jay, a sincere opponent of our second war against England,
came back, holding out a scroll that bore these words of his,
"As the war has been constitutionally declared, the people are
evidently bound to support it." Came back the Rev. David
Osgood, D.D., of Medford, Massachusetts, with his sermon of
June 27, 1812 : "My mind has been in a constant agony, not so
much at the inevitable loss of our temporal prosperity and hap-
piness, and the complicated miseries of war, as at its guilt, its
outrage against heaven, against all truth, honesty, justice, good-
ness, against all the principles of social happiness. " Came back
another Federalist, the Rev. Elijah Parish, D.D., with a sermon
recommending treason as a pious duty : " New England, if in-
vaded, would be obliged to defend herself. Do you not then
owe it to your children, and owe it to your God, to make
peace for yourselves ?" Unlike Jay, these men appeared to be
unhappy ; and then certain patriots of the Hartford Convention
filed by with averted eyes, each dragging after him a blasted
reputation. 20
In one thing, however, the opponents of the war succeeded.
Going far beyond the limits of reasonable criticism and helpful
suggestions, and indulging in language calculated to dishearten
and hamper the administration, they encouraged the enemy.
It is merely Folk's war, announced the Boston Atlas, quoted in
the Monitor Republicano. Mexico would have disgraced herself
by receiving Slidell, declared the same journal. Her spirit,
proclaimed the National Intelligencer, was fitted to "command
the admiration of all men capable of appreciating the virtue of
courage and fortitude under the most disastrous circumstances."
Severance, a member of Congress, openly applauded her resist-
ance. We cannot beat her without ruining our finances, main-
tained Waddy Thompson. The destruction of her national in-
THE DEMOCRATS IN CONGRESS 281
dependence was "the true issue," one sheet falsely assured her,
as if to whet her sword. It was entirely uncertain, proclaimed
Calhoun in February, 1847, whether our army could reach Mex-
ico City or dictate a peace if it should. She cannot be con-
quered, it was often said. 21
Magazines of epithets and arguments, that became gunpowder
the moment they crossed the Rio Grande, poured from the Whig
presses. Leading papers invoked foreign intervention. The
official journal of the Mexican government offered the thanks
of the nation to Webster for threatening our President with
impeachment. " If there is in the United States a heart worthy
of American liberty, its impulse is to join the Mexicans," ex-
claimed a Boston journal ; " It would be a sad and woeful joy,
but a joy nevertheless, to hear that the hordes under Scott and
Taylor were, every man of them, swept into the next world." No
wonder that Polk dropped a hint about aiding and abetting the
enemy. It was proper. In 1813-14 the National Intelligencer
had stigmatized those who denounced the country's war after
its own present fashion as "traitors in thought and purpose." 21
Early in December, 1846, amidst feelings of depression, dis-
satisfaction with the government and opposition to the war, the
second session of the Twenty-ninth Congress opened. The
Democrats of that body found themselves in a general state
of dissension. At the beginning of the year Marcy had written
privately, "Our noble party [is] on the brink of ruin," and there
it still hung. 22
Van Buren's implacable followers nursed a grudge against
Polk for the intrigues that had led to his nomination ; and the
partisans of Cass nursed one against them for their votes at the
Baltimore convention. New York Barnburners and Old Hun-
kers glared at one another. Calhoun's friends were sour be-
cause of his exclusion from the Cabinet. The old free-traders
cursed Walker in their hearts for stealing their tariff hobby.
The westerners had no thought of forgiving the South for
dropping Oregon, and the South refused to be scared by those
"Big Braggarts" of the west, who seemed to want all the funds
in the treasury for their internal improvements. Many wore
crape and hatchets, one might say, for the river and harbor bill.
Everybody wished to blame somebody for the recent election
returns. Some were quite ready to break openly with the
282 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
administration. The partisans of Buchanan and those of
Dallas marched with daggers drawn. "All around is dis-
sension and distrust. Gloom overspreads the party," wrote
G. W. Thompson of Wheeling. 22
The best of leadership was needed, and it could not be found.
If a person did not understand the situation, he wondered ; if he
did, he wondered more. Nobody credited Polk with possessing
the rod of Moses. Many disliked the man too much to respect
the official. He could inspire neither love nor fear. While at
one end of the avenue sat a party without a President, at the
other sat a President without a party. With a large Democratic
margin in each chamber, he admitted that he was practically in
the minority ; and at first sight this appeared the more surpris-
ing because Polk, knowing Congress and not knowing the coun-
try, labored with his eye on the former. But the explanation
could easily be found. The people were not believed to be
standing behind him. Within a month he was to be rebuffed
three times in the House on important matters during as many
days. One of his favorite measures was to go down amid shouts
of laughter without a single friendly vote. The Cabinet en-
joyed no greater respect. Walker seemed to be regarded as its
leading spirit, but men distrusted his character as much as they
admired his talents and energy. Moreover, in spite of Polk's
determination to shut Presidential aspirants from his council,
both Walker and Buchanan probably felt less interest in the
war than in personal schemes. 23
These circumstances left the party to find such leadership as
it could in Congress, and the leadership it found was a triangular
fight Benton, Cass and Calhoun. Benton had remarkable
powers and seldom failed to be a Democrat, a Senator and a
patriot, but he was egotistical, moody, overbearing, passionate ;
he despised Cass, he more than hated Calhoun, and he treated his
fellow-Democrats in general as minions. Cass, a courtier and
somewhat a scholar, lacked parliamentary experience, drew
more timidity than courage from his Presidential hopes, and
possessed no political convictions to reinforce his talents. Cal-
houn's high character, rare intellectual strength and frank,
affable manners made him personally the most influential man
at the capital ; but his judgment was erratic, and he aimed to
stand aloof, with a following of about four Senators, as a balance-
THE WHIGS IN CONGRESS 283
of-power faction. He was intensely narrow, too. For him there
seemed to be only one region in the world ; only one state in
the south, and only one public man there. Cass was loyal to
the administration, Benton helpful but domineering, and Cal-
houn unfriendly. Not a very firm tripod, this, to support a
government engaged in war. With almost all the Democrats,
politics that is to say, offices held the stage, and country
occupied the background. Dissatisfaction with Polk J s appoint-
ments increased the confusion. Indeed, a " passion " for getting
jobs invaded the sacred halls of legislation, and the President
found not less than twenty men voting against his measures to
avenge personal disappointments. 24
Whig harmony and efficiency were happily not impaired by
these allurements of the fleshpots, for the Executive did not
belong to their party; but their numberless inconsistencies
proved most embarrassing, and the necessity of satisfying
public sentiment, and throwing the responsibility upon the
administration, by voting supplies for - hostilities they de-
nounced, weakened them. No absurdities, however, were too
glaring, no contradictions too thorny for what they termed their
" patriotic sublimity" to ignore or surmount. They denounced
the war enough to incriminate themselves when they supported
it, and they supported it enough to stultify themselves when
they condemned it. Combining the views of several groups, one
discovered a line of policy truly remarkable : the attack upon
Mexico was unconstitutional and wicked, but it should be carried
on ; so let us halt, send an embassy, and proffer again the nego-
tiations that Mexico has repeatedly and recently spurned. 25
The success of the government's military and fiscal policies in
comparison with what had been predicted, and the freedom of
our commerce from Mexican and European molestation were
troublesome facts; but hopes of disaster could still be enter-
tained, and prophecies of woe still be chanted. Constructive
statesmanship, they held, was not their affair. The country's
difficulties occasioned them but slight concern. On that score
their detachment was charming.
"I heard a lion in the lobby roar ;
Say, Mr. Speaker, shall we shut the door
And keep him out, or shall we let him in
And see if we can get him out again ? "
284 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
In fact they found it most agreeable to hear savage growls and
roars, and proclaim that all responsibility belonged to the Demo-
crats. To heighten the turmoil Taylor and Scott were in poli-
tics, where they should not have been, and they had active and
hopeful friends in Congress. Many of the Whigs, indeed, felt
quite ready to put up " Old Zack " for President and " Old Whitey "
for Vice President, if only they could injure Polk and whip the
Democrats thereby; and their opponents, understanding the
game, fended off with no more scruple. 25
The speeches, which ran on almost interminably, were often
able, sometimes eloquent, almost always prejudiced, and quite
always deficient in information. Indeed, a multitude of essen-
tial or important data were wholly unknown. The same facts,
the same errors, the .same arguments, the same epithets, the
same laudable sentiments and the same ignoble aims presented
themselves over and over again. Assertions and denials, proofs
and refutations, accusations and answers, flings and retorts pur-
sued and were pursued. There was what the Public Ledger called
"an everlasting begging of the question" taking premises for
granted and reaching conclusions that any one could accept, if
he pleased. "How glad I shall be when I escape from the
region of speeches and get into the region of [undisguised]
pigs and calves," Senator Fairfield had exclaimed a few months
earlier ; and no doubt many felt in the same way now. 26
Naturally the genesis of the conflict proved to be a favorite
object of contemplation, and almost every complaint against
the administration that wit could invent or stupidity fall into
was brought forward. The fact that the action of the same
Congress at its first session had turned the leaf upon that subject
made no difference. The fact that Polk's newspaper organ chal-
lenged in his name " the most rigorous investigation not at any
future time, but now" - into the Executive's "whole conduct
of our Mexican relations " did not signify. No such investiga-
tion was attempted, but invective continued. The opposition
merely cocked its eye suspiciously at everything, and found
everything iniquitous.
"He must have optics sharp, I ween,
Who sees what is not to be seen, "
but the feat was now accomplished. 27
OPPOSITION SCHEMES 285
For example, Congress had scarcely assembled when attacks
began on the establishment of civil governments in California
and New Mexico. With such unusual strength of vision it
could readily be seen that Polk had been indulging in some vil-
lainy there. For a week or so excitement raged. But after a
while several things appeared. Our only aim had been to miti-
gate the harshness of military rule, about which the kindly
Whigs had felt much exercised. The action complained of had
been taken under a military sanction, and was proper legally
as well as by common sense, for the Executive, as commander-in-
chief , possessed the fullest military authority in regions occupied
by our arms. Harrison, a Whig, had proceeded after a similar
fashion in Canada during the War of 1812; and our Supreme
Court had even endorsed the view of a Whig lawyer, Daniel
Webster by name, that British occupation of Castine, Maine,
during the same war gave England rights of sovereignty there
for the time being. So far as Kearny, a Whig officer, had gone
wrong, the fault had been his own; and, finally, the unholy
word "conquest," which had made the Whigs most unhappy
when applied by Polk to the occupation of New Mexico, was
found to have been applied to the British occupation of Castine
by our own Supreme Court. 28
Behind idealistic declamation lay schemes that were distinctly
practical. It was thought, for example, that if the war could
be made odious, and the government's measures be hindered in
Congress, Polk would have to placate the Whigs by restoring
the protective tariff. This came out beautifully in the treatment
of the proposal to lay a duty on tea and coffee, which even the
National Intelligencer endorsed. A Democrat, "Long John"
Wentworth of Illinois, fully as noted for corporeal as for spiritual
grandeur, and wrathful over Folk's course in the Oregon and
river and harbor affairs, moved the rejection of the plan, and
the Whigs fell into line. 29
It was a noble scene. Regard for the poor man filled the
mouths of the orators. Though his cottons, his sugar and his
salt had been cheerfully made to pay, this duty would be "in-
human," a "tax on poverty," a tax "against the fireside and
against woman," a tax "against the wages of weary labor" to
support the "extravagance" of the "Tiberius" in the White
House. But almost in the same breath came the hint, " If the
286 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
administration needs money, let it re-enact the [protective!
tariff of 1842." "The first condition [of Whig support] is,"
explained the Boston Atlas, "repeal the British Bill. Repeal
the bantling of the House of Lords. Repeal the offspring of
British paternity and precedent." "Should they be in want
of money," proclaimed Webster, " I would say to them restore
what you have destroyed." A fairly definite understanding to
this effect seems to have existed among the Whigs ; malcontents
on the other side gave them help ; and the proposed duty was
rejected in the House by a vote of 115 to 48. Partly for the
same reason troops were not promptly voted. If the govern-
ment does not need money, it does not need men, said the opposi-
sition. Thus the "patriotic sublimity" of the Whigs again
commanded admiration, and some of the Democrats now had
a share in it. 29
Another illustration of sublimity was the "Wilmot Proviso,"
that "firebell in the night," as Alexander H. Stephens called it,
which no doubt some Congressmen accepted at its face value,
and a multitude of honest citizens regarded as a New Command-
ment revealed on a new Sinai. The introduction of this meas-
sure, which prohibited slavery in territory acquired from Mex-
ico, was both unnecessary and unwise. It blocked needed war
legislation, added to the prevailing discord, and weakened the
government in the face of the enemy. 30
But reasons of state outweighed all such trifling considerations.
The northern Whigs, to hurt their opponents and gain recruits,
had for some time been taunting the northern Democrats with
subserviency to the slave power, and it seemed to the latter that
a declaration of independence would help their electioneering.
Van Buren men, especially in the state of New York, desired to
annoy Polk in return for his beating their favorite, and taking an
Old Hunker instead of a Barnburner into the Cabinet. Wilmot,
the only Pennsylvania Democrat that had voted for the new
tariff, did not feel precisely happy about his action, and was
anxious to repel the charge of truckling. His great state and
New England considered the "Southern" tariff an abomination,
and longed to retaliate. Many felt that Walker and Tyler had
used sharp practice in the annexation of Texas for the advan-
tage of their section. The West believed the South had actually
broken a bargain by getting its help in that matter and then
BERRIEN'S PLAN 287
dropping the Oregon issue. A general sense that southern
politicians had been overbearing prevailed above the line.
The fear that southern domination would blight interests dear
to the North exerted its usual strength ; and as a final merit, the
Proviso helped to make the war odious by suggesting that it
aimed to extend slavery. 30
So without regard to the logic of the situation, the welfare of
the country or the needs of our armies it was urged ; and then
Calhoun made a profit in his turn by bringing in a series of pro-
slavery dogmas to rally the southerners under his banner. The
northern Whigs, for reasons just mentioned, and particularly to
save themselves at home, took up the Proviso, and it fared well ;
but after a time the party discovered that favoring it might cost
them several states in the next Presidential contest, and so the
New Commandment was quietly filed away. 30
To replace it, however, calm the "Proviso men," and avert
a party split by preventing the emergence of a slavery issue, the
" patriotic sublimity " of the Whigs evolved another idea. This
was the proposition of Senator Berrien that no territory should
be taken from Mexico, and that while it would be "desirable " to
have the Texas boundary settled and our claims paid, we
should always be ready to make terms that would leave Mexican
honor "inviolate." Here was truly a remarkable proposition.
By voting three millions to facilitate a settlement with Mexico,
in full view of Polk's grounds for proposing that measure, Con-
gress had already committed itself to the principle of acquiring
territory. 31
But other objections to Berrien's plan far outweighed the
point of consistency. If the United States was to decide what
would satisfy Mexican honor, the plan could only have proved
futile even insulting ; and if Mexico herself, it was ludicrous.
Nothing would have satisfied Mexico's ideas of honor except
the evacuation of her territory and the surrender of Texas.
When convinced by the passage of this resolution that she had
nothing to lose in the end, she would have felt still less anxiety
to sacrifice her daily golden egg the money that our armies
paid out by ending the war. Implying that she had done
nothing worthy of stripes, Berrien turned the war Message and
the war bill into falsehoods, and accused the United States of a
horrible crime the crime of warring upon an innocent neighbor
288 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
merely to do havoc. He reduced the minima of our solemn de-
mands to mere desiderata. He represented our expenditures,
our dead and our victories as elements of a senseless farce, and
left us no respectable excuse for having troops in Mexico, except
that we sent them down to scatter silver dollars and study the
fandango. He proposed to make this nation unique in history as
combining the villain, the ruffian, the simpleton and the come-
dian. He attempted to revive the unendurable status quo ante,
leave the United States without indemnity for the past or secur-
ity for the future, stimulate Mexican vanity and self-confidence,
and weaken the prestige of our arms in Europe. In order to
preserve Whig solidarity he aimed to deprive us, not merely
of California, but of self-respect. 31
All this Berrien proposed. Yet Webster, dreaming still
of the Presidency, endorsed the plan. He was put up as a
candidate by the Massachusetts Whigs on that basis ; and his
party, hoping to win spoils in the approaching national election
by this device, quite generally accepted it. Said a correspond-
ent of the National Intelligencer, vouched for by the editor
as a Whig statesman, "No Mexican territory. Let this be the
issue. Let this be the motto inscribed on the Whig banner, and
victory is certain." 31
All these manoeuvres of the Whigs, aided by the Democratic
underworking, resulted, of course, in the protraction of a war
which they posed as hating. The first seven weeks of the
session were almost thrown away. The opposition hung back
from granting needed troops for reasons already suggested, and
also lest the administration should turn the appointments to
party account. Democratic dissensions and probably a wish to
annoy Whig generals had a similar effect. Grudges on account
of the tariff and the river and harbor veto played their part
against war legislation. Men stooped so low as to argue that
Polk, the President of the United States, could not be trusted
with $3,000,000, when customhouse officials had larger sums
in their keeping. And then his "imbecile" administration
was charged with permitting the war to drag, " when by a few
vigorous blows it could have been ended long since." Its
course exhibited "unsurpassed inefficiency," declared the
Boston Atlas, as well as "one unrelieved picture of wrong-
doing, corruption, weakness and blunders." Indeed, the gov-
CLAY'S LEADERSHIP 289
eminent, "rolling this war, as a sweet morsel, under its
tongue," was detected in wilfully doing "everything in its
power to prevent" the energetic operations upon which, as
any one could see, its financial, political and personal credit
vitally depended. 32
In November, 1847, Henry Clay, the plumed leader of the
national Whig party, celebrated also as the man who elected
Polk, after taking even a longer time than others to consult
the omens, gave out a speech and a set of resolutions. These
were intended as a chart for the party to be guided by under the
pilotage of that distinguished though unlucky navigator. The
author forgot having said in 1813, " an honorable peace is attain-
able only by an efficient war," but he remembered to condole
with suffering Ireland. He forgot that a country engagedv in
hostilities of uncertain duration and cost cannot wisely bind
itself to specific terms of peace, but reiterated the favorite Whig
taunt that it was a blind war, without known aim. Historically
too, he wandered a little, for he charged the President with or-
dering Taylor to plant cannon opposite Matamoros " at the very
time" when Slidell was "bending his way" to Mexico; but
Polk was unpopular, and few thought it necessary to speak the
truth about him. We oppose the annexation of Mexico, Clay
proclaimed, which, on the other hand was perhaps too true to be
interesting ; and we demand only a proper boundary for Texas,
which bore him a long distance toward Berrien. 33
But here was the master stroke : We desire to acquire no
foreign territory "for the purpose" of extending slavery to it.
This had the threefold merit of completely "dodging" the great
question of principle, giving the northern Whigs a graven image
to worship, and conceding to their southern brethren a full priv-
ilege to do anything possible in the acquired territory, after it
should be ours. But unfortunately for his party the Navigator
admitted that Congress had made the conflict a national war,
that a long series of " glorious" victories had been won, and that
since Congress had formulated no declaration regarding the
objects in view, Polk frequently accused by Whigs of carrying
on the war for diabolical purposes both abhorrent and fatal to
the Constitution had been free to use his judgment. In Mex-
ico Clay's speech was widely circulated, and a competent ob-
server thought it might delay peace one or two years. Such
VOL. II U
290 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
was the highest Whig leadership in what Webster called a " dark
and troubled night." 33
One idea in the minds of not a few who endorsed the " no
territory" plan was that its adoption would render the prosecu-
tion of the war aimless, and so check it abruptly. Others fa-
vored gaining the same end by stopping supplies. Ex-Senator
Rives, a leader of prominence, advised Crittenden to concert
measures for this purpose with Democratic "patriots" ; and in
fact an understanding on the point seems to have been reached.
"Be prompt, when you are wrong, to back straight out," urged
the New York Tribune, demanding the recall of our troops.
Other Whigs, after doing all they could to make the war aimless,
argued, We are fighting for nothing, why persist ? "Let us call
home our armies," insisted Corwin. "Stop the war. With-
draw our forces," cried Sumner ; and Corwin believed, early in
February, 1847, that onjy two more votes would commit the
Senate for this plan of complete national stultification, and for
bringing back in a keenly aggravated state all our Mexican
difficulties. Practically nobody dreamed of offering to Mexico
the reparation that such an idea of dropping the war implied.
The proposition was therefore hollow and insincere ; little more
than politics weakly flavored with sentimentality. 34
The month after Clay's chart appeared, the first session of
the Thirtieth Congress assembled. About half the Representa-
tives were new men, a majority belonged to the Whig party, and
all had been chosen during the gloomy autumn of the previous
year. By the Navigator and by other party leaders their
work had been mapped out for them. The objects of the war
were to be defined as at most a settlement of the Texas boundary
at the Rio Grande, or a little farther north, and payment of the
old American claims ; supplies were to be qualified and limited
accordingly, or entirely cut off ; and in this manner hostilities
would be ended. 35
But politics, not principle, still dominated most of the Whigs.
They viewed everything with reference to the impending elec-
tion of a President ; and public sentiment regarding the war had
now changed. The battle of Buena Vista had aroused extraor-
dinary enthusiasm; Scott's victories, refuting the charges of
inefficiency and silencing the prophets of calamity, had been de-
cisive as well as brilliant ; the expenses of the war were far less
THE OPPOSITION FAILS 291
burdensome than its opponents had prophesied; Mexico had
proved stubborn and unreasonable ; the sort of opposition that
had been practised was seen to be aiding the enemy, and hence
fell somewhat into disfavor; and the people, believing peace
and a reward for their sacrifices within reach, had made up their
minds to carry the business through. Besides, many of the
Whigs themselves were too proud to "back out," and many at
the north high-tariff men wished the war to continue^ By
a rather small vote and a very narrow margin 85 to 81 it
was duly branded as unnecessary and unconstitutional, and
Webster, now an out-an-out opposition candidate for the Presi-
dency, approved of this little black "blister-plaster"; but in
view of national sentiment "patriotic sublimity" of a practical
sort now looked expensive, and a motion contemplating the
withdrawal of our troops perished in the House under a vote of
41 to 137. 35
It was perfectly feasible, however, to snarl, nag, procrastinate
and work for personal aims; and few opportunities passed
unheeded. "Tiger hunts" ambitious members attacking
rivals used up much time. Cliques locked horns over press-
ing military needs. Webster seemed to forget everything ex-
cept his ambition. Benton raged over the fate of the Lieuten-
ant General bill and the censure of Fremont for disobeying
Kearny. Calhoun, having allowed his hair to grow, resembled a
porcupine less than before, but felt no less anxious to prove him-
self the sole hope of the South. Polk, instead of gaining popu-
larity from the success of his administration, was looked upon
as intoxicated by its fumes, and a section of his party advised
throwing him openly to the sharks. Congressional resolutions
were aimed at him. All the dying embers of controversy were
solicitously fanned. The causes of the war, the conduct of the
war, the instructions to Slidell, the return of Santa Anna, the
occupation of New Mexico, the tariff in Mexican ports and the
treatment of Taylor and Scott furnished themes for stale
speeches. To chill the growing popularity of the war, direct
taxes were suggested ; and the chairman of the ways and means
committee piled up the prospective costs far above the estimates
of the government. After some two months of it Marcy gave
up hope. But the Whigs knew they must do nothing serious
against the war, and before long it happily ended. 38
292 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
The results of all this personal, designing or factious opposi-
tion to the government arid the war proved most unfortunate.
The administration could never be sure what action Congress
would take, nor when ; and therefore its course was necessarily
timid, weak and hesitating! Time and strength had to be con-
sumed in foreseeing and. in meeting captious objections, and in
battling against public prejudices that hampered both military
and financial efficiency. u We shall have three months of tur-
moil our errors exposed, our good deeds perverted," wrote
Marcy to a friend at the beginning of December, 1846 ; and such
an expectation did not conduce to satisfactory work. Bold,
rapid strokes could not be ventured ; caution and cheese-paring
had to be the rule. In the field all this bore fruit in vexation,
delay, expense and loss of life. " In the name of God," ex-
claimed a man at the front, " will the politicians of our country
never cease gambling for the Presidency upon the blood of their
countrymen?" 37
i And the uproar had another consequence. When the treaty
was ratified the government organ referred to the conflict with
Mexico as " one of the most brilliant wars that ever adorned the
annals of any nation" ; and the chief Whig journal placed these
words without criticism in its own editorial column. The
trial was over, and the fiercely contesting lawyers walked
off, arm in arm, to dine. The inefficient and shameless war was
now brilliant and most creditable. Indeed, the Whigs chose
for standard-bearer a man who represented professionally the
military spirit they had raised pious hands against, who belonged
to the slaveholding order so plainly viewed askance by the New
Commandment, who had recommended the advance to the Rio
Grande, who had aimed the cannon at Matamoros, who had ad-
vised appropriating Mexican territory by force of arms, and who
owed in fact all his prominence to playing a leading role in the
"illegal, unrighteous, and damnable" war. Nobody thought
of impeaching Polk, or of bringing home to him the guilt that was
to have sunk him to the bottom of the bottomless pit. 38
Yet all the Whig journalism and oratory stood in the record.
Hosea Biglow became an immortal. 39 New Englanders gained
the ear of reading people. Keen young radicals of the northeast,
where the muse of history chiefly dwelt, dominated to a great
extent the public thought. Polk retired from power and from
RESULTS OF THE OPPOSITION 293
life, and nobody cared to defend, or even to hear defended, a
creature so unpopular and so generally denounced. Declama-
tion that well-informed men of the day had rated at its true
value came to be taken seriously. One side of the case faded
from sight, the other was engraved on bronze. And so the
patriotic habit of eagerly , throwing stones at the Mexican
War and its backers became traditional. 40
This has been a mistake. No doubt, as we have seen,
errors and misdeeds enough must be charged to the admin-
istration. All the actors were. vessels of clay, like the rest of
us. But in reality the least creditable phase of our proceed-
ings was the conduct of the opposition.
XXXV
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE WAR
1846-1848
AT the time our difficulties with Mexico approached their
climax, the popularity and prestige of the United States abroad
were not the highest possible. England, our gentle mother,
showed a particular want of regard for us. 1 Herself recently
weaned from slavery, she viewed with a convert's intolerance
our adhering to that institution. Having just cured her most
outrageous electoral abuses, she enjoyed hearing the London
Times describe our government as " a polity corrupted in all
its channels with the foulest venality." Ever scrupulous and
self-denying when a question of gaining territory was con-
cerned, she felt shocked by American "rapacity"; and the
Times, while infinitely proud that England's banner waved
in every quarter of the globe, ridiculed American "imperial
pretensions" as echoed and re-echoed "in a nasal jargon, com-
pounded at once of bad grammar and worse principle. " 3
The disposition of certain states to repudiate bonds held
in Great Britain, and their tardiness in paying interest, excited
all the righteous indignation of the creditor. The descrip-
tions of this country put forth by honored guests like Dickens
and Mrs. Trollope, who made themselves merry and popular
at our expense, furnished excuses for countless jibes; and in
September, 1845, the Times discovered "great danger" that
the nightmare of an old English writer would come true in the
United States : " No arts, no letters, no society, and, what is
worst of all, continual feare and danger of violent death, and
the life of man solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short." 3
If one aspect of our civilization appeared more laughable
than all the rest, it was the military side. The title of General,
observed the Times, was "legitimately common to the greater
294
THE UNITED STATES CRITICIZED ABROAD 295
part of the respectable male population," and Britannia out-
did this excellent jest by telling of "majors who serve out
beer, and colonels who rub down the heels of one's horse."
Literary men were angered by our failure to amend the copy-
right law as they desired ; and our pronounced republicanism,
trumpeted by Polk in his annual Message of 1845, irritated
almost everybody. The plain intimation of the same Mes-
sage that European monarchies were not expected to inter-
fere in America seemed even worse; and the President was
represented as meaning that we intended to get Mexico into
a dark alley alone, and rob her. The annexation of Texas,
which England had exerted all her diplomatic strength to pre-
vent, could not be forgiven, and the Oregon difficulty threat-
ened war. 3
Even Englishmen who believed in the rights of the people,
said the Times, turned from us with "indignant scorn;" and
in another of its many outbursts, which would have been ter-
rible had they not been ludicrous, that paper warned us that,
as we followed the example, we invited the punishment of self-
willed Corcyra. "The most impudent, bullying, boasting
nation of mankind," was Britannia's genial description of us;
and she loved to parade "our national scorn of America and
her statesmanship." In short, McLane, the American min-
ister at London, reported privately with some exaggera-
tion, one desires to believe that a deep-seated dislike,
" amounting almost to hate, of our people, of our country and
of our Institutions," prevailed universally in England. 3
On the continent these opinions were more or less distinctly
reflected. In France the heart of the people beat warmly for
us and against their neighbors across the Channel; but the
court and the government, regarding a close alliance with
Great Britain as. of cardinal importance, and the newspapers
which, like the Journal des Debats, represented them with more
or less fidelity, exerted a strong influence the other way. At
the end of 1845 Polk deepened this, for his Message referred
in cutting terms to the interference of that country on the side
of Great Britain 2 in our business of absorbing Texas. 3
The French government occupied a weak position in ref-
erence to that affair, for Guizot, the chief minister, believing
that Henry Clay would be elected President and shelve it,
296 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
had thought he could safely gratify England. Thiers, ardent
and eloquent, now attacked his course in Parliament, insist-
ing that an ally had been sacrificed to an enemy. Guizot,
pale, scholarly and calculating, said in reply, Thiers has ap-
pealed to your instincts, I will appeal to your judgment ; and
pressed his theory of an American balance of power. But
good-will for the United States and hatred for England were
too strong for him. "What empty vocalization! " exclaimed
Le National; "What unhappy exertions! What reverberat-
ing accents, like echoes in the desert ! It was poor. It was
cold. It was null." Yet no doubt the sting of Folk's rebuke
lingered, though Guizot intimated in bitterly sweet language
that it should not be resented, since he knew no better; and
many Frenchmen who condemned their government's policy,
condemned the United States for publicly recalling it. 3
Mexico, however, stood in a much worse position abroad
than we. For many years, it is true, she had been represent-
ing herself as Andromeda, shivering at the American croco-
dile or what-not that was approaching to devour her; and at
the end of July, 1845, in announcing to foreign governments
that hostilities were shortly to begin, she repeated that while
she had done everything honorable to preserve peace, the
United States had exhibited " no rule of conduct toward Mexico
except a disloyal and perfidious policy, and no purpose except
to seize successively every part of her territory that it could
obtain." 4
By such reiterated protestations considerable sympathy was
aroused at London and Paris. Englishmen holding Mexican
bonds naturally had tender feelings on the subject. British
capitalists involved in Mexican silver mines and other invest-
ments, and British merchants and manufacturers, who en-
joyed the lion's pre-eminence in Mexican commerce, felt deeply
interested. British finances required silver bullion, and Brit-
ish statesmen dreaded a further extension of our boundary
toward the southwest. But the politics of Mexico excited
such contempt, her financial conduct such disgust, her restric-
tions upon foreign trade such irritation, and her treatment
of foreign powers such resentment that she could not be viewed
with cordiality, confidence or even respect. 4
Disraeli spoke of every government of Mexico as "born in
MEXICO UNPOPULAR IN EUROPE 297
a revolution and expiring in a riot." The charge d'affaires
of Spain told Santa Anna that, on account of the instability
of chiefs and systems, it was impossible to have a settled policy
toward his country. In twenty years British imports did not
increase, and the number of British houses engaged in Mexi-
can business diminished. The treaty made with France after
the war of 1838 was not carried out by Mexico; and at the
beginning of 1846, owing to a long-standing quarrel, which
France would have settled on reasonable terms, that country
was represented by the Spanish minister. Mexico has "wil-
fully incurred the odium of foreign Nations," declared the
British Foreign Office; and the Mexican correspondent of the
Times was permitted to say in its columns that an American
absorption of Mexico would be greatly for the advantage of
humanity. The London Athenaeum expressed the same opin-
ion. Even Le Journal des Debate, besides complaining that
every nation in Europe had been treated outrageously by
Mexico, admitted that she had "sunk to the lowest point
of weakness and folly." The country "is destitute of intelli-
gence, of energy, of principle, " said that paper ; " it is a gov-
ernment of barbarians, but of barbarians enervated by the
corrupting vices of civilization." 4
To conciliate public opinion abroad, our state department
on May 14, 1846, one day after Congress authorized war, is-
sued a circular to the American ministers and consuls. 5 "It
is our interest, as it has ever been our inclination," said Bu-
chanan, "that Mexico should be an independent and powerful
Republic, and that our relations with her should be of the most
friendly character " ; but " the avaricious and unprincipled
men who have placed themselves at the head of her Govern-
ment " have prevented her from acting the part of a stable
and orderly nation. "For some years, in our intercourse with
her, we have incurred much of the expense, and suffered many
of the inconveniences of war whilst nominally at peace. This
state of things had, at last, become intolerable. We go to war
with Mexico solely for the purpose of conquering an honorable
and permanent peace. Whilst we intend to prosecute the
war with vigor, both by land and by sea, we shall bear the olive
branch in one hand, and the sword in the other; and when-
ever she will accept the former, we shall sheathe the latter."
298 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
This despatch and the President's recent Message 6 were to
guide our foreign representatives in conversation about the
war. 7
By the Spanish-Americans the outbreak of hostilities was
received with surprising calmness. Mexico endeavored to
make them feel that a conflict of races had begun, and that
she was leading the van in a common cause ; but whether dis-
satisfied with her course in the past especially with ref-
erence to preferential trade relations thankful to the United
States for the shelter of the "Monroe Doctrine," or simply
indifferent to outside concerns, they held aloof. Guatemala
alone displayed a strong sympathy. The official gazette of
New Granada printed Folk's war Message in full without a
word of criticism. 9
The mother-country, Spain, would naturally have been ex-
pected to take a deep interest in the contest ; but Mexico had
been a rebellious daughter, had treated the Spanish subjects
within her borders with cruel unfriendliness, and had recently
shown a fierce aversion to the scheme of subjecting her to a
Spanish prince. For commercial reasons that power desired
an early termination of the hostilities, and signified as much to
our government ; 8 but at the same time she pledged herself
to "the strictest neutrality," and she refrained from even offer-
ing mediation. Her minister at Mexico, Bermudez de Castro,
assisted the authorities there with advice, but before the war
ended he turned over the legation to a charge, and went home.
A band of Carlist officers talked of going to the scene of action
in May, 1847 ; but if their plan was carried out, they success-
fully avoided publicity. About the same time El Heraldo of
Madrid asked whether Europe would permit the United States
to absorb, little by little, all of America; but this was aca-
demic, and the journal admitted that Mexico was then practi-
cally beyond relief. 9
Baron von Canitz, the Prussian minister of foreign rela-
tions, when officially notified of the war, said it must be far
from easy to live on amicable terms with a country like Mex-
ico, "where anarchy reigns and where the Supreme power was
constantly contested by a succession of military chieftains,
who were compelled to maintain their usurped authority by
the same unworthy means by which they had obtained it."
SENTIMENT IN ENGLAND 299
Aided by Alexander von Humboldt, who had lived in Mexico,
King Frederick William followed the operations of the war
attentively; but, happy enough that we were not his own
neighbors, he felt no concern about a possible enlargement of
our territory at the expense of Mexico. Indeed, he looked
upon our success as in the interest of civilization, and at a dis-
tinguished public meeting one of the ministers referred to our
future power on the shores of the Pacific with hope and appro-
bation. For the rest, as the Zollverein had little direct com-
mercial business with the region blockaded, Prussia busied
herself with her own affairs. 10
At London the announcement of hostilities was both unex-
pected and unwelcome. Ostensibly they grew out of the an-
nexation of Texas, and for that reason were a disagreeable re-
minder. They took place in spite of earnest efforts to pre-
vent Mexico from challenging the United States, and hence
recalled another diplomatic failure. They seemed almost cer-
tain to injure British interests, and increase the territory and
prestige of the United States. There was a notion, voiced in
Parliament by Disraeli, that success might be followed by an
attack upon Canada or the British West Indies. It seemed
highly probable that had England postponed .for a few days
the offer which finally settled the Oregon dispute, better terms
might have been extorted from the United States. Her policy
had been to have our difficulties with Mexico kept alive until
after an adjustment of that affair, and now it was thought
possible that we might bring Mexico to terms at once, and use
in some other unpleasant way our military preparations. The
war, so much regretted by her, was seen to be largely, if not
mainly or wholly, due to this policy and that of the British
newspapers, which had urged Mexico to despise our military
power, and to rely upon the difficulty of invading her territory
successfully; and finally an uncomfortable fear prevailed that
in some way the peace of the world might be imperilled. 11
Hence disappointment and irritation were felt at the Brit-
ish Foreign Office. Aberdeen warned our minister that dangers
of collision would be involved in a blockade and in any project
of acquiring territory; and he said frankly that he could not
be expected to contemplate with any pleasure the disastrous
injuries the war might very probably inflict upon the Mexi-
300 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
can government and people. Only one cause of satisfaction
could be seen by the British Cabinet. An apprehension had
been felt that France might be induced thrpugh her friend-
ship for the United States or the idea that American control of
Mexico would be for her diplomatic and commercial advan-
tage to join us ; and the French king, confirming an antici-
patory declaration already made by Guizot, took position at
once for strict neutrality. 11
In the press and the commercial circles of London sympathy
with Mexico was general, said our minister ; and the news that
Americans were fighting aroused no sentiment in our favor.
Of course little could be expected of "that Napoleon of the
backwoods," as Britannia called our President. The defeat
of Taylor on the Rio Grande was hoped for and counted upon ;
and even after his overthrow of Arista the Times, which had
already predicted that our operations, in the case of hostili-
ties, would be "utterly uninteresting and inglorious" even
"disgusting" concluded that we should probably fail.
"Bluster does not win battles, though it may begin brawls,"
the editor moralized. All Europe must consider the war "an
insulting and illegal aggression," said the Chronicle; and the
Post attributed .our course to " the angry passions of the un-
tamed democracy of the States," which Polk was ready to
gratify at any cost. 11
The press of France, on the other hand, was in general
friendly. Let the Americans have Mexico, and a prodi-
gious development of the country will follow, urged Le Na-
tional; would not that be preferable to seeing the English get
it? To support the United States is to strengthen an ally
against Great Britain, it added. Le Correspondant said, "The
Anglo-Saxon race will flow unchecked over the fair prov-
inces where the people, descendants of the conquering Span-
iards, have allowed themselves to slumber in corruption";
and it argued that such a change would benefit the Roman
Catholic church in Mexico by purifying and energizing it.
Even Le Journal des Debats admitted that our invasion " would
be something which humanity would have to applaud, in
spite of the just reprobation attached to a spirit of conquest."
In view of such public sentiment W. R. King, our minister at
Paris, had reason to predict, that no trouble was to be appre-
ENGLAND DISPOSED TO INTERVENE 301
hended from the government, since the country would restrain
it. 12 Even Guizot, when bitterest at heart, found it neces-
sary to profess high respect for that "great nation," the United
States. 13
June 6, 1846 that is to say, without loss of time Aber-
deen, the British minister of foreign affairs, intimated to Mc-
Lane in a private conversation, unofficially, and upon his per-
sonal responsibility, that should Polk desire it, "he would be
happy, in a more formal way, to propose a mediation. " 14 This
proposal, received by McLane in his private capacity only,
was duly made known to our government, but it elicited no
reply. Our silence did not please Palmerston, who succeeded
Aberdeen about the beginning of July; and that young "fop
with grey hair," as Le Journal des Debats described him, re-
solved to propose mediation in such terms as to require an
answer. 17
Soon after the middle of August, therefore, he instructed
Pakenham to ascertain whether a formal offer of mediation
would be acceptable, and if so to make it in " the form which
might be agreed upon" by Pakenham and Buchanan. 15 The
only result, however, was a memorandum received from our
government on September 11, which said that it duly appre-
ciated the friendly spirit of the British Cabinet, that it de-
sired to make peace upon just and honorable terms and had
therefore made an overture to Mexico on July 27, and that it
thought the formal mediation of a foreign power unnecessary
and inexpedient, but would regard with favor any influence
used to induce Mexico to accept this overture. 16 Later Paken-
ham improved every opportunity to remind Buchanan of the
British government's "anxious desire ... to be useful in bring-
ing about a reconciliation between the two Republicks," but
he found himself unable to accomplish anything in this direc-
tion. 17
The real question, however, was whether Great Britain
would forcibly interpose. Such a policy she forbade Mexico
to count on, saying that she could not be expected to assume
the chief burden of a war which had resulted from the fail-
ure of that country to act upon her advice ; 18 but this did not
bind her own hands, and no doubt the government felt a pres-
sure, if not a leaning, in the direction of interference. Both
302 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
certain interests and certain passions demanded such a course.
The Times and other newspapers pointed that way, 19 and in the
House of Commons Disraeli and Bentinck spoke on that side.
"A pretence only is wanting/' wrote McLane. This, however,
was not precisely correct. Aberdeen told Murphy, the Mexi-
can minister, that it would be Quixotic to take up arms on the
simple ground that Mexico had been wronged ; and in view of
England's own course, it would* also have been ridiculous.
"Scinde is ours," exclaimed Britannia at about this time, thus
announcing one more step in the conquest of India, "and we
pay the penalty of the treachery by which it was acquired in
the curse of possession." What Great Britain wanted was a
substantial advantage in prospect. 20
For a time it looked as if California might provide this. Peel
himself was rather dazzled by the idea of gaining San Fran-
cisco, and Aberdeen viewed with "the utmost repugnance,"
wrote Murphy, the likelihood that we should acquire the
province. During the last three months of 1845 the subject
was thoroughly discussed by Murphy and Aberdeen, and the
latter's mind appeared to be "tormented" for a solution of the
problem. The method of interposition followed in the war
between Buenos Aires and Montevideo appealed to him, but
he felt that France could not easily be drawn into it. The
Mackintosh plan of British colonization received careful atten-
tion as possibly the means of creating a British interest in Cali-
fornia; but Aberdeen thought it would be unbecoming, and
would give the United States a just ground of offence, to put
the plan in operation at so late a day, evidently for the purpose
of blocking us (a proposito para las circunstancias) , and he
feared it would not be effective after all against American im-
migration. The Mexican decree of April, 1837, which mort-
gaged a certain quantity of lands (for instance, in California)
to the bondholders appeared to promise better, and on that
basis a scheme was actually drawn up at London in October,
1845, for submission to the government of Mexico. But at this
juncture Herrera was overthrown, the British Cabinet felt pro-
foundly disgusted, and Murphy's position became uncertain. 21
After Aberdeen retired from the Foreign Office in 1846,
the suggestion of Paredes that Great Britain take military
possession of California seems to have tempted Palmerston;
BRITISH INTERVENTION NOT FEASIBLE 303
but, aside from other objections, he shrewdly .suspected that
Mexico had by this time lost control of the territory. In
December, 1847, Dr. Mora, who succeeded Murphy, proposed
on his own responsibility a sale of California to England, argu-
ing that by our endeavor to purchase it the United States had
confessed we had no claim there ; but Palmerston, though evi-
dently tempted again, merely decided that any authorized
communication on the subject should receive the attention
justly due to its importance, and soon the treaty of peace put
an end to the matter. No " substantial advantage " had seemed
to come within reach. 21
Nor had even a satisfactory pretext for intervention been
found. McLane had urged our government to give none,
and in particular to avoid all infringement upon the rights of
neutrals. 22 The policy of our blockade was extremely liberal.
British mail packets were exempt from its restrictions, and
they were permitted to embark specie and land quicksilver at
Vera Cruz and Tampico. During the blockade of Mazatlan
British subjects were treated with such consideration that
our courtesy was formally acknowledged, and it was admitted
that Scott "invariably" guarded their interests in the sphere
of his operations. Our opening the ports to all nations, es-
tablishing a low tariff, and endeavoring to protect commercial
relations with the interior were boons that foreign powers
had no reason to expect, and British traders appreciated
our attitude. 23 By December, 1847, the merchants of London
were distinctly opposed to intervention ; and when the Due de
Broglie demanded in astonishment why England had viewed
our military operations with such indifference, he was told that
Mexico in the hands of the United States would be of far more
value in regard to commerce and investments than ever
before. At the same time persons of less narrow views hoped
to see that country regenerated through us. 24
On the other hand embarrassments of the most serious
character stood in the way of interposition. As the Globe
said, the project of annexing Texas had afforded better grounds,
yet England had looked aghast before the prospect of losses
and risks involved in a collision with this country. So had
she done in the case of Oregon ; and the advantages of remain-
ing at peace with the United States were still obvious. There
304 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
were other considerations also. She wanted time to readjust
her business under the regime of free trade, and Le National
thought she desired to develop her India cotton fields before
severing her relations with us. The political situation in
Ireland and the Irish famine were grave embarrassments,
and the generous aid given by the United States to the starv-
ing population of that island excited gratitude. British mer-
cantile finances proved to be unsound, and a bad panic oc-
curred; and manufacturing interests awoke to the fact that
many rivals threatened them. The profound unrest which
precipitated Europe into the revolutionary convulsions of
1848 could already be felt ; 25 and finally the relations of Eng-
land to France occasioned a grave sense of uncertainty. 26
With the support of that power, said Murphy, Aberdeen
would have been willing to fight. 27 Her military assistance
did not particularly matter, but he was afraid that popular
unfriendliness toward the government already shown by a
violent opposition in the press and the parliament and the
scarcely slumbering hatred of England might drive the country
into active support of the United States, and bring on a gen-
eral conflagration. 28 Such was the situation when Peel, whom
Louis Philippe leaned heavily upon, stood at the head of the
British government ; and after he resigned at the end of June,
1846, it became far more difficult. For the new administra-
tion Louis entertained no such regard. The marriage of the
Due de Montpensier, his son, to a Spanish princess destroyed
the entente cordiale. Harsh language was exchanged. Guizot
and Palmerston endeavored to overthrow each other, and the
British ambassador at Paris had a personal difficulty with
Guizot. 29
As for France herself, the premier's loud advocacy of an
American balance of power compelled him logically to prevent
the United States, if he could, from acquiring new territory.
Influential writers Gabriel Ferry, for example insisted
that French interests, principles and prestige in Mexico de-
manded protection. L'Epoque, w r hich many regarded as
Guizot's personal organ, took that ground firmly in a long and
studied article, and called for joint intervention. Le Journal
des Debate, our persistent enemy, suggested the same view.
But the diplomatic journal, La Portefeuille, was resolute for
EFFECTS OF AMERICAN SUCCESS 305
neutrality, and the other leading papers reiterated the familiar
objections against playing the British game ; and hence, while
it appeared reasonable to expect that Guizot would aid Eng-
land more or less in a diplomatic way to limit the extension of
our boundaries, no other sort of French intervention seemed at
all probable. 30
The success of our armies clinched the argument. From the
first, McLane urged that a vigorous campaign should be waged.
That, he said, would be the best way to prevent interference,
and he predicted that victories would overcome sympathy
with Mexico. Had Taylor been defeated on the Rio Grande,
as Londoners expected, those ill-disposed toward us in Europe,
wrote our minister at Paris, "might have been emboldened
to unfriendly or offensive demonstrations"; but as it was, re-
ported McLane, the conduct of the American army and the
magnanimity of the American general served to "inspire a
respect for our country and our cause which was not felt be-
fore, and which nothing less could have produced." The fail-
ure of Ulua to detain Scott until the yellow fever should force
him to decamp had no slight effect ; and the victories at Vera
Cruz and Cerro Gordo, reported Bancroft, who succeeded
McLane at the court of St. James, totally changed the com-
plexion of sentiment in Europe regarding the United States.
After the battles of Contreras and Churubusco the same min-
ister said to a friend, "You should foe here to see how our suc-
cesses have opened the eyes of the Old World to our great
destinies." In England racial sympathy, too, could not wholly
be suppressed. Scott received very handsome compliments
from the commander of the British fleet at Vera Cruz and from
a son of Sir Robert Peel, who was aboard one of the vessels ;
and Robert Anderson remarked in his diary : When our arms
do something glorious, "jealousy, for the moment, is conquered
by pride. " Indeed Lord Palmerston himself spoke most warmly
to Bancroft of our victories as illustrating the superiority of
the Anglo-Saxon. 31
King believed they "secured a perhaps doubtful neutrality."
" Let Mexico show the determination and the power to resist, "
remarked Le Journal des Debats significantly, and a way to
aid her will doubtless be found, but "Europe cannot intervene
effectively in behalf of a people who throw themselves away."
VOL. II X
306 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
It is impossible to help those who will not help themselves, ad-
mitted the London Times; and Palmerston disgusted, no
doubt, like every one else, with Mexico's failure to achieve any-
thing except fresh revolutions admitted to Barikhead that
it would be very imprudent to break with the United States
for the sake of a country which did nothing effectual to defend
itself. 31
Some things, however, it was possible to do against us. At
the beginning of the conflict our minister observed in London a
systematic endeavor to break down American credit, and so
embarrass our military operations. Viscount Ranelagh pro-
posed to bring over enough British officers for some four or
five thousand men, and it was not their fault nor his that
Murphy said the Mexicans would not serve under foreigners.
A captain employed by the highly favored company of English
mail packets landed Paredes, an avowed enemy of the United
States, at Vera Cruz. Mexico is "the very country for the
guerilla," hinted Britannia; it "has ready-made guerillas by
the ten thousand or the hundred thousand; it has hills and
hollows where ten men might stop the march of 50,000. " And
the same journal went still farther. In the case of an invasion,
it proclaimed, "the soldier is a soldier no more ; he is a burglar,
a robber, a murderer"; and should foreign troops invade
England, "No quarter! " ought rightfully to be the cry. 32
But the special delight of unfriendly journals was to mis-
represent our military operations. 33 Apparently Taylor's bat-
tles on the Rio Grande surprised the editorial mind so much
that few comments were ready, but after a while the Times
remarked, "No hostile army has been really beaten"; and
it described our success at Monterey as merely occupying "a
town of log-huts." That paper long professed to regard the
war as "a border squabble," "ridiculous and contemptible,"
"justified by hypocrisy," "carried on with impotence," and
sure to end "in some compromise more humiliating to the
United States than to Mexico. " "The Americans who have to
conduct this most wearisome of wars, " it assured its gratified
readers, " are least of all nations competent to the task. They
have no army, and have constitutional objections to raising
one. They have no money, and are resolutely determined to
find none. They have no General, and have just agreed
VIEWS OF OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS 307
[by rejecting the plan of a lieutenant general] never to have
one." 34
"The military tactics of the Americans," remarked the
Examiner at the same stage, " have displayed an equal want of
talent and of purpose"; while its fair colleague, Britannia,
exclaimed : The hostilities against Mexico are " at once
wretched and ridiculous. ... So much for the boasting of
Jonathan!" With unwinking and unsuspecting humor the
Times commented thus on the fight at Buena Vista: "Be-
yond the fact that the Americans undoubtedly beat off, though
from a strong position, a force nearly quadrupling their own,
they seem to have no great grounds for triumph." In fact
they were now "worse off than ever"; they had actually lost
prestige; and all the Mexicans needed to do was "to sit still
and be sulky." 34
Scott fared no better than Taylor. His bombarding Vera
Cruz was characterized as "revolting," as an "infamy," as
"one of the most atrocious and barbarous acts committed in
modern times by the forces of a civilized nation," as "degrad-
ing to mankind." Somehow the. Times was repentant enough
to publish a reply, which said : " The first broadside of Lord
Exmouth's guns at Algiers destroyed a greater number of un-
offending, unarmed people, than the bombardment of Vera
Cruz," and pointed out that Scott was under some obligation
to treat with humanity his own troops, whom delay would have
exposed to the yellow fever. Compassionate John Bull ! ex-
claimed the American Review; "Is it true that the English
bombarded Copenhagen? Is Hindostan more than a fiction?
Had Clive and Hastings any substantial bodily existence? Is
not Ireland a my the?" and of course it might have added that
an assault would have caused immensely more loss of life at
Vera Cruz than did the bombardment. 35
According to the Times our contemplated advance against
Mexico City was " the mere dream of an ignorant populace " ;
while the more prudent Morning Chronicle termed it "about
as visionary as that of Napoleon upon Moscow." "There is
but one thing we know of," added the Chronicle, "that is more
difficult than for the United States army to get to Mexico,
and that would be to get back again to Vera Cruz." When
the Americans triumphed at Cerro Gordo over both nature
308 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
and man, the Chronicle itself had to admit that our courage was
"unquestionable/' but it consoled itself by placing the Ameri-
can and Mexican armies on the same level as partaking " pretty
considerably of the nature of mobs." The victories of Con-
treras and Churubusco were viewed by the Times as calculated
"to raise the confidence" of our enemy, and the editor an-
nounced that Scott, after these disastrous triumphs, was " much
more likely to capitulate" than to capture Mexico. Naturally
Britannia pronounced our invasion of the country "a great
mistake," and asked in deep concern, How are the Americans
going to get out of it? 36
The occupation of the capital was regarded as only one mis-
fortune more. "The Americans have played out their last
card," roared the Thunderer, "and are still as far as ever
from the game." Worse yet, it foresaw, we were now going
to crown our outrages. The churches would be robbed, and
"when churches are ransacked will houses be spared? When
saints are despoiled will citizens be spared?" The war never
can end, added the same paper, for " the invaders of Mexico . . .
are not the men to build the temple of peace" ; and retribution
is inevitable, since the passion for conquest, which has already
"extinguished" the political morality of the United States,
will eventually impair their political institutions, and the
annexed provinces will be an American Ireland. 36
The treaty of peace caused no serious trouble. As early
as January, 1846, Le Journal des Debats said the Americans
would soon have California, and thus prepared its readers
for the main feature of our terms. The United States will
obtain California, for Mexico cannot pay an indemnity, echoed
Le National. In reply to Aberdeen's hint on the opening of
hostilities, that it would be imprudent for this country to
appropriate any Mexican territory, McLane remarked that
"it was at present not easy to foresee all the consequences of
a war which Mexico had so wantonly provoked, and in which
the United States had so much injustice and so many wrongs
to redress"; and no British statesman could have failed to
understand what this meant. 37
When Folk's Message of December, 1846, clearly showed
that we expected to retain California, the British newspapers
set up an incoherent, savage growl ; but the triumphs at Vera
OUR PEACE TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO EUROPE 309
Cruz and Cerro Gordo made it plain that we had earned -
or were likely to earn the rights of a conqueror, and must
be taken seriously. Bancroft soon wrote that England was
"preparing to hear of our negotiating for half, or two thirds,
or even the whole of Mexico"; and Palmerston himself said
we might as well take it all. "You are the Lords of Mexico/'
exclaimed Lord Ashburton to our minister. After the occupa-
tion of the capital even Le Journal des Debats admitted that
the only possible indemnity would be a province or two, and
Britannia remarked, "From this time the whole country must
be considered as part of the territory of the United States."
"It is becoming a fashion, rather, to expect the absorption
of all Mexico," reported Bancroft. 37
When the treaty arrived in Europe, the convulsions of wide-
spread revolution had begun there, people on the continent
were too busy to think much about our gains, and the British
did not wish to think of them ; but the general sentiment of
those who considered the matter appears to have been sur-
prise at our moderation. Humboldt, though a citizen of
Mexico, conceded that our terms were proper ; and the critical
Journal des Debats remarked, "Assuredly this is sparing a
foe who lies in the dust." Such a characterization of our be-
havior was for us a legitimate source of pride; and, as the
respect universally paid to valor and success accompanied it
all over Europe, we had ample reason to feel gratified. 37
XXXVI
CONCLUSION
1825-1848
THE conflict with Mexico came to pass as logically as a
thunderstorm. At the beginning of her independent existence
our people felt earnestly and enthusiastically anxious to main-
tain cordial relations with our sister republic, and many crossed
the line of absurd sentimentality in that cause. Friction was
inevitable, however. The Americans were direct, positive,
brusque, angular and pushing ; and they could not understand
their neighbors on the south. The Mexicans were equally unable
to fathom our good-will, sincerity, patriotism, resoluteness and
courage; and certain features of their character and national
condition made it far from easy to get on with them. 1
Though generally amiable and often brilliant or charming,
they lacked common sense, principle, steadiness and knowledge
of the world. They were passionate, suspicious, over-subtle,
self-confident and fond of gamblers' risks. They regarded firm-
ness on our part as arrogance, and kindness as debility. Their
policy was defined by the Mexico correspondent of the London
Times as a compound of Spanish intrigue and Indian cunning,
dominated it might have been added by provincial vanity
and sensitiveness. They scarcely possessed the character of a
nation. The whole period from 1822 to 1848 has been classified
by their National Museum as a period of anarchy. Theirjnter-
national duties were not recognized. Loiscrupulous factions
and usurpers used foreign relations as the shuttlecocks of selfish
schemes. Pride, said their own statesman, J. F. Ramirez, for-
Jmde them to treat on the necessary basis of mutual consider-
ation and concession, and insisted upon either complete victory
or the consolation of having yielded to irresistible force, while
procrastination put off the settlement of issues until the proper
time for adjusting them had passed. 2
310
WHY MEXICO WAS DEFEATED 311
Then between us and this difficult people arose the extraor-
dinarily complicated question of Texas. It was characteristic
of Mexico to deny the justice of the Texan revolt on the ground
that settlers in her territory were bound to accept the political
will of the country ; but it was futile. " Nobody will be argued
into slavery," said Burke; and this was peculiarly true when
the proffered slavery did not in truth represent the will of the
country, and was more capricious, cruel and injurious than the
regime against which the Mexicans themselves had rebelled.
Our recognition of Texas not only was founded on just reasons,
but was concurred in by the leading powers of Europe. The
annexation of that republic meant the wise and unforced incor-
poration of a free people, independent both by right and in fact,
after Mexico had practically abandoned all expectation of its
becoming once more a part of that nation, and entertained little
hope save to gratify a stubborn pride at the expense of Texas
and the rest of the world. 3
Her treatment of Texans and Americans violated the laws of
justice and humanity, and since there was no tribunal to
punish it laid upon the United States, both as her nearest
neighbor and as an injured community, the duty of retribution.
In almost every way possible, indeed, she forced us to take a
stand. She would neither reason nor hearken to reason, would
not understand, would not negotiate. Compensation for the
loss of territory, in excess of its value to her, she knew she could
have. Peace and harmony with this country she knew might
be hers. But prejudice, vanity, passion and wretched politics
inclined her toward war; her overrated military advantages,
her expectations of European aid, the unpreparedness of the
United States, and in particular the supposed inferiority of
Taylor and his army encouraged her; and she deliberately
launched the attack so long threatened.
As was just and natural, Mexico primarily owed her failure
in the war to the characteristics that led her into it. From a
strictly military point of view her case was not precisely hopeless.
Intrinsically the rank and file of her armies, though not by nature
warlike, had courage enough, and possessed an extraordi-
nary degree of that willingness to endure fatigue and hardship,
which Napoleon deemed still more important. They were more
frugal and obedient than our men ; and while the lack of moral
312 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
and physical strength, discipline and confidence in one another
and their officers made them shrink from the American bayonet
and the fixed American eye behind it, they bore infantry and
artillery fire as well as we did, if not better. Many engineers
proved themselves excellent ; many artillery officers were brave
and efficient ; and hence there was no reason why the infantry
and cavalry might not have been well handled.
But the military point of view was by no means the only one
to be considered. The want of public virtue had filled the army
with miserable officers, the legislative halls with dishonest,
scheming, clashing politicians, and the whole nation with quarrel-
ing factions and wrathful, disheartened people, secretly thankful
to find their oppressors, whom they could not punish themselves,
punished by the Americans. The hungry and beaten conscript
went into battle sure that if wounded he would starve, if killed
he would be devoured by the birds, and should neither accident
occur he would simply drudge on as before ; and the industrious,
useful citizen understood, that if he should help the leaders of
the nation by paying contributions, he would then have to fatten
them by paying again. "We are saved by hope," wrote the
great Apostle, and the nation saw no hope. Primarily Mexico was
defeated because she did not fight ; and she did not fight because
she had nothing to fight for. The military class, who had long
pretended to be the nation, was given a chance to prove its claim,
and the poor wretches who could be forced into the ranks had to
support it ; but the people in general, holding aloof to a great
extent, said in effect, "Thou who hast consumed all the rev-
enues without giving anything in return, thou for whom we have
sacrificed so much, thou who hast used our own blood to make
thyself master instead of servant may the woe thou hast so
long inflicted on us fall now on thee ! " 4
Santa Anna, the logical hero of such a nation, was also its
logical scourge a statesman unable to guide, a general unfitted
to command, a leader qualified only to win revolutions, lose
battles, and alternate between dictatorship and exile. Some
observers even American officers impressed by the impos-
ing front that he reared time after time, felt that he was a great
man. Unquestionably he gathered troops and resources as no
other Mexican of the time could have done. No doubt his
lunge into the north and his defence of the capital were remark-
THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 313
able ; and one could not complain of him, as did Tacitus of a
Roman commander, that he was unable to harangue his army.
He certainly did many things. 5
But he did few things well. His achievements were the tem-
porary triumphs of autocratic will-power. He suffered always
from an essential want of capacity. He did not understand
the Americans, and fancied that one defeat would cow us. He
did not even understand his fellow-citizens, and could not' realize
that his long course of misconduct, and finally his negotiations
with Mackenzie, had cut the root of confidence. A proclama-
tion that sounded eloquent, he felt must be convincing. The
impossibility of controlling the factional politics of such a coun-
try and also managing a war without the support of the nation
of riding two such horses at the same time lay beyond his
comprehension. Often his policy was like that of the man who
ruins his constitution with drugs in order to cure a local ailment.
Even his apparently noble decisions grew out of selfishness and
rang hollow.
To his mind a collection of men was an army. Personal aims
and feelings, instead of sound policy and the demands of disci-
pline, controlled mostly his relations with officers. Because a
revolutionary band could be held together by the hope of plunder,
he imagined that a campaign could be waged on that basis.
Because he thought it would be natural for the enemy to attack
him in a certain way, he concluded positively that no other at-
tack would be made. Strategy he did not attempt. And when
it came to the direction of a battle, owing to ignorance and in-
tellectual disqualifications, he lacked the quickness of perception
and rapidity of combination that were essential to success. For
the same reasons his total strength was never focused at the
vital time and place, and a defeat became a rout. 6
This is what a final glance at the Mexicans reveals ; and now,
to conclude the whole investigation, we should take a summary
view of our own side.
While the Congress of the United States did not approach that
of Mexico in badness, there was too much resemblance. One
should always remember that among the people who really make
up the world and keep it going perfection is, and is likely to be,
somewhat rare; but for an elect body our Congress fell be-
low all reasonable expectations. The comedy of its political
314 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
manoeuvres was only surpassed by the tragedy of them. Amos
Kendall said, after the hostilities began, " There can be no peace
with that people [the Mexicans] but through victory or with
dishonor," and any person of judgment could see this ; yet prej-
udices, passions and interests prevented many from honestly
supporting a national war, and turned not a few into virtual
enemies of their country. Markoe wrote from Vera Cruz with
reference to Clay, Webster, Gallatin and others of their school,
" These great men have by their speeches done more to prevent
peace than though they had each of them severally arrayed
10,000 Mexicans against Scott" ; and when one recalls the ex-
pense and bloodshed that would almost certainly have been
spared this country and Mexico had our government felt at
liberty to spend with decent liberality in meeting Scott's requi-
sitions promptly, patience itself takes fire. 7
To think of giving him so small an army that the Mexicans felt
positively ashamed to yield ! And then to reflect how politics
went into the army itself, endangering the lives of men and the
fortunes of the country through unfit appointments. u How we
have been gulled and led about," exclaimed a soldier, "by a set
of political demagogues, who, regardless of the fearful responsi-
bility, have forced themselves into positions they possess no
qualifications to fill, with a hope thereby to promote their future
political aggrandizement !" We recall, even though we do not
endorse, the Frenchman who observed, " The more I see of the
representatives of the people, the more I love my dogs " ; and
we also recall the opinion of a British king : " Politics are a trade
for a rascal, not for a gentleman." 8
The President showed himself a small man, but the saying of
La Rochefoucauld comes to mind : " We may appear great
in an employment beneath our merit, but we often appear little
in ones too great for us." The situation in which Polk,
essentially a local politician from Tennessee, found himself -
called upon to re-make the fiscal system of the country, to dis-
pose of long-standing and now critical issues with Great Britain
and Mexico, to cope with a factious and unscrupulous opposition
in Congress, and to face a war in a foreign land, almost un-
known to us, with a handful of regulars commanded by Whigs
- was extremely difficult ; but he steered his course firmly to
the end, set an example of honest, faithful administration,
GENERAL TAYLOR 315
established a fiscal system under which the country enjoyed a
period of great prosperity, effected with England an adjustment
that in essence had been refused, enjoyed a series of uniform tri-
umphs in the field, and obtained from our enemy the peace and
the territory he desired. 9
Indeed, he achieved a still more surprising triumph, for he
disproved the favorite American axiom : " Nothing succeeds
like success." His lack of commanding qualities, his inability
to win admiration and sympathy, and his resorting to small
methods because he lacked the power to wield great ones, made
him seem legitimate prey. He became the dog with a bad
name, for which any stick or stone was good enough. Other
men in public life could misrepresent the facts as many were
doing all the time and still be honored ; but if Polk " put the
best foot forward," if he allowed men to draw inferences from
their wishes, if wittingly or not he colored things, if -
even by accident he made an incorrect statement, he was
promptly denounced as a villain.
And when he had supported his tremendous burden loyally,
if not with eclat ; when denunciations had failed, threats crum-
bled, taunts miscarried, hostile predictions fallen to the ground ;
when our people had not risen up against the war, our treasury
had not collapsed, our armies had not withered away ; when our
sword had been wielded with honor, our territory and commer-
cial field been extended far to the west, our international status
been elevated after all these triumphs the bitter tongue of
a partisan spit out on the floor of our national House the famous
nickname, "Polk the Mendacious," the President left office un-
der a leaden cloud of disparagement and contempt, and later
authors delighted to dip their pens in the gall of his enemies.
Truly, however little we feel inclined to go into raptures over
Polk, we can admire his traducers even less.
Next, in view of the civil as well as military fame gained from
the war by Taylor, one thinks of him. In reviewing his opera-
tions we must beware of judging him by mere professional stand-
ards, for he was more, as well as less, than a technical soldier.
The most essential qualities for a general, says the Baron de
Jomini, are physical and moral courage ; and in these respects
the head of our army of occupation was flawless. Indeed al-
most all the moral qualifications of an eminent commander were
316 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
his. He was a born fighter and born leader. He could think
best in danger and excitement. He could inspire confidence and
win devotion. The fact that one so plain could be a paladin
made even the ordinary feel capable of heroism. Like all un-
disciplined men of great force he possessed large reserves of
strength, and when an emergency stimulated these, he dis-
played a power that compelled those on the ground to imitate
and those at a distance to admire him. 10
On the other hand, most of the intellectual qualifications of
the commander were largely wanting. To be sure he possessed
a great deal of practical shrewdness, and he used moral force
with a broad sort of calculation that enabled him to produce
effects which a mere educated soldier could scarcely have ob-
tained. But he did not understand the aims or the art of war,
lacked initiative, failed in prevision, neglected preparation, ig-
nored details, took little care to gather information, misunder-
stood the intentions of the enemy, and underestimated their
strength. He preferred swinging an axe at a door to conducting
the battle sagaciously from a distance. He would chat with
soldiers about home, and then sacrifice their lives.
His "victories" made him famous, but the true test of general-
ship, observes Henderson, is "the number of mistakes"; and
every stage of Taylor's progress was marked with grave errors.
Besides, "however brilliant an action may be," remarks La
Rochefoucauld, " it ought not to pass for great when it is not the
result of a great design" ; and not only were none of Taylor's
exploits deliberately planned, but he never understood the risks
he was braving. Some ironical but loving god seemed to at-
tend him. The life he carelessly, improvidently ventured was
guarded ; and insubordination, both toward the President and
toward the general-in-chief, made him the successor of the
first and the superior of the second. "Old Zack is the most
lucky man alive," said Colonel Campbell. 11
Scott, however, was of course the pre-eminent commander.
In war he felt at home. He " is a Soldier and a General from the
ground up," wrote Consul Parrott after watching his operations.
With the possible exception of Molino del Rey, the petulant in-
discretion that he sometimes exhibited in civil affairs did not
affect his conduct in the field. To appreciate him, "to know
him at all," said Trist, one had to see him in the military sphere.
GENERAL SCOTT 317
Karl von Grone, who observed him at work, wrote : " He is
quiet, reserved, reflective. When, after mature consideration
of the circumstances, he has formed his decision, he goes with
strong, sure steps to his goal. He can manage with scanty re-
sources, is adroit in deceiving the enemy, and where feints are
not possible, deals a heavy, straight blow. When main force
must break the way, he demands much from his troops ; but, as
he possesses their full confidence, and is recognized as a fighter
of dauntless courage, he can do this." 12
" He sees everything, and calculates the cost of every meas-
ure," said Robert E. Lee. He could be "quick as guncotton
when neccessary," wrote Parrott, yet deliberate and cautious
under the utmost pressure. His initiative and self-reliance never
failed; yet, as even the prejudiced Semmes admitted, he
made full use of all the talents, as well as all the valor, of his
army. Though his plans were laid with extreme care in view
of all the information that could be obtained, he never permitted
them to shackle him, and promptly adapted himself, whether in
campaign or in battle, to a change of circumstances. Both
great things and little things were given his attention, but with
due reference to their comparative importance. He knew the
rules of his art, and also knew when to disregard them. He
could both rouse troops to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, and
surpass the calculations of the expert. Says Hamley, it is " im-
practicable" to "conceive how sustained operations can be con-
ducted in the face of an enemy without a secure starting-point."
Scott accomplished this. 12
Characteristics of a more personal kind supported his profes-
sional ability. The General, Trist assured his wife, was " the
soul of honour and probity, and full of the most sterling quali-
ties of heart and head ; affectionate, generous, forgiving and a
lover of justice." Though few made allowances for his imper-
fections, he was always ready to do this for others; and his
magnanimity would have been remarkable, even had he not
been a natural fighting man. Such traits enabled him to get on
excellently with reasonable officers, while his ability, prudence,
vigilance, good cheer, steadiness, courage, sympathy, and trust
in his army, and his anxiety to avoid wasting the labor and lives
of the men, gave him the entire confidence of the privates. A
soldier who loved peace instead of war, a general who valued
318 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
the lives of his troops more than glory, a conqueror who became
in the hour of triumph a friend, and a citizen who placed his
country above self-interest, he was the ideal commander of a
republican army. 13
To speak broadly and leaving genius out of the account, he
possessed all the military qualities of Taylor, and all Taylor
lacked. Taylor could fight splendidly, Scott could also avail
himself of the advantages that knowledge and skill were able
to supply. The soldiers of the one believed their leader was
going to win, those of the other could give reasons for their faith.
The army of occupation was ready to follow its commander with
eyes shut, the army of conquest with eyes open. Both were
kind at heart, but Scott's humanity was made systematically
effective. Both faced perils with unwavering courage, but
Scott did all he could to understand what lay before him. Both
complained of the government, but Scott had reason to do so.
Both disregarded instructions; but while Taylor aimed to
gratify himself, Scott's aim was to benefit his country. 14
The advantages were not all on one side, however. Taylor
had excellent control of his temper and the everyday, personal
shrewdness that Scott needed. His unsophistication bore the
winning appearance of ingenuousness, while Scott's reflective
and studious ways gave him the reputation of a schemer. Each
needed to be supplemented, but only Taylor had a Bliss. Scott's
men felt they were serving under a strong leader, Taylor's that
they were serving with one ; while to Great Demos, always
undiscriminating, the one represented head, the other heart;
the one science, the other heroism. 14
Both were remarkable. Taylor was a distinguished ple-
beian, Scott a distinguished patrician ; the first a superb cap-
tain, the second a superb general ; and each a great man.
The soldiers, of course, did not equal their chief commanders
in point of interest, but certain facts concerning them
deserve attention. The total number of regulars in the war
service down to July 5, 1848, was about 31,000. Of these, to
use round numbers, 1600 were discharged because their term
expired, 2550 for disability, and 500 for other causes; 2850
deserted; 530 were killed and 2100 wounded in battle; 400
died of their wounds ; and there were 4900 ordinary or acci-
dental deaths. Of the volunteers 59,000 actually served ; 7200
THE AMERICAN ARMY 319
were discharged for disability, and 2000 for other reasons be-
fore the expiration of their term ; 3900 deserted ; 1350 were
wounded ; 600 were killed or died of their wounds ; and there
were 6400 ordinary or accidental deaths. So it appears that out
of some 90,000 officers and men serving, 6750 deserted, 12,250
had to be discharged before their term expired, 11,300 met with
ordinary or accidental deaths, and only 1550 were accounted
for by the enemy. The difference between the number mustered
in and the number available at the front, and also between the
number who lost their lives by fighting and the number who
dropped out from other causes, was most instructive. The
Americans captured seem to have numbered less than 1100.
Of the volunteers, a very disproportionate percentage went
from the southwest ; the northwest did well, and the northeast
lagged. 15
From these figures it appears that approximately three out
of one hundred regulars were killed or died in consequence of
wounds and eight were discharged for disability, whereas the
numbers for the volunteers were one and twelve ; and in fact the
showing of the regulars was still better, since the "new" regulars,
officered with inferior men chosen largely for political reasons,
did not equal the record of the old establishment. In many
other respects also the volunteers ranked low. Not only was
there a greater percentage of sickness among them, but the
invalids required attendants. The volunteers wasted clothing,
provisions and ammunition both heedlessly and through igno-
rance of administrative business ; and their arms were not
properly cared for. 16
They had no intention of submitting to the discipline and
routine labor of campaigning, and even at the close of the war
could not be called real troops. The volunteers, wrote one of
them, " will not be treated as regular soldiers."
"Sergeant, buck him and gag him, our officers cry,
For each trifling cffence which they happen to spy,
Till with bucking and gagging of Dick, Pat and Bill,
Faith, the Mexican's ranks they have helped to fill,"
so another, an exceptionally good man, testified. "Soldiers
will take their merry frolics/' an officer admitted. The camp
slogan of a sturdy North Carolina company was : " Soldier, will
320 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
you work ? " " Sell my shirt first." " Soldier, will you fight ? "
"Twell I die." But even their fighting did not prove entirely
satisfactory. Individually they were braver than the regulars ;
but the soldier's business is to fight when the time comes, and
the volunteers to a considerable extent wanted to fight when
they pleased. They might do splendidly and they might not,
their general knew. In a word, they were unreliable ; and they
even imperilled their own cause by exasperating the people.
Marcy confessed that he felt disappointed. Yet there were
offsets. Their patriotism and enthusiasm stimulated their
officers and the regulars ; and at their best silent, grim,
patient, with a look of kingship in their faces they
glorified hardships, perils, wounds, disease and death. 16
A common idea of the regulars was expressed in the House
by Tilden of Ohio, who described them as "a set of puppets
. . . shut up without exercise and in barracks, from year's end
to year's end" ; and the "sausage democracy" looked with con-
tempt upon West Pointers as both puppets and aristocrats.
The regulars, however, were preferable not only in camp and on
the march, but on the field. In addition to being steady them-
selves, they helped immensely to steady the volunteers; and
the regular officers furnished volunteer generals with knowledge,
skill and sometimes resolution. As for their own commands,
West Pointers might curse their men, but they took splendid
care of them ; and it was far better that men should fear
their officers than that officers, like many in the volunteer army,
should fear their men. General Scott said that without the
science of the Military Academy his army; multiplied by four,
could not have set foot in the capital ; and Patterson, like him
not a graduate of the school, concurred in this opinion. 17
Our horse was to a large extent little more than mounted in-
fantry ; and our real cavalry, besides riding like the French and
therefore badly, showed no mastery in sword practice. On the
other hand our field artillery was excellent in personnel and
material ; and the engineers, though not fully trained according
to the most exacting standards, earned abundant praise. More
than once they made the very strength of the Mexican position
help our men while they were preparing to attack ; and the re-
port of General Smith upon certain officers " Nothing seemed
to them too bold to be undertaken, or too difficult to
THE AMERICAN ARMY 321
be executed " might have been applied to the corps as a
body. 18
In organization our armies were inferior to the best European
models ; but, said Gabriel Ferry in the Revue des Deux Mondes,
the soldiers made up for this defect by displaying an energy
adequate for every need. The infantry were criticised by foreign
observers for a lack of correctness and snap in their move-
ments. " What is called the American army," wrote the minis-
ter of Spain, to imply that we had no real troops. But they
husbanded their strength in this way ; it was therefore ready
for emergencies ; and they had the initiative, ingenuity, inde-
pendence and self-reliance that have been cultivated of late
years abroad in place of conventional precision. 19
Despite all technical defects, the faults of the volunteers
and the admixture of mere immigrants among the regulars, we
had soldiers to remember with pride. So many of the officers
were superior men that almost all caught the inspiration more
or less, and the privates felt ready to obey and follow them.
The troops as a body acquired a sense of invincibility. "We
may be killed, but we can't be whipped," was a favorite watch-
word ; and they fully meant it, said Karl von Grorie. Dangers
and hardships were bravely faced, as a rule, and often were faced
with gayety. "Oh, this is a glorious life of mine," exclaimed
Lieutenant Hamilton ; " a life in a land of fruits and flowers,
of dark-eyed maidens and sunny skies, of snow-capped moun-
tains and of flowering valleys ; a life of adventure, of calm and
storm, of bivouac and battle." 20
No doubt the political and social conditions of Mexico
helped our troops greatly, but in addition to routing every time
an enemy who was by no means intrinsically contemptible, out-
numbered us and knew the ground, they had to war against
deserts, war against mountains, war against fearful storms, war
against a strange climate, war against a devouring pestilence ;
and in spite of every difficulty Scott, after capturing more than
a thousand officers and more than six hundred cannon, occupied
the capital of Mexico with less than six thousand men. The
troops themselves, instead of boasting, pronounced it a
"miracle"; but the critical and unfriendly Journal des Debats
declared : "The new conquerors have equalled by their exploits
the great Cortez himself, if they have not eclipsed him." 20
VOL. IT Y
322 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
- Yet after all it was "a war of conquest/' we have long been
told. Popularly "conquest" is in truth an odious word, for
it has commonly been associated with odious deeds : aggression
and cruel tyranny; but "circumstances alter cases/' and when
the facts are unobjectionable, so is the term. Legally, the
idea has prevailed that conquest is robbery ; but this idea seems
to have grown from the old conception that the government
owned the country, and such is not our opinion to-day. 21
--FVroihlfi acquisitions may indeed be commendable. In that
way Rome civilized Europe, England gave peace, order and
comparative happiness to India, and our own country came
into being ; and none of us would undo these results. The wel-
fare of humanity is the true principle. Jjfe_has_the--r4ght--ef
way over death; enlightenment and energy over ignjarjai]Lce_and
torpor. Possession mefl.ns use ; power and opportunities mean
service. The primary law is that all shall move forward and
cooperate in achieving the general destiny. Like individuals,
every nation must run its course to the best of its ability, and
if it grossly flags, pay the penalty. In the absence of any other
tribunal, war must enforce this penalty. " Whosoever hath [in
use], to him shall be given, . . . but whosoever hath not, from
him shall be taken away even that which he hath." Such is
eternal right ; not the justice of the law schools, but the justice
of the Supreme Power. 21
all conquerors we were perhaps the most excusable, the
most reasonable, the most beneficent. The Mexicans had come
far short of their duty to the world. Being what they were, they
had forfeited a large share of their national rights. Even Hum-
boldt said that Mexico " ought not to expect to withhold, from
the uses of civilization and improvement," such neglected ter-
ritories as New Mexico and California. A philosopher like
Josiah Royce, a moralist like Francis Lieber and an unsympa-
thetic historian like Dr. von Hoist agree substantially that our
duty called upon us to occupy the Golden Gate. Not merely an
administration or a party, but the nation believed that our
destiny called us there, and felt ready to assume the high
responsibility of taking possession. 22
Besides, while ours could perhaps be called a war of con-
quest, it was not a war for conquest -the really vital point.
We found it necessary to require territory, for otherwise our
THE WAR LEAVES MEXICO FRIENDLY 323
claims and indemnity could not be paid. The conflict was forced
upon us ; yet we refused to take advantage of our opportunity.
"It is almost impossible/' says Bryce, "for a feeble State, full
of natural wealth which her people do not use, not to crumble
under the impact qf a stronger and more enterprising race."
But we gave back much that we took, and paid for the rest
more than it was worth to Mexico. "All deserve praise,
who . . . have been more just than their actual power made it
necessary to be," said Thucydides ; and we were not only just
but liberal. Finally, we gave proof, in the prosperity and use-
fulness of our new territories, that our responsibility was amply
met. 22
So the account was fairly adjusted and more. But something
still remains to say. A closer acquaintance with us and with
real national life taught Mexico some of her mistakes, confirmed
the political relations of her states, and helped greatly to liber-
alize her ideas and institutions. "The sad part of it is that
our chastisement is merited," preached Ramirez. "He that
reflects how useful are the lessons of suffering and misfortune,"
declared the minister of relations, "will admit that no one could
show more clearly the deformity of our errors than the foreign
invader [has done], and that there could have been no more
efficacious means of elevating our reason above the bastard in-
terests of political passion."
Still warmer sentiments prevailed. One of the chief obstacles
in the way of making a treaty was the desire of not a few Mex-
icans to have the Tinted States annex their country ; and after
that plan failed, the American general-in-ehief was actually
invited to become dictator for a term of years, backed by Amer-
ican troops. With reference to Trist, our commissioner, ("onto
and Cuevas remarked on presenting the treaty to Congress, "Of
him there remain in Mexico none but grateful and honoring
recollections"; and when bidding Clifford good-hy, the Presi-
dent expressed in no perfunctory way a sincere desire for
the most "sisterly" relations between the two countries, as
essential to the welfare of Mexico. Indeed, that nation had
not felt so cordial toward the United States for many years
as it did immediately after the war. 23
In Europe, too, fairer views and feelings regarding us began
to be entertained. "If nothing occur to tarnish what has been
324 THE WAR WITH MEXICO
so well begun," wrote our minister at the court of St. James in
June, 1846, " the moral influence produced here and in Europe
generally will be worth all the expenses of the war." "It was
a hard lesson for England to learn, but she has learned it," re-
ported Bancroft, who succeeded him ; " that America means to
go on her own way, and that Europe ... must give up the
thought of swaying her destiny." Our triumphs over Mexico,
remarked C. J. Ingersoll in the House, "have been admirable
lessons ... to the world, that the [wise] policy of all nations
is peace with these United States." Only on respect and ap-
preciation can peace and mutual helpfulness be founded, and
both our victories and the manner in which they were used pro-
moted harmony between us and the powers of Europe. 23
Humanity and moderation such humanity and modera-
tion as are practicable amid hostilities gilded our arms. " The
elevated and kindly character of Taylor and Scott," said the
Mexican historian, lloa Barcena, "lessened as far as waspossible
the evils of war." The Americans always treated us during
the conflict with "the most noble courtesy," wrote Ceballos.
"We shall certainly consider it as an unprecedented event if
this enormous booty [the wealth of the Mexican churches] es-
capes from pillage," proclaimed the London Times; and it did
escape. We have beaten the enemy, felt Robert E. Lee, the
knightly soldier, "in a manner no man might be ashamed of."
Even Theodore Parker, though opposed to the war, made this
public acknowledgment : " It has been conducted with as much
gentleness as a war of invasion can be." And a brave officer of
rare intelligence uttered on the floor of our Senate these words :
"We have cause to be proud of the record this war will leave
behind it a monument more lasting than brass. We, the
actors of to-day, must soon crumble to dust; the institutions
we now maintain, and hope will be perpetual, may pass away ;
the Republic may sink in the ocean of time, and the tide of
human affairs roll unbroken over its grave ; but the events of
this war will live in the history of our country and our race,
affording in all ages to come, proof of the high state of civiliza-
tion amongst the people who conducted it." M
NOTES
325
XXI. BEHIND THE SCENES AT MEXICO
1. This is a good illustration of Santa Anna's political ability.
2. Farias appears to have had no share in this quarrel with Salas
(Mexico a travel, iv, 593).
3. The course of Mexican politics. Federalista Puro, No. 3, supplmt. ;
No. 6, supplmt. London Times, Feb. 9, 1847. Apuntes, 71-3, 76, 124-6.
ISBankhead, Nos. 120, 136, 140, 146, 153, 157, 160, 169, 180, 1846. ^.Con-
sul Campbell, Nov. 10, 1846. 52Consul Black, Aug. 22, 27; Sept. 17,
22, 26, 1846. Comunicaci6n Circular de . . . Pena y Pena. Garcia,
Revol. de Ayutla, 18, 20, 27. Ultim s Comunicaciones habidas entre
. . . Salas y . . . Rej6n. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 538. Prieto,
Memorias, ii, 195, 199. ISThornton to Addington, June 29, 1847.
ISGutierrez de Estrada to Palmerston, Mar. 1, 1847. Mex. en 1847,
12-4. Ramirez, Mexico, 12, 142-4, 149, 152-4, 156, 165, 172, 176. 83Rej6n
to Berdusco, Dec. 23. Eco, Nov. 4, 7, 11, 14, 1846. Escudero, Mems.,
8, 13, 14. Dublan, Legisl., v, 171, 238-9. Memoria de . . . Relaciones,
Dec., 1846. 73Bermudez de Castro, nos. 332, res. ; 343, res. ; 345, res. ;
346; 368. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 100-1, 118, 120, 124, 126-8.
83Gov. Queretaro to Farias, Oct. 20. Roa Barcena, Recuerdos, 144.
Rivera, Los Gobernantes, ii, 310. Lara, Resumen, 65, note. Mora,
Papeles Ineditos, 64-5. 162Conner, Dec. 31, 1846. 164/d. Jan. 5,
1847. Bustamante, Campana, 7. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1125 (S. Anna).
Baz, Juarez, 43. Mexico d traves, iv, 576-7, 589, 591-2, 600-1, 698. Re-
publicano, Sept. 28; Oct. 20, 28; Nov. 17; Dec. 24, 1846; Jan. 1, 22-3;
Feb. 3, 1847. Monitor Repub., Sept. 25-6, 30; Oct. 19-23, 26; Dec.
25, 1846. Diario, Sept. 23, 25, 29 ; Oct. 9, 12, 14, 16, 31 ; Nov. 24 ; Dec.
18-9, 22, 28, 29, 1846. And from 76 the following Procl. gov. S. L. P.,
Oct. 22, 1846. J. Alvarez, Oct. 22. Comte. gen. Mex., Oct. 16. Canalize
to comte. gen. Mex., Oct. 18. Comte. gen. Oaxaca, Oct. 24. Salas,
procl., Oct. 25. Guerra, circulars, Oct. 14, 19, 22 ; Dec. 23. Relaciones
to gov. Fed. Dist., Dec. 23. Relaciones circular, Oct. 19. Comte. gen.
Chiapas, Nov. 3. Also others of minor importance. Otero was associated
with Pedraza in the leadership of the Moderados.
4. So far as possible, revenue was anticipated, even at a great loss.
E.n., if a merchant expected a cargo to arrive at Vera Cruz, he sent a
broker (agiotista) to the minister of the treasury, and by paying a sum in
advance he obtained drafts on the Vera Cruz customhouse that were
receivable at par for the duties. Of course the merchant, the broker and
the minister made profits, and the treasury lost (N. Y. Herald, Jan. 18,
1845). Another way in which the minister could make money was to
accept at face value as part of a loan or pnyment government paper that
had cost the one who tendered it only a trifle, and take a share of the net
proceeds. " Agiotista" became an odious term. It was giveru out that
Santa Anna would accept no pay, but the treasury books showed that he
drew his salary for even the time while he was at Havana (335Worrall
to Trist, Nov. 28, 1847). They apparently showed also that in 1846
millions were distributed among generals, brokers and others. The British
327
328 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXI, PAGES 7-9
minister said that Iturbe was the ninth finance minister whom he had
seen devoting "his peculiar attention to the augmentation, of his private
means while in office" (ISBankhead, no. 104, 1846). Another great
evil was that, in spite of express prohibitions, state officials drew upon the
proceeds of the tobacco monopoly. The following table illustrates the
state of the treasury (1846) :
Oct. 12 Oct. 16 Dec. 26 Dec'. 29
On hand $8510 $3410 $1148
Rec'd 3500 $7162 3700
Paid 1402 3628 5713 4367
A poll tax was thought of by Rej6n, but evidently the government dared
not propose it (TSBermudez de Castro, nos. 332, res., 346, 1846).
5. Mexican financial history (see also the first part of chap, xxxiii).
Comunicaci6n Circular de . . . Pena y Pena. Memoria de . . . Rela-
ciones, Mar., 1845; Dec., 1846. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 368, 716. Ilus-
trador Catolico, no. 239. Hacienda, series of Memorias. Hacienda, Mani-
fiesto de la Admin, y Progresos. London Times, July 6, 1846. Breve
Resumen. Casasus, Hist, de la Deuda contraida, etc., passim. Paredes,
address to Cong., June 6, 1846 (Diario). Alaman, Liquidacion. Esposi-
ci6n del Cong. Gen. llMartin, Apr. 30, 1827; July 4; Aug. 25, 1828.
llSeries of Memoires on the Spanish Colonies. Sierra, Evolution, i,
178, 218. Zamacois, M6x., xii, 254. 52Consul Jones, Aug. 1, 1839.
56 W. S. Parrott, Oct. 4, 11, 1845. 58Howland & Aspinwall, Mar. 1, 1847.
Republicano, Feb. 2, 1847. ISAshburnham, nos. 39, 51, 1837; 3, 97,
1838. ISPakenham, nos. 28, 1833 ; 6, 1836 ; 44, 62, 1839. ISBankhead,
nos. 81, 1844; 6, 38, 70, 106, 1845; 21, 104, 127, 146, 169, 1846.
52Poinsett, Jan. 4; Aug. 5, 1825; July 16, 1828. 52Butler, July 16,
1832. Revista Econ., Dec. 14, 1843; Feb. 5, 1844. Tornel, Resefia, 9,
171. Macgregor, Progress, i, 674-83. Thompson, Recoils., 12, 27-8,
87. 52D. Green, Oct. 28; Nov. 12, 29, 1844. N. Y. Herald, Jan. 18,
1845. Siglo XIX, June 14, 1844; Dec. 2, 1845. Patriota Mexicano,
Dec. 9, 1845. Reforma, Jan. 23, 1846. London Times, Mar. 29; May
15; Sept. 9; Nov. 11; Dec. 6, 1845; Mar. 2, 1846. Revue Indep., Apr.
25, 1845. 52Consul Black, Aug. 23, 1845. 52Consul Dimond, no. 338,
May 7, 1846. 73Bermudez de Castro, no. 346, 1846. 52Consul McCall,
no. 65, Sept. 26, 1845. Balbontin, Estado, 66. Wash. Union, Feb. 2,
1848 (Poinsett). N. Y. Globe, June 3, 1846. Diario, Sept. 18, 1846.
Monitor Repub., Nov. 27, 1846 ; Jan. 9, 1847. Ward, Mexico, i., 331-7.
76To S. Anna, Nov. 25. Vicario Capitular, Contestacion. Priestley,
Jose de Galvez, Chap. x.
6. The present financial problem. Dublan, Legislacion, v., 172, 211^-6,
235-7, 240. 77Relaciones circular, Nov. 27, 1846. ISBankhead, no.
6, 1845; nos. 21, 127, 153, 167, 169, 1846. 52Consul Black, Dec. 29,
1846. Apuntes, 76, 124-6. Ramirez, Mexico, 171. 335 Worrall to Trist,
Nov. 28, 1847. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 716. Ilustrador Catolico, i., 281.
Mex. en 1847, 14-19, 24. Don Simplicio, Feb. 1-3, 1847. 86Relaciones,
Oct. 26, 1846. Zempoalteca, Nov. 27, 1846. Escudero, Mems., 8,
92Gov. Fed. Dist., procl., Jan. 16. 82Gov. Durango to legisl., Nov. 8,
1846. Columna de la Libertad, Jan. 8, 1847. Sierra, Evolution, i, 178,
217-8. 52McLane, no. 5, 1845. 56W. S. Parrott, Oct. 4, 11, 1845.
llMemoire, 1828. D. Green to Calhoun, Oct. 28 ; Nov. 12 in- Jameson,
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXI, PAGES 9-11 329
Calh. Corresp., 976-80, 991. Siglo XIX, Jan. 14, 1844. London Times,
Sept. 9; Dec. 6, 1845; Oct. 8, 1846; Jan. 8, 1847. Memoria de . . .
Relaciones, Dec., 1846 (Lafragua). 73Bermudez de Castro, nos. 316, res.,
346, 371, res., 445. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 128. 75Relaciones,
circulars to govs., Oct. 9; Dec. 17, 1846; circs, nos. 233, 238, 255, 1846.
75aHacienda, circulars, Oct. 10; Nov. 9; Dec. 5, 31, 1846. 86V. Cruz
state treas. to gov., Jan. 11 ; Feb. 4, 1847. Constitutional, Dec. 18, 1846.
Wash. Union, Jan. 18, 29; May 11, 1847. Monitor, Oct. 12. 166Pom-
mares to Conner, Oct. 7, 1846. Republicano, Oct. 22 ; Nov. 5, 13, 24 ;
Dec. 8, 1846; Jan. 23, 1847. Monitor Repub., Sept. 25, 30; Oct.
18; Nov. 19, 30; Dec. 19, 1846. Diario, Sept. 23, 25, 29; Oct. 2, 3;
Nov. 21, 23 ; Dec. 4, 13, 15, 21, 29, 30, 1846 ; Jan. 1, 7-9, 1847. Mexico
& travel, iv, 589, 600, 628-9. 76S. Anna, Nov. 7, 9, 19 ; Dec. 3, 4, 7,
30, 1846; Jan. 1, 2, 4, 7, 1847. 76J. Alvarez, Sept. 30, 1846. 76Circ.
to comtes. gen., Sept. 28, 1846.
7. The law was a compromise (Apuntes, 124). Rej6n, as he frankly
told the Spanish minister (note 6), was for nationalizing i.e., confiscat-
ing the property of the Church. Santa Anna preferred to let the clergy
keep the title to their wealth, and require a loan from them now and then
a process termed "milking" (Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 992). The
essential basis on which the law passed was the practical necessity of rais-
ing money for the war ; but many who recognized this necessity and even
the desirability of reducing the wealth and power of the Church could not
bring themselves to act.
8. The law, if fully enforced, would no doubt have done much injury,
however great its benefits. E'.g., a great amount of land had been hypoth-
ecated to the Church with no expectation on either side that the loan
which it secured would ever be paid ; but the government, in order to ob-
tain cash, intended that the loan should be paid or the land sold. Many
individuals would thus have been ruined and the agricultural interests
partially crippled, while on account of the small amount of money in cir-
culation, only very low prices would have been realized for the land
(ISBankhead, no. 7, 1847). Moreover, land with a Church curse upon
it was sure to sell slowly, and many believed that titles obtained in this
way would not hold good very long. As the clergy would give no informa-
tion about their property, some exempted property was seized, and these
mistakes caused trouble (Mexico a traves, iv, 631). Many objected to the
law because they presumed that the proceeds of sales would reach private
pockets. The principal arguments against it were summed up by the
88ayuntamiento of C6rdoba as follows: "It attacks property, invades
the rights of the states, contravenes the sovereignty of the Church and is
anti-religious, for there can be no religion without worship, no worship
without priests and no priests without Church property." On the other
hand the Puro 92ayuntamiento of the capital described the law as "A law
to save our independence and religion, in which nothing is done except
that one class of society is to loan its property to society as a whole," add-
ing, "How unfortunate would be our faith, if the religion of the Savior
could be supported only with money . . . charity and poverty were
the example of his mission." The metropolitan chapter of Mexico took
the ground that property once consecrated to God was sacred, and that to
take it would be an act of sacrilege sure to bring upon the country the
wrath and punishment of heaven (92Representaci6n) . The bishop of
Puebla said to his flock: "Far from us is the idea of disturbing public
330 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXI, PAGES 11-13
order, but we must notify our very dear lambs that the pasturage offered
thorn is poisonous ; and if for so doing we incur the wrath of men, we will
strengthen our weakness with the words of the chief of the Apostles at the
council of the Jews: 'We must obey God rather than men'" (S2Mani-
fiesto). This was a clear and official incitement to insurrection.
9. The law of Jan. 11 and the struggle over it. Apuntes, 124-32. 13
Bankhead, nos. 180, 1846; 6, 7, 10, 14, 17, 1847. Gaxiola, Invasi6n,
118. 52 J. Parrott, Feb. 6. 56Beach, report, June 4. London Times,
Sept. 9; Oct. 7, 1846; Mar. 11; May 12, 1847. Oil portrait of Farias,
city hall, Mex. 52Consul Black, Feb. 24. Revue Indep., Apr. 25, 1845.
Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 822, 825-6. Catolico, iii, 553. Conducta Admin,
de Berdusco. Ilustrador Catolico, no. 239. 88C6rdoba ayunt., Feb. 4.
92Mex. i yunt. to chapter, Jan. 14. 92Ayunt., procl., Jan. 14. 92Repre-
sentaci6n of metrop. chapter to Cong. 92Segunda Protesta ; Tercera
Protesta del Ven. C bildo Metrop. 92Exposici6n que el Sr. Vicario Capit.
92Expos. del Cabildo Metrop. 92Procl. of gov. Fed. Dist., Jan. 16.
95Queret. cong., Jan. 12. 95Puebla ayunt. to gov., Jan. 16. 95Sanchez
to Puebla ayunt., Feb. 16. 82Bish. Puebla, manif., Jan. 27. 82Gov.
Puebla, procl., Jan. 27 ; Mar. 5, 15. Lamentos de los Mex. 73Bermudez
de Castro, nos. 332, res., 346, 445. Dublan, Legislaci6n, v., 246, 255,
261-2. Registro Oficial de Durango, Jan. 26. SOGuanajuato cong., Jan.
29. L^comotor, Jan. 18. Mora, Papeles, 74-6. Negrete, Invasi6n
iv, app., 412-4. Ramirez, Mexico, 172, 184, 188, 190, 193, 198. Diario,
Dec. 21, 1846; Jan. 7-9, 11-16, 18, 19, 26, 30; Feb. 4, 1847. Republicano,
Dec. 9, 12, 1846; Jan. 8, 11, 23-4, 27, 29; Feb. 6, 11, 12; May 14, 1847.
Mexico a traves, iv, 601-8, 628, 630-1, 638. And the following from 76.
Comte. gen. Queret., Jan. 19, 20, 22. Id., procl., Jan. 20. Comte
gen. Puebla, Jan. 12, 28; Feb. 17. Guerra, order, Jan. 24. Min. eccles.
affairs to metropol. chapter, Jan. 14. Comte. gen. Mex., Jan. 15. Comte.
gen. Jalisco, Feb. 2. J. Alvarez, Feb. 2. Comte. gen. Oaxaca, Feb. 11,
15. Comte. gen. Guanaj., Jan. 29; Feb. 15, res. To comte. gen. Puebla,
Feb. 24. Decrees, Jan. 15, 27; Feb. 4, 7, 10. To S. Anna, Jan. 30.
S. Anna, Jan. 7, 13, 22, 26, 29 ; Feb. 9.
10. Beach's mission and escape. 56Special Missions, p. 257. 56Beach
report, June 4, 1847. Polk, Diary, Apr. 14, 1847. lOSMrs. Storms to
Bancroft, July 23, 1846, and Marcy's endorsement. Griffis, Perry, 224.
52Consul Black, Jan. 28, 1847. N. Y. Sun, Apr. 15; Aug. 16, 24, 1847.
166Dimond to Conner, Jan. , 1847. Scribner's Monthly, xvii, 300.
Appleton, Amer. Biog. (article on M. Y. B.). Kenly, Md. Vol., 269.
76To comte. gen. V. Cruz, Jan. 14. 76Landero, Jan. 14. 76S. Anna,
Jan. 22.
11. Apuntes, 126. ISBankhead, no. 14, 1847. 56Beach, report,
June 4, 1847. Ramirez, Mexico, 193-4, 198-9. Mexico a traves, iv, 608,
631. 199Anon. MS. of go-between.
12. The monarchists, who were closely associated with the Church,
shared in the insurrection (Apuntes, 119), and no doubt many of the
Moderados took part in it (London Times, May 10, 1847), though Pedraza
denied positively that he drew up the plan (Apuntes, 131).
13. The insurrection. 56Beach, report, June 4, 1847. Apuntes, 126,
128-37. ISBankhead, no. 17, 1847. Consideraciones, 37. Me*x. en
1847, 14, 19. Le6n, Hist. Gen., 475. 52J. Parrott, Feb. 6. Bustamante,
Campafia sin, etc., 5, 8, 10, 11, 13. 52Black, Mar. 6. London Times,
May 10, 12. Salas, pamphlet, Mar. 3. ISPeiia y Barragan, procl.,
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXI, PAGES 13-14 331
Mar. 8. Septimo Disengano. Boletin de la Democratic, Mar. 2, 7, 13.
Farias, Address. Ramirez, Mexico, 190, 193, 198-9, 201, 204, 209. Mexico
A traves, iv, 631-5. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 841-9. Arco Iris, Nov. 24, 1847.
Escudero, Mems., 14, 19, 20. 82Zacatecas cong., Mar. 5. 82Jalisco
legisl., Mar. 12. 77Relaciones, circular, Mar. 13. SOMex. state legisl.,
Mar. 18. Balbontin, Invasi6n, 104. 80Lt. gov. Mex. state procl.,
Mar. 23. 199Anon. MS. 76Farias, procl. 83Gov. Queret. to Pena
y Barragan, Mar. 2, 20. Rivera, Los Gobernantes, ii., 318. N. Y. Sun,
Apr. 15; Aug. 24. Diario, Feb. 20, 21. Monitor Repub., Dec. 27, 1846;
Feb. 13; Mar. 23. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1125 (S. Anna). Lerdo de Tejada,
Apuntes, ii, 539. And from 76 the following, besides others of minor
importance. Comte. gen. Queret., Jan. 20. Canalize to Anaya, Feb.
26. J. Alvarez, Mar. 10. L. Carri6n, Mar. 10. Gov. Puebla, Feb. 17;
reply, Feb. 24. Plan of Puebla insurgents, Feb. 27. Govt. bulletins,
Mar. 2, 5. Morales, Mar. 1. Aguascalientes legisl., Mar. 4. Gov.
Zacat. to Relac., Mar. 5. Gov. Queret. to Relac., Mar. 9. Provis. gov.
Jalisco to Relac., Mar. 3. Comte. gen. Jalisco to garrison, Mar. 7. Gov.
Puebla to Relac., Mar. 5. Lt. Col. Indep. b ttal. to mistress, Mar. 15.
Comte. gen. Oaxaca, Feb. 17. Gov. M6x. state to Relac., Mar. 19.
Id., procl., Mar. 18. Decrees, Mar. 1, 8, 12, 15.
On this subject Beach reported in substance as follows: When the
government resolved to raise money on the Church property, I urged the
clericals to an organized resistance. They consented, and at the moment
of General Scott's debarkation at Vera Cruz they made a most important
diversion in his favor by raising the standard of civil war at the capital,
at Puebla and in a degree at Michoacan. This occupied 5000 men and
all the arms, munitions of war and means of the government in the city
of Mexico for twenty-three days ; effectually preventing them from aiding
Vera Cruz, or strengthening Puebla or the strongholds nearer the coast.
On the tenth day of this rebellion or pronunciamiento, I was informed that
$40,000 would be required of the clergy to carry it on another week, and
that it would be paid if the importance of the crisis justified the outlay.
As General Scott had but just landed his artillery at Vera Cruz, and might
be detained there for some time, I deemed that almost any outlay would
be justified. The rebellion was therefore kept up, until the sudden appear-
ance of General Santa Anna closed the affair. [One must remember, in
passing judgment on the conduct of the clergy, how much they had suf-
fered at the hands of Santa Anna and how much reason they had to fear
him.]
Beach had arranged to visit Mexico on private business, and he persuaded
Buchanan that he could, through Almonte and others, bring about peace.
Hence he was appointed "confidential agent to the Republic of Mexico"
to accomplish what he could ; and, on learning the state of things at
Mexico, he saw that Scott's operations could be materially assisted by
inaugurating and continuing the clerical insurrection. His report may
be found in the state department archives at Washington.
14. Santa Anna left San Luis Potosi March 15 with more than 5000
men and ten guns.
15. Rej6n wrote to Santa Anna, March 7, 1847, urging him to stand
firmly by his manifesto of August 16, 1846, i.e. by the Puros, and detail-
ing a series of Moderado intrigues intended (he said) to annoy and humiliate
Santa Anna until he should inaugurate a revolution, with a view to then
having him shot.
332 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXI, PAGES 14-16
16. Beach was watched for several days before he left the city. He
escaped by paying for his lodgings for some time to come, leaving a trunk
there, taking a carriage late at night without baggage, and choosing an
unusual route (N. Y. Sun, Aug. 16, 1847). A reward of $1000 was offered
for him dead or alive (ibid., Aug. 24). Notices were put up denouncing
as a traitor anyone possessing a copy of the New York Sun. He was
accused of having tried to bring about a clerical revolution and also to
induce the states of Guanajuato, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi and Jalisco
to secede and declare for the United States. See also N. Y. Sun, May
27, 1847; Polk, Diary, May 11, 1847; Kenly, Md. Vol., 269. We shall
hear again of Beach's operations.
17. Santa Anna received news of the insurrection near Cedral.
18. Santa Anna may very possibly have hoped now to combine the
military class, the conservatives and the clericals into a solid phalanx
behind him, and he may have commended the movement against Church
property for the very purpose of making the clergy feel the need of his
assistance. See Tribute d la Verdad, 76.
19. His overthrow was not really due to the law of January 11, but
resulted from his radical ideas and unpractical methods, the odium of
his former administration, his consequent inability to secure the cooper-
ation of influential men, and the general state of unrest and dissension.
20. Outcome of the insurrection. Apuntes, 111, 115-8, 133, 136-8.
ISBankhead, nos. 33, 34, 1847. M6x. en 1847, 14-18. 69S. Anna, order,
Mar. 14. Anglo-Saxon, Mar. 13. 56Beach, report, June 4, 1847. Bus-
tamante, Campana, 30. London Times, May 10. Britannia, May 15.
Mexico a traves, iv, 577, 635-40. Ramirez, Mexico, 184, 198-9, 205, 207,
209-12, 215-8. 82Gov. Puebla, boletin No. 4 (S. Anna to Farias, Mar. 6 ;
Gil to Ruano, Mar. 6). 77Relaciones, circulars, Mar. 22 ; Apr. 1. Tributo
d la Verdad, 76. 75Rej6n to S. Anna, Mar. 7. 84Palacios to Gov. S. L.
P., Mar. 17. Republicano, Mar. 24. 75aHacienda, circular, Mar. 29.
Puga y Acal, Docs., 62-3. Escudero, Mems., 19. Bustamante, Nuevo
Bernal, ii, 146-7. Dublan, Legisl., v, 262-5. Locomotor, Jan. 18.
Baz, Judrez, 47. Diario, Mar. 29, 1847 (Baz). The twenty-millions
law had very little effect, if any. Le Constitutionnel, June 17, 1847 (The
clergy have kept none of the promises by the aid of which they obtained
the repeal of the confiscation of their property).
XXII. VERA CRUZ
1. "New volunteers," those called out in November. For the ten
transports see chap, xviii, note 28. Jan. 18 Conner wrote to Scott that
Santa Anna had moved, about January 1, against Taylor, but that from
all accounts presumably Taylor had probably retired to Monterey (Ho.
60 ; 30, 1, p. 893). It was therefore natural for Scott to feel satisfied that
Santa Anna, learning of the expedition against Vera Cruz, would retrace
his steps and reach that place in season. At Scott's instance a spy, selected
by Consul Campbell with the aid of Consul Dimond (who visited Cuba
for the purpose), was to have set out from Havana in January for Mexico
City and San Luis Potosi (166Dimond to Conner, Jan. 15) ; but the author
found no further trace of him.
2. Some transports reached Ant6n Lizardo Feb. 27 and notified Conner
that Scott was coming (162Conner, Feb. 27). Certain troops, leaving
Tampico March 1, arrived at that rendezvous in advance of Scott (139
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXII, PAGES 17-21 333
W. B. Campbell to wife, Mar. 6). By sunset on March 5 about seventy
sail had appeared there.
3. To Anton Lizardo. Macgregor, Progress, i, 677. 47Conner, Dec. 1
1846; Feb. 17; Mar. 7, 10, 1847. 159Collins narrative. 298Porter,
diary. GGRemarks in margin of chart of V. Cruz harbor. Le Clercq,
Voyage, 401, 418. Robertson, Remins., 214-6. Campos, Recuerdos,
31. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 238. Grant, Mems., i, 125. Hartman,
Journal, 6. Taylor, Broad Pennant, 123. Picayune, Mar. 26. Delta,
Oct. 16. Meade, Letters, i, 187. 65Scott, gen. orders 28, 33, 34, 37.
313Saunders to Conner, Mar. 5. Oswandel, Notes, 63. Semmes, Ser-
vice, 106, 109, 111. Kenly, Md. Volunteer, 266. Lawton, Artillery
Officer, 65-6, 68. 146Caswell, diary. 322Smith, diary. Kitchen, Rec-
ord, 21-2. 270Moore, diary. 327Sutherland, letter. Ballentine, Eng-
lish Soldier, i, 257, 261. 254McClellan to sister, Feb. 23. Moore,
Scott's Campaign, 1-4. Parker, Recoils., 49, 82. Washington Union,
Apr. 6. Monitor Repub., Mar. 16. 164Scott to Conner, Feb. 22, 26.
162Conner to wife, Aug. 10, 1846; Feb. 26, 27, 1847. Ho. 60; 30, 1,
pp. 879, 892 (Conner) ; 896 (Hetzel) ; 893, 896, 899 (Scott) ; 568 (Jesup).
Nebel and Kendall, 17. Diccionario Univ. (Anton Lizardo). Niles,
Mar. 13, 1847, p. 21. 332Tennery, diary. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 65.
254McClellan, diary. IGSConner to Scott, Jan. 18; to Breese and to
Aulick, Feb. 28. Hammersly, Naval Encyclop., 94. 139W. B. Campbell
to wife, Mar. 6. Smith, To Mexico, 108-10. 76Garay, Mar. 5. 76Cos,
Feb. 19, 21. 76Soto, Mar. 7. 76 Watchman at Uua, Mar. 5.
4. For additional information regarding San Juan de Ulua the reader
may consult chapters xviii and xxx.
5. New York letters received in Cuba and made known at Mexico gave
notice that Scott planned to capture Vera Cruz before attacking Uliia
(76Relaciones, Jan. 26) ; some Mexicans believed he would enter the
Antigua River (which emptied a short distance to the north) with boats,
and strike at once into the interior ; some thought he would land at Tux-
pan, and march south along the coast ; and some ridiculed the idea of an
attack upon Vera Cruz on the ground that, since the Americans could
not possibly reach the capital by that route, it would be useless to capture
the city (Monitor Repub., Mar. 28). Many argued that in any case Ulua
would protect Vera Cruz.
6. Besides fine old Spanish guns, there were new and heavy English
pieces (Nacional, July 12, 1846) and twenty recently cast in the United
States (Davis, Autobiog., 131). A battery of sixteen bronze long 24-
pdrs., made in England in 1840, was pronounced by American artillery
officers "far superior" to anything of the sort they had seen elsewhere
(213 Hatch to father, Apr. 2). It was in the city. As to the amount of
ordnance in the city and castle accounts differed. Scott made it 400
pieces; Hitchcock, upwards of 350; Balbontin, 113 mounted, 46 un-
mounted at Ulua, 83 and 57 respectively at Vera Cruz ; G. T. M. Davis,
390 effective pieces. The statement of the Mexican government, Decem-
ber, 1846 (based of course on earlier reports), was as follows : Vera Cruz,
mounted, bronze, eleven 24's, twenty 16's, six 12's, four 8's, four 4's,
four mountain 4's, five 12-inch mortars, seven 8-inch howitzers, and of
iron, mounted, three 42-lb. mortars, three 24-lb. cannon, five 12's, nine
8's, six 13-inch mortars, two 9-inch mortars ; Uliia, bronze, mounted, thirty-
six 24's, four 16's, four 8's, two 14-inch mortars, and of iron, mounted,
ten 84-lb. mortars, ten 68-lb. mortars, sixteen 42-lb. mortars, fifty-one
334 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXII, PAGES 21-22
24-lb. cannon, two 16's, a total of 224 besides a considerable number of
unmounted pieces in both places, some of which were doubtless mounted
later (Memoria de . . . Guerra). Still other guns were sent from the
interior. Possibly some unserviceable ordnance may have been included
in the highest American figures. Balbontin gives the number of firearms
as 7369 half of the total number belonging to the government. Ripley
(War with Mex., ii, 19) and Wilcox (Mex. War, 251) state that there
was no ditch, but the weight of evidence seems to be against them. Perhaps
the drifting sand filled the ditch before the Americans took the city.
7. It was not easy to believe that the factions at Mexico would not
agree to turn their arms against the Americans on learning they had landed.
March 9 the state of Vera Cruz issued a strong appeal to them and to the
nation. Neutrals and valuable neutral property were taken aboard
foreign war- vessels (12Matson to Giffard, Mar. 5). The American
blockade had greatly impaired the resources of the state and city. A
forced loan was imposed by the former, but no large receipts could be
expected.
8. The accepted (not official) Mexican figures were 1030 for Uliia and
3360 for Vera Cruz, but the authorities did not consider it obligatory to
publish the correct number. ISMarch 11 the British consul, Giffard,
reported the garrisons as about 1500 and 4000 respectively, and later
(according to Mexican accounts that were probably rather flattering)
more than 1000 threw themselves into the city. Santa Anna stated in
April that Morales had 5000 in the town (76S. Anna, Apr. 29), but he was
unfriendly to that officer. Scott's figures were 5000 besides those who
perished or escaped during the siege ; but before the surrender he heard
the city alone had that number (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 221). British naval
officers stated there were about 6000 in city and castle (Meade, Letters,
i, 188), and Col. Campbell was told there were 5-6000 (139to wife, Mar.
6). The Mexicans complained of a lack of gunners, but their own figures
were 680. No doubt the troops were poorly cared for, but such was the
custom. Robles counted for not a little. In the autumn of 1846 Landero,
personally liked but considered wanting in ability and regarded as a tool
of Santa Anna, was made comte. gen. because Morales was strenuously
denounced by Santa Anna as politically unsafe (76S. Anna, Oct. 14) ;
but on the approach of the crisis the people forced a change, and the con-
fidence inspired by Morales enabled him (Landero admitted in his 76
report, Apr. 3, 1847) to accomplish more than the latter could have done.
Particular resentment was felt against Santa Anna for taking away in
August, 1846, the best regiment (the Eleventh Infantry). For the names
of corps at Vera Cruz and Ulua see Roa Barcena, Recuerdos, 158.
9. The situation at Vera Cruz and Ulua. ISConsul Giffard, Nov. 1 ;
Dec. 1, 1846; Feb. 28; Mar. 11, 1847. 52Consul Dimond, no. 336,
May 2, 1846. Engineer School, U. S. Army, Occasional Papers, no. 16.
218Henshaw narrative. 280Nunelee, diary. 159Collins, diary. GBravo
to Tola, Apr. 18, 1846. 224Hitchcock, diary, Mar. 13. ISPakenham,
no. 25, 1842. National, July 12, 1846. Constitutionnel, May 8, 1847.
W. S. Parrott, Feb. 6, 1847. SOMexico state legislature to people.
Memoria de . . . Guerra, Dec., 1846, p. 22. (Cisterns, etc.) Lyon,
Journal, ii, 221. Orbigny, Voyage, 407-8. Robertson, Visit, i, 232, 239.
Ruxton, Adventures (London, 1847), 12-15. Robertson, Remins., 225-6,
235, 237. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 541-50, 552, 569. Naredo,
Orizaba, i, 107-8. Scott. Mems., ii, 422. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 248.
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXII, PAGES 21-22 335
Ballentine, English Soldier, i, 288-9. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p. 239. Balbontln,
Estado, 49-55. Tribute a la Verdad, 17-26, 29, 88. Apuntes, 152-5.
S. Anna, Apelacion, 33. Delta, Oct. 16, 1847. SSOWeber, recoils. 12Mat-
son to Giffard, Mar. 5, 1847; to Fischer, Mar. 8; to commodore, Mar.
10, 25. Oswandel, Notes, 102. Semmes, Service, 102, 104-6. 139W.
B. Campbell to D. C., Mar. 20. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 56, 865. Otero,
Comunicaci6n, 11. Diario, Apr. 8. Republicano, Dec. 8, 1846. SGRela-
ciones to gov., Jan. 27, 1847; reply, Feb. 1. 86State treas. to gov., Jan.
15. 86Morales to gov., Feb. 8. 90Soto, proclam., Mar. 2. 90/d. to
state congress, Dec. 1, 1846. 100V. Cruz ayunt. to prefect, June 4,
1846. lOOBravo to ayunt., June 9, 1846. lOOAyunt. to jefe of dept ,
Oct. 26, 1846. lOOSoto, proclam., Feb. 6, 1847. 88ld., proclam., Feb.
15, 1847. Regenerad r Re/ ub. Puebla, Mar. 13 ; Apr. 7, 1847. 82Noti-
cias de V. Cruz. Kenly, Md. Volunteer, 267. Mexico traves, iv, 600.
Lawton, Artillery Officer, 67, 105-7. El Estado de Veracruz d Todos.
Memoria de . . . Guerra, Dec., 1846. 146Caswell, diary. 270Moore,
diary. 73Bermudez de Castro, nos. 441, 445, Feb. 28; Mar. 2, 1847.
Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 67. Valois, Mexique, 40-43. 27lMorales
to commander of Uliia, Oct. 20, 1846. Moore, Scott's Campaign, 12.
Conner, Castle of S. Juan de Ulloa, 13. Parker, Recoils., 79. (Learned)
Monitor Repub., Nov. 13, 30, 1846; Mar. 28, 1847. Negrcte, Invasi6n,
iv, app., 413-4. 166Campbell to Conner, Jan. 9, 1847. 166Pommares to
Conner, Oct. 15, 1846. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 911, 1169 (Scott). Meade,
Letters, i, 188. Diccionario Univ. (Uliia). 47Conner, Oct. 4, 1846.
165/d. to Scott, Jan. 18; Feb. 5, 1847. lOOSoto to jefe, V. Cr. dept.,
Sept. 17, 1846. lOOJefe to V. Cr. ayunt., Dec. 21, 1846. Bishop, Journal,
29. Niles, May 9, 1846, p. 160. So. Quart. Rev., July, 1851. 86V. Cruz
congress, manifiesto, Mar. 9. And from 76 the following. A large amount
of correspondence between the dept. and successive commanders at Vera
Cruz, particularly in March, April, Sept. and Oct., 1846, Jan. and Feb.,
1847, relating to the fortifications, garrison, supplies and dangers of the
city and Ulua. S. Anna, Oct. 12, 14, 20, 1846; Jan. 14, 18; Apr. 29,
1847. Morales, Jan. 20, 1847. Tampico letter to Garay, Jan. 25. Soto,
Feb. 7, 15; Mar. 7, etc. Morales, Feb. 9, 15; Mar. 4, 5, etc. Boletin de
la Democrac'a, Mar. 2, 1847 (N. Y. letter, Jan. 8). To S. Anna, Oct.
17, 1846; Jan. 30, 1847. To Morales, Mar. 6, 7. Morales, proclam.,
Mar. 5. Landero, report, Apr. 3. Jalapa letter, Mar. 16. Canalizo
to Hacienda, Jan. 11. Landero, Jan. 25, 1847. J. Alvarez, Oct. 21,
1846. Memo., Feb. 9, 1847. Tampico letter, Dec. 30, 1846. Morales
to Marin, Mar. 11.
10. What Scott called his "little cabinet" consisted of Col. Totten
(chief engineer), Lieut. Col. Hitchcock (acting inspector general), Capt.
Robert E. Lee (engineer) and H. L. Scott (acting as military secretary).
Col. James Bankhead was chief artillery officer, Capt. Huger was acting
chief of ordnance, and Maj. Turnbull was the chief topographical engineer -
(Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 239-40). Col. Harney commanded the regular cavalry,
and Capt. Edson commanded three companies of marines loaned by
Conner, and temporarily attached to the Third Artillery. At this time
the engineers, artillery and cavalry were kept by Scott under his immediate
orders. While at Lobos Islands he laid down the rule (65gen. orders
33) that every project of siege or bombardment should first be discussed
between the senior engineer and artillery officers and then reported to him
for approval or amendment. Hence the detailed plan for the operations
336 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXII, PAGES 22-26
at Vera Cruz came formally from Totten, and he has been credited with
originating it.
11. Simms wrote to Gov. Hammond of South Carolina that Scott's
operations at Vera Cruz lacked brilliancy.
12. Conner had reckoned upon the starvation method ; but (1) the
amount of supplies in the town and castle was not certainly known and,
as we shall find, was too large for this method ; (2) fishing was a resource
of unmeasured value (even from the mole great quantities of fish were
caught : Delta, Oct. 16, 1847) ; (3) it was possible that on some night the
American line might be temporarily broken, and thousands of cattle be
run into the city; (4) as British observers agreed, the Mexicans were
capable of bearing privations for a long while; (5) Scott rested under
an imperative obligation to remove his army from the coast in time to
save it from the vomito ; and (6) he had to count on reducing Ulua after
capturing the city.
13. ISGiffard, Mar. 11. Scott, Mems., ii, 422-5. Ballentine, English
Soldier, ii, 3-6. Davis, Autobiog., 140-1. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 223,
239. Balbontin, Estado, 53, 55. 65Scott, gen. orders 33. 12Matson
to commodore, Mar. 11, 25. Steele, Amer. Campaigns, i, 120. N. Y.
Sun, Aug. 16, 1847 (Scott should have left 5000 to reduce V. Cruz).
So. Quart. Rev., July, 1851. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 47-9. Oswandel, Notes,
101. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 892 (Conner). McCall, Letters, 483. Moore,
Scott's Camp., 12.
14. This seems like a foolhardy performance ; but other boats had gone
as near without being fired upon, and the Petrita was supposed to be out
of range (Mag. Am. Hist., xiv, 567). The engineers intended of course
to get as near as they could with safety, and it is possible that Scott wished
to set an example of fearlessness. McCall, who was on board, wrote that
this occurred on Mar. 6 ; other accounts place it on the seventh.
15. Just as the fleet was leaving Anton Lizardo, 800 Louisiana volun-
teers arrived. These, with a shipload who came some hours later, gave
Scott upwards of 11,000 men. His 62return of Mar. 25 included
13,470.
16. With some light guns, which would probably have been lost, a
thousand Americans might have been accounted for. It has been sug-
gested that until the boats moved toward the shore the Mexicans did not
know where the blow would fall; but their own explanation was that
they had no suitable troops to spare for the purpose (Tribute a la Verdad,
28). Morales had, however, what he called an Extra-muros section,
i.e., militia. A lack of intelligence, enterprise or nerve was doubtless the
real cause of his remissness. The one shot mentioned in the text probably
came from a gun found later among the dunes (GSBackus to Brady, Sept.
22, 1848). A company of sappers and miners and an iron boat loaded
with entrenching tools and sand-bags accompanied Worth's brigade.
Less than half the surf-boats ordered by Scott had arrived.
17. The landing. Bullock, Six Months (1825), i, 10. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1,
pp. 216-8, 220, 222 (Scott); 239-40 (gen. orders 80). Ho. 1; 30, 2,
pp. 1177-9. Apuntes, 153. Engineer School, U. S. Army, Occasional
Papers, no. 16. 218Henshaw narrative. 280Nunelee, diary. 216Hei-
man, First Regt. of Tenn. 159Collins, diary. 298Porter, diary. 69Bac-
kus to Brady, Sept. 22, 1848. Robertson, Remins., 216-9. Lerdo de
Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 540, 551. Scott, Mems., ii, 413-4, 418-9, 421. Bal-
lentine, English Soldier, i, 292-303. Davis, Autobiog., 125. Tributo a
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXII, PAGES 26-28 337
la Verdad, 28, etc. McCall, Letters, 475. Taylor, Broad Pennant, 125.
Picayune, Mar. 25. Meade, Letters, 187-8. 65Scott, ' gen. orders 28,
33, 34, 42, 45. 12Matson to commodore, Mar. 11. Oswandel, Notes,
67-70, 83. Semmes, Service, 111, 125-7. Ramirez, Mexico, 234. Law-
ton, Artillery Officer, 74, 79, 167. 270Moore, diary. Journ. Milit. Serv.
Instil., v, 37 ; xxiv, 422-8. Moore, Scott's Campaign, 5. Revue des Deux
Mondes, Aug. 1, 1847, p. 418. Conner, Home Squadron, 18-20, 60-70.
Smith, To Mexico, 113-4. Nebel and Kendall, 17. Parker, Recoils.,
49, 83, 85-6. 162Conner to wife, Jan. 11; Mar. 10, United Service,
July, 1895, p. 37; Dec., 1896, pp. 492-517. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i,
108. Jones, Tattnall, 58. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 847, 1169 (Scott); 892
(Conner). Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 71-2. 254McClellan, diary. 165Con-
ner, Mar. 11; order, Mar. 7; to Forrest, Mar. 7. 316Judd to Sherman,
Feb. 26, 1848. Mag. of Amer' Hist., xiv (Scammon). So. Quart. Rev.,
July, 1851. 139W. B. Campbell to wife, Mar. 13. TSMorales, Mar. 9, 10.
76Landero, report, Apr. 3.
18. The consuls were in close touch with one another and with the Mex-
icans, and hence the charge that Scott gave no warning of a bombardment
falls to the ground. He could not be expected to state positively and
precisely what he intended to do. By Mar. 13 Morales reached the con-
clusion that he would not assault (82M. to gov. Puebla, Mar. 13), and
by Mar. 20 that a bombardment was to be expected (76M. to Guerra y
Marina, Mar. 20). Intercourse with neutral vessels was allowed to remain
open until the morning of Mar. 23 (12Matson to commodore, Mar. 25),
mainly as a way of escape for neutrals (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p. 230) (closed then
except under a flag of truce because affording moral aid and -comfort
ibid., p. 228) ; and Matson, the British naval commander, warned the
British residents with his utmost energy that they would not be safe dur-
ing "an assault or a Bombardment" (12M. to commodore, Apr. 2). He
was notified in advance that intercourse with neutral vessels would shortly
be cut off, and so informed Giffard officially on March 18 for the benefit
of British residents (12M. to commodore, March 25). Scott's warn-
ing note to the Spanish consul (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p. 219) referred to the city,
not to Ulua, for the consuls resided in the city ; yet Matson and Giffard
had the face to assert that on the authority of Conner they understood
that only Ulua would be bombarded. Matson admitted that he did this
for effect on Perry (12to commodore, Apr. 2) ; and he did not question
Scott's right to act as he did (12to Perry, Mar. 27). Again, Scott's sum-
mons stated that batteries adequate to reduce the city were in readiness,
and this was further notice of a bombardment. Everything compatible
with the military necessities of the United States was thus done for neu-
trals and non-combatants. Moreover Morales replied that Scott might
attack in the way he thought most advantageous (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p. 227).
The truth is that the people were full of fighting spirit, did not know what
real war meant, and felt not a little confidence. Giffard certainly (12Mat-
son to commodore, Mar. 25) and (as Perry reported, 47Oct. 22) the other
consuls probably took under their protection large quantities of property
belonging to Mexicans. By means of kites the Mexicans distributed
addresses to the "honest" Americans, defying their prowess but inviting
them to accept lands, as friends and brethren, in the country of perpetual
spring.
19. The Americans admitted the skill of the Mexican gunners. Twenty-
eight balls were put through a wall five feet high and 150 feet long, more
VOL. ir 7
338 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXII, PAGES 28-30
than a mile distant. Americans were supposed to be lying behind the
wall (Kenly, Md. Volunteer, 267).
20. Scott still supposed Ulua would have to be reduced after the cap-
ture of Vera Cruz, and felt greatly troubled by the non-arrival of the
larger part of the heavy ordnance, etc., that had been duly called for (Sen.
1; 30, 1, p. 222). He was annoyed also by his lack of enough cavalry
for thorough reconnoitring, and by the passing and repassing of small
boats between the city and the north shore. Owing to the treacherous
weather none of the American vessels could lie close enough to the coast
to stop this intercourse entirely. A sortie against the batteries was to
be anticipated, but access to them was made so easy and secure that such
an attack could have been repulsed. The squadron endeavored to divert
the attention of the enemy while the mortars were being placed.
21. Scott's preliminary operations: ISGiffard, Feb. 28, 1847. Engi-
neer School, U. S. A., Occas. Papers, no. 16. 218Henshaw narrative.
Charleston Mercury, Apr. 6, 1847. 280Nunelee, diary. Trans. Ills.
State Hist. Soc., 1906, p. 179. 159Collins, diary. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp.
216-25, 244-9 (reports of Scott and his officers). Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1177
(Conner). 298Porter, diary. GlBankhead to Scott, Mar. 26. 60Pickett
to , Mar. 10. Robertson, Remins., 220-27. Lerdo de Tejada,
Apuntes, ii, 552. Scott, Mems., ii, 426. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 240-5.
Grant, Mems., i, 127. BtJlentine, English Soldier, i, 304-6; ii, 18-9.
Davis, Autobiog., 126. Tributo d la Verdad, 29. McCall, Letters, 477.
Hartman, Journal, 7-8. Picayune, Mar. 26, 30, 31 ; Apr. 2, 4. Meade,
Letters, i, 191. 350Weber, recoils. 65Scott, gen. orders, nos. 33, 53.
McCabe, Lee, 17. 12Matson to commodore, Mar. 11. Oswandel,
Notes, 71-85. Semmes, Service, 129. 139W. B. Campbell to D. C., Mar.
20. 210Simms to Hammond, May 1. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 73,
78, 81, 84, 89. 124Blocklenger, letter. 270Moore, diary. Steele, Amer.
Campaigns, i, 106. Nebel and Kendall, 18-9. 37- Scott to Conner, Mar.
16. Griffis, Perry, 216. Conner, Home Squadron, 68. Monitor Repub.,
Mar. 16. 164Scott to Conner, Mar. 17, 18, 19, 20. Spirit of the Times,
Apr. 17. IGGDirnond to Conner, Jan. 15. IGGCampbell to Conner,
Jan. 9. United Service, July, 1895, p. 37. Jones, Tattnall, 57. Ho.
60; 30, 1, p. 1169 (Scott). 254McClellan, diary. 165Conner to Scott,
Mar. 19. Bishop, Journal, 29. So. Quart. Rev., July, 1851. TGMorales,
Mar. 10, 16. TGCano, Mar. 26. Mag. of Amer. Hist., xiv, 567.
22. The mosquito fleet consisted of the steamers Spit/ire and Vixen
under Commanders J. Tattnall and J. R. Sands, and the gunboats Bonita,
Reefer, Petrel, Falcon and Tampico under Lieuts. Commanding F. G.
Benham, J. S. Sterett, T. D. Shaw, J. J. Glasson and W. P. Griffin (Ho.
1; 30, 2, p. 1182). Each had a 32-pounder or 8-inch Paixhan. Addi-
tional information may be found in chap. xxx.
23. The parapet of the naval battery (known as No. 5) was of sand-
bags. Each of the guns weighed 6300 pounds, and was mounted on a
ship-carriage, so that transportation on land was extremely laborious.
They were taken ashore March 23, and some 1500 men were employed
in dragging them nearly two and a half miles through the sand. Scott
did not value the shell guns highly. They were 8-inch Paixhans. Cap-
tains Aulick and Mayo commanded the battery alternately. According
to Robert Anderson the orders for the battery were issued by Conner
(Lawton, Artill. Officer, 101) who had repeatedly offered it before Scott
gave up the hope of receiving adequate army ordnance in time (Conner,
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXII, PAGES 30-32 339
Home Squad., 47, note 3). Early on the morning of March 23 Perry (who
had withdrawn the mosquito fleet the previous evening) had Tattnall
launch a sharp though brief attack, presumably to divert attention from
the naval battery, then under construction. An officer who gained fame
later as Commodore Porter was TattnalFs pilot. The opening of Battery
No. 4 (24-pounders, etc.) was delayed by a norther, and one of the howitzers
was not ready as soon as the other pieces. Only about half of the siege-
train and ordnance stores called for in November arrived before Vera
Cruz surrendered (see chap, xviii, note 11).
24. Summons and bombardment. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 222-44 (reports
of Scott and his officers ; summons and reply ; etc.) ; 230 (Scott to con-
suls, Mar. 25). Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1175-83 (naval reports). ISMorales,
circular, Apr. 4. ISGiffard, nos. 7, 8, Mar. 22, 29. 12Matson to commo-
dore, Mar. 25, 28; Apr. 2; to Perry, Mar. 27. 47Perry, Mar. 26; Oct.
22. Henshaw narrative. Nunelee, diary. 216Heiman, First Regt.
Trans. 111. State Hist. Soc., 1906, pp. 179-80. Collins, diary. 224Hitch-
cock to Lizzie, Mar. 27. GOPerry to Mason, Mar. 25. GOScott to Perry
and reply, Mar. 25. 6lBankhead to Scott, Mar. 26. 60Pickett to ,
Mar. 10. Robertson, Remins., 227-32, 278. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes,
ii, 555. Scott, Mems., ii, 426-7. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 244-7. Bal-
lentine, English Soldier, ii, 24. Davis, Autobiog., 127. A Soldier's
Honor, 24. Apuntes, 155-8. Tribute a la Verdad, 30-1, 109. McCall,
Letters, 480. Nebel and Kendall, 19-21. Hartman, Journal, 9-10.
Picayune, Apr. 4. Meade, Letters, i, 192. F. Lee, Lee, 36-7. McClay,
Navy, ii, 180-1, 183. Oswandel, Notes, 90-5. Semmes, Service, 130-
42. 139W. B. Campbell to D. C., Mar. 28. Diario, Mar. 29 ; Apr. 10.
Regenerador Repub., Apr. 7. Kenly, Md. Volunteer, 267. Lawton,
Artillery Off., 91-7, 101, 104. Caswell, diary. 322Smith, diary. Moore,
diary. 358Williams to father, Mar. 25, 28. Judah, diary. Moore,
Scott's Campaign, 15. Arnold, Jackson, 84. Conner, Home Squadron,
47, note 3. Wash. Union, Sept. 11. N. Y. Sun, Apr. 16. 162Conner
to wife, Mar. 31. Soley, Porter, 67-9. Jones, Tattnall, 57. Ho. 60;
30, 1, pp. 913, 1220 (Scott). ISOScott to Stribling, Mar. 25. Ramsey,
Other Side, 190, note. Bishop, Journal. So. Quart. Rev., July, 1851.
Weekly Courier and N. Y. Enquirer, Mar. 2, 1848 (letter probably by Hitch-
cock). Griffis, Perry, 221-3. Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 519-40
76G.G6mez, Mar. 25. 76Soto, Mar. 28. TGMorales, Mar. 24. 76Vega
Mar. 25.
25. March 24 the consuls requested Scott to grant a truce and allow the
women and children to leave town (12Matson to commodore, Apr. 2).
With perfect propriety he declined to do so (Scott, Mems., ii, 427), unless
Morales should ask for a truce with a view to surrender (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1,
p. 226), pointing out that due warnings had been given (note 18). He
could not afford to suspend his operations or let the number of mouths
be diminished ; and doubtless he was counting on the moral effect of the
presence of women and children. Time pressed ; there were well-founded
reports that a Mexican army was approaching ; and cases of yellow fever
had occurred (Scott, Mems., ii, 427, and see Davis, Autobiog., 141).
Scott's action looks hard, but it was humane to force an immediate sur-
render. Roa Bdrcena (Recuerdos, 178) fully admits that the American
policy was just. This move of the consuls tended to shake the confidence
of the Mexicans, and led to dissensions among the officers.
March 25 Harney was sent against a force posted at a bridge near Medel-
340 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXII, PAGES 32-33
Hn, about ten miles from Vera Cruz (Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 250-2). Includ-
ing reinforcements, his detachment consisted of about 500 men with artil-
lery. The independent reports of the two principal Mexican officers give
their number as 140-50 with scarcely any ammunition. Harney thought
there were 2000 of them, and claimed great credit for carrying the day.
His orders were to reconnoitre only. There were other insignificant
affairs (Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 249-55; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 915; Reavis, Har-
ney, 186).
26. On the Mexican side. ISGiffard, Mar. 11, 29. 12Matson to com-
modore, Mar. 25 ; Apr. 2. Papeles Varios, no. 10. Henshaw narrative.
Nunelee, diary. Collins, diary. Robertson, Remins., 222. Lerdo de
Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 552-3, etc. Ballentine, English Soldier, ii, 32-3.
pavis, Autobiog., 138. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 220-38 (reports, etc.). Tribute
la Verdad, 29, 30, 109 (Ult. Boletin). Apuntes, 157-60. Picayune,
'Apr. 9. (Fish) Delta, Oct. 16. -312Morales, Apr. 3. Revue de Pans,
Dec., 1844. Semmes, Service, 149. 82Noticias de Veracruz. 86Rela-
ciones to gov., Jan. 27. 86 Treasurer to gov., Jan. 15. 86Many letters
regarding inability to pay the tax. lOOMorales to ayunt., Mar. 12, 17,
20; reply, Mar. 14. 95lbarra, proclam., Mar. 23. Regenerador Repub.,
.Apr. 7. 82Gov. to legislature of Puebla, Mar. 9. 82lbarra, proclam.,
Mar. 17. 82Morales to gov. Puebla, Mar. 13. 86/d. to Soto, Mar. 8.
Lawton, Artillery Off., 106-7. Caswell, diary. Moore, diary. 375
Morales to Soto, Mar. 14. Monitor Repub., Apr. 4. Spirit of the Times,
Apr. 17. SOLegislature of Mex. state, address. IGSConner to Scott,
Mar. 19. Bishop, Journal. And from 76 the following. Comte. gen.
Puebla, proclam., Mar. 16. Arrieta, Mar. 15. Cano, Mar. 26. S.
Anna, Apr. 29. Memo., Feb. 9. F. Vdzquez, Mar. 26. Soto, Jan. 23,
26 ; Mar. 7, 9, 19, 24, 25 (two). G. G6mez, Mar. 18, 19, 20 (two). Vega,
'Mar. 24, 25 (two). Canalizo, Apr. 1. Morales, Mar. 5, 10, 16, 20, 24.
l.andero, Jan. 30, Apr. 3. Hacienda, Mar. 15. To G. G6mez, Mar.
16. To Soto, Mar. 28. And many documents of minor importance.
27. Morales, probably in view of Santa Anna's enmity, would not
surrender though he believed he ought to do so (76Landero, Apr. 3), but
he turned the command over to Landero when capitulation was seen to be
inevitable, and left the city in a boat during the night of March 25-6.
He induced Gen. Jos6 Duran, who commanded at Ulua, to regard himself
as under Landero's orders, it was stated by Santa Anna (76 Apr. 29),
and so brought about the surrender of the castle. This apparently sin-
gular move was doubtless made to save Vera Cruz from being bombarded
by Ulua. (Recognizing this danger to the city, Scott intimated, when
summoning the town, that no batteries would be established in it against
Ulua, unless Ulua should open fire upon it.) There was considerable
dissatisfaction among the Americans because the prisoners were set free,
for their parole was justly deemed of slight value ; but it would have been
costly, and perhaps not easy, to hold them at Vera Cruz or send them to
the United States, and they did good service by spreading tales of American
prowess. Mar. 26 the consuls went to Scott's camp under a white flag,
but he would not see them (12Matson to commodore, Apr. 2). On the
morning of March 27 two boat-loads of neutrals under the French flag
attempted to reach the neutral vessels at Sacrificios, but Perry would
not allow them to proceed (12Matson to commodore, Apr. 2). (Roa
Barcena, Recuerdos, 178, admits that Perry's course was proper.) At
about the same time the consuls and the second alcalde threatened that
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXII, PAGES 33-34 341,
unless the military chiefs would promptly bring hostilities .to an end, they
would lead the non-combatants toward the American lines at the risk of
being fired upon. This was said to have had great effect in town, but the
chiefs had already decided to give up. Owing to bad weather the navy
was not represented at all the deliberations. Some of the American mili-
tary men felt that the share of the navy did not entitle its representative
to sign the capitulation. It was stated by Sedgwick that, aside from the
investment, only about 600 Americans took part in the operations.
28. Next to Matson's figures our best evidence regarding the casualties
is the statement of Giffard, that hundreds of women and children, harbored
at the consulates, escaped from harm though the buildings suffered (13
Mar. 29). Many other buildings were no doubt equally solid and equally
distant from the principal scene of destruction. Vera Cruz was a great
importing city, where large stocks of goods needed to be securely housed.
Mercantile establishments had strong vaults, in which families now took
refuge. Many found safety on the long mole. Scott asserted that most
of the people were sheltered in the basements. Consequently one can
hardly believe that more than 500 persons out of a civilian population prob-
ably not exceeding 3000 were injured. Lieut. Mackall believed that
perhaps thirty or forty soldiers were killed or wounded (252Apr. 30).
Kendall, editor of the New Orleans Picayune, who was on the ground,
represented 150 as a mean estimate of the total number that perished
(Picayune, Apr. 9). Landero reported 750 killed and 200 wounded (76
Apr. 3), evidently an absurd statement, for a greater number must have
been hurt than killed. Other Mexican estimates rose as high as 600 civil-
ians killed, which would imply on a reasonable calculation that almost
every civilian was hit. One of the best Mexican authorities (Apuntes,
165) states that 600 or more soldiers were wounded, and 400 of these
lost their lives. This is far too large a percentage of fatalities. How
accurate this authority is may be judged also from the fact that the
Americans are said to have thrown 6700 projectiles into the town, whereas
(Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 244) the number was actually about 2500 (possibly
besides those from the naval battery, which may have thrown 800).
It is worth while to add that Scott was persistently represented (partly
to exalt the Mexicans and partly to injure the Americans) as having de-
stroyed a great number of non-combatants, but Morales wrote on March
24 that most of the killed and wounded had been soldiers.
Next let us inquire as to the provisions. Giffard stated (ISMar. 29)
that when the Mexicans surrendered, the city had food enough for three
days and the castle for ten ; but probably he had reference only to the
provisions belonging to the authorities, and perhaps, as he had objected
strongly to the destruction of property and tried to stop the bombardment
by sending word to Scott that hunger would force the Mexicans to yield
in a few days, he felt compelled to support that representation. March
10 Conner thought the enemy had subsistence enough for about four or
five weeks (Ho. 1 ; 30, 2, p. 1179). 76 April 29, after having talked with
officers from Vera Cruz, Santa Anna assured the minister of war that
Morales could have held out until he (Santa Anna) could have arrived
with regular forces. Gov. Soto, who went down to the coast, where he was
in communication with the city by means of boats and doubtless knew
whether stocks of foodstuffs (belonging perhaps to neutrals) existed there,
placed drafts for $30,000, payable at Vera Cruz, in the hands of Morales
oft March 24 (76Soto, March 25). This money must have been intended
342 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXII, PAGES 34-36
solely or principally for provisions, for on the fourteenth Morales had
written to Soto that nothing else was needed. On the same day $2000
from Oaxaca were delivered. These sums would have purchased enough
food to last beyond April 15. About March 17 a French barque ran in
during a norther, which shows that supplies from the outside could be hoped
for. The property loss due to the bombardment was estimated at five
to six million dollars (Monitor Repub., Apr. 4). The southwest quarter
of the town was demolished. It was ordered that not only Morales, but
Landero and Duran should be tried. Besides disliking Morales, Santa
Anna felt resentment against Vera Cruz for receiving him so coldly in
August, 1846.
29. The surrender; losses (note 28). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 224-6 (Scott);
228 (consuls) ; 229-38 (Scott, etc.) ; 239 (gen. orders 80). Apuntes, 159-
66. McCall, Letters, 483-4. Picayune, Apr. 9. 252Mackall to father,
Mar. 30. 312Morales, Apr. 3. 12Matson to commodore, Mar. 25;
Apr. 2; to Perry, Mar. 27; reply, Mar. 27. Semmes, Service, 141.
Diario, Mar. 27 ; Apr. 4, 8. Regenerador Repub., Apr. 7. Lawton,
Artillery Off., 98, 100, 106. Hiney, diary. 358Williams to father, Mar.
28. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 160. 375Morales to Soto, Mar. 14.
Monitor Repub., Apr. 4, 5. N. Y. Sun, Aug. 16. IGGKirby to Conner,
Mar. 27. Ho. 1 ; 30, 2, p. 1186. Mag. of Amer. Hist., xiv, 570. Bishop,
Journal. ISGiffard, nos. 7, 8, Mar. 22, 29. Henshaw narrative. Collins,
diary. 95Puebla ayunt., address, Apr. 7 (V. Cruz yielded because of "the
lamentations of innocent families expecting every instant to die "). Roa
Barcena, Recuerdos, 177-9. Tribute d la Verdad, 109 (Ult. Bol.). Nebel
and Kendall, 21. Robertson, Remins., 232. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes,
ii, 558-69. Scott, Mems., ii, 427-9. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 243-8.
TGLandero, Apr. 3. 76M to Canalize, Mar. 31. TGCanalizo, Apr. 1.
76S. Anna, Apr. 4, 29. 76To S. Anna, May .4. TGTerms of capitula-
tion. The date Of the capitulation was Mar. 27.
Had Vera Cruz held out until April 15, perhaps 5000 regulars would
have been in Scott's rear (chap, xxiii, note 12). With this backing,
3-4000 irregulars could probably have been embodied. By means of
signals and boat communication operations in concert with the garrison
of Vera Cruz could have been arranged for, and the prospect would have
encouraged the city to hold out to the uttermost. Very likely Scott's
line could have been broken, and provisions introduced. He could not,
then, before the advent of the yellow fever, have reduced Uliia and Vera
Cruz, and have made the preparations necessary for advancing into a
hostile region in the face of a numerous enemy. When the fever became
active, Santa Anna's upper country troops could have retired quickly,
leaving the Americans to be annoyed by the coast forces. Other diseases
quite as fatal as the vomito prevailed in that district (Thompson, Recoils.,
4). Lieut. Hatch (to father, Apr. 2) wrote that all attributed the sur-
render to the effect of Scott's artillery upon the civilians, and the circum-
stances prove as much.
30. The northers, though in themselves a scourge, drove the mosquitoes
away, and so prevented the yellow fever. They subsided about the middle
of April, and then the fever was due.
31. Hardships and consolations. (Losses) Ho. 24; 31, 1; Sen. 1;
30, 1, pp. 253-5; Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1185 (naval). Henshaw narrative.
Charleston Mercury, Apr. 6. Nunelee, diary. Collins, diary. American
Eagle, V. Cruz, Apr. 8. GOPickett to , Mar. 10. Vigne, Travels, i,
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIII, PAGE 37 343
8. Robertson, Remins., 223, 226-7. Campos, Recuerdos, 31. Scott.
Mems., ii, 430. Ballentine, English Soldier, ii, 8, 15. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p.
221 (gen. orders 54); 224-6 (Scott, Mar. 23). Picayune, Apr. 4. 350
Weber, recoils. Maury, Recoils., 34. 12Matson to commodore, Mar.
11, 25. Oswandel, Notes, 71-4, 79-81. Semmes, Service, 107-8. Law-
ton, Artillery Off., 79, 88, 96. Gilliam, Travels, 40. 361 Woods, recoils.
Caswell, diary. 327Sutherland to father, July 15. Moore, diary. 136
Butterfield, recoils. Spirit of the Times, Apr. 17. Stevens, I. I. Stevens,
i, 115. Tennery, diary. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 879 (Conner). Bruell, Sea
Memories, 57. Lancaster Co. Hist. Soc. Mag., Mar. 6, 1908 (Nauman).
Our army loss was nine killed and fifty-one wounded (Ho. 24 ; 31, 1).
32. Occupation of city and "castle." American Eagle, V. Cruz, Apr.
6. Nunelee, diary. Collins, diary. Polk, Diary, May 15. Robertson,.
Remins., 232. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 567-8. Naredo, Orizaba,
108. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 247. Davis, Autobiog., 129-30. Sen.
1; 30, 1, pp. 229, 235 (Scott); 237-8. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1185 (Perry).
Apuntes, 166-7. Picayune, Apr. 9, 10, 14. Lawton, Artillery Off., 110,
252Mackall to father, Mar. 30. 12Matson to commodore, Apr. 2. Os-
wandel, Notes, 98. Semmes, Service, 145-6. Regeneradw Repub., Apr.
7. Lawton, Artillery Off., 102-3. 222Hiney, diary. 146Caswell, diary.
322Smith, diary. 270Moore, diary. Id., Scott's Campaign, 23. Ho,
60; 30, 1, p. 907 (Marcy) ; 911 (Scott). Tennery, diary. Sedgwick,
Corresp., i, 79-80. Bishop, Journal. Littell, no. 157, p. 326 (Hine).
139W. B. Campbell to wife, Mar. 31. Britannia, May 15 (V. Cruz letter,
Apr. 1). 76Landero, gen. orders, Mar. 29-30. 76S. Anna, Apr. 29. Nebel
and Kendall, 21.
Some of the National Guards broke up and took flight in order to avoid
surrendering. As fast as the arms were stacked American sentries mounted
guard over them. When the Mexican soldiers found the victors offering
to divide rations with them, their sentiments became friendly, and most of
those belonging at Vera Cruz went back to town that day.
XXIII. CERRO GORDO
1. According to a memo, furnished by the adjutant general to the
ordnance bureau, Mar. 24, Scott's forces were as follows. I. REGULARS.
1 Dragoons, Co. F. 2 Dragoons, Cos. A, B, C, F, I, K. *Mounted Rifle-
men (on foot). 1 Art., Co. K. 2 Art., Co. A. 3 Art., Co. H. (These
three companies had field batteries.) Artillery serving as infantry: *1
Art., Cos. B, F, G, H, I; 2 Art., Cos. B, C, D, F, G, H, I, K; 3 Art., Cos.
A, B, D, G, K; *4 Art., Cos. A, D, E, F, G, H. 1 Inf., Cos. C, E, F, G, H,
K. *2 Inf., Cos. A, B, D, E, F, G, H, I, K. *3 Inf., Cos. C, D, F, G,
H, I, K. 4 Inf., Cos. A, B, C, D, E, I. 5 Inf., Cos. E, F, G, H, I, K. 6
Inf., Cos. A, C, D, E, F, H. *7 Inf., Cos. C, D, E, F, I, K. 8 Inf., Cos.
A, B, D, E, H, I, K. (Italics indicate the division of Bvt. Maj. Gen.
Worth; asterisks that of Brig. Gen. Twiggs.) II. VOLUNTEERS.
(Maj. Gen. Patterson.) Tenn. Mounted regt. Infantry: Baltimore and
Wash, battal. ; Ga. regt. ; Ala. regt. ; two Tenn. regts. ; two 111. regts. ;
Ky. co. ; La. co. ; La. regt. ; two Pa. regts. ; N. Y. regt. ; S. C. regt. This
list includes troops not mentioned by Scott (Mems., ii, 460-5). As
Worth was now serving with his brevet rank his command was called a
division. The same change was made in Twiggs's case. A letter of
Mar. 13 from Marcy, due to a suggestion from Polk of the day before
344 'NOTES ON CHAPTER xxin, PAGES 37-33
urged Scott to make the protection of the troops against yellow fever his
prime consideration (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 904; Polk, Diary, Mar. 12, 20).
At the same time it gave a slanting assent to the movement against the
capital by discussing the question of roads. This was Scott's first authori-
zation to proceed (So. Quart. Rev., Apr., 1852), and the Cabinet had not
decided to have him do so, though he had assumed that Benton's plan,
endorsed by himself, was the basis of his expedition (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p.
913). The hesitation of the government is illustrated by the fact that
Marcy first wrote merely, "If you should occupy an interior position,"
which he changed to, "If you should move into the interior" (Marcy
papers).
2. This proclamation has been censured on the ground that it exasper-
ated the Mexicans by mentioning their domestic dissensions and bad
government. If so, the blame rested primarily on the American govern-
ment, which had ordered Taylor to circulate a proclamation embodying
such ideas (p. 1 of chap. xxxi). The word "unnatural" has-been thought
unfortunate as suggesting (since ordinary war seemed to Mexico perfectly
normal, and Scott could not be supposed to be reflecting upon himself and
his government) that the Mexicans were acting in an inhuman and inde-
cent way ; but the author does not recall seeing any such point made by
them.
3. Many wagons were lost in wrecked vessels. It had been supposed
that about two thirds of the animals would be obtained locally, but it was
found by April 5 that not one tenth of them could be reckoned upon.
4. Harney proceeded to La Antigua on April 2 with two squadrons
of dragoons, a section of artillery and two infantry companies, drove
lancers from the village, captured about thirty-five horses and obtained
Mexican promises of assistance from the people (Ho. 60 ; 30, 1, pp. 915-6).
He returned the next day. The Alvarado expedition set out on March
30. It was a joint affair designed not only (like Harney's) to obtain draft
animals and beef cattle and open up permanent markets for these desid-
erata, but to impress and "neutralize" the people of that section, acquire
a harbor for Perry's small vessels, provide a regular supply of water for the
squadron, and perhaps capture the Mexican vessels lying there. Perry
himself commanded the naval contingent, and Quitman commanded the
land force, which consisted of three volunteer regiments (Ga., Ala. and
S. Car.), a squadron of dragoons and a section of artillery (Ho. 60; 30,
1, pp. 917-8). The march of about fifty miles (about 44 by the present
railroad) was at times difficult and always hot. Late on April 1 Perry
and Quitman reached Alvarado, a fishing town of 1200-1500 persons;
and the land forces arrived the next day. They found it occupied by an
American midshipman and five sailors. Lieut. Hunter, commanding
a one-gun propeller, the Scourge, sent down to assist in blockading the
town, had violated his orders (probably to show what the naval men were
capable of doing, if given a chance to act) by opening fire, upon which the
town (though it endeavored later to rescind its action) had offered to sur-
render. Learning that public property had been taken up the Alvarado
River, here a wide, clear, deep stream, he pursued it and, to take advantage
of the panic resulting from the fall of Vera Cruz, captured the industrious
town of Tlacotalpam. Quitman accepted this turn of events genially,
but Perry was furious, and to the disgust of many naval officers and the
general public Hunter was tried and cashiered.
To Scott the results of Hunter's error were serious (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p.
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIII, PAGES 38-39 345
547). The intention had been to grant capitulations to the towns on terms
that would have provided the Americans with a large number of the needed
animals (Wash. Union, Sept. 11) or to obtain the same result in some other
way ; but Hunter's action, though only one day in advance, gave time for
the removal of the livestock. Quitman did, however, arrange with the
authorities of Tlacotalpam for at least 500 horses, and opened negotiations
for more and for beef cattle. How fruitful these arrangements proved
cannot be stated. April 8 about 300 of the Fifth Infantry sailed from
Vera Cruz for the same district (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 928), and about April
14 they brought back some wild mustangs.
On retiring from Alvarado the Mexicans burned the few small vessels
that constituted the national navy, and spiked or buried the ordnance of
the forts. The buried guns were, however, discovered. In all they num-
bered about sixty, but a large part were valueless carronades. For Quit-
man's troops the expedition was unfortunate. A number ,'died and almost
all were prostrated. He was back at Vera Cruz April 6. The affair
amused the American public hugely. One evidence of this is afforded by
the following lines (N. Y. Sun, May 7, 1847) :
"On came each gay and gallant ship,
On came the troops like mad, oh !
But not a soul was there to whip,
Unless they fought a shadow ;
''Five sailors sat.within a fort,
In leading of a lad, oh !
And thus was spoiled the pretty sport
Of taking Alvarado."
5. Scott's preparations for advancing (including the Alvarado expedition).
Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 903 (Marcy); 908, 912-3, 920, 928, 937, 1221, 1271
(Scott) ; 915 (Harney) ; 917 (Quitman) ; 918 (Mason) ; 939 (gen. orders).
60Scott to Marcy, Apr. 5. Courrier Frangais, Apr. 17. GlHarney,
report, Apr. 4. Negrete, Invasion, iii, app., 435. Scott, Mems., ii, 431.
Robertson, Remins., 238. Velasco, Geografia, iii, 203. Sen. 1; 30, 1,
pp. 230 (Scott); 547 (Jesup). Davis, Autobiog., 140. Delta, May 19.
Diccionario Universal (Alvarado). 164Scott to Conner, Mar. 20. 60
Mason to J. L. Smith, Apr. 9. Semmes, Service, 148, 211. TSBermudez
de Castro, no. 445, Mar. 2, 1847. Nebel and Kendall, 23. Ho. 1 ; 30,
2, p. 1190. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 121. 270Moore, diary. Id., Scott's
Camp., 44-9, 52. Griffis, Perry, 239. Parker, Recoils., 103-4. 12Cap-
tain of Alarm to commodore, Apr. 13. Bennett, Steam Navy, 94, 97.
Maclay, Navy, ii, 185. 358Williams to father, Apr. 5. 62Adj. gen. to
ordnance dept., Mar. 24. 65Scott, gen. orders 87, 91, 105. 65/d, proclam.,
Apr. 11. 13Giffard, no. 12, Apr. 13. Polk, Diary, Mar. 12-14. ISPak-
enham, no. 7, Jan. 28. Metropol. Mag., Jan., 1908, p. 441. Soley,
Porter, 71. Wash. Union, Sept. 11. N. Y. Sun, May 7, 21. Niles,
May 1, pp. 131, 141; 22, p. 189. Southwest. Hist. Qtrly., xviii, 216.
Steele, Am. Campaigns, i, 120. TGMarin, Jan. 2; Apr. 26. 76L6pez,
Jan. 15. 60Plan of Alvarado. Ho. 1 ; 30, 2, p. 1200 (Mackenzie).
Worth, although he had been given the most prominent place in the
operations against Vera Cruz, demanded the leading position in the ad-
yance, and felt deeply offended when Scott, mindful of the rights of the
Sooond Division, replied that he would not, even to please his best friend,
346 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIII, PAGES 39-42
do an injustice (Mag. Am. Hist., xiv, 573-4). There was a route to thr
interior via Orizaba, but it was not available for artillery. In reply to
Marcy's despatch of March 13, which suggested that the advance be made
from Tuxpan, Scott pointed out the impracticability of that plan (Ho.
60; 30, 1, p. 909).
6. In January Gen. R. D. de La Vega was made chief of the Division
of the East and provided with an army mostly of paper. The same
month Alonzo Wenghieri offered to furnish 50,000 muskets, 25,000 ter-
cerolas (carbines of a certain kind) and 50,000 swords at reasonable prices,
but it is not certain that his offer, though endorsed by the war department,
was accepted (76to Hacienda, Jan. 14). By March 12, four 16-pounders
from Vera Cruz arrived at the national bridge. March 18 orders proper
for the situation were despatched to La Vega, but they sound as if issued
mainly for form's sake. In February the government attempted to take
control of 25,000 National Guards for the purposes of the war (76circular
Feb. 3) ; but it soon rescinded that unpalatable assumption of authority,
and confined itself to asking state governors for them (76circular, Apr. 8).
7. March 24 the northern brigades were at Queretaro on their way
south (TGacuerdo, 1 Mar. 24). Rangel's brigade and some artillery left
the capital March 28. March 30, 1400 National Guards, who had been
turned over to the national government by the governor of the state
(82Guerra to gov., Apr. 1), left Puebla to join 700 of the same class already
at Jalapa, and some 12-pounders were despatched from the former city.
These forces were primarily designed to aid in the defence of Vera Cruz
by attacking Scott's rear. There was great need of money, especially
as the attitude of the clergy was now so dubious that even drafts accepted
by them were distrusted (Diario, June 8).
8. One method of rousing the public was to excite religious fanaticism.
A pamphlet, Clamor de las Ovejas, declared that some of the Vera Cruz
churches were to be sold to Protestants, others to Mohammedans, others
to pigs, others to worshippers of Venus.
9. Mexican preparations before Santa Anna arrived on the ground. Cour-
rier Fran^ais, Apr. 3, 10, 17. 52Consul Black, Apr. 25. Davis, Autobiog.,
142. ISBankhead, no. 34, 1847. Apuntes, 120-2, 168. Revue Indep.,
Apr. 25, 1845. Memoria de . . . Guerra, Dec., 1846. Lerdo de Tejada,
Apuntes, ii, 574. Diario, Mar. 29; June 8. Monitor Repub., Mar. 31.
Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 888. Balbontin, Invasi6n, 105. 94Canalizo, proclams.,
Apr. 2, 4. 94Soto, proclams., Jan. 22 ; Feb. 5. Regenerador Repub.,
Mar. 31. 84Guerra, decree, Feb. 13. 84Relaciones, circular, Feb. 16.
Republicano, Mar. 31. Ramsey, Other Side, 221, note. And from 76 the
following (out of a great number). To Rinc6n, Oct. 10, 11, 1846. To La
Vega, Jan. 25 ; Mar. 18, 20, 27, 1847. Acuerdos, Mar. 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31 ;
Apr. 1. To Gaona, Apr. 1. To Canalize, Mar. 28, 31 ; Apr. 1. Gaona,
Mar. 18; Apr. 1. Soto, Mar. 7, 22, 26; Apr. 3. G. Gomez, Mar.
18, 19, 25, 26. La Vega, Mar. 22, 24. Canalizo, Mar. 30; Apr. 1, 3.
To Soto, Apr. 1. Soto to V. Cruz cong., Dec. 1, 1846. Morales, Oct.
15, 1846; Feb. 2, 6, 1847. Canalizo to his troops, Mar. 29. Guerra,
circulars, Feb. 3, 13 ; Mar. 31 ; Apr. 8. To comte. gen. Mex., Mar. 25.
Canalizo, proclam., Mar. 29. To gov. Puebla, Apr. 1. Gov. Puebla,
1 " Acuerdo," frequently to be mentioned hereafter in the Mexican citations,
meant the decision of an executive conference, and was applied also to the
memorandum embodying the decision. The conferences referred to will usually
be those in which the President or at least the Cabinet was concerned.
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIII, PAGES 42-45 347
Mar. 28. A little later Santa Anna had the spiked cannon drawn to Cerro
Gordo by cattle.
10. The northern wall of the canon is much more nearly vertical than
the southern. The author went down one side and up the other by rough
mule paths.
11. Accounts differ as to the number of men and guns on each tongue but
agree that B was much more strongly guarded than A and C. It had
supporting works. After the battle R. E. Lee wrote that the highway
was commanded by thirty-five Mexican guns (F. Lee, Gen. Lee, 38).
Allowing four for El Telegrafo, five for the battery at the camp, and seven
for D, we should have nineteen left for the tongues. In all, according to
the chief Mexican artillery officer, there were forty-one pieces, so that
Santa Anna was able to send additional guns to his left. There seems to
have been a 12-pounder at A, but most of the guns were light. The four
16-pounders were at D, and commanded the highway.
12. After the battle Santa Anna reduced his numbers to about 6000
infantry (only about half of them permanent) and 1500 or 2000 cavalry
(76May 7; Negrete, Invasi6n, iii, app., 112); but on March 20 (76to
La Vega) he had placed the troops from La Angostura at 6000 (Roa
Barcena, Recuerdos, 194, says 5650) to which must be added at least
2000 from the capital (ibid.), 2000 (besides a brigade that arrived just
before the battle) from Puebla (note 7), and contingents from Jalapa,
Coatepec and other places. Mexican accounts run from Santa Anna's
figures up to 15,000 (Republicano, June 1, correspondent). Canalizo,
April 3, proclaimed that more than 12,000 were coming, and the troops
to whom he referred did not include all who were present. ISBankhead
placed the number from Mexico at 2500. Ro i Barcena (Recuerdos, 195)
specifies 3, 4, 5, 6 and 11 Line regiments, 1, 2, 3, 4 Ligero regiments, 5 and
9 cavalry, and 12 smaller corps of foot and horse. Canalizo's demand
that all citizens rally to the colors does not seem to have been very effective ;
but many who had given their parole at Vera Cruz were forced to take up
arms (Roa Barcena, Recuerdos, 189). It appears safe to estimate that
Santa Anna had at least 10,000, probably 11,000, and quite possibly 12,000
men besides the Puebla brigade under Arteaga, which arrived after the
fight had begun. The brigade from Mexico arrived April 11, and the three
brigades from the north April 12. After the battle Santa Anna and others
attempted to represent the troops as of wretched quality. But cer-
tainly he had picked the corps brought from the north, and there is no
reason to suppose that the other troops were below the average. Santa
Anna pretended that he lacked ammunition, but great quantities were
found in the camp after the battle (Oswandel, Notes, 139). The distri-
bution of it was very likely defective, however. It was asserted also that
some of the cannon cartridges contained no powder. They should have
been inspected. Twenty-nine Irishmen served in the hospital force (76
acuerdo, Mar. 30). The army was fairly well supplied with money.
April 10 38,000 pesos went from the capital, and the bishop of Puebla
sent 10,000.
13. Santa Anna had water brought from El Encero by a ditch, but it
only began to run just as the battle opened.
14. Mexican preparations, Apr. 4~1 6. Delta, May 1. Picayune, May 2.
312Anaya to S. Anna, Apr. 9. 312Guerra to gov. Puebla, Apr. 9. 312Pablo
to S. Anna, Apr. 8. 312Guerra to S. Anna, Apr. 9. 312Baranda to S. Anna,
Apr. 8. Courrier Franqais, Apr. 17. Repub., Apr. 22 ; June 1, 9. Sen. 1 ;
348 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIII, PAGES 45-46
30, 1, p -261. Negrete, Invasi6n, iii, app., 49. Grant, Mems., i, 134. Apun-
tes, 121, 169-75. Tribute dla Verdad, 41. S. Anna, Apelaci6n, 33-7.
Surez y Navarro, Causas, 68. Steele, Amer. Campaigns, i, 121. Diario,
Mar. 29 ; Apr. 3, 9, 30 ; June 10. Gamboa, Impug., 29-32. Ramirez,
Mexico, 214, 229. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 157, 189. Lerdo de
Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 574. Dublan, Legislaci6n, v, 264-5. Monitor Repub.,
Apr. 24, 27, 28; May 3; Oct. 24. ISBankhead, no. 34, Apr. 1. Os-
wandel, Notes, 139. 82Pav6n, Apr. 29. Sedgwick, Corres., i, 86. 76
Gaona, Apr. 8. 76To Canalize, Apr. 2. 76To S. Anna, Apr. 9. 76
Canalizo, Mar. 29; Apr. 3, 24. 76S. Anna, Apr. 6, 7, 11, 13, 17, 29;
May 7. 76Uraga, May 1. 76Memorias by heads of war dept., Nov.,
1847. 76Decrees, Apr. 8, 10. 76 A great number of less important papers.
No doubt, as Willisen (" Higher Theory of War ") and others have
said, combining strategical defensive with tactical defensive is as a rule to
be condemned ; but here the circumstances were peculiar. The Americans
were pursued by the yellow fever, and only a decisive victory could save
them from ruin. Hence Santa Anna's policy cannot be censured uncere-
moniously. Ripley (War with Mexico) gives the name El Tele"grafo
to La Atalaya, an error that of course leads to much confusion. Robles
had a series of objections to the Cerro Gordo position. It could be turned ;
the rough and woody country made it possible for the enemy to get near ;
cavalry could not be used; the line was too long; a threatened point
could not be easily reinforced; water was lacking; retreat, especially
with artillery, would be difficult (Roa Barcena, Recuerdos, 197-8).
15. One of the field batteries was Taylor's ; the other was Talcott's
howitzer and rocket battery (R. Jones to ordnance dept., Dec. 3, 1846).
Steptoe's field battery and a squadron of dragoons accompanied Patter-
son later. The statement regarding the artillery outfit is from Lieut.
Hatch (213to father, Apr. 7), who went with Twiggs.
16. Scott has been called rash for sending his army forward and expos-
ing it to attack piecemeal. But (1) had it all formed one column it would
have been no safer against a raid from some crossroad ; (2) had it been
attacked in front, numbers would not have signified, and the individual
superiority of the Americans as well as their superior artillery would have
given them the advantage ; and (3) Santa Anna, having possession of such
fine defensive positions, was not likely to make a venturesome attack,
especially as the battle of Buena Vista had shown how tenaciously the
Americans could defend themselves. The two last points bear also upon
the criticism that Santa Anna ought to have attacked Twiggs before the
arrival of Pillow and Shields (see remark at the end of note 14) . The volun-
teer division left Vera Cruz April 9 under Patterson. It consisted of
two brigades, for Quitman's men had not sufficient transportation, and
probably needed time to recover from the effects of the Alvarado expedi-
tion. Capt. Loch, a British naval officer off Vera Cruz, was as much
surprised as Scott when it was found that Santa Anna had a large force at
Cerro Gordo (12to commodore, Apr. 9).
17. From the national bridge to Cerro Gordo the pavement was not in
rery good condition. Above the latter point stone blocks took the place
of cement. In places, where these had never been laid, or had been taken
up by revolutionists, or had been overlaid with stones by floods, the high-
way was extremely bad.
18. The position looked impregnable but was n.ot, for a besieging force
ould easily deprive the garrison of provisions and water.
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIII, PAGES 46-50 349
19. The march from Vera Cruz to Plan del Rio. Ho. 60; 30, t, pp. 920-
2, 928 (Scott); 921 (gen. orders 94). Hartman, Journal, 10. Picayune,
Dec. 9. Delta, May 15. 312Gutierrez to gov. Puebla, Apr. 9. Sen.
1; 30, 1, p. 274 (Twiggs). 217Henshaw papers. Stapp, Prisoners of
Perote, 159-60. Raleigh Star, May 5. 280Nunelee, diary. 159Narra-
tive based on papers of F. Collins. 220Higgins to Clutter, Apr. 1, 1851.
Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 36-48. Davis, Autobiog., 142-4. Apuntes,
169. Ward, Mexico, i, 12 ; ii, 177-88. Robertson, Visit, i, 269. Ruxton,
Adventures (1849), 22-5. Tudor, Tour, ii, 171-5. Bullock, Six Months
(1825), i, 32-42. Orbigny, Voyage, 409-10. Robertson, Remins., 238-40,
242. Latrobe, Rambler, 297. Velasco, Geografia, iii, 28, 37, 54, 64.
Lawton, Artillery Officer, 123, 132. Engineer School, U. S. Army, Occas.
Papers, no. 16. 29lPierce, diary. Journal Milit. Service Instil., v, 38
(Coppe*e). Bishop, Journal. 60G. W. Smith to Stevens, Apr. 23. Haw-
thorne, Pierce, 78-85. Steele, Amer. Campaigns, i, 121. 185Memo.
on the route. SSGWhitcomb, diary. Carleton, address. ;, Lowenstern,
Le Mexique, 32. 236Judah, diary. Wash. Union, May 1. Vedette,
viii, no. 5. 322Smith, diary. Norton, Life. 270Moore, diary. 358
Williams to father, Apr. 21. 152Claiborne, memoirs. 136Butterfield,
recoils. Revue de Paris, Dec., 1844. 66Stevens to J. L. Smith, May 7.
66G. W. Smith to Stevens, May 1. 65Scott, gen. orders 91. Thompson,
recoils., 11-12. Poinsett, Notes, 25-9. 335Calendario de Ontiveros.
12Loch to Lambert, Apr. 9. Oswandel, Notes, 108-10, 119. Semmes, Ser-
vice, 162-75. 256J. Parrott to Marcy, Apr. 19. 254McClellan, diary. Mag.
Amer. Hist., xiv, 575. Uttell, no. 162, p. 546. 139W. B. Campbell to wife,
Apr. 8. Moore, Scott's Camp. TlDiccionario Universal (Puente National).
20. Twiggs and his operations, Apr. 11-13. Maury, Recoils., 29.
Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 274 (Twiggs). 217Henshaw papers. Trans. Ills. State
Hist. Soc., 1906, p. 181. 159Narrative based on the papers of Francis
Collins. Polk, Diary, Apr. 30. 66Tower to Twiggs, Apr. 16. SOScott
(on Twiggs), remarks on a letter from Worth. Id., Mems., ii, 432. Hitch-
cock, Fifty Years, 250. Grant, Mems., i, 131. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier,
ii, 25-6, 51-4. Brackett, U. S. Cavalry, 141. Davis, Autobiog., 143-6.
Apuntes, 173-5. Robertson, Remins., 240. 270Moore, diary. Lan-
caster Co. Hist. Soc. Mag., Mar. 6, 1908 (Nauman). Bishop, Journal.
210Bragg to Hammond, Dec. 20, 1847 ; May 4, 1848. 327Sutherland to
father, Aug. ; Nov. 28, 1847. 358Williams to father, Apr. 21. 152
Claiborne, mems. 112Beauregard to Patterson, Apr. 20. 204Gouverneur,
diary. 66Tower to Maj. Smith, undated. 273Mullan, diary. Lee,
Lee, 38. 139W. B. to D. Campbell, Apr. 13. Hist. Teacher's Mag.,
Apr., 1912, p. 75. Ho. 60; 30, 1 ; pp. 921 (gen. orders 94) ; 928 (Scott).
So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1852. 170Crooker to father, Apr. 27. Henry,
Camp. Sketches, 268. Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 331. Some may
ask why Scott put a general like Twiggs forward. Twiggs had^a rank and
a position that had to be recognized, and his officers and men had their
right to see honorable service and win distinction.
21. Major J. L. Smith commanded the engineer company of fifty-one
men. Lee had ten of the men, and under his direction Lieut. Foster with
eight had charge of building the road "located" by Lee. Lieut. Mason
also worked on the road. McClellan with ten was assigned to Pillow's
command, and G. W. Smith with ten to Harney's (66G. W. Smith to I.
I. Stevens, Apr. 23). Tower had charge of the reconnoitring on the
Mexican right.
350 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIII, PAGES 50-51
22. I. I. Stevens, one of the engineer officers, 66reporting on May 7,
stated in the most distinct manner that according to this plan El Telegrafo
was not to be attacked before the highway in its rear should have been
occupied in strength, and that insistence upon this point constituted the
essential difference between this plan and the operations previously sug-
gested by Beauregard. Scott wrote to Marcy (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p. 261)
that he had intended to turn the Mexican position and attack in the rear.
He clearly indicated as much in his Memoirs (ii, 432), and his orders for
tha battle were that Twiggs's division, supposed to be already near the
highway, should move before daybreak to occupy it, while the orders only
contemplated an attack in front as likely to be made before 10 o'clock.
It was well understood in the army that his plan was to bag Santa Anna's
army, and this implied since some of the Mexicans were likely to retire
early that the way of escape must be cut off before a frontal attack
should be launched. Stevens tried to reach the highway via the Mexican
right, but was taken ill and had to return (Stevens, Stevens, i, 124).
23. Scott's operations, Apr. 12-16. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 261 (Scott).
Picayune, May 1, 2. 217Henshaw papers. A Soldier's Honor, 24.
Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1906, p. 181. 159Narrative based on the
papers of F. Collins. Scott, Mems., ii, 432. Hitchcock, Fifty Years,
250. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 56-8. Davis, Autobiog., 144-8. Bishop,
Journal. 322Smith, diary. 112Beauregard to Patterson, Apr. 20. lllSte-
vens to J. L. Smith, May 7. lllG. W. Smith to Stevens, Apr. 23.
lllTower to J. L. Smith, undated. lllMason to J. L. Smith, Apr. 24.
65Scott, gen. orders 105, 111. 332Tennery, diary. McCabe, Lee, 19,
note. 12Loch to Lambert, Apr. 9. Oswandel, Notes, 113-5. Stevens,
I. I. Stevens, i, 122-4. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 929 (Scott); 939 (Twiggs) ;
940 (Pillow).
24. The range had to be estimated (322W. B. Smith, diary), and per-
haps it was not easy to rectify the estimate by seeing where the shot struck.
Many of them flew much too high.
25. Scott's orders for the battle gave no directions for such a charge.
His plan was to place Twiggs's division and Shields's brigade, supported
by Worth's command, on the highway in Santa Anna's rear and attack
from that quarter. From one of his reports it appears that he made some
suggestion to Twiggs about the possibility of a frontal attack on El Tele"-
grafo presumably in the case of some unlooked-for turn of events ; but
he did not expect that officer to create the turn. The charge seems to have
been ordered by Scott during the night (213Hatch to father, Apr. 21).
To be sure, Scott's orders spoke of a frontal attack, but evidently the
reference was to Pillow's movement.
The officers of the Rifles were taken by Polk from civil life. Scott offset
this by having Major Sumner of the Second Dragoons, a veteran and able
soldier, command the corps ; but as Sumner had been disabled on Satur-
day, Major Loring was now at its head. When moving from shelter he
exposed his men to being enfiladed by the enemy's cannon, and the other
troops actually cried out, "That's the way to murder men" (218Henshaw).
This illustrates how political appointments are likely to work on the firing
line. The Rifles were expected to join in the attack on El Telegrafo
after repulsing the enemy on the left, but a part of them were unable to
do so (p. 352).
26. Events of Apr. 17-18 (except Pillow's operations). Sen. 1 ; 30, 1,
pp. 255-95, 298 (Scott's orders; reports of himself and officers). Maury,
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIII, PAGES 51-56 351
Recoils., 37, 44. Hartman, Journal, 11. M'Sherry, El Puchero, 221-3.
Picayune, May 1, 6, 9, 19. Delta, May 1, 15 ; June 18. 252Mackall to
father, Apr. 18. 335Trist, May 7, 25. 217Henshaw papers. Trans.
Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1905, p. 213 ; 1906, pp. 182-3. 159Narrative based
on F. Collins papers. GRiley court of inquiry. GOPlympton to Scott,
July 27. 60E. K. Smith to Plympton, July 23. 60J. R. Smith to Polk,
Nov. 30, 1848. GOTwiggs to J. R. Smith, Nov. 9, 1848. GOMorris to
J. R. Smith, Nov. 15, 1848. GGRussell court of inquiry : orders 155. 223
Hirschorn, recoils. Negrete, Invasi6n, iii, app., 46-52, 98-114. Hitch-
cock, Fifty Years, 251-2. Grant, Mems., i, 132. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier,
ii, 59-84, 88, 90-1. Davis, Autobiog., 148-52, 155-8. Apuntes, 175-83.
Tribute a la Verdad, 42, 49, 62, 136. S. Anna, Apelacion, 34-41. Id.,
Manifiesto, 1847, 7. Eye witness, Complete History, 79-80. Robert-
son, Remins., 248-52. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 137-40, 267. Engineer
School, U. S. Army, Occas. Papers, no. 16. N. Y. Times, July 16, 1916
(Worth). Bishop, Journal. Nebel and Kendall, 24-5. S. Anna, Mi
Historia, 67-8. 66G. W. Smith to Stevens, Apr. 23. Mansfield, Mex.
War, 195. 210Bragg to Hammond, May 4, 1848. 254McClellan, diary ;
to sister, Apr. 22. Diario, Apr. 28, 30 ; May 20 ; June 10, 23, 30. Re-
publicano, Apr. 21, 23, 27 ; June 9 ; July 10. 84Ampudia to gov. S. L.
Potosi, Oct. 10. Gamboa, Impug., 30. Kenly, Md. Vol., 337. Ramirez,
Mexico, 227-9, 231, 261. 298Porter, diary. London Times, June 15.
Wash. Union, May 10, 11 ; Oct. 23. Monitor Repub., Apr. 20, 23, 24, 27 ;
May 3, 6 ; Nov. 1, 30. Spirit of the Times, May 29 ; June 5. 124Block-
lenger, recoils. 327Sutherland to father, Aug. . Vedette, ii, no. 2.
322Smith, diary. 307Roberts to wife, Apr. 21. 178Davis, diary. 270
Moore, diary. 358Williams to father, Apr. 21. 152Claiborne, memoirs.
112Beauregard to Patterson, Apr. 20. 66Stevens to J. L. Smith, May
7. 66Tower to J. L. Smith, undated. GGMason to J. L. Smith, Apr.
24. Arnold, Jackson, 87. 66G. W. Smith to Lee, Apr. 20. 66Lee to
Twiggs, undated. 65Scott, gen. orders 249. GORiley to Westcott, Nov.
30. 332Tennery, diary. Gimenez, Apologia. Ho. 85; 30, 1. Journal
U. S. Artill., 1892, pp. 419-20. Lee, Gen. Lee, 38. Oswandel, Notes,
116, 122-8. Semmes, Service, 178-81, 183. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 887-94.
82Soto to gov. Puebla, Apr. 18. 82Pavon to Puebla sec. state, Apr. 29.
Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1089 (Hitchcock). Niles, May 22, pp. 183, 188. 148
Chamberlain, recoils. Elderkin, Biog. Sketches, 66. Journ. Mil. Serv.
Instit.,xlil, 128. Henderson, Science of War, 215. Stevens, I. I. Stevens,
i, 126. Smithwick, Evolution, 286. 76S. Anna, Apr. 17, 21; May 7.
TGCanalizo, Apr. 18, 21. TGCarrera, May 1. 76Circular, Apr. 20. 76
Ampudia, Apr. 25. 76To Brito, May 25. TGAlvarez, Oct. 28. TGCanalizo
to Villaba & Co., Apr. 24; to son, Apr. 24. TGMemorias by heads of
depts., Nov., 1847.
REMARKS on the battle (April 18). The perfect confidence displayed
in Scott's orders for the battle is noteworthy. No doubt it had a great
effect on the troops. The orders to Worth were rather vague. Probably
this was because the course of the battle was expected to indicate how
his division could be used to the best advantage, but possibly on account
of his intense jealousy of Twiggs it was not deemed wise to say clearly that
he was to support Twiggs. In fact he followed Twiggs, ascended El
Telegrafo, saw the white flag at the tongues, and sent Harney and Childs
(Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 74) to accept the surrender of the Mexican
right wing. The movement assigned to Twiggs was hazardous, but the
352 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIII, PAGES 5&-S7
military quality of Santa Anna and the Mexican troops was now well
understood.
General Shields was struck by a grape shot that passed through the
upper part of his body ; and his recovery, due to high surgical skill and the
most devoted nursing, seemed almost miraculous. When Shields fell.
Col. E. D. Baker took command. Canalizo was ordered to charge Shields's
brigade ; but the ground was only partly cleared, and Santa Anna reported
that a charge was not practicable. Canalizo was, however, accused by
many of causing the Mexjcan defeat by letting the Americans reach
the highway. He could have dismounted all his cavalry, as he did his
cuirassiers, and 2000 fresh troops especially if aided by those at the
tongues might have done a good deal ; but probably he believed that
the battle had already been lost. When Shields's men approached the
highway they came upon a party of Mexican surgeons, and on learning
their business became instantly, according to the surgeons, their friends
and protectors (Diario, Apr. 30). The chief Mexican surgeon stated that
the Americans made no distinction between the two nationalities in
bringing wounded men to the hospitals (Courrier Fran^ais, May 5). Worth's
command, deprived of its expected share in the battle through Twiggs's
departure from Scott's plan, played the part of a reserve. Harney's
charge may have been launched just when it was because a thinning
out of the summit of El Telegrafo (probably due to sending troops against
Riley) led to the belief that the La Atalaya guns were doing great execu-
tion (Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 81). Harney placed the Seventh Infantry
on his right, deploying some of the men as skirmishers to guard that flank,
and the Third on his left, protected by the Rifles. (In consequence of
Loring's incompetence (213Hatch to father, Apr. 21) the Rifles did not
charge in a body or effectively.) This line was supported by the First
Artillery. Some of Harney's men joined with Riley's in capturing the
minor crest. The La Atalaya battery fired over the heads of the charging
Americans as long as this appeared to be safe. Vazquez died bravely
at his post, whereas a number of high Mexican officers proved recreant.
After the fighting began near the summit of El Telegrafo the Mexican
cannon placed there could not be used, for they would have injured Mexi-
cans as well as Americans. Santa Anna appears to have done all in his
power to stem the tide of defeat. About 1000 Puebla men under Gen.
Arteaga arrived during the battle. They were placed at the headquarters
battery, but took flight early. S. Anna's line was about a mile and a
half long.
27. It has been argued that Pillow's attack should have been a "mere
feint," i.e. threat. But (1) Scott had reason to fear that the purpose of
a "mere feint" would be detected as soon as the grand battle should begin,
and that the feint would fail of its purpose (see Donaldson and Becke, 387) ;
and (2) Pillow had troops of superior mettle, who probably would not
have been satisfied to make a mere threat (Nebel and Kendall, 25, note) .
In ordering this attack Scott violated Napoleon's principle, which was to
turn the enemy's flank without dividing his own army (Johnston, Founda-
tions, 180), but the circumstances warranted doing so. In particular
Santa Anna had shown that he did not wish to be aggressive, and Scott
intended to keep him busy (see Hamley, Operations, 160).
28. Pillow had also a few Tennessee horse and (attached to Haskell's
regiment) a Kentucky company in all about 2000 men (Robertson,
Remins., 244).
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIII, PAGES 57-58 353
29. The text is based primarily on the full and minute account given
in the diary of George B. McClellan (who accompanied Pillow and whose
integrity and technical ability will not be questioned) and the following
documents : reports of Engineers Stevens (66May 7) and Tower (66un-
dated) ; Haskell and sixteen officers (Picayune, May 29); Haskell (ib.,
June 28) ; Pillow, reply (ib., June 9) ; Id., 61substitute report, May 29
(to take the place of his published report, which he admitted was not cor-
rect) ; 139letters of Col. Campbell, an able and fair man (who said pri-
vately the affair was most badly managed ; also that Pillow was no general ,
and on the field had no judgment or decision) ; 224Williams to Hitchcock,
June 4, 1849; Wynkoop, July 16, in Picayune, Sept. 19; Stevens, I. I.
Stevens, i, 125 (Stevens says, e.g., that Pillow's attack failed because
" made prematurely, with great precipitation, without order in the assault-
ing columns, and before the supporting columns were in position, and at
the wrong point," and that it, "both as to time and as to direction, was
earnestly remonstrated against by the engineer officer directing the attack,
by the personal staff of the general, and by Col. Campbell, second in com-
mand"). Of course Ripley, who wrote his history of the war in consul-
tation with Pillow, gives a misleading account of this affair as of others.
The author used also the following sources : Sen. 51 ; 32, 1. Sen. 1 ; 30,
I, pp. 257 (Scott); 258 (orders 111); 294 (Patterson); 296 (Pillow).
217Henshaw papers. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 109. 69Pillow to adj.
gen., June 25, 1848. 69Ripley to adj. gen., June 25, 1848. 66Tower to
Twiggs, Apr. 16. Negrete, Invasi6n, iii, app., 50. Hitchcock, Fifty
Years, 251. Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 593. Grant, Mems., i, 133.
Davis, Autobiog., 146. Apuntes, 173, 181. Weekly Courier and N. Y.
Enquirer, Mar. 2, 1848. Robertson, Remins., 244-8. Lawton, Artill.
Officer, 139. 293Pillow to wife, June 9. 293Rains to Mrs. Pillow, Apr.
18. Republicano, June 9, 24. Picayune, May 9; Sept. 11. Mexico d
traves, iv, 654. Hillard, McClellan, 18, 19. Nat. Intelligencer, June
II. Monitor Repub., June 24. 358 Williams to father, Apr. 21. Vedette,
viii, no. 5. Oswandel, Notes, 110-1, 122-35. Semmes, Service, 182-3.
Hitchcock in semi-weekly Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 1, 1848. lOOMata,
Apr. 18. 82Pav6n to Puebla sec. state, Apr. 29. 288Tapper to wife,
May 3. Niles, June 5, p. 219; Oct. 2, p. 75. Boston Atlas, Dec. 13.
Griepenkerl, Applied Tactics, 116. 316Judd to Sherman, Feb. 26, 1848.
Johnstone, Foundations, 180. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1852. ISlArmstrong
to Donelson, July 4. 139Cummings to Campbell, May 12; June 13.
TGCarrera, May 1. 76S. Anna, May 7. The reason why reversing the
regiments caused trouble seems to have been that infantry were accustomed
to manoeuvre and fight in a certain formation, and felt awkward if the
right was unexpectedly brought out on the left. As Wynkoop had farther
to march than Haskell and did not wish to attack before his support was
in position, placing Campbell third in the line of march involved a delay.
One derives a lesson on the value of official reports from Patterson's
representation that Pillow was wounded while gallantly leading his bri-
gade (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p. 295):
30. The American soldiers were not pleased with this policy. The
American government expressed itself against it and, placing an undeserved
value on Mexican officers, ordered that no more of them should be paroled
except for special reasons. It is probably enough to say that Scott was
in the best position to judge; but one may remark that Santa Anna's
difficulty was not so much to obtain men as to obtain arms. Further
VOL. II 2 A
354 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIII, PAGES 58-59
grounds for releasing them are mentioned in Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p. 257. Ac-
cording to Gen. Pav6n, Gen. La Vega and twenty-four other officers were
not paroled. Some six declined to give their paroles. Among the spoils
were a large amount of ammunition, $11,791.19 in cash (Sen. 34; 34,
3, p. 24), and a wooden leg (supposed to have belonged to Santa Anna)
now preserved in the capitol at Springfield, 111.
31. Pursuit, losses, prisoners, spoils. Ho. 60; 30, 1, 948, 1012, 1221
(Scott); 1089 (Hitchcock); 1233 (Marcy). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 258
(gen. orders 111) ; 262 (Scott) ; 276, 278, 283, etc. Scott, Mems., ii, 443.
Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 253. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, 86-7, 106-7.
Tribute a la Verdad, 62. Bustamante, N. Bernal, ii, 189. S. Anna,
Apelacion, 40. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 140, 179. Ho. 24; 31, 1. Sen.
34; 34, 3, p. 37. Republicano, Apr. 27.; June 9. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp.
122, 136. Courrier Fran$ai<, May 5. Mexico d traves, iv, 655. Monitor
Repub., Apr. 24; May 6. 322Smith, diary. Williams to father, Apr. 21.
152Claiborne, mems. 332Tennery, diary. 82Pav6n to Puebla sec.
state, Apr. 29. N. Y. Sun, Aug. 16. Niles, May 15, p. 164 ; May 29'
p. 201. McClellan, diary. Nebel and Kendall, 25. Robertson, Remins.,
249, 253. TGCarrera, Apr. 27; May 1. TGAmpudia, Apr. 25. 76Cana,
lizo, Apr. 18. 76ld., undated. 76S. Anna, May 7. 76Junta directiva-
May 3. 76G. G6mez to Gaona, Apr. 18. The cavalry appear to have
been late in beginning the pursuit. Ripley (War, etc., ii, 75) says Scott
was so busy that he forgot to send for the cavalry, but Scott's orders
for the battle put the responsibility on the commander of that corps,
which was placed in reserve on the highway with a field battery (Sen.
1 ; 30, 1, p. 259). In places, too, they found the highway cut or blocked.
32. A deputation of the ayuntamiento met Patterson (Sen. 1 ; 30,
1, p. 296), and were promised protection on condition that no liquor
should be sold to the troops. The term "nondescript costumes" applies
primarily to the volunteers, but probably some of the regulars had lost
parts of their outfits.
33. Scott's report was a model in concealing facts ; and W T orth, writing
to a member of his family, called it "a lie from beginning to end." Gen.
U. S. Grant, doubtless recording without investigation his early impres-
sions, wrote in his Personal Memoirs (i, 132) : "Perhaps there was not a
battle of the Mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before
an engagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards
took place," and such has been the accepted opinion, though a thought-
ful comparison of the orders with Scott's own report (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp.
258, 261) is enough to disprove this view. For example, Scott in his
orders, intending to attack from the enemy's rear, assigned no troops to
the frontal attack on El Telegrafo, which was the main feature of the
actual battle. Unpublished documents of a wholly unbiassed character
disprove it still further. As two more illustrations, the artillery, for
which infinite trouble was taken to make a passable road, did not figure
at all in the battle (though a section of Taylor's battery went that way in
season to join in the pursuit), and a court of inquiry declared that Riley's
brigade, which played a most important role, was diverted from its orig-
inal destination a finding approved by Scott (65gen. orders 249).
Robert Anderson said that if Scott's orders had been carried out, not a
Mexican would have escaped (Lawton. Artillery Officer, 137) ; and Davis,
Shields's aide, stated that Twiggs failed to execute Scott's orders and dis-
appointed Scott's expectations (Autobiography, 148). See also notes
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIV, PAGES 60-62 355
22 and 25. It is possible that one reason why Scott in his report com-
mended Twiggs's course was that, even if satisfied as to the practicability
of his own plan, he did not care to raise an issue on that question. Obvi-
ously it would have been impossible to prove now that the plan was prac-
ticable, and a bitter, harmful controversy would have resulted. That on
general principles such an exposure of the American flank was very hazard-
ous could not be 'denied.
34. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 296 (Patterson). 217Henshaw papers. 159
Narrative based on F. Collins papers. Robertson, Remins., 253-7.
Ruxton, Adventures (1847), 16. (King Death) Griffis, Perry, 217. 298
Porter, diary. Monitor Repub., Apr. 21, 27. 322Soiith, diary. 66G.
W. Smith to Stevens, May 1. Oswandel, Notes, 140. 256 J. Parrott
to Marcy, Apr. 19. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 948 (Scott). 254McClellan, diary.
Ramirez, Mexico, 260.
XXIV. PUEBLA
1. Worth's advance. Henshaw narrative? Hitchcock, Fifty Years,
255. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 154. Davis, Autobiog., 173. Ddta,
July 8. Picayune, May 19. 159Collins papers, Apr. 21 ; June 19. M5x-
ico d travel, iv, 655. Tornel, Breve Resena, 345. Robertson, Visit,
i, 303. Orbigny, Voyage, 411. Lyon, Journal, ii, 181. Balbontin,
Estado, 22. Velasco, Geografia, iii, 97, 99. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 141-
4. Robertson, Remins., 276. GSScott to Worth, May 6. Colecci6n
de Itineraries. Revue de Paris, Dec., 1844. Oswandel, Notes, 162.
Semmes, Service, 217-22. 139W. B. to D. Campbell, Apr. 25. 185
Memo. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 261 (Scott); 300 (Worth). Ramirez, Mexico,
228-9. Roa Barcena, Recuerdos, 236-9. 254McClellan to sister, Apr.
22. 236Judah, diary. Moore, Scott's Campaign, 10-2. Norton, Life.
Diccionario Universal (Las Vigas and Perote). 327Sutherland to
father, undated. Ward, Mexico, ii, 193-5. Green, Journal, 238. Ho.
60; 30, 1, pp. 944-6, 948 (Scott). 364 Worth to daughter, Apr. 30. Ne-
grete, Invasion, iii, app., 58, 60, 110. Tributo a la Verdad, 43-6. 76
Gaona, Mar. 4, 8, 15; Apr. 8, 19. 76To Id., Apr. 17. 76Canalizo, Apr.
21, 24, etc. 76Baneneli, Apr. 24. 76Bravo, Apr. 23. 76S. Anna, Apr.
27. The distance from Jalapa to Perote was called about thirty miles.
2. "Convoy" will be used to signify a line of wagons or pack-mules
or both transporting merchandise or supplies under escort. Among the
difficulties in getting articles from the coast were the sandy road, the
heat, the weakness and insufficient number of animals, the shortage of
wagons, and above all the want of good drivers and conductors (Sen. 52;
30, 1, p. 127). Scott had supposed that successive bodies of new troops
would escort the convoys up, but the diversion of these to the Rio Grande
for some time (in consequence of S. Anna's advance against Taylor) made
it necessary to weaken his forces by sending escorts from Jalapa (6lScott
to Wilson, Apr. 26). The policy of treating the Mexicans kindly required
more self-support and therefore larger trains than would otherwise have
been necessary. Moreover, in order to avoid a reverse, which would
have had consequences of peculiar gravity in Mexico, Scott had to avoid
risks.
3. It has been argued (e.g. by Semmes) that Scott was in fact able to
obtain subsistence from the country all the spring and summer, and there-
fore the matter involved no difficulties (Service, 208) ; but Scott had to
356 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIV, PAGES 62-65
ascertain beforehand through agents (Delta, May 18) both that subsistence
existed and that it could be obtained ; and to make the success of his
precautions a basis for asserting that he should not have waited to take
them, is unreasonable. Scott said later that he might have rushed ahead
by dep3nding upon the provisions near at hand, but that within a week
the army would have had to scatter and fight for supplies (Mems., ii,
553). The resources of the country were found to be mostly at a distance
from the line of march (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 949). Time was required to
select intelligent, reliable agents, and they needed time to go and come.
A particular reason for deliberation lay in the fact that the new crops
would not be ready before about the middle of June. It should be added
that some statements of Semmes and others regarding material elements
of the situation are contradicted by Scott's reports written at the time.
Semmes was probably influenced by Worth, whose aide he was.
4. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 904. Marcy forgot this when he severely censured
Scott for dismissing the men before their time was out (ibid., 1245).
5. By the Glfield return of May 7 Scott had : Engineer Co. (Smith),
43; Ordnance Co. (Huger), 60; First Div. (Worth), 2331; Second Div.
(Twiggs), 2216; Dragoons (Harney), 433; volunteers (Quitman), 2030.
The disparity between Scott's numbers as figured at Washington and his
numbers as counted at the front is suggested by the fact that on April
26 his volunteers (aside from those now discharged) were estimated by
the adjutant general as 4994 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 928). The regiments
that went home were the Georgia, the Alabama, the Third and Fourth
Illinois, and the First, Second and Third Tennessee.
6. Scott at Jalapa (except his proclamation, etc. : Note 8. Ho. 60 ; 30,
1, pp. 910, 944-8, 954-8, 1221 (Scott); 983-92; 950 (H. L. Scott) ; 904,
953, 1241 (Marcy) ; 967 (Worth). GlScott to Wilson, Apr. 26. GSWorth
court of inquiry, proceedings. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, i, 278; ii, 118-
23, 126-7, 129-30, 143-4. 66Beauregard to Smith, May 10. 52Trist
to Buchanan, May 7. Davis, Autobiog., 164-6. Hartman, Journal,
13. SSOScott to Cadwalader, Apr. 25. 304Patterson, orders 10, May 1 .
(The district) Robertson, Visit, i, 278; Ruxton, Adventures (1915), 56;
Kendall, Narrative (N. Y., 1844), ii, 398; Orbigny, Voyage, 410; Lyon,
Journal, ii, 186; Velasco, Geografia, iii, 99. 362G. A. Worth to Van
Buren, May 20. Robertson, Remins, 261, 275. Revue de Paris, Dec.,
1844. 218Henshaw narrative. Lowenstern, Le Mexique, 26. GSScott
to Worth, May 6. GSScott, gen. orders 128, 129, 135-6, Apr. 30, 30 ;. May
4, 5. 332Tennery, diary. Thompson, Recoils., 13. Oswandel, Notes,
142, 149, 152. Sen. 14; 30, 1, p. 6 (Scott). Semmes Service, 189-90,
207-10. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528 (Hitchcock). 139W. B. to D. Campbell,
Nov. 2, 1846. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 124, 129 (Scott). Picayune, May 4, 7,
11; Nov. 14. Steele, Amer. Campaigns, i, 110. 335Scott to Trist,
July 21, 1848. GlField report, May 7, 1847. GlScott to Wilson, May 2.
Moore, Scott's Camp., 68. Roa Barcena, Recuerdos, 236. 322Smith,
diary. 270Moore, diary. 73Bermudez de Castro, no. 517, June 29.
Polk, Message, Feb. 13 (Richardson, iv, 515). Scott, Mems., ii, 452, 466,
553. London Times, Aug. 6. Diario, Aug. 5. N. Y. Sun, Aug. 16.
Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 133, 135. (Bounty) U. S. Statutes at Large,
ix, 184. Upton, Mil. Policy, 215. So. Qtrly. Review, Apr., 1852, 376-
85. GlScott, memo., Nov. 29, 1846 (12 new regts.). Sen. 1; 30, 1,
pp. 45-6. 364Worth to diughter, Apr. 30. Bishop, Journal. 112Beaure-
gard to Smith, May 2. Negrete, Invasion, iii, app., 60. GOScott to Marcy,
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIV, PAGES 65-66 357
Apr. 5. Stevens, Campaigns, 16. 139Five colonels to Scott, May 1.
62Adj. gen. to Brooke, May 29. (Govt. will move) 76To S. Anna,
Apr. 21.
The Spanish minister reported that if Scott had been prepared to
attack the capital immediately after April 18, he could have taken it
without a shot (no. 517, June 29). Patterson left the army at this time
because the return of so many volunteers destroyed his command, and
Pillow left because he had been appointed a major general and wished
to bring on his division. Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 514) says Scott
could have established a garrison of 4000 at Mexico and held the city.
But assassinations and sickness would soon have reduced his numbers.
Parties sent out for provisions and forage would have been cut off. The
Mexicans, not yet thoroughly beaten, would have been encouraged by
the isolation of so weak a force, as they had been by the size of Taylor's
army. They might have been able to starve out the garrison. The
result would probably have been at best that a rescue-army would have
had to fight its way to the capital without the assistance of Scott, his
regular officers and his veteran troops. He had no right to take such a
risk, especially when it seemed very doubtful whether success in holding
the capital would signify much.
7. This agent, whose name has been given as Campos and (probably
correctly) as Campomanes, appears to have been the parish priest of
Jalapa (Baz, Juarez, 47, note). The paper, which was printed first in
Spanish and then in English (76Hitchcock to Worth, May 12), may be
summarized as follows : It is my duty, Mexicans, to make known certain
facts that are purposely concealed from you. For the sake not only of
ourselves but of the whole American continent and of republican institu-
tions, we of the United States made every effort consistent with honor to
adjust our difficulties with Mexico, but the patriotic Herrera was thrown
from power, and the new government, ignoring your interests in order to
further its monarchical designs, compelled my nation to take up arms.
Like you, we hoped that good would result from the overthrow of Paredes,
and therefore we permitted Santa Anna to return ; but, again like you
perhaps, we were mistaken as to his intentions. What has followed, you
know. Your troops, whose devotion and valor we admire, have been
badly led, and even betrayed or deceived ; and he has not only rewarded
those who waged civil war at Mexico, but insulted the brave defenders
of Vera Cruz. Recently the battle at Cerro Gordo showed what you
may expect from him. Everywhere generals long supported in idleness
by the nation have exhibited a lack of honor or skill, while the dead or
wounded soldiers, abandoned on the field, have not been given by their
leaders even the poor recompense of a grave. The clergy and all other
peaceable and useful citizens have been, and still are, taxed, menaced
and sacrificed, whereas criminals go unpunished. Can this be called
liberty? The Mexicans, I am sure, have the courage to admit mistakes
that involve no dishonor, and to adopt for the future a policy of peace,
of liberty and of harmony with their brethren of the United States. My
troops, as your bishops and priests will testify, have not committed the
outrages alleged against us for the purpose of exciting your anger. We
adore the same God as you, and many of our people and of our army are
Roman Catholics. We punish crime and reward merit ; we respect prop-
erty especially that of the Church and we seek your friendship .
Abandon prejudice, then ; cease to be victims of the ambitious ; act as a
358 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIV, PAGES 66-67
great American nation. If, however, the war must go on, my country
will send should they be needed 100,000 men, and settle the pending
difficulties in a decisive manner. Guerilla warfare, should it be persisted
in, would lead to reprisals, and you could not blame us for your sufferings.
I have set out for Puebla and Mexico, and shall certainly reach those
places ; but my desire is peace, friendship, union. It is for you to choose
between these and war (Tribute & la Verdad, doc. 18).
It has been said that this proclamation, by opening old political sores
and insulting the Mexicans, did more harm than good (Southern Quarterly
Review, April, 1852, p. 394) ; but (1) even the formal reply made to it
admitted its truth, and the facts outlasted any temporary resentment
that may have been produced in some minds ; (2) it was intended for the
common people, with whom plain, solid interests had more influence than
high-flown sentiments of pride; (3) the clericals, who suggested the con-
tents of the proclamation, were shrewd men ; (4) the fury of Santa Anna
against it (76May 18) is sufficient evidence that he saw it would injure
him; and (5) we have direct proof that it was received eagerly by the
Mexicans. See, for example, Roa Bdrcena, Recuerdos, 240-1.
Closely allied with the clerical party were the monarchists, who, though
comparatively few, wielded much influence on account of their wealth
and social position. They had good reason to fear the United States
but they hated Santa Anna ; and it was suspected that they wished the
people to realize that without European aid they were helpless.
Among minor matters attended to by Scott at Jalapa were the establish-
ment of a battery commanding the city, and the creation of the military
department of Jalapa (Plan del Rio to La Hoya, inclusive).
8. The understanding with the clericals, etc. (Beach) 56Report, June
4; N. Y. Sun, May 19, 22. (Agent) Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 255-6;
68/d. to Worth, May 10; Baz, Juarez, 47, note; Apuntes, 192;
Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 125 (Scott). Tribute la Verdad, 49, 54, 56
and doc. no. 18 (proclam. of May 11). S. Anna, Apelaci6n, 41-3. Clai-
borne, Quitman, i, 311. Consideraciones, 3, 7, 22-3. (Priests tolerant)
Kendall, Narrative (N. Y., 1844), ii, 341-3; Consideraciones, 32, 37;
Lawton, Artill. Officer, 160-1, 175. (True) ISBankhead, no. 57, May
29; Impug. del Manif. London Times, July 15. Apuntes, 193. Sen.
52; 30, 1, p. 127 (Marcy). Ramirez, Mexico, 239, 256-7, 263, 272.
Mexico a traves, iv, 661. 236Judah, diary, May 2, 6, 17, 26. 95Protest,
Apr. 12. Monitor del Pueblo, Apr. 29. 95S&nchez, proclam., Apr. 29.
95Orders, May 8. 95Ayunt., proceedings. Picayune, June 30. 820tero,
proclam., Apr. 26. 82Baranda to gov., Apr. 24 and reply (draft). 82
Isunza, proclam., May 13. (Crowning) Scott, Mems., ii, 549. (Proclam.
of May 11) Wash. Union, June 12. Courrier des Etats Unis, May 22.
Mata, Reflecciones. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 967, 995 (Worth); 968 (pro-
clam.) Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 190. 76Winette, statement, May
2. 76To S. Anna, May 14. 76S. Anna, May 18. 76Hitchcock to
Worth, May 12 (intercepted). 76Furlong, May 17.
9. His intellectual plane is suggested by the fact that after the battle
he promptly sent instructions to his mistress but not to his second in com-
mand (76Canalizo, Apr. 24).
10. At this juncture appeals were again made to the Roman Catholics,
particularly the Irish, of the American army, and apparently 2-300
deserted while at Jalapa (Ballentine, English Soldier, ii, 144). One appeal
said, "Are Catholic Irishmen to be the destroyers of Catholic temples,
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIV, PAGES 67-69 359
the murderers of Catholic priests, and the founders of heretical rites in
this pious country?" A large amount of money seems to have been col-
lected by Santa Anna at this time. The Manifiesto of Vera Cruz State
(Monitor Republicano, Dec. 19, 1847) asserted that in fifteen days he
obtained 120,000 pesos, though he said (May 9) he had received less than
25,000 (Gamboa, Impug., 35).
11. Santa Anna's flank position was even more favorable than Wash-
ington's at Morristown. While he lingered near Vera Cruz, Scott could
not feel safe, and his trains were in imminent danger. Had he remained
there, Scott, whose small numbers would not have permitted him to send
an adequate detachment to Orizaba, might have felt compelled to go there
with his whole army, and much embarrassment might have resulted
(Steele, American Campaigns, i, 125-6. W. B. Lane, The United Service,
June, 1896, p. 485. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, 146).
12. Santa Anna's operations till he reached Puebla. Only the principal
documents can be cited here. Tribute a la Verdad, 48-9, 54, 136.
Picayune, May 6. Diario Sept. 10. 312Guerra to S. Anna, Apr. 8.
Roa Bdrcena, Recuerdos, 265-7, 570, 634. S. Anna, Apelaci6n, app.,
72-3, 76. 366/cL, Address to Amer. soldiers, Apr. . Id., Detail, 8.
Defensa de . . . Estrada. S. Anna, Manifiesto, Mar. 24, 1848. 12Loch
to admiralty, Apr. 20, 1847. Apuntes, 183-91. Gamboa, Impug., 36.
Negrete, Invasi6n, iv, app., 274. ISBankhead, no. 42, 1847. Courrier
Francais, May 5. Ramirez, Mexico, 261. Mexico a traves, iv, 660-1. 88
C6rdoba ayunt., proceedings, Apr. 28-9. 82Official docs., Apr. 20-30.
S^Prefect of Matamoros, Apr. 26. (Indians) 82Prefect Tlapa, May 13.
Republicano, May 4. 73Bermudez de Castro, no. 517, June 29. Nat.
Intelligencer, June 2. Monitor Repub., May 4, 23. (Tlacotalpam) Sen.
1 ; 30, 1, p. 547. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 190. S. Anna, Comunic.
Oficial. Carreno, Jefes, cclxx. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 260. 76
Carrera, Apr. 27. (Chiquihuite.) 76Acuerd3, Mar. 29; 76Soto, Apr.
3 ; 76to Soto, Apr. 1. 76Canalizo, Apr. 21, 24, 28. 76To S. Anna, Apr. 21.
76To Canalize, Apr. 21. 76To Bravo, Apr. 21. 76Furlong, May 9.
76Gov. to comte. gen. Oaxaca, May 4. 76S. Anna, Apr. 27. 76/d. to
Rosa, Feb. 5, 1848.
13. Santa Anna's operations after he reached Puebla (except the Amozoc
fight). Negrete, Invasi6n, iv. app., 250-2, 255, Tributo la Verdad,
49-53, 56-7. S. Anna, Apelacion, 41-3. Id., Detail, 8. 166Pommares
to Conner, Aug. 29, 1846, confid. Donnavan, Adventures, 99. Dos
Palabras. London Times, July 9. Apuntes, 192-3. Gamboa, Impug.,
33-5. Ramirez, Mexico, 260, 282. Mexico a" traves, iv, 661. 95Protest,
Apr. 12. Monitor del Pueblo, Apr. 29. 82Comte. gen. to gov., May 10.
82Letter to secy., May 11. 95Puebla ayunt., proceedings, May 10-15.
82lsunza, proclam., May 12. 199S. Anna to Gimenez, May 15. Diario,
May 10. Monitor Repub., May 13, 23 ; Dec. 12. Baz, Juarez, 47, note.
Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 190. 312Bishop Puebla to S. Anna,
Apr. 8. 76S. Anna, Apr. 27, 29; May 11, 15. 76To S. Anna, Apr. 20,
30. 76To Bravo, Apr. 21. 76To Gaona, Apr. 21. 76Carrera, Apr.
23. 76Furlong, May 9. 76S. Anna to Rea, May 12.
14. The American advance to Puebla (including the Amozoc fight). Ho.
60; 30, 1, pp. 941-8, 957 (Scott) ; 967, 99 1 (Worth). GlScott to Wilson,
Apr. 23. 218Henshaw narritive. Tributo a" la Verdad, 50. Scott,
Mems., ii, 430. Grant, Mems., i, 135. BUlentine, Eng. Soldiar, ii,
159, 161, 175-6. S. Anna, ApeLici6n, 41-2. 303 Worth to Quitman,
360 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIV, PAGES 69-71
May 10. 159Collins papers, May 20; July 3-8. Robertson, Visit, i,
312. Orbigny, Voyage, 412. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 145, 156, 162,
170-4, 207-8. Journal Milit. Serv. Instil., xvii (Van Deusen). Lowen-
stern, Le Mexique, 31. Smith, To Mexico, 153, 163, 165 (nothing in U.
S. equal to Puebla), 166. Sen. 65 ; 30, 1, p. 527. Brackett, Lane's Brigade,
191, 276. 213Hatch to father, June 3. GSScott to Worth, May 6. Colec-
ci6n de Itinerarios. Revue de Paris, Dec., 1844. Semmes, Service, 225-6,
230-7. Apuntes, 193-6. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 125 (Scott). Gamboa,
Irnpug., 36. Mexico a traves, iv, 662. 236Judah, diary. Moore, Scott's
Camp., 84-96. Rosa, Impresiones, passim. 270Moore, diary. Steele,
Amer. Camps., i, 107, 110. Diario, May 16. Ward, Mexico, ii, 201.
Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 140, 142. 364Worth to daughter, Apr. 30. 76
Prefect of S. J. de los Llanos, May 11. 76Comte. milit. Huamantla,
Apr. 29. 76To Bravo, Apr. 26. 76Fiirlong, May 5. 76Bravo, Apr.
23. 76S. Anna, May 13, 15. 76To S. Anna, "May 14. 76S. Anna to
Rea, May 12. And others.
Santa Anna, to j ustify his course, said he felt compelled to leave Puebla
on account of the unfavorable local conditions and the approach of the
Americans (Detail, 8). Worth did not have outposts and scouts on the
alert, as he should have had, at Amozoc, and knew nothing about the roads
(Stevens, Stevens, i, 142). Scott's delay showed that he did not feel strong
enough to advance to the capital. That city was therefore in no danger
from his army. If Santa Anna, instead of going there, had now gathered
all the Mexican strength between Puebla and Vera Cruz and prevented
reinforcements from reaching Scott, the latter would have been in a hard
position.
15. The Puebla ayuntamiento archives contain the agreement signed
at Chachapa by Worth. Later he sought to modify this (GSorders 31),
calling it merely a memorandum (68to H. L. Scott, June 16), and on May
20 he signed a new 95version. Naturally the Pueblans held to the former
(GSDoran to Scott, June 17). For general orders 20 see p. 455.
16. Semmes represents Worth's regime as entirely satisfactory to the
civil authorities (Service, 275). This illustrates the fact that caution is
necessary in reading what he says when Worth is concerned, for the rec-
ords of the ayuntamiento give a different impression. For Worth's charac-
teristics see chap, xii, note 8. The Southern Quarterly Review, April,
1852, 406, note, said Worth "was quite superficial, had no solid or pro-
found attainments, nor was he gifted with grasp of mind requisite to high
combinations and extended operations." Robert Anderson remarked once
that he hoped Worth would not, "from a fit of passion, alter his opinions"
(Anderson Artill. Officer, 32). Hitchcock in N. Y. Courier and Enquirer
(semi- weekly), Mar. 1, 1848 : Worth has striking manners and great
felicity in conversation, but is utterly destitute of stability and judgment.
17. Worth's operations at Puebla. GSWorth court of inquiry, proceed-
ings, documents. Weekly Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 2, 1848. Tribute
a la Verdad, 12, 48, 51-2. 224H. L. Scott to Worth, June 20. GlScott
to Wilson, Apr. 26. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 257. (Alarms) Grant,
Mems., i, 136 ; Delta, July 8 ; 218Henshaw narrative ; 307Roberts, diary ;
Sen. 65 ; 30, 1, pp. 527-8. 303Gen. orders 128. Collins papers. Robert-
son, Visit, i, 314. Ruxton, Adventures (1847), 30. Bullock, Six Months
(1825), i, 83. Leon, Hist. Gen., 477. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 169, 174-5,
226. Journal des Debats, July 6, 1847. Semmes, Service, 210, 254,
264, 275. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 912. Apuntes, 193-5. Sen. 52; 30, 1,
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIV, PAGES 71-72 361
p. 125 (Scott). Gamboa, Impug., 33-4. Ramirez, Mexico, 261, 267-8,
272. Mexico a traves, iv, 662. 236Judah, diary. Monitor del Pueblo,
Apr. 29. 95Ayunt., orders, May 8. 95Ayunt., proceedings and corresp.
with Worth. 95W. to first alcalde, May 18. 82Bravo, proclam., Apr.
28. 82lsunza, proclam., May 13. 270Moore, diary. Davis, Autobiog.,
274. Negrete, Invasion, iii, app., 61, 86-7. Monitor Repub., May 2,
21 ; June 5. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 994 (Worth). Niles Jan. 15, 1848, p. 311.
364\Vorth to Sprague, July 29, 1847. 76S. Anna, May 13, 16. 76Furlong,
May 13. 76Worth, May 12. 76Bravo, Apr. 30. 76Worth to Furlong,
May 17. 76To Furlong, May 20.
Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 115) points out very pertinently that
Worth placed his troops injudiciously at Puebla. Worth's errors bore most
unfortunate fruit. Scott, before knowing or suspecting what had been
conceded to Mexican laws, made sharp comments on the attitude of the
Puebla authorities. Naturally he felt seriously troubled. Worth even
allowed them to try citizens who had killed American soldiers, and of
course the culprits were acquitted (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 527; 95ayunt.
to Worth, May 22). Scott thought seriously of evacuating the city and
recapturing it in order to wipe out that concession; but, concluding that
such a course would be rather farcical, he simply overrode the concession
by republishing general orders 20 (chap, xxxi, note 22). This action and
the comments angered Worth. Scott angered him further by requesting
him to withdraw the 68circular of June 16, which was impolitic, implied
that Worth held an independent command, and if entitled to credence
(Lawton, Artill. Officer, 227) should have been given to headquarters,
so that all the troops could be warned (224H. L. Scott to Worth, June 20).
Worth therefore demanded a court of inquiry (65gen. orders 196). Quit-
man, Twiggs and P. F. Smith formed the court and sat on June 30. Their
68conclusions strongly condemned the circular, the terms granted to
Puebla and Worth's complaints against Scott; and they pronounced
him worthy of a severe rebuke, as certainly he was. Scott could not
avoid approving the verdict and publishing it in orders (65no. 196), but
these orders were made known only to chiefs of the general staff and com-
manders of divisions and brigades. From this time Worth was no doubt
in his heart a mortal enemy of Scott. Unhappily, more will be heard of
this matter. As for criticising Scott, Worth wrote on July 29 (364to S.)
that Scott might have entered Mexico city by May 20, in which case (it
was Worth's "firm belief") " peace would have immediately resulted"
a very superficial judgment. Worth added: "We gain victories and
halt until all the moral advantages are lost." Hitchcock well said that
Worth looked only at his ability to march troops to a certain place, while
Scott had to see also how the advance could be supported and supplied
(Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528). (Other references for this note. GSScott to
Worth, June 16. 68Worth to Scott, June 20. 681 d., order 61, June 20.
Lawton, Artill. Officer, 226-8. GSWorth to H. L. Scott, June 16. 68
Scott to Worth, May 6. National (Atlixco), May 16. Davis, Autobiog.,
270-1, 274.)
18. At Jalapa he left Brev. Col. Childs with the First Artillery (five
companies), the Second Pennsylvania and three companies of the First
Pennsylvania; at Perote seven companies of the First Pennsylvania
with some artillerists ; and at each place a troop of dragoons (Sen. 52 ;
30, 1, p. 125). The stock of ammunition was still inadequate, and the
paymaster had only half of his estimate for January-April (ibid., 124-5).
362 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIV, PAGES 72-74
19. Dommguez, leader of the Spy Company, had been an honest weaver,
it was said, but on being robbed by a Mexican officer, took to the road and
became a brigand chief. When the Americans reached Puebla he was
living there quietly with his family ; but, knowing the insecurity of his
position, he accepted Hitchcock's offer to become a scout. His band con-
sisted at first of five men but rose to about 100, and probably might have
been increased to 2000 (Lawton, Artill. Officer, 266). He and men of his
even entered the capital in disguise. While he was at the head of the com-
pany, the actual captain was a Virginian named Spooner, who had been
a member of his band ; and the two lieutenants also were foreigners. The
men seem to have served and obeyed orders faithfully, and their leader
refused very advantageous terms offered by Santa Anna. (For the Spy
Co. see Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 259, 263-4, 330, 335-41, 344-5. Brackett,
Lane's Brigade, 187. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 266. Henshaw narrative,
Aug. 8. 69Dominguez to Polk [Sept., 1848].)
20. Hargous, an American merchant of Vera Cruz, was Scott's financial
agent (Picayune, June 30) . Without him one hardly sees what the Amer-
icans could have done. An intercepted letter from the wife of Brev. Col.
Childs, abusing Polk roundly, gave considerable comfort to the enemy.
Another letter imparted much information about military matters. One
is again surprised that our war department did not use a cipher.
21. Scott instructed the commander at Vera Cruz what to do in case
of attack, and gave the commander at Jalapa full directions with refer-
ence to the sick and wounded (about 1000) lying there (Ho. 60 ; 30, 1,
p. 997). There were also about 1000 sick at Vera Cruz and 200 at Perote
(Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 129). The people at home did not understand Scott's
situation. Regiments nominally 800-1000 strong had actually less than
300 (185 to Duncan, July 20).
Owing to the state of public sentiment in Mexico, cutting loose from
Vera Cruz was much less hazardous than it seemed. Besides, the small-
ness of the American army made the problem of subsistence and forage
comparatively simple. Marcy was candid enough to admit that Scott
understood the advantages of holding Jalapa, and was the best judge as
to the advisability of giving it up (Ho. 60 ; 30, 1, pp. 1003-4). The Br tlsh
consul at Vera Cruz reported it as the unanimous opinion of the merchants
of that place that with five times his actual force Scott could not have kept
the line to the interior open (13no. 19).
22. Scott at Puebla. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 954, 957, 993, 997, 1012-3
(Scott) ; 967 (Worth) ; 998, 1002-4 (Marcy) ; 1021-7 (Scott and Quit-
man). Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 124, 129, 135 (Scott); 242 (Trist). Rivera,
Jalapa, iii, 912, 925. Henshaw narrative. Haynes, Scott's Guide.
Tribute a la Verdad, 56. Scott, Mems., ii, 453-4, 460, 466. Hitchcock,
Fifty Years, 256-9, 261, 266, 270, 341-4. Grant, Mems., i, 136. Bal-
lentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 135-6. Davis, Autobiog., 169. Picayune,
May 19 ; June 30 ; Aug. 20 ; Nov. 14. Delta, June 12 ; July 9. Repub-
licano, June 6, 7, 14. (Sickness) 223Hirschorn, recoils.; Delta, July 9;
Lawton, Artill. Officer, 145, 154, 242; 29lPierce, diary; Scott, June 4
(Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 129); Moore, Scott's Camp., 119; 73Bermudez de
Castro, no. 517, June 29; 316Judd to Sherman, Feb. 26, 1848. Polk,
Diary, Apr. 2, 10, 12 ; July 9, 13, 15. 159Collins papers, May 22. Le6n,
Hist. Gen., 477-8. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 153, 177-8, 189, 203, 206,
211-6, 228, 233-4, 242-6, 256, 265, 272, 274. GSWorth court of inquiry,
docs. 68Scott to Worth, May 6. 65Gen. orders 206, 211, 238; July 9
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIV, PAGES 74-75 363
12, 28. (4000 available) Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 257. Simples Obser-
vaciones (written by Hitchcock). 60 Wilson to Marcy, Aug. 1. 335
Trist to wife, Aug. 6. Oswandel, Notes, 223, 210. Ssmmes, Service,
210, 239, 247, 263, 275-6, 278-81. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 524. 224L. V. to
M. O., Aug. 21 (intercepted Mex. letter). 185[Duncan] to Lewis, July
20. 307Roberts, diary. 236Judah, diary. 95Ayunt. to Bravo, Apr.
29. 95Amable to prefect, Aug. 18. 270Moore, diary. 327Sutherland
to father, Aug. . 73Bermudez de Castro, no. 517, June 29. Kennebec
Journal, May 21. Repub. Banner, May 19. Nat. Intelligencer, June 1.
Monitor Repub., May 2; June 5, 8. Sedgwick, Corres., i, 101. 132
Atocha to Buchanan, Aug. 1. Baz, Juarez, 47, note. Negrete, Inva-
si6n, iii, app., 87-9. 364Worth to S., July 29 ; to daughter, Apr. 30. Ohio
Arch, and Hist. Qtrly., Apr.-July, 1912, p. 292. GlScott to Wilson, May 2.
Steele, Amer. Camps., i, 122. And from 76 the following and others.
R. Rueda, statement [June 18]. Acuerdo, July 13. Soto, July 3. Sol-
dier from Puebla, statement, July 17. Alvarez, June 16 ; July 28. Isunza
to Canalize, July 20. Bravo, proclam., Apr. 28. Furlong, May 17.
To Furlong, May 20. " Ein Deuttcher," circular to Germans. To Alvarez,
June 19. Worth to first alcalde, May 17; to ayunt., May 18.
Alvarez stated that he had an organized party at Puebla preparing for
an insurrection, and meanwhile was systematically promoting desertion.
The alarm caused by Santa Anna's advance against Taylor led to the
temporary diversion of troops (intended for Scott) to the Rio Grande,
but on April 30 Marcy sent Scott statements showing that about 3500
new regulars were expected to land at Vera Cruz before June 1 and that
some 5500 volunteers also had been ordered to him. Unfortunately the
despatch was captured by the enemy, and Scott did not receive another
copy of it until June 6 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 922-5, 1012). (Expected)
Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 994. The official counting of the votes was deferred
until Jan., 1848.
23. Richardson, Messages, iv, 508. Benton wanted full powers to
negotiate (Polk, Diary, Mar. 8, 1847), and was willing to take the position
mainly with a view to its diplomatic functions (Cong. Globe, 29, 2, pp.
246-7).
24. The new regiments (which brought the regular army up to 1356
officers and 29,534 men) were to serve during the war and then be dis-
banded. One of them was the Third Dragoons. Another consisted of
" voltigeurs," theoretically an equal number of infantry and of mounted
men (the former to be taken up on the horses of the latter, when celerity
of movement should be desired) with a battery of small guns that could
be taken apart and transported on mules (Niles, May 15, 1847, p. 161) ;
but practically the Voltigeurs were foot-riflemen (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 924).
The regiments destined for Scott were the following : (Brig. Gen. Pierce's
brig.) 9 Inf. from N. Eng. under Col. Ransom, 12 Inf. from N. andS. Car.,
Mo., Ark. and Texas under Lieut. Col. Bonham in the absence of Col.
Wilson, and 15 Inf. from Ohio, Mich., Wis. and Iowa under Lt. Col. How-
ard in the absence of Col. Morgan; (Brig. Gen. Cadwalader's brig.)
11 Inf. from Pa., Del. and Md., under Col. Ramsey, 14 Inf. from 111.,
Tenn. and La. under Col. Trousdale, Voltigeurs from Pa., Md., Va.,
Ga., Ky. and Miss, under Col. Andrews (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 924). Each
regiment was theoretically to consist of 851 men including 47 officers
(ibid.}, but the two brigades going to Scott were not expected to muster
quite 3500. Scott was authorized to change tho organization should the
364 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIV, PAGES 75-76
exigencies of the campaign require (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 922). Each private
serving a year or more was to receive 100 acres of government land or
$100 in treasury scrip as a bounty. The law of March 3 provided also
that (in view of the deficiency in field officers caused by the lack of a retire-
ment law) an additional major might be appointed in each regiment,
that individuals might be accepted to fill vacancies in volunteer corps,
that non-commissioned officers might be brevetted to the lowest commis-
sioned rank, that distinguished privates might be given certificates of
merit and $2.00 extra per month, that two companies mightjbe added to
each artillery regiment, that one more company in each artillery regi-
ment might be equipped as field artillery, that unfilled regular or volun-
teer regiments should be consolidated and the supernumerary officers
discharged, etc. (These laws were quite elaborate and cannot be given
in full here ; see U. S. Statutes at Large, ix, 123, 184.) After receiving
Scott's report on the battle of Cerro Gordo, Polk ordered five companies
of the Third Dragoons to him.
25. Reinforcements provided. Upton, Milit. Policy, 206-7. 62Adj.
gen. to Scott, May 10. 65M, gen. orders 57, Dec. 22; 2, Jan. 8; 8, Mar.
4; 17, Apr. 15. Semmes, Service, 314-5. 354 Welles papers. Polk,
Messages, Dec. 29 (Jan, 4, 1847), 1846; Feb. 13, 1847 (Richardson,
Messages, iv, 508, 513. lOSPolk to Bancroft, Jan. 30. Wash. Union,
Jan. 4, 7, 11, 12, 14, 21, etc. Nat. Intelligencer, May 26. Cong. Globe,
Sen. and Ho., Dec. 28 to Mar. 3 (One needs to examine the proceedings
and speeches considerably in detail). (Voltigeurs) Niles, May 15, p. 161.
Amer. Review, Sept., 1847, p. 223. Statutes at Large, ix, 117, 123, 184.
Boston Atlas, Jan. 14. 316Bragg to Sherman, Mar. 1, 1848. 6lRansom,
Apr. 12; May 9, 21; June 26.' GlScott to Wilson, Apr. 26. 330H. L.
Scott to Cadwalader, Apr. 25. 61 Adj. gen. to Scott, Dec. 17, 1846;
Jan. 23; Mar. 20; May 6, 10, 22, 1847; to Cadwalader, Apr. 28; to
qtr. mr. gen., Apr. 21. Ho. 42; 29, 2: adj. gen., Jan. 13. 256Marcy to
Wetmore, Jan. 6, 10; July 16. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 121 (Marcy). Senex,
Myth. Ho. 48; 29, 2 (adj. gen.). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 45, 50. 62Marcy
to Brooke, Mar. 22; to Pierce, Mar. 22; to govs. Ala., Miss., La., Mar.
22. 61 Adj. gen. to Cadwalader, Mar. 26. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 866, 944,
948, 1221 (Scott) ; 873, 905-6, 922, 953, 1241 (Marcy) ; 924, 926 (state-
ments). 69Scott, mems. for adj. gen., Nov. 29, 1846. Polk, Diary.
The principal references for the attempt to give Benton the chief com-
mand are the following. 345Benton to Polk, Mar. 6; to Van Buren,
Jan. 26. Polk, Diary, Nov. 10, 11, 18; Dec. 3, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18-21,
24, 25, 1846 ; Jan. 2, 4, 16, 19, 22-3 ; Feb. 4-Mar. 12 ; Mar. 19-20,
22 ; Apr. 6, 14, 28 ; May 10-4 ; July 17, 1847. 21oSimms to Hammond,
May 1. 354Welles papers. 345Blair to Van Buren, Dec. 26, 1846;
Mar. 13, 1847. Jameson, Calhoun Corres., 727. Dix, Speeches, i, 166.
London Times, Feb. 18; Mar. 17; Apr. 17. Meigs, Benton, 364-7.
Benton, View, ii, 698. Id., speech : Niles, June 5, 1847, p. 223. Scott,
Mems., ii, 401. Public Ledger, Jan. 8, 27; Mar. 1. Cong. Globe, 29, 2,
Senate, Jan. 11, 14, 15 (Badger's speech the most important one made on
the subject), 25 (Benton) ; House, passim. Elaine, Twenty Years, i,
76. Buchanan, Works, viii, 365, 367. Mag. of Amer. Hist., xiv, 575.
Wash. Union, Mar. 11. 6lBenton to adj. gen., Mar. 9.
This call of Apr. 19 included (infantry) a regiment, each, from Ills.,
Oh., Ind. ; a battalion (5 cos.), each, from N. J., Mo., Ga., Ala., La. ;
three cos. from the Dist. of Columbia; two cos., each, from Pa., Md.,
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIV, PAGES 76-77 365
Va. ; and one co. from Fla. ; also (horse) two cos. from La. and one
co., each, from Oh., Ills., Ga., Ala., Ark. A regt. consisted of ten cos.
Each co. included a capt., a first lieut., two second lieuts., four sergts.,
four corps., two musicians and eighty privates. A co. of horse had also
one farrier and blacksmith (62memo., Apr. 21). Of vols. Scott was now
to have two brigades : I, *one N. Y. and *two Pa. regts. and two Pa. cos. ;
II, *one S. Car. and *one La. regt., one La. and one Ga. battal., two cos.
La. horse and one co. Ga. horse (asterisks mean, "already in Mexico").
There were certain exceptions as to the dates of calls which it seems un-
necessary to specify.
After the lieutenant general plan failed, Benton was nominated as a
major general, and was promptly confirmed by the Senate, and a bill au-
thorizing Polk to place him in supreme command was urged upon Congress
(Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1219) ; but as it appeared doubtful whether the chief
authority could be conferred upon him, Benton declined the position
abruptly (345letters dated Mar. 9). This episode caused no material
delay in war legislation.
26. One unfortunate result of giving up the line of communication was
that new troops had to wait at Vera Cruz until assembled in sufficient
force to defy the enemy, and some of them fell sick in consequence ; but
this was not fairly chargeable to the evacuation of Jalapa, for the irregu-
lars did their worst below that city. It was the intention of the govern-
ment that Quitman should go to Taylor, but Scott retained him because
his services were valued and he could not be sent away without a heavy
detachment (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 137). Having only two full regiments,
though a major general, Quitman naturally felt aggrieved (Ho. 60; 30,
1, p. 1024). To illustrate once more the difference between paper figures
and real ones, the Washington Union stated on July 20 that more than
15,000 reinforcements had marched from Vera Cruz. The text shows
how many did go. July 19 Marcy wrote that 1900 men were en route
to Vera Cruz (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1003). The fact was that on August 2
or 3 about 850 men left that place for the interior under Col. L. D. Wilson
of the Twelfth Infantry (GOWilson, July 31).
27. Reinforcements arrive. (Other references will be given when the
guerillas are studied : chap, xxix.) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1002, 1241 (Marcy) ;
1012, 1221 (Scott). Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 4, 13, 16, 18, 20-25 (Mclntosh
et al.). Scott, Mems., ii, 453, etc. 65/d., gen. orders 250, 1847. Hitch-
cock, Fifty Years, 265, 269. Davis, Autobiog., 174-5. 69Marcy to
Pillow and Quitman, Apr. 14. Hartman, Journal, 15. Picayune, Aug.
20. Delta, Oct. 1. Upton, Milit. Policy, 213-4. Polk, Diary, May 10.
159Collins papers. 29lPierce, diary. GlCadwalader to Wilson, June
13. 62Adj. gen. to Scott, May 10, 22. 287Parrish, diary. 60H. Wilson
to Marcy, Aug. 1. 60L. D. Wilson to Marcy, July 31. Mansfield, Mex.
War, 224. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 136. 236Judah, diary. Monitor del Pueblo,
Apr. 29. 178Davis, diary. 335Dimond to Trist, July 14. Semmes, Ser-
vice, 314. Wash. Union, July 20. ISOPillow to wife, June 14. 61
H. Wilson to adj. gen., June 7, 14. 6lPillow to adj. gen. [June 19]. Hen-
shaw narrative. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 215, 238-41, 272-4. 61 Jones
to Wilson, Apr. 29.* 76Soto, July 17, 21, 23, 25, 31; Aug. 3, 11. 76
Canalize, July 8. 76Alvarez, July 5. 76Hitchcock to Worth, May 12.
76Many other documents.
28. Under general orders 218, July 16, 1847, the following artillery
companies were ordered to be equipped (i.e., were recognized) as light
366 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXIV, PAGES 77-78
(field) artillery in accordance with the law of March 3, 1847 : First Regi-
ment, Co. I, Capt. J. B. Magruder ; Second, Co; M, J. F. Roland ; Third,
Co. E, T. W. Sherman; Fourth, Co. G, S. H. Drum. Co. M was not
organized in time to serve during the war ; the others were already in the
service.
29. Scott, Mems., ii, 460-5. Grone, Briefe, 84. 60Marcy to Quit-
man, Apr. 14. Upton, Milit. Policy, 214. 159Collins papers, June 18.
236Judah, diary, Apr. 26. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 274. Aldrich, Marine
Corps, 104. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1002 (Marcy) ; 1012 (Scott). 62Adj.
gen. to Scott, May 22. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instil., iii, 415.
The general staff (as given by Scott in his Mems., ii, 460-3) included
at this time: Lt. Col. Hitchcock, asst. inspect, gen.; Capt. H. L. Scott
(not related to the General) actg. adj. gen.; First Lt. T. Williams, Bvt.
First Lieut. G. W. Lay and Second Lieut. Schuyler Hamilton, aides ; Maj.
J. P. Gaines (one of the Encarnacion prisoners, who had escaped) vol.
aide ; Maj. J. L. Smith, Capt. R. E. Lee, and Lieuts. P. G. T. Beauregard,
1. 1. Stevens, Z. B. Tower, G. W. Smith, G. B. McClellan and J. G. Foster,
engineer officers; Maj. Wm. Turnbull, Capt. J. McClellan, Second Lieut.
George Thorn and Bvt. Second Lieut. E. L. F. Hardcastle, topog. engs. ;
Capt. Benjamin Huger, First Lieut. P. V. Hagner and Second Lieut. C.
P. Stone, ordnance officers ; Capt. J. R. Irwin, chief quartermaster ; Capt.
J. B. Grayson, chief of subsistence dept. ; Maj. E. Kirby, chief paymaster ;
Surgeon Gen., Thomas Lawson. The Marine Corps, which had no regi-
mental organization, included, Mar. 2, 1847, 1283 privates. On that day
Congress raised the number to 2293,* and added twelve " commanding
officers" (Sen. 66; 30, 1). In May, 1847, the secretary of the navy, in
order to help strengthen Scott, offered a part of this corps (Sen. 1 ; 30,
I, p. 957). Perry did not think it wise to detach all of the men whom
the department proposed to contribute (47 July 4), but a battalion under
Lieut. Col. Watson and Maj. Twiggs marched to Puebla with Pierce.
30. Picayune, Aug. 20; Nov. 14. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 244, 246,
274-5. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 135 (Scott). 65Scott, gen. orders 246, Aug.
5. Collins Papers. Smith, To Mexico, 178. Hitchcock, Fifty Years,
271.
XXV. ON TO THE CAPITAL
1. This chapter is amply supported. About 1400 documents were
used in writing it. As, however, any investigator consulting on this
subject the TGarchives would easily find the pertinent papers, only the
most important ones belonging to that collection will be cited.
2. Affairs at Mexico to Apr. 20. Sen. 19 ; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith). 34lBlack,
memorial, Dec. 20. 312Anaya to S. Anna, Apr. 9. 312Baranda to S.
Anna, Apr. 9. Monitor Repub., Apr. 11. Picayune, May 12. Semmes,
Service, 328. 92Gov. Federal Dist. to Mex ayunt., Apr. 10. 92Mex.
ayunt., proclam., Apr. 27. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1088. Niles, May 15, p.
168 (Gamboa). Kenly, Md. Vol., 338. N. Y. Sun, May 19. Apuntes,
198-9. Otero, Comunicaci6n. Negrete, Invasi6n, iii, app., 483. ' From
76 the following. Memo., Apr. 10. Salas, Apr. 12. Ords. to generals,
Apr. 2. Ords. to Liceaga, Apr. 10. Relaciones to gov. Fed. Dist., Apr.
II. Almonte, May 14. To comte. gen. Guanajuato, Apr. 16. To J. P.
Galvez, Apr. 9. Measures recommended, Apr. 6, 14. Relaciones, Apr.
12. Berrospe to Monterede, Jan. 20, 1846.
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXV, PAGES 79-82 367
3. This specimen may be quoted: "The cunning dissimulator, Ibarra
[a member of the Cabinet], venomous as a serpent, crawls forth obscurely
from his lurking-place to-day in order that he may set his malignant teeth
to-morrow in the vitals of the republic. . . . Off with the heads of the
vile traitors ! " One ingenious writer said : If Santa Anna will not sacrifice
his vanity by admitting he is incompetent, why should we sacrifice
our lives and property? Apiil 21 a general amnesty for political offences
was declared in the vain hope of producing harmony (76to Bustamante, Apr.
21).
4. This important law provided (Mexico a" traves, iv, 656) : 1, The gov-
ernment is authorized to take all steps necessary to carry on the war and
preserve the republican system ; 2, but it must not make peace with the
United States, cede territory, conclude negotiations [particularly with
reference to a monarchical regime] with foreign powers ; 3, make coloni-
zation contracts, impose punishments or confer civil or military appoint-
ments except those placed within its authority by the Constitution ; 4,
any arrangement between the United States and authorities superseding
the present government shall be void ; 5, any person, whatever his status,
who treats with the United States is hereby declared a traitor ; 6, should
Congress be unable to meet, its place shall be taken by a council of govern-
ment, consisting of the senior member present of each state delegation.
5. Affairs at Mexico, Apr. 20 to May 18. S. Anna, Apelaci6n, 44-5 ;
app., 76. Id., Detail, 8. Dublan, Legislaci6n, v, 267 (Apr. 20). Gimenez,
Mems., 107-9. Mex. en 1847, 20. Picayune, May 6, 20. Defensa de
. . . Estrada. 3l2Basadre to S. Anna, Apr. 9, very private. 73Ber-
mudez de Castro, no. 517, June 29. Manifiesto del Supr. Tribunal.
Molina, El Asalto. Memoria de . . . Relaciones, Jan., 1849. Boletin
de Noticias, May 14. Republicano, May 10, 22. Courrier Frangais, May
5. London Times, June 15; July 9. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii,
196-8. Encarnacion Prisoners, 67. 52Trist, no. 7, June 13. 92Dona-
tions, Mex., May 1-6. 92Bravo, proclam., May 6. Roa Barcena,
Recuerdos, 570. 92Ayunt., call for volunteers, May 20. Consideraciones.
Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 967 (Worth). SOOlaguibel to Relac., Aug. 15. Lara,
Resumen, 66, note. Mexico traves, iv, 655-6, 661, 704. Prieto, Memorias,
ii, 210-2. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 255. Ramirez, Mexico, 229, 233-4,
239, 241, 246-7, 250-1, 256, 272-7, 284. SSMetropol. dean, May 8.
Monitor Repub., Apr. 22; May 3, 8, 10-11. S. Anna, manifiesto, Mar.
24, 1848. Apuntes, 199, 200-1, 203-4. SOGuerra to gov., Mar. 11 ; Apr.
22. SOGov. to Bravo, May 5. Diario, Apr. 25, 28 ; May 3, 4, 6, 12, 15.
From 7e the following. Decrees, Apr. 26; May 1. Junta directiva, May
1, 3. Acuerdo, Apr. 20, 25. Circular, Apr. 30. Garrison, estado, May
13. To generals, Apr. 25. To Brito, May 25. J. J. Min6n, Apr. 24.
Deserters, May 15. Circular, May 4. Basadre, May 16, res. To
Alvarez, Apr. 26. To Monterde, May 18. To S. Anna, Apr. 20-2.
To Bravo, Apr. 24. To Bustamante, Apr. 21. Almonte, Apr. 28, 30;
May 8, 12, 15, 18. Monterde, May 9. Bravo, May 11, 16. Rinc6n,
May 17. S. Anna, May 16.
6. Affairs at Mexico, May 18 to June 2. Negrete, Invasion, iii, app.,
61-72, 81-3; iv, app., 261-8, 273-4. Tribute a la Verdad, 56, 74-6.
Gimenez, Memorias, 109-11. S. Anna to Congress, May 28 (Biblioteca
Nac.). Id., Apelaci6n, app., 83-8. Id., Detail, 8. Defensa de . . .
Estrada. Sen. 52 ; 30, 1, p. 177-8. Portrait of Anaya : city hall, Mex.
Picayune, July 15 ; Aug. 7, 8. Monitor Repub., May 20 ; June 3, 4, 14 ;
368 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXV, PAGES 82-87
Dec. 12 (S. Anna, Nov. 19). Republicano, May 10; June 5, 10, 15, 26.
Mexico a traves, iv, 662, 664-7. Ramirez, Mexico, 229-30, 233, 284-6.
ISBankhead, nos. 59, 60, May 29. London Times, July 9, 16 ; Aug. 6.
73Bermudez de Castro, no. 517, June 29. Roa Bdrcena, Recuerdos,
290-3. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 157, 196-204. Encarnacion
Prisoners, 67. SOGuerra to gov. Mex., May 20. Diario, May 19, 21,
23-4 ; June 8. Boletin de la Democratic,, May 25. Hitchcock, Fifty
Years, 260. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 967. Apuntes, 201, 204. Otero, Replica.
Dublan, Legislaci6n, v, 264. 76Bravo, May 15, 16, 24, 30. 76S. Anna to
Rosa, Feb. 5, 1848. 76Valencia, June 7, 1847. 76Mora, June 5. 76To
Brito, May 25. GOBravo, proclam., May 6. 76S. Anna, May 21.
The statesmen who met S. Anna were Manuel Baranda, Ignacio
Trigueros and J. F. Ramirez.
7. A signal illustration oi the incompetence of the Mexican government,
particularly Congress, was afforded by its treatment of Great Britain.
At the end of August, 1846, Bankhead, under the instructions of the Foreign
Office (13to Bankhead, no. 20), proposed mediation to Mexico, but the offer
was not welcomed. Santa Anna and Rej6n believed that it proceeded
wholly from self-interest, and that, in order to prevent her commerce from
suffering longer from the war and other interests from becoming im-
perilled, England was ready to sacrifice the honor and welfare of their
country (73Bermudez de Castro, nos. 332, res., 343, res., Sept. 24, 27,
1846) ; and, moreover, the Mexicans still felt quite able to cope with the
United States (ISBankhead, no. 130, Sept. 7, 1846). In October, under
renewed instructions (13no. 11), Bankhead again submitted the proposal
(ISnos. 162, 180), and later he returned to the charge (Apuntes, 202).
The subject was unwisely referred by the Mexican Executive to Congress,
but nothing was done (ibid). After the battle of Cerro Gordo, however,
the administration thought negotiations might be used to delay the
American advance (ibid. ; Ramirez, Mexico, 246) and the Puros hoped the
subject might be made embarrassing to the government (Ramirez, Mexico,
224). Violent, acrimonious and dangerous debates followed in Congress
and, in order to embarrass the Executive (ISBankhead, no. 45, 1847),
enough Puros remained away (at the time set for voting) to destroy the
quorum (ibid.}. The matter was then dropped (Ramirez, Mexico, 246, 274).
The general feeling was that British mediation would signify British control
and a dishonorable, disadvantageous peace (London Times, June 15 ;
Monitor Repub., May 18). But, even if this view contained some elements
of justice, trifling with a great power and throwing the vital interests of
Mexico into the cockpit of party politics could not be excused.
8. The political situation after June 2. S. Anna, Apelacion, app., pp. 3, 6,
8, 10, etc. Id., Detail, 8. 87Coalition junta, July 7 ; Aug. 8 ; etc. Repub-
licano, June 4, 5, 9, 15, 16, 20, 22, 26. 312Baranda to S. Anna, Apr. 8.
Mexico a traves, iv, 667, 704. Iniciativa que el Hon. Cong, del Estado de
Zacat. Otero, Replica. ISBankhead, nos. 60, May 29 ; 64, 65, 70, June
29. Id., no. 125, Dec. 30, 1845 (Tornel has no reputation for honesty).
London Times, Aug. 6. 77Gov. S. Luis Potosi, June 19. ISThornton to
Bankhead, June 14. 52Consul Black, no. 389, Sept. 12, 1846. Encarna-
cion Prisoners, 68, 77-8, 86. 73Bermudez de Castro, no. 517, June 29.
77Letter from Coatepec, June 26. 82Treas. to sec. state of Puebla, June
14; reply, June 15. 82Guerra to gov. Puebla, Aug. 2; reply, Aug. 7.
SOLegisl. of Mex. state, Mar. 26; June 12. 80/d., address, Apr. 26.
SOCoalition, address, Aug. 4. Verdadero Liberal, Aug. 12. SOCoal.
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXV, PAGES 87-91 369
junta to gov. Mex., June 17. SOld., dictamen, July 4. eoOaxaca state,
exposici6n, June 26. 83Gov. Queretaro to gov. S. Luis Potosi, Apr. 9.
Diario, June 7, 8, 11, 24, 30; July 3, 9, 18. Monitor Repub., May 3, 4,
26-7; June 3, 7, 11, 13, 14-16, 18, 19, 24, 30; July 6, 7, 9; Dec. 12 (S.
Anna, Nov. 19). Nttes, Oct. 30, p. 141. 83Gov. Queretaro to Farias,
Oct. 20, 1846; to Anaya, May 4; to all govs., May 7. 82Gov. Jalisco
to gov. Puebla, Apr. 13. 82Gov. Mex. to gov. Puebla, Apr. 12. Ramirez,
Mexico, 237, 244-6, 254, 263, 272, 288-90. SOGov. Mex. to Bravo, May 5.
76To Alvarez, June 29. TGExtracto re Guanajuato. 76J. J. de Eche-
verria, June 6. 76Arellano, July 9. 76Olaguibel to Relac., Apr. 19.
76Hacienda to Basadre, Aug. 9. 76Reyes, June 1, 22. 76Basadre,
Aug. 9. 76Yanez, June 15. 76Mora, Apr. 28.
In February, 1847, a revolutionary government satisfactory to the
people was set up in Oaxaca state, and this supported the national cause to
the full extent of its ability. A factional combination made up in Congress,
however, took the side (May 8) of the deposed authorities. This action
naturally caused great dissatisfaction in Oaxaca (76exposici6n de la cong.
de Oaxaca, June 26), and it was particularly imprudent because Gen.
Antonio de Le6n and his officers were partisans of the revolutionary party
(Ramirez, Mexico, 255).
9. July 9 the Mexican Army of the East included, according to a
document published by Santa Anna, 17,548 officers and men. A. L6pez
(D6cimo Calendario, 57) placed the army, including the National Guards,
at 30,000 on Aug. 9. The only official Mexican accounts of the forces
present in and near the capital early in August was made up during the
following November, and are far from complete ; but they were stated
to have been five times as large as those existing in November, which were
8109 total, 6785 available (75report at meeting of govs. ; Mexico a traves,
iv, 701). The unofficial statements cannot be harmonized with these
accounts nor (except when drawn from the same source) with one another.
It does not help us to know what corps were present (see Roa Barcena),
for we have not the number of men in each of them. The com-
manders of brigades in the Army of the East were Generals Terres,
Martinez, Rahgel, Perez, Le6n and Anaya and Col. Zerecero. The three
sections of Valencia's army were commanded respectively by Mejia,
Parrodi and Salas. A portion of Alvarez's force consisted of semi-savage
"pintos" men from the hot region, who were marked with spots
(llM4moire). They lay flat when charged upon, and hewed the enemy
down with heavy knives (machetes),- and they were expected to fill the
Americans with terror.
10. The hill (El Pen6n Viejo) was about 1000 yards in length at the
base, and' the higher of its 'two summits reached an elevation of about
400-450 feet (66reports of Lee, Stevens and Mason, Aug. 12, 26). The
work of fortifying it was skilfully as well as thoroughly done. Engineer
I. I. Stevens made out nearly forty guns. Topog. Engineer M. L. Smith
thought there were about sixty (Sen. 19; 30, 2, p. 4). A* large stock of
rations was placed here (76acuerdo, Aug. 5).
11. Santa Anna's preparations (see note 1). 66Stevens to J. L. Smith,
Aug. 12, 26. 66R. E. Lee, J. L. Mason to J. L. Smith, Aug. 12. S. Anna,
Apelaci6n, 44-7. Id., Detail, 8-11. 60Patterson to Marcy, Oct. 26.
Picayune, June 30; Aug. 8. Donnavan, Adventures, 29. Pacheco,
Exposici6n. Negrete, Invasi6n, iii, app., 91-4, 123-5. Scott, Mems., ii,
466. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 274. 224lntercepted Letters (ed. by Hitch-
VOL. II 2fi
370 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXV, PAGES 91-92
cock). (Embezzlement) Consideraciones, 25; Apuntes, 207. Sen. 19;
30, 2 (M. L. Smith, E. L. F. Hardcastle). Apuntes, 205-10, 223-8.
Molina, El Asalto. Raleigh Star, Sept. 1. ISThornton, June 29.
178Davis, diary. Portrait of Lombardini : city hall, Mexico. 350Weber,
recoils. N. Orl. Delta, July 18. Verdadero Liberal, May 20. (San Patricio
cos.) Dublan, Legislaci6n, v, 290 ; Diario, July 15. Mexico traves, iv,
668-71. 70"Guerra," no. 1120. London Times, May 10; Sept. 6.
Semmes, Service, 348-9. Dublan, Legislaci6n, v, 280, 284, 289, 294.
73Bermudez de Castro, nos. 517, June 29 ; 534, res., July 28. 73Lozano,
No. 2, Aug. 24. Gamboa, Impug., 51. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii,
205-6. 335Thornton to N. P. Trist, July 29. Encarnacion Prisoners,
69. 60 Wilson to Marcy, Aug. 1. N. Y. Sun, Aug. 23. Diario, May 24;
June 5-10, 14-6, 18, 20, etc. Monitor Repub., May 31 (Eleventh Inf.) ;
June 13-5, 18, etc.; Dec. 12 (S. Anna, Nov. 19). Niles, June 19, p. 251.
13Bankhead, no. 74, 1846. (Honduras) 60Patterson to Marcy, Oct.
26, 1847. (Powder from N. Orl.) 166Consul McFaul to , Nov. 12,
1846. Ramirez, Mexico, 268. The following from 76 are cited for p irticu-
lar reasons. Valercia, proclam., May 14. Estado of garrison, May 13.
Ayunt., Me xico, June 3. Recommended measures, Apr. 6, 14. Circulars,
June 12; July 24. S. Anna to Alcorta, June 12; Aug. 3. Valencia,
July 19. Statement, lines of defence, June 29. J. Terr6s, report on
ca^alry [Nov.]. J. de D. Peza, report on infantry, Nov. 29. Acuerdos,
May 21, 23-4; June 5, 6, 8, 19, 25; July 17, 18, 19, 28, 30; Aug. 2, 3, 5,
6. To Alvarez, June 3, 30, etc. To Mora, June 26 ; July 2, 20, 23, etc.
To Lombardini, June 26; July 2, 5, 7, 11, 22, 31, etc. Alvarez. May 29;
June 9, 16; July 5, etc. Mora, July 9, 19, 20, 22, etc. Lombardini,
July 6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, etc. Olaguibel, Aug. 20. Decrees, June 5, 8;
July 10, 12; Aug. 8, etc.
Among other preparations were the following : information about the
defence not to be published, and no communication to be had with points
occupied by the Americans ; the troops to be trained in firing (June 6) ;
the state of siege to be rigorous (June 28) ; as much wheat as possible to be
ground and stored in the city, and the rest to be removed from the Valley ;
all Americans, even if naturalized, to leave the city (July 12) ; the American
prisoners (e.g., from La Encarnaci6n) to go to Toluca ; prices of provisions
fixed ; no persons to be tried for acts not injurious to a third party. Nat-
urally there was much evasion of these edicts. A Council of Defence
composed of the heads of the executive departments most concerned in
the work began to meet on July 2 (76acuerdo, June 29; Lomb rdini,
July 6). After the near approach of the enemy the shops (excepting those
selling provisions and those of the Plaza del Mercado) were to close,
civilian horses and carriages to keep off the streets, and no civilian to
leave the city [without a pass] except those who had brought in coal
and provisions [but on August 13 permission was given old men, women
and children to go out]. By August 24 nearly all civilians [of any
importance] left the city (73Lozano, no. 2). After the Americans came
within easy reach the usual efforts to cause desertion among them were
made by the Mexican government. The Paixhan guns cast by the
Mexicans were believed by them to equal the American ordnance
(Apuntes, 207).
12. Diario, Aug. 10-13. 77Relaciones, circular, Aug. 9. 73Lozano,
no. 2, Aug. 24. Apuntes, 206-8, 210-20. Mexico a travel, iv, 671-2.
Ramirez, Mexico, 296. 76To Basadre, Aug. 10. 76To Alvarez, Aug. 12.
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXV, PAGES 92-95 371
76Relaciones to gov. Zacat., Aug. 11. 76Olaguibel, Aug. 11. 76Decree,
Aug. 8.
13. April 30 Marcy had promised that by the end of June, Scott should
have about 20,000 men (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 922). Scott felt he needed that
number in addition to the garrison of Puebla (Sedgwick, Corres., i, 141).
He has been criticised for having his small army march in four divisions
a day apart. Twiggs and Quitman together had only about 4000 men
and it has been represented that, even had they and the cavalry com-
bined, Santa Anna could have crushed them before Worth could have
reached the scene (Semmes, Service, 326) ; but, as a day's march was only
12-15 miles (Hardcastle in Sen. 19 ; 30, 2, p. 10), Worth was but five hours
(in case of emergency much less) behind Quitman, and an attack strong
enough to crush Harney, Twiggs and Quitman, provided as they were
with heavy ordnance, could not have taken place in a moment nor with-
out warning, Scott expected to be attacked on the march (Scott, Mems.,
ii, 466). He might have avoided the high mountains by taking the route
via Tlaxcala and Apam ; but this route was long and unsuitable for his
trains. There were nearly 1000 wagons (335Trist to Buchanan, Aug. 22).
14. These works were abandoned because not in keeping with Santa
Anna's plan. Very likely the fact that it would not have been easy to
subsist a large force here counted also. Many of the Americans believed
Santa Anna had built the works in the expectation of using them to cut
Scott off after defeating him in the Valley, and set their teeth the harder.
All felt that they must conquer or die.
15. Scott's march to Ayotla. Scott, Mems., ii, 465-7. Hitchcock,
Fifty Years, 266, 271. Grant, Mems., i, 164-5. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier,
ii, 190-3. Davis, Autobiog., 192. Missouri Republican, Nov. 3, 1857
(Hitchcock). 217Henshaw papers. 218Henshaw narrative. Haynes,
Gen. Scott's Guide. 183Drum, recoils. 376Nicholson, recoils. Donna-
van, Adventures, 98. 159Collins papers. (Route) Lyon, Journal, ii,
106; Thompson, Recoils., 33; Velasco, Geograffa, i, 25; Cardona, M6x.
y sus Capitales, 129 ; Robertson, Visit, i, 321 ; Ruxton, Adventures
(1847), 33-4; Tudor, Tour, ii, 211; LeClercq, Voyage, 178-9; Mason,
Pictures, ii, 6; Bullock, Across Mex., 67-8. Lawton, Artillery Officer,
274, 281-7. 65Gen. orders 246, Aug. 5. 29lPierce papers. Sen. 11;
31, 1 (map). Sen. 19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, E. L. F. Hardcastle). G. W.
Smith, Co. A. Carleton, Address. 178Davis, diary. Sen. 52; 30, 1,
pp. 124 (Scott) ; 186-8. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 303 (Scott), app., 37. Kenly,
Md. Vol., 344. Rosa, Impresiones Nebel and Kendall, 27. Brackett,
Lane's Brigade, 280-1. Colecci6n de Itinerarios. Oswandel, Notes,
242, 245. Semmes, Service, 235, 286-9, 325-8, 452-3. 73Bermiidez de
Castro, nos. 534, res., July 28; 550, Aug. 21. 73Lozano, no. 2, Aug. 24.
335Trist, statement, July 25, 1849. 236Judah, diary. Diario, July 2.
Sedgwick, Corres., i, 108, 141. Smith, To Mexico, 188-93. Wilson,
Mexico, 168. Niles, Oct. 30, p. 138. Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 37. Ho. 60;
30, 1, p. 1032 (Scott). 132Atocha to Buchanan, Aug. 1. Ripley, War
with Mexico, ii, 187. MiYhigan Pioneer Soc. Colls., vii (Toll). So.
Qtrly. Rev., Apr., 1852, pp. 406-7. SIGJudd to Sherman, Feb. 26, 1848.
Ramirez, Mexico, 239. Monitor Repub., Oct. 1 (Gamboa). Manifiesto
que dirige . . . Alvarez.
16. S. Anna, Apelaci6n, 44; app., 146-50, 157-61. Sen. 52; 30, 1,
pp. 186-7. 73Bermudez de Castro, no. 534, res., July 28. Monitor Repub. ,
Dec. 12 (S. Anna, Nov. 19). And from 76 the following. TO Canalizo,
372 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXV, PAGES 95-96
June 30. To Alvarez, June 29, 30; July 13, 28; Aug. 6, 9, 12, 14, 21.
To Valencia, Aug. 9, 11, 13, 14, 15. Canalize, June 23 ; July 19; Aug. 9,
10, 11. Alvarez, July 5, 8 ; Aug. 6, 8, 8, 9, 9, 10, 10, 11, 12, 12, 25. Valen-
cia, Aug. 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14. Expediente against Valencia. Acuerdo, Aug.
13,
17. The choice of approaches. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 272-4. Grant,
Mems., 164-5. Mo. Republican, Nov. 3, 1857 (Hitchcock). Weekly
Courier and N. Y. Enquirer, Mar. 2, 1848 (letter from Hitchcock). 217Hen-
shaw to wife, Aug. 21. Haynes, Gen. Scott's Guide. GlHamilton to
Scott, Oct. 17, 1850. 66R. E. Lee, I. I. Stevens, J. L. Mason to J. L.
Smith, Aug. 12, 26. Chase, Polk Admin., 225. Claiborne, Quitman, i,
333-7. 22lHill, diary. 159Collins papers. Lawton, Artill. Officer,
289. Sen. 11; 31, 1 (M. L. Smith). Sen. 19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, E.
L. F. ' Hardcastle) . 178Davis, diary. 136Butterfield, rec'olls. S. Anna,
Detail, 11. 52Trist nos. 11, 12, Aug. 14, 22. 185Letters from Worth,
Duncan and others. 335H. L. Scott to Worth, Aug. 13. Picayune, Oct.
8. Nebel and Kendall, 27. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 303, app., 27. Apuntes,
208, 225. Semmes, Service, 348-52, 355-8. Ramirez, Mexico, 293. Sen.
65; 30, 1, pp. 461-2 (Lee); 522-7 (Hitchcock). GSCharges against
Duncan (Scott). 236Judah, diary. Wash. Union, Nov. 3. Nat. In-
telligencer, Nov. 12. Diario, Aug. 18. 377Capt. Willing (paper published
by Engineer School, Washington). Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 148-9, 190.
So. Qtrly. Rev., Apr., 1852, p. 412. TGOrder to Lombardini, June 19. 76To
Mora, July 2. 76Acuerdos, Aug. 5, 8. 76Mora, Aug. 2. 76Gugerson to
Alvarez, Aug. 10. 76(Spies) Alvarez, Aug. 12; Valencia, Aug. 13, 14;
Becerril, Aug. 13 ; spy, Aug. 12 ; etc. 76Bravo, Aug. 13. 76To Bravo,
Aug. 13.
The Mexicaltzingo plan was said to be, that while the rest of the troops
should force their way between Lakes Chalco and Xochimilco by a broken
causeway commanded by five batteries on a hill, Worth should pass
round or across the latter lake and cooperate with them wherever he could
do so to the best advantage (Davis, Autobiog., 193; etc.). Under orders
from Scott (Hitchcock in Mo. Republican, Nov. 3, 1857; 377paper;
335H. L. Scott to Worth, Aug. 13 ; 68charges against Duncan) to examine
the Chalco route, Worth (at Duncan's suggestion) had Duncan, supported
by strong detachments, reconnoitre that route on August 14 under the
pretence of obtaining provisions. Duncan, who reported (305Aug. 14)
favorably, was sent to Scott late that day to give an account of the re-
connaissance and deliver a 305letter from Worth, which argued against
dividing the army. Not receiving credit in Scott's report Duncan pub-
lished (Picayune, Oct. 8; Dec. 18) a letter claiming in effect to have
caused the change of plan (chap, xxix, p. 187). But the letter proved that
he knew less about the matter than he supposed (68charges) ; it did not
prove that the change of orders resulted from his report ; and there is no
proof that Scott intended to divide the army though he collected boats
enough for about 2000 men with a view to crossing or to making the Mexi-
cans believe (Claiborne, Quitman, i, 335) he intended to cross the lake
and it was thought that as many more could be obtained or definitely
decided to attack Mexicaltzingo. On the other hand Scott stated (68
charges) that he was himself investigating (305Mackall to , May 10,
1848) the Chalco route while Duncan was doing so, and that a spy sent
from headquarters reported favorably upon it (68charges) ; and he denied
squarely tha,t he gave up the Mexicaltzingo for the Chalco route in conse-
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXV, PAGES 96-98 373
quence of Duncan's report (68charges). Extreme secrecy and all possible
mystification of the enemy were necessary, and on account of Worth's
unfriendliness Scott had special reasons for not opening his mind fully to
him. Other generals have purposely kept their subordinates in the dark
(see Henderson, Jackson, i, 421, 441 ; Id., Science of War, 42). Instead of
proving that Worth was the better general, Worth and Duncan proved
the opposite, for they showed that Worth committed himself to the Chalco
route on very incomplete data, whereas Scott studied three routes and
reserved his decision until, as far as was possible, he had full information
before him. As usual, when Worth's relations with Scott were concerned,
we find Semmes inaccurate and biassed here. Ripley uses the incident
against Scott at great length and very unfairly. Facts regarding the
Mexicaltzingo route are brought forward, though not known to the Amer-
icans at the time (Ripley, War with Mexico, 194). We are told (p. 191)
that Scott ordered Duncan to study the Chalco route after Duncan had
proposed to do so, as if Scott had not previously ordered Worth, Duncan's
commander, to investigate the route. It is alleged that the case did not
warrant "a departure from the rules of the [military] art to so great a
degree" [as was proposed by the Mexicaltzingo plan]; yet Ripley shows
that the Texcoco route was impracticable (pp. 179, 186), that El Pen6n
was virtually "impregnable" (p. 188), and that the Chalco route was con-
sidered out of the question (p. 190). This was a situation clearly war-
ranting extraordinary measures. On p. 202 Ripley seems to argue that
the orders to attack Mexicaltzingo cannot have been given to conceal the
movement that Scott actually made, since any movement against that
point would have caused Santa Anna to place troops in that vicinity,
detect promptly Scott's real intention, and defend the southern line, and
so the ruse would have defeated itself. But (1) the question concerns
orders, not as Ripley assumes an actual movement toward Mexi-
caltzingo ; (2) Santa Anna had troops in the vicinity of Mexicaltzingo, but
the results anticipated by Ripley did not follow ; (3) indeed, though Ripley
was not aware of the fact, Santa Anna concluded Aug. 14 (76to Valencia)
that Scott was going to S. Agustin, and merely had the reserves at S.
Antonio garita go with five 4-pounders to S. Antonio hacienda (76to
Valencia, Aug. 14), for he was relying on his fortified points ; and (4) since
the same troops could not defend at the same time the works near Mexi-
caltzingo and also the road to S. Agustin, orders involving a threat against
the former would have tended, without costing Scott anything, to keep
the latter clear.
The vulnerable point of El Peii<5n Vie jo was that owing to its steep-
ness the cannon could have little action on the slopes (66Stevens to Smith,
Aug. 26). A particular disadvantage in attacking Mexicaltzingo would
have been that (Santa Anna said) such a movement could have been
detected in good season, and reinforcements could have been placed there
promptly (76to Bravo, Aug. 13). As the American generals needed in-
formation that could only be obtained from Mexicans, they were pecul-
iarly exposed to the artifices of spies, and some of these gained a confiden-
tial footing with Worth and even with Scott.
18. To S. Agustin. 218Henshaw narrative. S. Anna, Apelaci6n, 47,
50; app., 146-51. Id., Detail, 12. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 195.
Davis, Autobiog., 192-5. 217Henshaw to wife, Aug. 21. 22lHill, diary.
159Collins papers. Latrobe, Rambler, 121. Lawton, Artill. Officer,
290, 293. Sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 37. Sen. 11; 31, 1 (map). Sen. 19; 30, 2
374 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXV, PAGE 98
(M. L. Smith, E. L. F. Hardcastle) . G. W. Smith, Co. A. 204Gouverneur,
diary. 178Davis, diary. Gamboa, Impug., 38-9. Mexico a traves, iv,
672. Apuntes, 220, 229. Arroniz, Manual, i, 243. Semmes, Service,
352-5, 370-5. Nebel and Kendall, 28. 12Caryton to Lambert, Sept. 1.
Steele, Campaigns, i, 123. 236Judah, diary. Hitchcock, Fifty Years,
275. Moore, Scott's Camp., 129. Wash. Union, Nov. 3. Stevens, I. I.
Stevens, 168. Niles, Oct. 30, p. 139. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 303 (Scott);
app., 28 (Twiggs); 37 (Sumner) ; 39 (McKinstry). 76To Alvarez, Aug.
11, 21. 76To Valencia, Aug. 14, 15. 76To Lombardini, Aug. 14. 76
Acuerdos, Aug. 15, 16. 76To Herrera, Aug. 15. 76Becerril, Aug. 15.
76Valencia, Aug. 14, 15. 76Alvarez, Aug. 16, 17, 19, 22, 25. 76To
Alvarez, Aug. 14, 15. Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 647 (Lee to Mason).
Santa Anna's policy seems to have been wise. Any detachments that
he could have thrown hastily in front of Worth must have consisted of
inferior troops, and would no doubt have been routed. The last portion
of the Chalco route was over ground which, though in part hilly, was firm
(T. F. Davis, diary). The brush with Twiggs was greatly exaggerated
by the Americans, some of whom estimated the enemy as 12,000 strong,
and felt that a victory was gained, whereas Alvarez had no intention
of fighting, and did not come within musket range. It has been said
(Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 289) that Scott should have had the cavalry,
Worth and Pillow advance without heavy baggage, and reach S. Agustin
in twelve hours. But (1) there was a distinct advantage in keeping Worth's
division intact, (2) Scott's van was less likely to be attacked than his rear,
(3) Scott probably understood that Santa Anna intended to rely on his
fortified positions, for he was well posted about affairs at the capital
(ISThornton to Bankhead, June 14), nothing could be kept secret there,
and Santa Anna's Plan was known to many, (4) Scott's judgment on the
point was likely, especially in view of his fuller knowledge of the facts,
to be better than Ripley's, and (5) it was justified by the event. The
Chalco route was the one taken by Cortez (Gamboa, Impug., 38). In
leaving Pen6n Viejo Santa Anna had money and provisions remain there
for a prospective "distant march" (76to Herrera, Aug. 15). Whether
this referred to a pursuit of the Americans or his own flight can only be
guessed, but as the order was addressed to Herrera, one inclines to the
former view.
19. 52Trist, no. 11, Aug. 14. Mexico a traves, iv, 672-3. Apuntes,
220-2, 230. S. Anna, Detail, 11-2. 95Notice to first alcalde, Aug. 19.
So. Qtrly. Rev., Apr., 1852. Negrete, Invasion, iii, app., 446. 73Ber-
miidez de Castro, no. 445, Mar. 2. 76To Valencia, Aug. 14, 15, 16. 76To
Lombardini, Aug. 14. 76Valencia, Aug. 15, 16. 76To Alvarez, Aug. 16.
76Acuerdo, Aug. 16.
XXVI. CONTRERAS, CHURUBUSCO
1. The basis for distances is Smith and Hardcastle's map of the Valley
(Sen, 11; 31, 1). A garita had to be a somewhat formal place, for mu-
nicipal duties were levied and collected there, and some accommodations
for the officials and the guards were necessary. The last word of "S.
Antonio Abad" was commonly omitted. For the sake of distinction the
Acapulco road will be called the "highway" and the road via Tacubaya,
San Angel and Ansaldo the "turnpike" (Trist's word for it). The name
Contreras was applied by Americans to three places, to none of which it
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVI, PAGES 90-102 375
belonged. Contreras was a village on the turnpike some distance south
of Padierna. San Agustin was also known as Tlalpam.
2. August 14 Valencia's 76return (estado) included 486 officers, 5078 rank
and file, 1447 horses, one siege 16-pounder, three siege 12-pounders, five
8-inch (68-pound) howitzers and fifteen smaller guns. One of the guns
was assigned to Torre j on and he saved it. Another small one disappeared.
The name of the rounded hill where Valencia took post was Peloncoahu-
titlan.
3. Valencia had one excuse, for very possibly he believed (in view of
Santa Anna's delay at San Luis Potosi, abandonment of Tampico, ap-
parent neglect of Vera Cruz, etc.) that the President traitorously intended
to leave open a door by which Scott could reach the capital ; but none the
less he was a conscienceless conspirator and the mortal foe of Santa Anna,
disgusted with subordination, and eager to overthrow his chief. His past
conduct had been thoroughly suspicious, and his manifiesto of August 22
does not bear analysis well. To remove him would have seemed an act
of jealousy, if not treason, and very likely have caused a mutiny. Santa
Anna hoped that the national crisis would hold him in line for the time
being. Besides, Santa Anna did not know precisely where Valencia pro-
posed to make a stand (Diario, Sept. 1). When he learned, he sent General
Mora to reconnoitre the position (76to Valencia, August 19). Again, he
could not afford to raise an issue with Valencia now, for the latter (doubt-
less with the. help of his engineers) had divined Scott's plans better than
the former, and undertaken to guard a quarter left open by the President.
Finally it was quite possible that Santa Anna thought Valencia would be
taught a lesson by the Americans. It is unnecessary to discuss the merits
and disadvantages of Valencia's position, for they will appear plainly in
the narrative (see Balbontin, Invasi6n, 110-11). Had the Americans been
willing to do as he wished, the hill would have been entirely satisfactory.
Of Valencia's intellectual quality the following specimen is suggestive :
"Soldiers of Liberty, anarchy put out its head, but your arms drowned
it in a moment."
4. Mexican preliminaries. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 304, 306 (Scott) ; 348-9
(Smith) ; app., 80 (Alexander). Collins papers. 66Lee to Smith, Aug. 21.
Semmes, Service, 393. Sen. 65 ; 30, 1, pp. 276 (Longstreet) ; 570. 224ln-
tercepted Letters (14, L.V. to M. O. ; 26, to Old' Gentleman). Apuntes,
221,230-6. Balbontin, Invasi6n, 111. Gamboa, Impug., 41. 70"Guerra,"
no. 30 (F. Perez). Mexico a traves, iv, 672-3, 677. Long, Memoirs,
54. So. Qtrly. Rev., Apr., 1852, pp. 408-9. Latrobe, Rambler, 90. Sen.
19; 30, 2 (Hardcastle to Smith; Smith to Abert). Valencia, Manifiesto.
Calder6n, Life, i, 314. 178Davis, diary. Prieto, Mems., ii, 213. 73Ber-
mudez de Castro, no. 534, res., July 28. S. Anna, Apelaci6n, 51-2; app.,
140-54, 157-60. Id., Detail, 12. Monitor Repub., Dec. 17, 1847. Hitch-
cock, Fifty Years, 276. Negrete, Invasi6n, iv, app., 279-83. 76Acuerdo,
Aug. 16. 76To Lombardini, July 22. 76To Alvarez, Aug. 21. 76Zere-
cero, Aug. 25. 76To Valencia, Aug. 16. 76Expediente contra Valencia.
The defences of Valencia's camp were somewhat extended later, but not
enough to render them formidable.
5. According to a topographical officer (Washington Union, Nov. 3,
1847) the only route from San Agustin to Mexico of which the Americans
knew when they reached the ground was the highway. This surprises
one at first. But the turnpike beyond San Angel was a local road serving
only a few farms, the small villages of San Ger6nimo and Contreras, and
376 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVI, PAGES 102-105
a manufacturing establishment near Contreras. It seemed to be of no
strategic significance, and was not likely to be heard of at a distance. The
fortifications along the highway were largely developed after Scott turned
toward San Agustin. Valencia's movements were impromptu. Scott
had an Englishman residing at Mexico in his pay, and we know that two
persons brought data on Aug. 19 (Sen. 65 ; 30, 1, p. 162). Apparently
Scott did his duty as to seeking information.
6. American preliminaries. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 304, 307, 315, 348-50
(reports of Scott, Worth and Smith) ; app., 41 (Mason) ; 66 (Smith) ;
101 (Magruder) ; 118 (Cadwalader). Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii, 307. Pica-
yune, Sept. 8 ; Oct. 21. 66Lee to Smith, Aug. 21. Semmes, Service, 380,
393. 224lntercepted Letters (26, To Old Gentleman). Hitchcock, Fifty
Years, 275. Grant, Mems., i, 142. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 188 (Trist, no. 12).
TGExpediente contra Valencia. 236Judah, diary. Sen. 19 ; 30, 2 (Hard-
castle to Smith). Monitor Repub., Dec. 17. Diario, Aug. 19.
7. Quitman had only the Second Pennsylvania, the Marines, Steptoe's
battery and a troop or two of dragoons (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p. 341) ; but Worth's
division was available in case of need. See Claiborne, Quitman, i, 347.
8. Pillow, as was decided by a court of inquiry (Sen. 65 ; 30, 1, pp. 332-
45) on the testimony of such men as Lee (p. 78), Smith (p. 102), Riley
(p. 147) and Shields (p. 268) f did not devise the plan on which this victory
was gained ; and when Lee brought word to Scott of Smith's plan he
washed his hands of it (335Trist, draft of address ; Sen. 65 ; 30, 1, p. 333) ;
but he had the audacity to claim that Smith merely executed the precise
plans and views laid down by Pillow for his guidance (Ho. 60 ; 30, 1, p. 1018).
Pillow could claim the credit only on the ground that he was the senior
officer on the field, and that Smith's operations were a logical consequence
of the events ; but Scott was the senior of Pillow, and all that occurred was
as Smith pointed out (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 104) the logical consequence
of Scott's order to gain possession of the San Angel road. The consensus
of opinion was expressed by Twiggs : "General Smith deserves the whole
credit" (Stevens, Stevens, i, 196). Moreover the famous letter signed
"Leonidas" prepared at Pillow's quarters doubtless with his conni-
vance (Hitchcock in Mo. Republican, Oct. 2, 1857 ; Republican Banner,
Feb. 23, 1858), conveyed by his agency (Davis, Autobiog., 285) to the New
Orleans Delta, which published it Sept. 10 (chap, xxix, note 31), and
fathered (when exposed) by an untruthful subordinate of his "puffed"
Pillow in the most extravagant manner for this " unparallelled victory,"
and represented Scott not only as leaving everything to Pillow but as
blundering sadly. E.g. it said, "The army had been marching through
marshes and almost impassable roads, nearly half around the city, to find
some points upon the enemy's works that could be successfully assailed,"
the provisions had been nearly exhausted, and the mountains prevented
going farther; Pillow's "plan of battle [at Contreras], and the disposition
of his forces were most judicious," and he "achieved this signal and brilliant
victory." (For the letter signed "Leonidas" see Sen. 65 ; 30, 1 (pp. 385-9,
and the testimony of Pillow, Burns, Freaner, Trist) ; 335Pillow to Trist,
Aug. 31, private; St. Louis Evening News, Oct. 2, 1857; chap, xxix,
pp. 435-7.)
Pillow's design in having such a statement prepared and placed before
the people in advance of the official reports was probably to influence public
opinion in the United States so as to make him an available candidate for
the Presidency or enable Polk to put him in Scott's place. As Pillow was
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVI, PAGES 105-110 377
known to have great influence with the President, and was an active,
affable, plausible man, he naturally had a following ; but the sentiment of
the able and honest officers towards him was one of contempt. "The
ass Pillow," "that consummate fool," said the future General D. H. Hill
(diary) of Pillow as he showed himself on Aug. 19. A sensible Pennsyl-
vanian wrote in his diary, Aug. 10, that Pillow was without question
"the poorest and most unpopular" of the generals (Oswandel, Notes,
249). Col. W. B. Campbell characterized him as light, impetuous, of
little military judgment and no skill (139to D. Campbell, Mar. 20, 28 ;
Apr. 18, 25) ; and a correspondent of the future Gen. W. T. Sherman
described him as "a mass of vanity, conceit, ignorance, ambition and
want of truth" (SIGJudd, Feb. 26, 1848). The doings of the Pillow court
of inquiry (Sen. 65 ; 30, 1) were carefully digested and analyzed by the
author ; but as the subject concerns only incidentally the history of the
war, space cannot be taken to present this analysis.
9. Valencia could see that retreat meant his personal ruin, and he pre-
ferred to argue that honor required him to hold his ground.
10. Persifor F. Smith, a graduate from Princeton, was admitted to the
bar at Philadelphia, practised law at New Orleans, and had considerable
military experience in the Florida war. He was a simple, scholarly, un-
assuming man ; but all ranks appreciated his ability, attainments, clear
perception, valor, promptness and steadiness.
11. The battle of Contreras. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 303, etc. ; app., pp. 66,
etc. (reports of Scott and his officers). S. Anna, Apelaci6n, 52-5; app.,
154-6, 160. Id., Detail, 12-4. Picayune, Sept. 8; Oct. 21. 22lHill,
diary. GlTwiggs to Marc}', Feb. 7, 1848. 66Lee to Smith, Aug. 21,
1847. 60Riley to Westcott, Nov. 30. Semmes, Service, 381, 385, 392.
224lntercepted letters (14, L. V. to M. O. ; 25, note by E. A. H. ; 28).
Apuntes, 237-43. McSherry, El Puchero, 73, 76. Murphy, Hungerford,
99. Delta, Sept. 9; Nov. 12; Dec. 1. Monitor Repub., Sept. 27 (Salas) ;
Dec. 12 (S. Anna). Porvenir, Aug. 26, supplem. (Valencia). 65Scott,
gen. orders 258. Balbontin, Invasi6n, 111-8. Hitchcock, Fifty Years,
276-8, 281. Ballentine, English Soldier, ii, 207, 218-20, 223-6, 228-9.
Davis, Autobiog., 196-8. 66Foster to Smith, Aug. 23. 66McClellan
to Smith, Aug. 23. 66Beauregard to Smith, Aug. 25. 66Tower to Smith,
Aug. 25. 66Mason to Smith, Aug. 24. Prieto, Mems., ii, 222-7. L6pez,
Decimo Calendario, 58. SOOlaguibel, Aug. 20-1. 199Anon. MS. written
by a person of importance. 307Roberts, diary. Gamboa, Impug.,
42-3. 350Weber, recoils. 70"Guerra," no. 30 (F. Pe"rez). Ramirez,
Mexico, 298. Mexico a traves, iv, 677. 217Henshaw to wife, Aug. 21.
327Sutherland to father, 'Nov. 28. Jackson, Memoirs of Jackson, 41.
Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 188. Long, Memoirs, 54-9. Wash. Union, Sept. 20.
Diario y Aug. 24; Sept. 1. So. Mag., July, 1874, p. 75. 204Gouverneur,
diary. 277Burnett, statement. United Service, June, 1896 (Lane).
Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 62 (H. L. Scott); 68-9 (Williams); 72-4, 298, 300
(Gen. Scott) ; 75-9, 463 (Lee) ; 81-6 (Cadwalader) ; 97 (Deas) ; 99-106
(Smith) ; 137-8 (Canby) ; 147-51 (Riley) ; 162 (Hooker) ; 180 (Hodge) ;
182-4, 188 (Ripley) ; 208-9 (Rains) ; 230-1 (Beauregard) ; 232-3 (Hitch-
cock) ; 246 (Morgan) ; 267 (Shields) ; 270 (Howard) ; 283, 286-7 (Twiggs) ;
334-5 (verdict); 570. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 174-9, 196. Carreno,
Jefes, ccxc (Perez), ccxciv (Torrej6n). Niles, Oct. 30, pp. 138-9. Cong.
Globe, 34, 1, p. 105 (Foote). Lancaster Co. Hist. Soc. Mag., Mar. 6,
1908. Gimenez, Mems., 266. 29lPierce to Appleton, Aug. 27. 29lGard-
378 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVI, PAGES 105-110
ner to Canby, Aug. 30. 291 Pierce to Hooker, Aug. 22. Engineer School,
U. S. A., Occas. Papers, No. 16. Valencia, Manifiesto. 178Davis, diary.
Stevens, Vindication, 4-7. Negrete, Invasion, iv, app., 281-3. TGTornel,
Aug. 19. TGOrders to Valencia, Aug. 26. Kenly, Md. Vol., 421.
TSLozano, No. 2., Aug. 24. 210Bragg to Hammond, Dec. 20. 125Bon-
ham to wife, Aug. 24; to adj. gen., Feb. 26, 1849. So. Qtrly. Rev., Apr.,
1852, pp. 415-26. Calderon, Rectificaciones, 41. S. Anna, Mi Historia,
72-3. 112Beauregard to Smith, Aug. 25. 76Valencia, Aug. 19. 76J. B.
Arguelles, Aug. 22. 76Alcorta to Alvarez, Aug. 21. 76Alvarez, Aug.
21.
REMARKS. This engagement was called by the Mexicans the battle of
Padierna. At first Valencia had a reserve under Salas at Ansaldo, but he
drew this in at about the time when the battle began. He then placed
Torrejon's cavalry between Ansaldo and his main position. A turn in
the road near his position enabled him to command the turnpike for some
distance. For further details regarding his dispositions see Apuntes, 236.
During the afternoon of Aug. 19 the Ninth Infantry (Ransom) and a
battalion of the Twelfth under Lieut. Col. Bonham crossed the ravine and
remained about 200 yards from Valencia's camp until 9 or 10 o'clock,
partly occupying usefully Valencia's attention. When these troops re-
tired, Mexicans attacked the guard at Padierna, but American reinforce-
ments defeated them. R. E. Lee and G. B. McClellan helped set up
Magruder's battery, and T. J. (" Stonewall") Jackson commanded one
section of it a part of the time. These officers distinguished themselves
highly. Riley understood he was "sent across the pedregal to cut off the
retreat of the enemy and check reinforcements" (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 148).
When Smith moved to the right, he had Magruder resume firing to divert
attention from that movement. Magruder's men tried to save themselves
by falling flat at each Mexican discharge, and the ground sheltered them
somewhat, yet fifteen were killed or wounded. His guns were withdrawn
over the rocks after nightfall.
It has been said with force that it would have been better had Scott
been on the ground from the first. But he did not wish or expect to fight ;
no doubt he had much administrative work on hand ; he was not far away ;
aid he believed that his instructions to Pillow provided for all probable
contingencies. It seems to be true that Pillow, a most plausible and
insinuating talker, had gained a certain ascendency over him. Probably
for this reason, as well as owing to his general wish to gratify his officers,
Scott permitted Pillow to make statements in his report on the battle,
which, as the trial of Pillow showed, ought not to have been there
(210Bragg). Pillow later urged the point that Scott approved of his
dispositions ; but it was Scott's practice to accept what his officers did,
and make the best of it. Scott was slightly wounded in the leg during
the afternoon of August 19 but did not mention the incident at the time.
Later the wound made him trouble.
The Fifteenth Infantry (Morgan) did not act with the rest of Pierce's
brigade on Aug. 19, for Pillow had detached it as a reserve. Pierce was
injured by falling from his horse, and hence Col. Ransom took command
of the brigade. Late in the afternoon Valencia placed a 4-pounder and
two battalions of infantry on the turnpike toward Ansaldo to prevent
more Americans from reaching San Geronimo (Balbontin, Invasi6n, 114),
but this force accomplished nothing. At -first he had thought the Ameri-
cans crossing the pedregal in groups, partly concealed by the ground and
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVI, PAGES 105-110 379
trees, were mere scouting parties. It was found impossible at the Pillow
trial to decide at just what time Scott arrived on the lookout hill (the
lower summit of Zacatepec). The variation of careful witnesses was an
hour and twenty-five minutes. Watches appear to have been out of
order, and therefore one cannot be positive regarding the precise time of
any event.
Smith's plan to attack Santa Anna on Aug. 19 has been criticised as
unsound (Claiborne, Quitman, i, 339, note). But he believed a repulse
of Santa Anna would ensure the defeat of Valencia ; he wanted to dispose
of Santa Anna before his forces could become stronger ; he did not wish
(having no artillery) to let him cannonade at his leisure ; and probably
the situation of the American right appeared to require unusual boldness.
Lee (66to J. L. Smith, Aug. 21) attached less importance to this opera-
tion. Tower (66to J. L. Smith, Aug. 25) said the inexperience of the new
troops, particularly Cadwalader's, had something to do with leading Smith
to give up the plan. Doubtless Pillow's fiasco, Aug. 19, tended to inflate
Valencia's confidence and so to ensure his destruction. Valencia's artillery
accomplished nothing against the Americans at San Geronimo, partly
because the trees and rough ground hid and protected them, and partly
because the guns he used were not very powerful. Smith supposed he
was Shields's senior, and retained the command after the hitter's arrival
at San Geronimo. Shields refrained from claiming it, knowing that Smith
had made preparations to attack and understood the situation best.
Cadwalader, as well as Shields, outranked Smith ; but doubtless he felt
unequal to the situation, and he did not assert his rights. During the
night the few houses at San Geronimo were required for the wounded.
Santa Anna has been too much criticised for his course. Valencia did
not see the Americans in force, Aug. 19, until after one o'clock, and we do
not know how promptly he reported the fact. Santa Anna stated that
at about two o'clock he received word from Valencia that cannon fire
had begun. He was then at San Antonio, yet in about four hours he had
a considerable force near San Geronimo. He reasonably hesitated about
attacking an unknown number of Americans in an admirable defensive
position. His cavalry could have done nothing in the ravines, lanes and
woods which composed it, and his artillery little. Had he attacked, as he
threatened to do, late on Aug. 19, he would have been beaten. After
Riley joined him, Smith had about 3600 men (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 105).
Had Santa Anna advanced by the turnpike he would have exposed his
flank to Smith. Valencia had got himself into a hopeless impasse, and
the best thing he could have done was to tear himself out of it, as Santa
Anna ordered. Santa Anna sent orders to Perez in the afternoon to help
Valencia, but overtaking that brigade (which had set out for the purpose)
took charge of it. Shields brought about 600 men (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p. 344).
Smith's plan of attack against Valencia was not perfectly safe, for, as
Napoleon said, the ground of a night attack should be the roughly known ;
but the circumstances warranted the risk. Friday morning Tower, who
had discovered the ravine (66Tower to J. L. Smith, Aug. 25), led Eiley's
brigade, and Beauregard led Smith's. As soon as Valencia was routed,
orders were given to complete the road begun Aug. 19, but this was soon
found to be unnecessary. The Fifteenth regiment, on account of its
distance from Riley, reached Valencia's camp too late to take part in the
battle. It should be remembered that Smith's troops did not know of the
demoralization of the Mexicans, and expected to find them elated and
380 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVI, PAGES 105-110
confident. Apparently Shields made a mistake in leaving San Ger6nimo
to go to the road on Friday morning, but the mistake was natural. Valen-
cia went to Toluca with a few troops. He was notified to present himself
for trial, which would have meant death. Some irregulars made a trivial
attack upon Quitman (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p. 347), but Alvarez's troops did not
corne near San Agustin. Twiggs had a lame foot at this time, and he
was not under fire Aug. 19. Brookes (Brooks) was on his staff.
Ripley (War with Mexico ii, 291) intimates that Scott sent Pillow
and Twiggs forward, Aug. 19, without taking much into account Valencia's
army and cannon, and permitted the Mexicans to open the battle when
they pleased. This seems careless on Scott's part ; but, as the text shows,
Scott did not know Valencia had marched to Padierna, and had no reason
to suppose (particularly in view of the threat against S. Antonio) that large
Mexican forces would be there. Ripley suggests (p. 292) that it was
improper to let Valencia see the road-building, learn the Americans were
moving that way, and prepare to receive them ; but road-building ceased
when the Americans came in view of Valencia, and after that time he had
little opportunity for preparations. Ripley complains (p. 293) that it
was confusing to have Twiggs open the battle, Pillow take charge of it,
and Scott supersede Pillow; but it is not customary for the general-in-
chief to ride at the head of his forces on a road-building expedition, and
under the circumstances the above arrangement was natural. He re-
marks (p. 297) that Riley's reconnoitring with a view to assaulting
Valencia's rear proves that he understood his mission was more than
to occupy S. Ger6nimo and await orders [i.e. understood that Pillow sent
him to do what Smith did] ; but Riley testified that he had no such under-
standing, and reconnoitred on his own responsibility to obtain informa-
tion that might prove useful (Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 147-8). Ripley, in his
efforts to sustain Pillow's claims, says (p. 297) that Riley fell back be-
cause of his "believing himself unsupported, "yet says that Riley "relied"
on being supported. He explains (p. 298) Pillow's not informing Riley
of the despatch of Cadwalader by saying that a single mounted officer could
not cross the pedregal ; but an officer could cross on foot, and all or most
of the officers were afoot (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p. 304). Rives (U. S. and Mexico,
ii, 488) observes that placing four brigades successively between superior
forces of the enemy involved a great risk ; but it should be remembered
not only that it was worth while to take the risk and that the American
troops were of superior quality, but that Santa Anna was not present when
Riley went to S. Ger6nimo, Valencia could not see what was taking place
in that quarter, he was expecting a frontal, attack all the afternoon, S.
Ger6nimo was a splendid defensive position, and the Mexicans could not
see how large forces occupied it.
Had Santa Anna and Valencia cooperated with judgment and good-will,
Scott's army would perhaps have been crushed ; but had the Mexicans
been sensible and patriotic, we should have had no war. How much Scott
knew about the mutual relations of Santa Anna and Valencia one cannot
say, but in all probability he was well informed regarding them. As
scarcely needs to be pointed out, this battle and that of Churubusco had a
great effect in discouraging, not merely the Mexicans in the vicinity but
those at a distance. Men intending to fight or to provide money drew
back at once (e.g. TGlsunza, Aug. 24).
12. Santa Anna's course after the battle of Contreras. Sen. 19; 30, 2
(Smith to Abert). 224lntercepted letters (14, L. V. to M. O. ; 22, diary ;
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVI, PAGES 110-118 381
23, narrative ; 26, to Old Gentleman). Apuntes, 209-10, 241, 244, 250-4.
Semmes, Service, 396-7. Picayune, Oct. 8. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 306, 315,
325; app., 69 (reports of Scott and others). S. Anna, Apelaci6n, 53
Id., Detail, 14-5. Balbontin, Invasion, 120-1. 217Henshaw to wife,
Aug. 21. GlHuger, Aug. 22. 70"Guerra," no. 30 (F. Perez, Rangel,
Argiielles, Zenea). Mexico a traves, iv, 678. Wash. Union, Nov. 3.
Diario, Sept. 1, 2. Monitor Repub., Oct. 24; Dec. 13, 17. Carrefio,
Jefes, ccxc (Perez), ccciv, cccvi. Negrete, Invasi6n, iii, app., 446 ; iv,
app., 283-4. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 295. Remarks on Mason and
Hardcastle's Plan of Worth's operations (Sen. 1; 30, 1). 76Report of
losses, Churubusco, Aug. 21. 76Rincon, Aug. 20. 76 Argiielles, Aug. 22.
76Rinc6n to S. Anna, Aug. 26.
13. To guard against contingencies Scott had ordered Worth with
Garland's brigade and Quitman with his troops to proceed toward San
Ger6nimo on Friday morning, leaving San Agustin guarded by Harney
(Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 306-7). This has been thought risky. But Scott had
no doubt learned from Lee that Santa Anna was operating in the vicinity
of San Ger6nimo, where was evidently the critical field, and hence prob-
ably he felt that there was little danger of an attack upon San Agustin
that Harney aided, if necessary, by Clarke's brigade (not far distant)
could not meet.
14. Scott's course after the battle of Contreras. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 306-9,
338, 344; app., 36 (reports of Scott, Pillow, Shields, Kearny). Hitchcock,
Fifty Years, 278, 281-2. Davis, Autobiog., 199. Picayune, Sept. 8.
66Lee to Smith, Aug. 21. 335Trist, draft of address. Wash. Union, Sept.
15. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 74, 632 (Scott); 77 (Lee). So. Qtrly. Review,
July, 1852, pp. 81-2. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1018 (Scott). Smith, To Mexico,
199.
15. Worth's operations at Churubusco. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 306, 315, 333 ;
app., 36, 41-2, 44-65 (reports of Scott and officers). 22lHill, diary. GSBonne-
ville court-martial (testimony of Hoffman, Nelson, Pemberton, Worth,
Armistead, Ruggles, etc.). 335Trist, draft of address. Semmes, Service,
394-400. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (Smith to Abert). Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 464 (Lee).
224lntercepted letters (14, L. V. to M. O. ; 23, narrative; 26, to Old
Gentleman). Apuntes, 244-6. Picayune, Sept. 22; Oct 8. Delta,
Sept. 26. 76Zerecero to Guerra, Aug. 25. 76Rinc6n to S. Anna, Aug. 26.
Balbontin, Invasi6n, 120-2. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 278, 282. 260Hen-
shaw, comments on map. Stevens, Stevens, i, 198. GlHuger, report,
Aug. 22. GSScott, gen. orders 327, Oct. 28. Gamboa, Impug., 47.
70" Guerra," no. 30 (Perez, Perdigon Garay). Ramirez, Mexico, 299-301.
73Lozano, no. 2, Aug. 24. 236Judah, diary. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1018
(Scott); 1076 (Hoffman). Carrefio, Jefes, cccvi (Perez). So. Qtrly.
Review, July, 1852, pp. 82-4, 90-1. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 294-5, 298.
Smith, To Mexico, 199-202. Negrete, Invasion, iv, app., 284. S. Anna,
Detail, 15. Monitor Repub., Dec. 17.
16. Twiggs's operations. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 306, 315, 322, 325, 348,
etc.; app., 69-82, 85-8, 96-7, etc. (reports of Scott and officers). 221HU1,
diary. 12Caryton to Lambert, Sept. 1. Apuntes, 246, 250-3. Ballen-
tine, Eng. Sold., ii, 230. GGStevens to Smith, Aug. 24. Sen. 65; 30, 1,
p. 98 (H. L. Scott). Stevens, Stevens, i, 180-4, 199. Stevens, Vindic.,
4-7. Carrefio, Jefes, 29. Michigan Pioneer Soc. Colls., ii, 173; vii, 117.
So. Qtrly. Review, July, 1852, pp. 87-90. Engineer School, U. S. A.,
Occas. Papers, no. 16. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instil., xvii (Van Deusen).
382 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVI, PAGES 110-118
76Argiielles, Aug. 22. 76Rinc6n to S. Anna, Aug. 26. Davis, Autobiog.,
199. 70"Guerra," no. 30 (G. Perez). Negrete, Invasion, iii, app., 447.
Calderon, Rectificaciones, 43. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 73-4. Hitchcock,
Fifty Years, 278-9, 282.
17. Shields's operations. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 303, 306, 315, 325, 333, 342 ;
app., 76, 106, 113, 118, 128, 130-4 (reports of Scott and officers). 66Lee
to Smith, Aug. 21. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 342-3. City of Charleston,
Year Book, 1883, p. 523. SOSShields to Quitman, Aug. 21. 22lHill,
diary. 335Trist, draft of address. Semmes, Service, 402. 224lntercepted
letters (22, diary; 25, to E.). Hawthorne, Pierce, 100. Apuntes, 246-7.
Murphy, Hungerford, 102. TGZerecero to Guerra, Aug. 25. Balbontfn,
Invasion, 121-2. Davis, Autobiog., 200-1, 286. 70" Guerra," no. 30
(F. Perez). Stevens, Stevens, i, 198. Ramirez, Mexico, 300. Carreno,
Jefes, ccxciv (Torrejon), cccvii (Perez). ITOCrooker to mother, Sept. 1.
So. Qtrly. Review, July, 1852, pp. 93-9. Oil painting of Butler : sen. cham-
ber, Columbia, S. C. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (Smith to Abert). 29lPierce to
Appleton, Aug. 27. Monitor Repub., Dec. 17. 125Bonham to adj. gen.,
June 15, 1848. Nat. Intelligencer, Jan. 3, 1848. Stevens, Vindication,
4-7. Negrete, Invasi6n, iv, app., 285. 277Burnett, statement. Hitch-
cock, Fifty Years, 279. Sen. 65 ; 30, 1, p. 464. S. Anna, Detail, 15.
18. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1. pp. 306, 315, 325, etc. ; app., 35, 42, 46, 49, 64, 77,
127, etc. (reports of Scott and officers). Semmes, Service, 397, 401-2.
224lntercepted letters (17, J. U. to J. P. F.). Apuntes, 254-8. 76Ar-
giielles, Aug. 22. 76Rincon to S. Anna, Aug. 26. Balbontin, Invasi6n,
122. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 233. Carreno, Jefes, cccvii (Pe>ez).
Niles, Jan. 22, 1848, p. 323.
19. S. Anna, Detail, 15-6. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 313, 318, 340, 347; app.,
p. 36 (reports of Scott and officers). Picayune, Oct. 21. Apuntes, 247.
Charleston Courier, Oct. 2. Balbontin, Invasi6n, 123. Fate of F. D.
Mills. Grant, Mems., i, 146. Davis, Autobiog., 202. 223Hirschorn,
recoils. De Peyster, Kearny, 140, 142-5. Journ. U. S. Cavalry Assoc..,
Mar., 1911, p. 841. Ramsey, Other Side, 287, note. Negrete, Invasi6n,
iv, app., 285-6.
REMARKS ON THE BATTLE OF CHURUBUSCO. The active fortifying of
the convent did not begin until the afternoon of Aug. 18 (76Rinc6n to
S. Anna, Aug. 26) ; one gun arrived there on the morning of the twentieth
and the rest were left by Santa Anna later that day (Apuntes, 252) ; and
hence Scott could not well have learned from spies what the situation was
in that quarter. It is bootless to say (Calder6n, Rectificaciones, 43) that
Santa Anna should have prevented Scott from reaching Coyoacan. Neither
he nor his army was in a condition to fight without fortifications, and they
could not have stopped the Americans anywhere if not at Churubusco.
On the Mexican right at the convent were two 8-pounders and a 4-pounder ;
in embrasures at the front, an 8-pounder and a 4-pounder ; en barbette at
the left an 8-pounder ; and in an embrasure defending the left flank a
6-pounder. A detachment of the Independencia battalion under Penunuri
occupied Coyoacan when the Americans approached, and retired with
some loss. The fight at Churubusco convent was actually begun by the
Mounted Rifles, but their orders were merely to escort the reconnoitring
party, and the First Artillery was expected to clear the way by turning
the supposed one-gun battery (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p. 330). Riley had only the
Second and Seventh Infantry at Churubusco. The Fourth Artillery was
on guard at Valencia's camp. Scott ordered that Worth should attack
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVI, PAGES 110-118 383
and turn San Antonio aftor finding the Americans were. in its rear, but
when he sent Lee to give the signal to Worth, Lee found Worth had al-
ready done this.
Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 250-1) says that Scott ordered Pillow
to do what Twiggs did and vice versa. But (1) nothing of this is found
in Scott's or Pillow's report ; (2) Scott would not have been likely to order
two bitter enemies (Worth and Twiggs) to cooperate in an indefinite
manner, and (3) H. L. Scott testified at the Pillow trial that he carried
from Gen. Scott to Twiggs the order to attack the convent (Sen. 65 ; 30,
1, p. 98). Davis, Shields's aide, says on the other hand (Autobiog., 199)
that Scott knew by reconnaissances of a remarkably strong fortification
at Churubusco, and ordered Twiggs to take the route actually taken by
Shields. But (1) Dayis's first statement is not correct; (2) Scott was at
Coyoacdn, where the roads forked, and would have recalled Twiggs, had
he seen that officer take the wrong road ; (3) Scott felt in haste to strike
the retreating Mexicans, and the quickest way to do that was apparently
by the road to Churubusco ; and (4) H. L. Scott's testimony, supported
by the reports of Gens. Scott and Twiggs, seems to be decisive. Davis's
account contains other errors, and appears to have been written long
afterwards from memory.
What Scott intended to do after concentrating we do not know. Prob-
ably, as was his custom, he held several plans in suspense, awaiting develop-
ments and fuller information regarding the enemy, which the delay ex-
pectei in Worth's operations would have given him time to acquire. But
his promptness in sending off Pierce and Shields, and his attempt to hold
back one of Smith's and one of Pierce's brigades, suggest that he aimed to
get behind Santa Anna himself and force a decisive battle. Gen. U. S.
Grant endorsed Scott's strategy at Churubusco as faultless and said the
engineers served him perfectly (Mems., i, 145) ; but Stevens's confession
is decisive on both points (Stevens, Stevens, i, 180, 184, 196, 199). Stevens
states expressly that Scott had intended to reconnoitre before attacking
at Churubusco.
Worth's attacking the bridge without reconnoitring was mainly due to
over-confidence and eagerness ; but the intense ambition and rivalry of
Worth and Twiggs probably had something to do with the undue haste of
both. Of course Semmes (Service, 398, 446) asserts that Worth advanced
with deliberation and reconnoitred the bridgehead, but the evidence,
especially that given at the trial of Major Bonneville, is decisively against
him. Ripley, on the other hand, states that a reconnaissance was not
practicable (War with Mexico, ii, 267) ; but while a complete reconnais-
sance could not be made, tjie cornfields on the right would have enabled
an officer to advance unseen, and at a glance learn something regarding
the obstacle in front. This would have been to save, not lose, time.
Scott was accused of having no plan and leaving his generals to attack
as they saw fit, and was criticized especially for fighting to gain a road
neither needed nor used by him, from which the enemy could easily have
been manoeuvred, had they cared to hold it (Roa Bdrcena, Recuerdos,
378) ; but the text explains these apparent errors. The battle was, how-
ever, in effect a blunder, even though not chargeable to Scott as such.
Still, the ardor of the army was something not be thrown away by delay-
ing, and the promptness of the Americans prevented Santa Anna from
completing his preparations. (Greene, Russian Army, 433: Excessive
prudence has a bad effect on the morale of the men.) Perhaps Scott
384 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVI, PAGES 110-118
gained as much as he lost in this way. Moreover, had he manoeuvred
the Mexicans out of Churubusco, it would have been necessary to fight
them elsewhere, when they would probably have been more ready to
fight ; the moral effect of this victory on both armies would not have been
gained ; and our military annals would not have contained this page.
The moral effect on the Mexicans, however, was largely offset by pride in
the stubborn resistance they had offered, and by the armistice that Scott
immediately offered. One could not always determine just where firing,
heard from a distance, was taking place. Probably for this reason we have
inconsistent reports that make it impossible to determine precisely where
and when the battle began. The Sixth Infantry, moving toward the bridge
a considerable distance in advance of Worth himself, were said to have
received the first fire from the convent (Hoffman : Ho. 60 ; 30, 1, p. 1076),
but Scott reported that the attack upon the convent began some time
before that upon the bridgehead. Stevens (I. I. Stevens, 198) supports
him. The writer in "Apuntes" says that Worth was checked by am-
munition wagons in the road, and that Santa Anna, seeing this, recalled
Perez to defend the bridge ; but the wagons appear to have caused no such
delay as this writer assumed. The rest of Santa Anna's force (which this
writer says kept on towards Mexico) was mainly cavalry, and presumably
this cavalry assisted in flanking Shields. Brev. Lieut. Col. C. F. Smith's
battalion consisted of two companies from the Second Artillery, one from
the Fifth Infantry and one from the Eighth Infantry (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p. 316).
The Fifteenth, but only one battalion (commanded by Capt. Wood) of
the Twelfth Infantry was with Pierce, and a battery of mountain howitzers.
Pierce, who had been thrown from his horse the day before, fainted and
fell out before coming into action, so Shields commanded both brigades.
Lee was the engineer officer with Shields. Seeing the need of more troops,
he went back to Scott and obtained the Mounted Rifles and a troop of
the Second Dragoons, but these men did not reach the spot in time to
fight. Scott has been criticized for not sending a stronger force in this
direction ; but in fact he did not even retain an escort, and the Rifles were
Twiggs's reserve (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p. 309). The South Carolina regiment,
commonly known as the "Palmettoes," was made up. of superior material.
Men fit to be officers were in the ranks. Shields's movement was partly
based on a misapprehension, for the Mexicans could retreat from Churu-
busco via Mexicaltzingo ; but anyhow it was wise to aid the frontal attack
on the bridge by applying pressure on the flank. Shields seems to have
marched too far north to cooperate effectively with the attack upon the
bridgehead. Presumably he did so in order to reach Santa Anna's rear.
The combined effect of this movement and the outflanking of the Mexican
left was to extend the American line enormously, and expose it to a (happily
very improbable) counter-attack. At about three o'clock the Americans
were in three sections, badly separated by distance or by the enemy,
while the Mexicans, besides fighting behind strong defences, were all
actually or virtually in touch one with another, and able to give mutual
support.
Shields naturally overestimated the numbers opposed to him. Perhaps
the Victoria and Hidalgo battalions from San Antonio passed along the
highway to Mexico at this time. They would not fight. They thought
hunger, sunburn and blistered feet bad enough. The Americans be-
lieved that they fought at least 32,000 men on Aug. 20 (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1,
p. 313) ; but this was a great exaggeration. Rangel's brigade was in
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVI, PAGES 118-119 385
town ; Alvarez's was far away ; and there must have been a large number
of soldiers guarding the fortifications, and attending to the general require-
ments of the service. The number fighting that day on the Mexican side
seems to have been about 16,000, though Mexican authors have tried to
reduce it to 12,000 or 13,000 (e.g. Roa Barcena, Recuerdos, 375).
Scott's dragoons were divided and assigned to special duties at this time
(Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 38). Pillow and a part of his troops joined Worth,
but figured very little in reports of the fighting. The Eleventh and
Fourteenth Infantry attempted to cut the Mexican line from the bridge
to the convent, but on account of the heavy fire were ordered to lie down.
Col. Andrews explained that his regiment (Voltigeurs) came up later than
Worth's division, and could not fire without endangering troops ahead of
him (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, app., 122) ; but this is not convincing, for he must
have left Coyoacan at about noon, and there was room enough at the
front.
It was stated at Puebla in October, 1847, that 260 Americans fought with
the Mexicans at Churubusco (Flag of Freedom, i, no. 1). Some of these
men cut their way through (70"Guerra," no. 30, Perdigon Garay), and
reached Mexico (ibid., Rangel) . Some eighty appear to have been captured.
They were fairly tried. A number were found not guilty of deserting, and
were released. About fifteen (Hartman, Journal, 18), who had deserted
before the declaration of war, were merely branded with a "D," and
fifty of those taken at Churubusco were executed (65Scott, gen. orders
296). There was bitter complaint because any were spared, but Scott
declared he would rather be put to the sword with his whole army than do
an injustice in the matter (Davis, Autobiog., 226), and urged the courts
to find grounds for reducing the number of executions (335notes on letter
to Ho. of Repres.). It was said that more than once the American de-
serters killed Mexicans who tried to raise a white flag at the convent.
For the deserters and their fate consult : 12Caryton to Lambert, Sept. 1 ;
Picayune, Sept. 8; Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 319, 344; Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii,
230; 70"Guerra," no. 30 (Rangel, Perdigon Garay); Judah, diary;
Amer. Star, Mexico, Sept. 20 ; Diario, Sept. 2 ; Flag of Freedom, Puebla, i,
no. 1; 178Davis, diary; Negrete, Invasi6n, iii, app., 452; Hartman,
Journal, 17-8; Scott, 65gen. orders 281-3; Davis, Autobiog., 224-7).
Hancock and Longstreet, destined to be on opposite sides at Gettysburg,
here fought together. Twiggs was at this time under fire (Stevens, Stevens,
i, 199). Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 493) explains the stiff defence of the
convent as due to the presence of "men of Spanish (not Indian) descent" ;
but (1) the Victoria and Hidalgo battalions, which would not fight (supra)
were still more truly "Spanish" (vol. ii, p. 3), and (2) the nearly worth-
less officers were always of such descent.
20. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 465, 478. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 313-4, 348, 384.
Ho. 24; 31, 1. 76Rinc6n to S. Anna, Aug. 26. 76Quijano, Sept. 3.
76Olaguibel, Aug. 27. Ramirez, Mexico, 299. Monitor Repub., Dec. 17
(S.Anna). 76Alcorta, Aug. 30. 12Caryton to Lambert, Sept. 1. Semmes,
Service, 408. 76Report, Aug. 21. 224lntercepted letters, passim.
76Cuerpo Medico, report, Aug. 24.
21. Mich. Pioneer Soc. Colls., ii, 173. Stevens, Stevens, i, 199. En-
carnacion Prisoners, 55. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 278-80. Sen. 1 ; 30,
1, p. 331. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 464 (Lee). Apuntes, 247. Roa Barcena,
Recuerdos, 377.
VOL. ii 2 c
386 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVII, PAGES 120-122
XXVII. NEGOTIATIONS
1. The American situation after the battles of Aug. 20. 260Henshaw,
comments on map. GlTrousdale, Aug. 22. 217Henshaw to wife, Aug.
21, etc. 218Henshaw narrative. Vedette, vii, no. 9 (Toll). St. Louis
Republican, Sept. 27. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 314 (Scott). Hitchcock, Fifty
Years, 284-5, 294. McSherry, El Puchero, 88, 100. 364Worth to
daughter, Sept. 2. 61N. C. to Elizabeth Miller, Nov. 30. Semmes,
Service, 413. London Chronicle, Nov. 12. N. Y. Herald, Feb. 5, 1848
(Pierce). 236Judah, diary. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 129 (Scott). Semi-
weekly N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 1, 1848. 358Williams to father,
Oct. 1. 29lPierce to wife, Aug. 23. Davis, Autobiog^a phv, 189. 350
Weber, recoils. 303Shields to Quitman, Aug. 21. 22lHill, diary. 68
Scott's statement to court of inquiry, Apr. 17, 1848. Gamboa, Impug.,
49. Picayune, Sept. 9. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 460 (Turnbull).
Semmes (Service, 413) says that eventually Scott had to disperse the
elements of peace, and incorrectly adds that they seemed to reassemble
all the more rapidly. But Scott had reason to believe that what it required
months to do later could be done now in only a few weeks. He reported
that understanding his nation's desire for peace and "Willing to leave
something to this republic of no immediate value to us on which to
rest her pride, and to recover temper I halted our victorious corps at
the gates of the city" (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 314). Even the fiery Worth
deemed it best not to enter Mexico at this time (364to daughter, Sept. 2).
2. lOSMarcy to Bancroft, Apr. 28. Polk, Messages, May 11 ; June
16, 1846; Feb. 10, 1847 (Richardson, iv, 437, 451, 511). Ho. 60; 30,
1, pp. 328 (Scott); 334 (Marcy). 297Benton MS. (with Folk's notes)
received by Polk, July 4, 1846. 69Worth to Bliss, Nov. 29; Dec. 14,
1846.
3. Bankhead reported, Oct. 10, 1846, that he was weary of arguing in
favor of treating with the United States; that the dominant faction,
positively refusing to negotiate, were crying, "A levy of 40,000 and make
terms only on the other side of the Nueces !"
4. The overture of July, 1846. Sen. 107; 29, 2, pp. 1-3. Sen. 1; 29,
2, pp. 43-4. ISPakenham, nos. 93, July 13; 107, Aug. 13; 119, Sept.
28 ; 130, Nov. 12, 1846. ISBankhead to Pakenham, Oct. 10. 256Marcy
to Wetmore, June 13. Locomotor, June 27. 158Cobb to wife, June 4.
National, June 22. Pregonero, June 11. Monitor Repub., June 22. 162
Buchanan to Conner, Oct. 1. 162Conner, July 19. ISBankhead, nos.
92, 104, 105, June 29; July 30; 125, Aug. 31; 128-30, Sept. 7,1846.
Rej6n to Buchanan, Aug. 31 (in Memoria de . . . Relaciones, 1846).
Polk, Diary, Sept. 19, 20, 26. Buchanan, Works (Moore), vii, 40, 82, 87.
Indicador, Aug. 27. Nat. Intelligencer, Sept. 28. Diario, Dec. 6, 13, 25.
52Black, May 21 ; June 9; July 4. 166/d. to Conner, July 9; Aug. 1.
166Pommares to Gregory, July 2. 166M to Conner, July 4, 21 ; Aug.
12. Reeves, Amer. Diplomacy, 298. Polk, Message, Dec. 8 (Richard-
son, iv, 494). 297Mackenzie, July 7. 76Comandante, V. Cruz, Aug.
26. See vol. i, pp. 217, 502, 504.
Sept. 26 Buchanan replied to Rej6n that the United States did not
wish to ignore in the peace negotiations the causes of the war, since to do
that would be to abandon the just claims of the United States (Polk,
Diary, Sept. 26; Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 44). The necessity of explaining his
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVII, PAGES 122-124 387
previous despatch illustrated once more the Mexican superiority in diplo-
matic fencing. Buchanan added that delay would make it the harder
to end the conflict. Polk regarded the Mexican reply as a refusal to treat
(Diary, Sept. 19). In consequence he proposed aggressive operations in
Tamaulipas (chap, xiii, p. 263) and the imposition of contributions in lieu
of paying for needed supplies (chap, xxxiii, p. 264). Buchanan, however,
directed Conner to notify Slidell, who was still on waiting orders at New
Orleans, whenever the Mexican government should announce that it was
"disposed" to treat (162Oct. 1).
5. Polk, Diary, July 26, 30, 31 ; Aug. 1, 4, 7, 8, 10, 1846. Id. to Senate,
Aug. 4, 8 (Richardson, Messages, iv, 456, 466). Id., Message, Dec. 8,
1846 (ib., 494-5). Benton, View, ii, 681-2. Cong. Globe, 29, 1, pp.
1211-21. See also the long debates on the subject in Senate and House,
Jan. and Feb., 1847 (Cong. Globe). Von Hoist, United States, iii, 293.
Benton, Abr. Debates, xvi, 40, note, 45 (Sevier), 60 (Cass). Boston
Atlas, Feb. 17, 1847. ISMora to Palmerston, May 26, 1847. Diario,
May 24; June 8, 1847. Republicano, June 11, 1847. 13Thornton to
Bankhead, June 14, 1847. (Consul Black notified) ISPakenham, no. 40,
Mar. 29, 1847. Wash. Union, Aug. 12, 1846. lOSPolk to Bancroft,
Jan. 30, 1847. Daily Telegraph, Oct. 16, 1852.
The request for two millions apparently grew out of the negotiation with
Santa Anna; see chap, ix, note 38. Folk's object was probably to be
able to supply funds promptly to the Mexican administration making a
treaty, and to satisfy it that it would be able to gain the needful military
support. The three millions could not be used until after Mexico should
have ratified the treaty (Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 46 (Berrien), 60 (Cass) ;
Washington Telegraph, Oct. 18, 1852), and the government was required
to account for the expenditure of the money (U. S. Stat. at Large, ix, 174 ;
Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 45). An improper use of it was therefore im-
possible.
6. The overture of January, 1847. Ho. 85; 29, 2. Washington
Union, Oct. 9, 1846 (N. Y.) ; Apr. 22; June 11, 1847. 162Matson to
Conner, Feb. 20, 1847. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 36-7. 162Conner to wife,
Feb. 17. 132Benton to Buchanan, Jan. 14. 132Atocha to Buchanan,
July 3. 13^ Buchanan to Atocha, Jan. 18 ; to Scott and Perry, Apr. 23.
Niles, May 1, p. 129; May 15, p. 162. Von Hoist, United States, iii,
332. Courrier des Etats Unis, Aug. 15, 1846. Buchanan, Works (Moore),
vii, 198, 211. ISBankhead, nos. 141, Sept. 29, 1846; 16, Mar. 2, 1847.
TSBermudez de Castro, no. 444, res., Mar. 1. Tribute d la Verdad, 26.
58Dobson, Feb. 14. Epoca, Feb. 23. 86Gefe V. C. dept. to gov., Feb. 9.
Don Simplicity, Feb. 17. Diario, Aug. 18. Webster, Writings, ix, 158.
52Black, Feb. 24. ISPakenham, nos. 107, Aug. 13, 1846; 40, Mar. 29;
56, Apr. 28, 1847. Nat. Intelligencer, June 10, 1845; May 3, 1847. 52
Shannon to Cuevas, Mar. 1, 1845. 69A clipping from Republicano.
Polk, Diary, Nov. 7, 1846; Jan. 12-19; Mar. 20, 1847. Picayune,
May 6, 1847. Delta, Mar. 13. TGMorales, Feb. 9.
At Atocha's suggestion the American commissioners were to have
power to suspend hostilities after actually meeting Mexican commission-
ers. Such was Webster's idea (Writings, ix, 158). The plan would have
given Mexico a fine opportunity to protract the negotiations, let our war
expenses accumulate, and cause our war spirit to languish. The Mexi-
can reply said that the Texas affair [besides being atrocious in itself] was*
"a cover to ulterior designs, which now stand disclosed" (Sen. 1 : 30,
388 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVII, PAGES 124-126
1, p. 37). The failure of the overture naturally angered Polk, and he de-
clared for a most energetic military movement against the capital (Diary,
Mar. 20). In April Atocha, who loved to represent himself as "sole agent
for Santa Anna's gamecocks and all, and his particular friend in every
respect" (l62Conner, Feb. 17), returned to Mexico ostensibly on private
business, but with 132letters of introduction from the government to Scott,
Shields and Perry. "O God", exclaimed El Republicano, "send unto us
shells, rifles, shot and every kind of projectiles and misfortunes; burn
and destroy us, reduce us to ashes, annihilate us, but . . . permit not
that Atocha be the broker of a treaty of peace !"
7. The Mexican attitude. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 190, 205-12 (Trist), 174.
Picayune, May 12; July 8; Oct. 15, 17. Apuntes, 264. ISBankhead,
nos. 42-3, Apr. 30; 58, May 29; 83, Aug. 29. Polk, Diary, Apr. 16.
Ramirez, Mexico, 224, 234, 239, 248, 263, 271, 275. Meade, Letters, i,
180. Sen. 1 ; 29, 2, p. 44. Mexico en 1847, 34. 77Undated clipping
from N. Y. Sun describing a Mexican society to promote annexation to
U. S. 47Mexican letter, Orizaba, [Sept., 1847]. ISPakenham, no. 40,
Mar. 29. ISBankhead to Pak., Oct. 10, 1846. Semmes, Service, 426.
335Belton to Hitchcock, Aug. 23. Ocampo, Obras, 263. Republicano,
Oct. 24, 1846; May 8, 11; June 9, 11, 1847. Esperanza, Aug. 8, 1846.
Eco de Tampico, Nov. 11, 1846. Zempoalteca, July 15, 1847. SOSpeaker
in Mexico legislature, Apr. 21. London Times, July 15; Oct. 27; Nov.
6, 16, 1846 ; Jan. 8, 13 ; Feb. 9 ; Mar. 15 ; May 10, 1847. Tribute a la
Verdad, 27. M'Sherry, El Puchero, 189. 73Bermudez de Castro, no.
332, res., Sept. 24, 1846. Encarnacion Prisoners, 83. Opinion del Ejercito,
Nov. 13, 1846. Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 211 (Corwin) ; 323 (Calhoun).
335Eayres to S. Anna, Oct. 10, 1846; reply, Oct. 21. 52Black, Sept. 22,
28, 1846. 92Mex. ayunt. to gov. Fed. District, Sept, 3, 1847. Sen. 1;
30, 1, p. 36. Wash. Union, Sept. 28 ; Oct. 6, 27, 1846 ; Apr. 22 ; May 22 ;
July 10; Aug. 5; Oct. 5, 1847. Nat. Intelligencer, Nov. 7, 1846; Feb.
5, 1847. N. Y. Express, Nov. 12, 1846. Iris Espanol, Oct. 30, 1846.
Regenerador Repub., Dec. 23, 1846. Benton, Abr. Debates, xvi, 58-9
(Calhoun). 132Cushing to Buchanan, Oct. 31, 1847. Constitutional,
Nov. 10; Dec. 5, 1846; Aug. 17, 1847. Correspondant, Sept. 15, 1846.
London Globe, Nov. 16, 1846. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 270. Lawton,
Artill. Officer, 144. Monitor Repub., Sept. 2; Nov. 14, 18, 1846; Apr.
21, 29; May 15, 17, 27, 1847. Diario, Oct. 8 ; Nov. 21; Dec. 20, 23,
1843; Feb. 13, 14; Mar. 31; Apr. 11; May 5, 21, 23, 25; June 10, 18;
July 8; Aug. 29, 1847. 76Mora, Apr. 23, 1847. See also chap, xxxiv,
note 21, and the corresponding text.
8. Appointment of Trist. Polk, Diary, Dec. 3, 4, 9, 1846; Jan. 18;
Apr. 10, 14, 16, 21-2, 1847. 335Buchanan to Trist, July 13, 1847. Mans-
field, Mexican War, 275. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 310. 52Trist to
Buchanan, July 31, private. Ho. 69; 30, 1, p. 43 (Buchanan). 57Trist,
reports. Polk, Message, Dec. 7, 1847 (Richardson, iv, 536). Benton,
View, ii, 704. Chase, Polk Administration, 215-6. 335Mrs. Trist to
T., July 13. 345Blair to Van Buren, Dec. 26, 1846; July 7, 1847. Delta,
May 1, 1848. 335Trist to Mann, Dec. , 1853 (draft). 335Document
by Trist re his wife. 335Trist, draft of letter to the Times. Amer. Hist.
Review, x, 312-4 (Reeves). 335Trist to Felton, June 14, 18. 335
Id., memorial (draft). 335Buchanan, Aug. 28, 1845 (appointing Trist
chief clerk). For Buchanan: 354Welles papers; Monitor Repub., Mar.
*10, 1848 (Landa) ; Poore, Perlsy's Remins., i, 332.
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVII, PAGES 126-129 389
9. Trist's early relations with Scott in Mexico. 335Trist's credentials,
etc. 335Walker to Trist Apr. 15. 335Buchanan to Relaciones, Apr.
15. Pennsylvanian, Apr. 18. Boston Post, Apr. 15. 335Trist to wife,
Apr. 18, 25, 28 ; May 4, 8, 15, 21, etc. ; to Buchanan, May 21. 335Trist's
sister to T., May 22. 335Trist, drafts and memoranda. Scott, Mems.,
ii, 399-401, 576, 579. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 150, 153, 159, 181 (Trist);
126, 135, 157, 172 (Scott) ; 123, 128, 131 (Marcy) ; 108-9. 335Buchanan
to Trist, July 13, private. Ho. 69; 30, 1, pp. 43, 47, etc, 52Trist to
Scott, May 9. Ho. 60 ; 30, 1, pp. 940 (Marcy) ; 993, 1218 (Scott). Kenly,
Md. Vol., 336. Mansfield, Scott, 364. Polk, Diary, Apr. 15, 16; June
12-15 ; July 9, 13, 15, 17 ; Aug. 24. 52Buchanan to Trist, July 13. Lon-
don Times, July 15; Aug. 16 (Genevese traveller: Scott warned).
Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 38. Polk, Message, Dec. 7, 1847 (Richardson, iv, 535) .
47Scott to Semmes, May 9. 48Mason to Perry, Apr. 15, confid. 335
Trist to Scott, Sept. 30 (draft). Oswandel, Notes, 155-6. Semmes,
Service, 197-201. 345Blair to Van Buren, Mar. 3, 1848. 335Trist to Ho.
Repres., Feb. 12, 1848 (draft). Sen. 107; 29, 2, p. 3 (Buchanan to
Conner, July 27, 1846). 132Mason to Buchanan, June 28. N. Y. Courier
and Enquirer in Niles, July 10. Buchanan, Works (Moore), vii, 270-9.
So. Qtrly. Review, Apr., 1852, pp. 386-93. (Semmes episode) Ho.
60; 30, 1, pp. 976-92. 335Trist to Felton, June 14, 18.
The government desired to keep the despatch of the peace commis-
sioner secret, lest Whigs should defeat the plan (Polk, Diary, Apr. 16),
but a member of the Cabinet betrayed the fact (335Trist to Mann, Dec.
, 1853). Scott had been given some reason to expect that he would be
(as he naturally desired to be) one of a peace commission (Mems., ii, 576),
as would have been very proper, and no doubt he was not pleased to find
he had been ignored. He was further exasperated at this time by the
arrival of Lieut. Semmes, as a representative of the navy, to see about
the case of a naval prisoner (Rogers: chap, xxx, p. 444), as if Scott had
not been able and willing to attend to the business, and in fact had not
already attended to it (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 989), and by Semmes's demand
(which had to be refused) for an escort (Semmes, Service, 198, etc. ; Ho.
60; 30, 1, pp. 977-92). It would not have been proper to detach one
soldier unnecessarily. May 31 Marcy wrote to Scott that Trist was
"directed" to show the General his instructions (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 123) ;
but Buchanan used the word "authorised" (52to Trist, July 13). So did
Polk (Message, December 7, 1847) and Marcy to Scott on July 12 (Sen.
52; 30, 1, p. 133). Polk and the Cabinet were greatly disturbed by the
quarrel between Scott and Trist, blaming both but of course blaming
Scott most. Polk proposed to recall them, but Marcy said Scott could
not be spared at that time, and the rest of the Cabinet agreed with him
(Polk, Diary, June 12, 14; July 9). Polk said Scott had thrown away
"the golden moment" to make peace. But, as Scott knew (Sen. 52 ; 30,
1, p. 120), the Mexican Congress by its law of April 20 (vol. ii, p. 81)
had made peace negotiations practically impossible. A military officer
is not expected to execute an order if the condition of things when he
receives it is essentially different from that known or assumed by his
superior at the time of issuing it. Trist admitted later that he had been
misinformed about the Mexican situation, and was not sorry Scott did
not promptly forward the despatch (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 819, 825). As for
the power to grant an armistice, Scott held that the army, cut off without
supplies in the heart of a hostile country, must be free to take military
390 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVII, PAGES 129-132
security for its own safety (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 121). Trist was given
authority to draw any part of the three millions appropriated to facilitate
making a treaty. Buchanan to excuse himself wrote (52to Trist, June
14) that Scott would not have replied to Trist as he did, had he waited to
see Trist's. instructions. This amounted to saying that, since Scott knew
nothing about those instructions, his letter was natural. Marcy admitted
(May 31 : Sen. 52 ; 30, 1, p. 122) that Scott ought to have seen the in-
structions, the pro jet and Buchanan's despatch, of which Trist had a copy.
Dec. 25 256Scott had written privately to Marcy that he had heard from
Congressmen of a plan to place Benton over him, but did not believe a
word of it ; and Jan. 16 he again had expressed his gratitude and loyalty
to the President. But it should not be forgotten that while the adminis-
tration was entitled to full credit for its meanness and blundering, the
trouble arose primarily from Scott's having gone deeply into politics.
He was not politically active now. Jan. 16 he 256wrote privately to
Marcy, "On setting out, on my present mission, I laid down whiggism,
without taking up democracy," but the politicians were not fitted to believe
this manly and truthful declaration. The Whigs insisted that Trist had
been sent to embarrass and perhaps to ruin Scott.
10. Thornton, later Sir Edward Thornton, British minister to the
United States, saw Scott also, who gave him to understand that he should
advance against Mexico July 1 or 2 unless a reply to Buchanan's despatch
should seem probable (1ST. to Addington, June 29). Thornton believed
that Rejon was intriguing with Scott to have the Americans come to
Mexico, install the Puros and make peace with them, and that Rej6n's
party were insisting upon war for this reason (ibid.). Baranda had tried
to catch Scott in some entanglement by means of secret negotiations
through the British legation, but had failed (ISBankhead, nos. 47, 54,
1847). Bankhead exerted all his influence with the government in favor
of negotiations. June 22 the minister of relations replied politely to Buch-
anan that his despatch had been referred to Congress, with which the settle-
ment of the matter rested (Diario, June 26).
11. Scott 335wrote to Trist, July 17, to the following effect: I concur
with you, several of my generals and many foreigners of high standing
here and at Mexico in believing that our occupation of twenty principal
towns, besides those we already hold, probably would not within a year
or more force the Mexicans to accept a peace on terms honorable to the
United States without the pledge in advance or the payment of money to
some of the principal authorities. This is expected as a preliminary to
any negotiation. We must pay $10,000 down to one high official, and
$1,000,000, probably to be divided among many, on the ratification of
a treaty. With your concurrence I sent $10,000 to Mexico yesterday,
and at the proper time I will unite with you in pledging $1,000,000. I have
no question as to the morality of this course, nor have you. We have
tempted the integrity of no one. The overture, if corrupt, came from
parties already corrupted. We merely avail ourselves of that corruption
to obtain an end highly advantageous to both countries. Such transac-
tions have always been considered allowable in war. We do not know
that this money would not go into the same channels as that which our
government is willing to pay publicly for territory would go into.
June 4 Poinsett said he should be "surprised" if the Mexicans could be
made to accept the terms of the United States (345to Van Buren). June
11 Buchanan said privately he should not be "much disappointed" should
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVII, PAGES 132-133 391
the war continue for years (132to Fremont). July 16 Marcy could see
no hopes of terminating it (256to Wetmore). Hence the fears of Trist
and Scott do not seem unreasonable. The $1,000,GOO was to have been
deducted fro.n the sum to be paid by the Umted States government (i24
Hitchcock, memo.) Who the intended go-between was cannot be stated,
though on settling his accounts Scott told confidentially who received
the $10,000 (Scott in N. Y. Herald, Nov. 3, 1857) ; but there is reason
to believe that it was Miguel Arroyo, who will presently appear as secre-
tary to the Mexican peace commissioners. It has been said (Rives, U.
S. and Mexico, ii, 501) that Scott acted as he d d with reference to peace
because anxious to get back to the United States for personal political
reasons. Had this been true, Scott would have resigned under the cloud
of glory rising from his capture of Mexico City. We have political letters
written by Taylor at this period, but Scott seems to have shown no such
activity. On the other hand he wrote to Marcy (no e 9), "On setting
out, on my present mission, I laid down whiggism."
July 16 Scott mentioned the subject of paying for a treaty to a num-
ber of his principal officers at what came to be called improperly a council,
stating (rf. supra) that he felt no scruples about it (Hitchcock, Fifty Years,
257). Pillow, who had already assented heartily to the plan (Claiborne,
Quitman, i, 317), supported that view of it strongly (GSShields to Marcy,
Mar. 11, 1848). Quitman, Shields and Cadwalader opposed it. Prob-
ably their opinions had no practical effect, for Scott had already com-
mitted himself, and the Mexicans soon ceased to desire peace. July 7
Trist sent to Buchanan a copy of a note written by him (52to Thornton)
which could hardly fail to suggest to a politician that something peculiar
was afoot, and early in August "Gomez," an army correspondent of the
St. Louis Republican, gave some account of the negotiations (published
Nov. 22, republished by the Baltimore Sun, Dec. 6) . Polk and the Cabinet
made no sign, however. But on Oct. 28 and January 18 Pillow, now a
bitter enemy of Scott, wrote to Polk about the affair (Polk Diary, Dec.
11, 18, 20, 28, 1847; Feb. 16, 19, 1848), pretending (224Hitchcock, memo.)
that Scott had beguiled him into supporting the plan, and that his better
nature had almost immediately reacted against it. Pillow end Polk
doubtless thought that here lay an opportunity to do Scott a great ir jury,
and took the matter up with much apparent indignation ; and in March,
1848, Marcy confidentially ordered the officers sitting in the Pillow court
of inquiry to make an investigation (Polk, Diary, Mar. 14, 16 ; GSMarcy,
Mar. 17). They did what they could, but the investigation came to noth-
ing, for Trist and Scott would not implicate the British legation. See
GSproceedings of the court and statements of generals; Daily Democrat,
Chicago, Sept. 15, 1857; 256Marcy to Towson, Mar. 17, 1848; GSScott
to Marcy, Jan. 28, 1818, and Shields to Marcy, Feb. 12, 1848; Davis,
Autobiography, 177; 224Hitchcock, memo.; Claiborne, Quitman, i,
323; 256memo. Scott overlooked the facts that such a bargain could
not be kept secret indefinitelv, and that, even if ethically justifiable and
in accordance with the practice of giving presents to Indian chiefs and
Barbary pirates, it would give great offence to American pride. The
latter point was urged forcibly by Shields. To buy peace of a vanquished
enemy seemed to him and Quitman humiliating and degrading.
12. The Puehla negotiations. 52Trist to Buchanan, nos. 7, June 13 ;
9, July 23 (and P. S., July 25) ; 12, Aug. 22. 52Thornton to Trist, July
29. ISThornton to Bankhead, June 14; to Addington, June 29. 13
392 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVII, PAGES 132-133
Pakenham, no. 116, Sept. 13, 1846. 335Trist to Scott, June 25, confi-
dential; July 16, confidential. 335Worth to Trist, July 2, 22. 132
Atocha to Buchanan, July 3. 335[Thornton] to Hargous, undated. 335
Trist to Thornton, July 3. 335Scott to Trist, July 17 ; to P. F. Smith,
July 6. 335Trist to Buchanan, no. 8, July 7. 335 to Trist, July 8.
St. Louis Republican, Nov. 22. Baltimore Sun, Dec. 6. Diario, May
21, 23-5; June 8, 26, 27; July 2, 18, 24-6; Aug. 18. Monitor Repub.,
May 13; June 18, 25, 27-8. 335 - to , July 21. 335Otero to
Pesado, July 13. Picayune, June 30 ; Aug. 8 ; Oct. 1, 15. Republicano,
June 24-5. Scott, Mems., ii, 579. 47Semmes to Perry, July 28. Clai-
borne, Quitman, i, 314-21, 326. Polk, Diary (see note 11). 68Quit-
man to Marcy, Mar. 9, 1848. 68Pillow to Marcy, Jan. 18, 1848. 52
Buchanan to Trist, no. 7, Dec. 21, 1847. 68Shields to Marcy, Mar. 9,
1848. Raleigh Star, Aug. 25, 1847. GOWilson to Marcy, July 31 ; Aug.
1. London Times, May 10; Aug. 6; Sept. 6. Ramirez, Mexico, 239,
255-6, 263, 271. Davis, Autobiography, 177-8, 207-9. 224Hitchcock,
Memorandum. N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 1, 2, 1848. Missouri
Republican, Sept. 16, 1857. GSScott to Marcy, Jan. 28, 1848. GSShields
to Marcy, Feb. 12, 1848. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 38, 40. Sen. 1 ; 29, 2, p. 44.
Sen. 34; 34, 3, pp. 21, 37-9. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 144, 150, 229, 232,
235, 238, 240, 259-61, 269-70. 335Trist to Thornton, July 30. 335E. E.
Smith to Trist, Aug. 31. 335Trist to Scott, Sept. 30 (draft). 256Marcy
to Wetmore, July 16; Oct. 21. Otero, Comunicaci6n. Dictamen
de la Comisi6n, etc., 29, 30. Republicano, May 8, 21 ; June 9, 28. 82
J. J. Otero, proclam., Apr. 25. Negrete, Invasi6n, iii, app., 115-20.
52J. A. Jones to Polk, May 2. Delta, July 15. Hitchcock, Fifty Years,
260-1, 264-9, 326. GOScott to Marcy, Apr. 5. ISBankhead, nos. 184,
Dec. 30, 1846; 6, Jan. 29; 34, Apr. 1; 42, 46, Apr. 30; 47, May 6 ; 54,
58-60, May 29; 61, June 26; 67, June 29; 75, July 29, 1847. GSScott
to Towson et al, Apr. 17, 1848. 335H. L. Scott to Trist, May 29, 1852.
Wash. Telegraph, Oct. 13, 22, 1852. London Chronicle, Aug. 6. 335
Trist to Scott, Sept. 1, 1861. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 524-5. 56M. Y. Beach,
June 4. Wash. Union, June 2 ; July 10 ; Aug. 5, 20. N. Y. Sun, May
22, Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 830 (Trist) ; 945, 1011, 1085 (Scott) ; 922 (Marcy).
132Atocha to Buchanan, July 3; Aug. 1; Sept. 4, 21. 132Dimond to
Buchanan, Aug. 2. Klein, Treaty,- 255. Buchanan, Works (Moore),
vii, 484. N. Y. Herald, Nov. 3, 1857 (Scott). Furse, Organization,
143. Replica a la Defensa. Semmes, Service, 310, 413. 73Bermudez
de Castro, no. 517, June 29. Apuntes, 199. 185 to Lewis, July 20.
335Trist, marginal notes on Sen. 52; 30, 1. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 135,
172 (Scott); 181-6, 231-46, 306 (Trist); 194 (S. Anna). 76Orders for
Guzman and Avila. 76Alvarez, July 16.
Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 149) represents Scott as desiring a recon-
ciliation with Trist in order to play a brilliant part in bringing about peace
and so increase his political popularity. This view, which befits a pupil
and friend of Pillow and furthers the purpose of both to injure Scott, is
disproved by a number of circumstances and particularly by the fact that,
after the reconciliation took place, Scott, while ready to do all in his
power for peace even at the sacrifice of military glory kept himself
entirely in the background so far as that business was concerned. July
23, 1847, Trist wrote to Buchanan : Scott's whole conduct with reference
to the duties with which I am charged "has been characterized by the
purest public spirit, and a fidelity and devotion which could not be sur-
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVII, PAGES 132-133 393
passed, to the views of the government, in regard to the restoration of
peace" (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 831). Aiming to further the negotiations with
Santa Anna, Seott sent from Puebla to Mexico a 335Memorandum that
he would advance and would either defeat the Mexicans in view of the
capital (if they would offer battle) or capture a strong position, and then,
if able to restrain his troops, would halt and give the Mexicans an oppor-
tunity to save the capital by making peace (Sen. 65 ; 30, 1, p. 524). Rip-
ley (War with Mexico, ii, 167-9) endeavors to relate this honorable inci-
dent in a way to represent Scott as the dupe of Santa Anna and to compli-
ment Pillow. But the fact that for good and purely American reasons the
general-in-chief pursued this very course after the negotiations had ended,
refutes Ripley ; and it also proves that in offering to make that agree-
ment Scott did not allow his military plans to be influenced by the enemy,
as was charged, for by the morning of Aug. 20, as no sign of a disposition
to treat had met Scott, he regarded the Memorandum and every other
vestige of an understanding as no longer binding upon him "in any degree"
(68Scott to court, Apr. 17, 1848, confid.). Scott was ready, in the
interest of his country and humanity, to do anything, compatible with
his duty, to obtain peace.
Rives (op. cit., ii, 445) states that in consequence of a letter of July 16
from Pacheco, minister of relations, to Congress a committee of Congress
reported that the restrictions placed by the law of Apr. 20 on the preroga-
tives of the Executive had been removed by the recent "Act of Reforms"
of the Constitution. This would have been an important point ; but tj^e
facts are that the committee's report, now lying before the author, was
dated July 13 and did not mention the law of Apr. 20, and that Congress
was not in session to receive Pacheco's reply of July 16 to its report (52
Trist, no. 9, July 23).
13. Pacheco asked Bankhead to use his good offices with Scott to save
the city from sack; but as neither the United States nor Mexico had
shown favor to the offer of British mediation, he would not act. It is
hard to see how, with due regard to Folk's declarations and the real desire
of the United States for peace, Scott could have taken the risk of scatter-
ing the Mexican government and the elements of peace by refusing to
remain outside the city for a time ; and remaining outside involved an
armistice, because for one thing the only large stock of provisions
on which he could count lay in town. Hence censure of Scott for making
the armistice came from Polk with a very bad grace (52Trist, no. 22 ; 221
Hill, diary).
14. The making of the armistice. Sen. 52 ; 30, 1, pp. 186, 190, 231-2
(Trist); 189 (Pacheco), 192 (Scott). 52Trist to Buchanan, no. 12,
Aug. 22. 52Bankhead to Trist, Aug. 20, 21. Contestaciones Habidas,
3-7, 11-19. Picayune, Sept. 9. Apuntes, 260-3, 268-9. Sen. 1; 30, 1,
p. 314 (Scott) ; 356-9. Kenly, Md. Vol., 350. GSScott, statement to
court, Apr. 17, 1848, confid. ISBankhead, nos. 76, Aug. 21; 82, Aug.
29. Raleigh Star, Sept. 22. 22lHill, diary. Mexico a traves, iv, 681.
Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 279-80, 284-6. Davis, Autobiog., 189, 207,
215-6. 224lntercepted letters (Hitchcock, ed.}. 259lntercepted letter.
Chicago Democrat, Sept. 15, 1857. GlGates to adj. gen., Aug. 31. Hen-
shaw narrative. S. Anna, Apelaci6n, 61-2. 29lPierce to wife, Aug.
23 ; to Appleton, Aug. 27. 335Trist, memo., July 29. Semmes, Service,
412, 415-9, 427, 446. N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 1, 1848. Sen.
C5; 30, 1, pp. 170, 178, 191, 196-8, 204, 281, 288, 460, 465, 543. SORela-
394 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVII, PAGES 132-133
clones, circulars, Aug. 23, 30. SORelaciones to Olaguibel, Aug. 31, res.
73Lozano, no. 5, res., Aug. 28. Negrete, Invasi6n, iii, app., 447-8; iv,
app., 286. 335Trist, notes on a letter to Ho. of Repres., Feb. 12, 1848.
Wash. Telegraph, Oct. 13, 1852. 236Judah, diary. Sedgwick, Corresp.,
i, 114. So. Qtrly. Review, July, 1852, pp. 112-6. S. Anna, Detail, 16.
Monitor Repub., Dec. 12 (S. Anna, report, Nov. 19). 70"Guerra," no. 30
(F. Perez, statement, June 17, 1853). Ramirez, Mexico, 301. Wash.
Union, Nov. 3. 76To Lombardini, Aug. 21. 76Tornel to Lombardini,
Aug. 24. 76Circulars, Aug. 26; Sept. 1, 6, 7. 76Many others. Mora
was accompanied by Arrang6iz, lately Mexican consul at New Orleans.
Quitman and Pierce, who had not been able to distinguish themselves
in the recent battles, and P. F. Smith were armistice commissioners for
the Americans and Generals Mora and Quijano for the Mexicans. They
met at Mackintosh's house. In brief the terms, as drawn up, were as
follows: 1, cessation of hostilities; 2, to continue while the peace com-
missioners are negotiating or forty-eight hours after one of the commanders-
in-chief gives formal notice of its termination; 3, during the armistice
no military work, offensive or defensive, shall be begun, enlarged or rein-
forced; 4, neither army shall be reinforced; troops and munitions en
route shall stop twenty-eight leagues [about seventy-five miles] from Mex-
ico ; 5, no troops of either side shall advance " beyond the line now actually
occupied"; 6, the intermediate ground shall not be trespassed upon by
military men except when acting as messengers or engaged under a white
flag on other business ; 7, neither side shall prevent the other from receiv-
ing provisions ; the Americans may obtain supplies from city or country ;
8, prisoners shall be exchanged; 9, Americans residing at Mexico and
banished thence may return ; 10, either army may send messengers to or
from Vera Cruz ; 11, the Americans will not interfere with the adminis-
tration of justice when Mexicans are the parties; 12, they will respect
private property, personal rights and trade ; 13, wounded prisoners shall
be free to move for treatment and cure ; 14, Mexican army health officers
may attend on such Mexicans; 15, commissioners shall superintend the
fulfilment of this agreement; 16, the agreement is to be approved by
the commanders-in-chief within twenty-four hours (Sen. 52 ; 30, 1, p. 310).
Santa Anna struck out article 9, but through passports the same end was
reached (52Trist, no. 13); and it was agreed that " supplies" (recursos)
in article 7 should cover everything needed by the army except arms and
munitions. For Scott's draft see Sen. 65 ; 30, 1, p. 543.
It is believed that enough has been said in the text to show the wisdom
of making the armistice, and more space cannot be given to the subject.
Any one interested in it should read Trist's 52no. 22 (most of it in Sen.
52; 30, 1, pp. 231-66). It should be borne in mind that the Mexicans
believed the armistice was greatly for the advantage of the Americans.
Alcorta, minister of war, said that Scott's purpose in proposing it was
solely to give his troops a needed rest, collect his wounded, obtain pro-
visions and prepare batteries (Negrete, Invasi6n, iii, app., 448). It was
believed that his losses had been severe (Blundated Mexican letter).
The reasons avowed by Santa Anna for accepting the armistice were
to let the troops rest and recover morale, to gather the wounded and the
dispersed, and in general to undo the effects of the recent battles ; also to
show the world that Mexico was willing to discuss peace, and to convince
all that the American demands were unreasonable. The weakest point
about the armistice was Scott's not requiring that Chapultepec should
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVII, PAGES 133-134 395
be surrendered or evacuated, as at one time he intended to do (Hitchcock,
Fifty Years, 285). The reason for his policy was, in brief, that he believed
Santa Anna fully intended to make peace, and, understanding the immense
difficulties that Santa Anna would have to meet, he did not wish to increase
them (52Trist, no. 13). Besides, magnanimity which is a strong qual-
ity, not a weak one to a beaten foe often produces good results. Per-
haps Scott erred on this point ; but if so, it was a noble error and not has-
tily to be censured. Apparently by oversight, neither Scott nor Trist had
been instructed what to do should the Mexicans ask for an armistice with
a view to peace. Hence Scott was left to take the course that seemed to
him best, and that he did. Pillow claimed great glory for opposing the
unsuccessful armistice. Rives says (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 501) that
Scott was too eager for a return to the United States to be "critical" of
Santa Anna's honesty. This is to say that Scott was unfit to be a corporal.
Everybody was suspicious of Santa Anna. See Sen. 52 ; 30, 1, pp. 248-52.
Rives further says (p. 507) that Scott should have seen that Santa Anna,
situated as he was, would have accepted any conditions ; but Santa Anna
certainly would not. He did not accept our peace terms. Rives also al-
ludes to Scott's "amiable weakness" in the matter (p. 508) very errone-
ously, the present author thinks.
15. Picayune, Sept. 9; Oct. 16, 17. Gamboa, Impug., 49, 50. Apun-
tes, 270-1, 286. ISBankhead, nos. 77, Aug. 27; 83, Aug. 29. 22lHill,
diary. Ramirez, Mexico, 275, 303. Mexico a traves, iv, 686. Hitch-
cock, Fifty Years, 280, 287-92, 294. Grant, Mems., i, 148. Davis,
Autobiog., 211. 224lntercepted letters (Hitchcock, ed). Henshaw
narrative. Haynes, Gen. Scott's Guide. 259lntercepted letter. Sen.
19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, Nov. 30, 1848). 29lPierce to Appleton, Aug.
27. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 297, 301, 303, 306. 178Davis, diary. Diario,
Sept. 2, 4, 8. 335Belton to Hitchcock, Aug. 23. 335E. E. Smith to
Trist, Aug. 31. 335Memo. in Spanish, Aug. . Roa Barcena, Eecuerdos,
415. Semmes, Service, 424. Sen. 11 ; 31, 1 (Hardcastle). SORelaciones,
circular, Aug. 23. SOAlcalde S. Fe to Olaguibel, Aug. 29. SOOlaguibel
to legislature, Aug. 30; reply, Sept. 1. SOValencia to O., Aug. 21, 23.
800. to Guerra, Aug. 22. SOGuerra to O., Aug. 24 ; reply, Aug. 29.
199MS. written by leading citizen. 73Lozano, nos. 5, res., Aug. 28; 8,
res., Sept. 17. Encarnacion Prisoners, 81, 83-4. Monitor Repub., Nov.
16 (Alvarez). Carrefio, Jefes, cccxv, note. 260Henshaw, comments
on map. Wash. Union, Nov. 3. Apuntes, 271-2. And from 76 the
following (and many others). Alvarez, Aug. 22, 23, 24, 26, 29. To
comandante Toluca, Aug. 24. Acuerdos, Aug. 23, 25, 26, 28, 31 ; Sept.
1, 4. To Alvarez, Aug. 21, 25, 28. Tornel, Aug. 27, 27, very res., 29.
To Ugarte and comtes. gen. Guanajuato, S. Luis Potosi and Queretaro,
Aug. 29. Cosio, Sept. 6. J. Y. Gutierrez, S?pt. 2, res. To Lombardini,
Aug. 9. 22, 24, 25. Alcorta, Aug. 22. Quijano to Lombardini, Aug. 23,
24. To comte. gen. Mexico, Aug. 27 29, 30. Bravo, Aug. 28. To
Herrera, Aug. 25. To Relaciones, Aug 27. Tornel to comte. gen.,
Sept. 4. Pacheco to TVnel, Aug. 23 Oculars, Aug. 26; Sept. 1, 6,
7. Alvarez to Olaguibel, Oct. 30. Olaguibel, Aug. 27.
Paredes, who had been banished, landed at Vera Cruz on Aug. 14
(Pa^edes, B^eve Exposici6n).
On August 26 a long train of army waeons went to the capital for
provisions and was turned back ; but an explanation came promptly from
Santa Anna. The next day a similar train, while waiting in the main
396 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVII, PAGES 134-135
plaza of the city (76Tornel, Aug. 27), was attacked by the populace be-
cause the teamsters appeared to gaze with indifference, if not insultingly,
at a religious procession (Carrefio, Jefes, cccxv ; Henshaw narrative).
Immediately the prevailing hostility against the Americans and a sus-
picion that Santa Anna was planning to introduce Americans in this way
and betray the capital (Arco Iris, Nov. 29, 1847) led to a riot, in which
six or seven of the Americans were injured and two killed. Tornel, now
governor of the Federal District, tried without effect to quell the mob;
but Herrera, comandante general, succeeded (Apuntes, 271). Mexican
troops defended the wagons (Davis, Autobiog., 211). Santa Anna felt
and expressed deep regret for the incident (76to Relaciones, Aug. 27),
and some Mexican officers were punished for imprudence (76to comte.
gen. Mex., Aug. 27). Scott viewed the affair philosophically. After
this Herrera and Tornel took precautions (76Tornel, Aug. 29), the busi-
ness was done at a very early time in the morning, the wagons did not
actually go into the city (76to comte. gen. Mex., Aug. 29), and an officer
of the American commissary department, disguised as a peasant, had
charge of them. Minor riots occurred later, however, and after a time
the place where the supplies intended for Scott were kept was discovered
and sacked (Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 291). Owing to the non-success
of the negotiations, about $300,000 of American cash had to be left in the
town. Both cash and provisions had been arranged for by the indefati-
gable Hargous (ibid.) During the armistice the American equipments,
artillery, etc. were put into the best possible order.
16. Santa Anna had much difficulty in persuading good men to serve
as commissioners. Trist met the Mexican commissioners first on Aug.
27 at Atzcapuzalco, about eight miles from Tacubaya (Sen. 52; 30, 1,
pp. 191, 195), but at the second session (Aug. 28) it was agreed to meet
at the house of Alfaro (Casa Colorado) near Tacubaya and within the
Mexican lines. The instructions drafted for the Mexican commissioners,
Aug. 24 and 29, were avowedly drawn as if Mexico had "triumphed,"
and represented merely a basis for bargaining (Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 313-5,
369-71). The commissioners were authorized at first only to receive and
transmit the American propositions ; but, believing they would be given
(as they were on Aug. 31 : ibid., 335) full powers, like his own, to negotiate,
Trist laid his projet (ibid., 326-30) before them on Aug. 27 (see Roa
Barcena, Recuerdos, 389, note 1). Aug. 29 Santa Anna and his Cabinet
discussed this (Sen 52; 30, 1, 330). Aug. 30 he discussed it with his
generals (Diario, Aug. 31). Sept. 1 the Mexicans presented to Trist
their full powers, and the discussion of his terms began. Sept. 2 they were
discussed further, and, as agreement was found to be impossible, Trist
proposed that the armistice be extended. A large gathering at the palace
then discussed the situation (Apuntes, 278). Sept. 3 Santa Anna ordered
that no more provisions and other articles that could be useful to the
Americans should leave the city (76to comte. gen. Mex.). Sept. 4 Pacheco,
the minister of relations, issued a 77circular intimating that unless Trist
should moderate his terms, negotiations would be broken off. Cabinet
consultations followed, however (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 202). Sept. 5 Pacheco
notified the Mexican commissioners that the Nueces-Rio Grande district
and New Mexico would not be surrendered (ibid., 373-5). Sept. 6 the
final meeting was held and the Mexican counter-pro jet presented (ibid. f
375-80). The Spanish charge had thought that, owing to Santa Anna's
disposition to jockey, the negotiations would last a long time. This was
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVII, PAGES 135-137 397
prevented by Trist's frank, direct methods. Trist was now in good health
except for a severe toothache. He and Scott worked in perfect harmony.
Santa Anna was extremely anxious to gain foreign support and, if
possible, a foreign guaranty of the boundary (TSLozano, no. 3, res., Aug.
25). Seiffart, the Prussian minister, who had felt annoyed by the insignif-
icant role to which the negative policy of his government and his own lack
of capacity had condemned him, now broke out with an unauthorized
expression of sympathy for Mexico, and Santa Anna endeavored to use
this as a lever on his colleagues (TSLozano, no. 8, res., Sept. 17). But
France had no representative on the scene. Bankhead, besides enter-
taining considerable displeasure because his advice and the British offer
of mediation had not been effective, had been for some months, and still
was, too ill to take a strong position (TSLozano, no. 5, res., Aug. 28) ;
and Ramon Lozano, the Spanish charge ( the minister having left for home
on the conclusion of the armistice), would not act without instructions,
and personally expressed the opinion that it would not be easy to obtain
a European guaranty of the new line (73nos. 5, res., 8, res.).
17. The negotiations (including S. Anna's difficulties). Sen. 52; 30, 1,
must be studied closely by any one desiring to investigate the subject,
and hence citations of the documents that it contains need not be given.
52Trist to Buchanan, nos. 13, Aug. 24 ; 15, Sept. 4, confid. 335Thornton
to Trist, July 29. Sen. Report 261; 41, 2. Sen. 20; 30, 1. Ho. 40;
30, 1. Ho. 69; 30, 1, pp. 43, 47, 56, 59. 52Contestaciones Habidas,
1847, with Trist/s notes, throughout. Delta, Nov. 13. Picayune, May 12 ;
June 30; Sept, 9; Oct. 1, 15, 16, 17. Apuntes, 264-9, 277-9, 283, 286.
52Buchanan to Trist, no. 3, July 13. ISBankhead, nos. 83, Aug. 29;
87, Sept. 28. Constitutional, Aug. 17. Ramirez, Mexico, 234, 241,
271-2, 274, 278, 303. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 287-9. Davis, Autobiog.,
209. 224lntercepted letters (Hitchcock, ed.). lOSBuchanan to Bancroft,
Sept. 29. 224Letter from member of Congress (intercepted), Aug.
21. Henshaw narrative. Pacheco, Exposicion. 284Comunicacion que
s:jbre . . . dirigio . . . Otero. Negrete, Invasion, iii, app., 483 (Otero).
Roa Barcena, Recuerdos, 388-408. Mexico en 1847, 34. London Times,
May 10 ; Oct. 26. Polk, Message, Dec. 7, 1847 ; Feb. 2, 1848 (Richard-
son, Messages, iv, 536-9). 29lPierce to Appleton, Aug. 27. 4TPrivate
letter from Orizaba, undated. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 240, 271. ISThorn-
ton to Addington, June 29. Arco Iris, Sept. 16. Opinion Publica, Aug.
29. Diario, Aug. 31. 335E. E. Smith to Trist, Aug. 31. 83Gov. Quere-
taro to Relacion?s, Sept. 4. 83Gov. Jalisco to Relacioncs, Aug. 31. 83
Farias, Otero et al., declaration, Aug. 22. SSQueretaro legislature to Rel.,
Sept. 4. Semmes, Service, 414, 426, 446. Sen. 65 ; 30, 1, p. 540. SOGov.
S. L. Potosi to Olaguibel, Aug. 28. SOGov. Queretaro to O., Aug. 21 ;
reply, Aug. 27. SORelaciones, circulars, Aug. 23, 30. SOOlag. to Relac.,
Aug. 26. SOOlag., proclam., Aug. 26. SORelac. to Olag., Aug. 31, res. ;
Sept. 6, 8. SOProceedings of Coalition junta, Aug. 4, 25. SOMexico
legisl., Aug. 27. Porvenir, Aug. 24, supplmnt. 199MS. written by a
leading person. 82Gov. Oaxaca to gov. Puebla, Sept. 9. TSBermudez
de Castro, no. 550, Aug. 21. TSLozano, nos. 3, res., Aug. 25; 5, res.,
Aug. 28; 6, Sept. 10; 8, res., Sept. 17. Encarnacion Prisoners, 83.
SOCoalition junta to Mexico state, Aug. 14. 92lviexico ayunt. to gov.
Fed. District, Sept. 3. N. Y. Herald, Feb. 5, 1848. Nat. Intelligencer,
Aug. 31. Monitor Repub., May 26, 31; Oct. 8. 132Atocha to Buch-
anan, Sept. 4. Amer. Hist. Review, x, 319 (Reeves). Amer. Review,
398 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVII, PAGES 135-137
Jan., 1848, 5-14. So. Qtrly. Review, July, 1852, pp. 114-5. Republicano,
May 11. ISlBuchanan to Donelson, Jan. 29. Prieto, Mems., 236.
364Worth to S., July 29 ; to Marcy, Oct. 30. 221H111, diary. S. Anna,
Detail, 16. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 74. 86Relaciones, circular, Sept. 4.
and from 76 the following (and many others). Cosio, Sept. 6. J. Y.
Gutierrez, Sept. 2. To Herrera, Aug. 25. To Bravo, Aug. 31. To
comte. gen. Mexico, Sept. 3. To Canalize, Aug. 12. To comte gen.
Queretaro, Sept. 4. Gov. Michoacdn, Sept. 3. Alvarez to Olagufbel,
Oct. 30. To Alvarez, Aug. 21.
Santa Anna said in his manifesto: "A perpetual war is an absurdity;
because war is a calamity, and the instinct of self-preservation, which is
even stronger and more powerful in nations than in individuals, recom-
mends that no means whatever should be omitted that may lead to an
advantageous arrangement. To adopt this course the constitution gives
me competent authority. Consecrated to interests so noble and highly
privileged, it is my duty to maintain at all cost the respect and reverence
due to the supreme authority with which I am invested ... I will be
yet more explicit: sedition and attempts at subverting the government
shall be exemplarily punished" (Sen. 52 ; 30, 1, p. 250).
(Trist's "vague remark") Ibid., 253.
The Mexican commissioners were instructed (Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 314,
369-71) to draw Trist into discussions that not only would have given
them opportunities to create awkward dialectic situations, as Rej6n and
others had done with reference to Texas, but might have excited fresh
discord in the United States regarding our treatment of Mexico. For
example, they were to ask the motives and aims of the war, and whether
the United States based its expectations upon force or upon friendly nego-
tiation. The ground was taken that since Mexico was now ready to give
up Texas, all reason for the war had ceased to exist [as if the fighting that
had already occurred, its loss of life, triumphs and expenses, signified
nothing]. It was urged that since no title except to Texas had been claimed
by the United States, we could continue the war only for the odious sake
of conquest or the unheard-of purpose to punish Mexico because she was
unwilling to ssll her lands and her people (see Roa Bdrcena, Recuerdos,
391, 400-1, 588, note 3).
In justification of his plan to extend the armistice, Trist pointed out
that the American sick and wounded would recover, the rainy reason
end, the inundations diminish, the roads improve and the temperature
fall (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 259). Eipley, on the other hand, asserts (op. cit.
ii, 350) that the Americans would have been "dependent upon the good
faith of the Mexicans for all of the conveniences and many of the neces-
saries of life," and, at the end of forty-five days, after living in unhealthy
villages, would hardly have been fit to act. But had Santa Anna accepted
Trist's proposal he would have done so with the strong expectation of
peace and American ass stance, and hence would have treated our army
well; and Tacubaya, S. Angel and S. Agustfn were not only snlubrious
but delightful in comparison with the capital, and free from its tempta-
tions. With reference to Trist's departing from his instructions by pro-
posing to refer a point back to Washington, it is interesting to recall
Napoleon's dictum (which bears also on Scott's action supra regarding
the sealed despatch) : "A genera 1-in-chief cannot exonerate himself from
responsibility for his faults by pleading an order of his sovereign or the
minister, when the individual from whom it proceeds is at a distance from
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVII, PAGES 137-139 399
the field of operations, and but partially, or not at all, .acquainted with
the actual condition of things" (Maxims, p. 59).
18. There was probably some basis for certain of Santa Anna's charges
against the American troops. Scott allowed a day to pass, it was said, in
order to enable Americans in town to get away. Ripley (op. cit., ii, 352)
says this was done to allow unarmed inhabitants to do so. But it was
good policy to prevent such persons from leaving, and such had been
Scott's course at Vera Cruz (chap, xxii, p. 32). Naturally Santa Anna
wavered back and forth, and Trist believed that at about three o'clock,
Sept. 5, he almost decided to accept the American terms (Sen. 52; 30,
1, p. 251).
19. The termination of the armistice. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 195-203,
231-66 (Trist); 307, 346, etc. 52Trist to Buchanan, no. 15, confid.,
Sept. 4. Sen. 20 ; 30, 1, pp. 9, 14. Contestaciones Habidas (1847), 22, 26,
28, 30, 34. Picayune, Oct. 16. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 354, 360. 303H. L. Scott
to Quitman, Aug. 31. National, Nov. 14. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 291-4.
Haynes, Gen. Scott's Guide. 217Henshaw to wife, Sept. 13. London
Tines, Nov. 13. Sen. 34; 34, 3, pp. 21, 37-9. Ho. 40; 30, 1. 291
Pierce to wife, Aug. 23. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 309. 335Trist to Thorn-
ton, confid., Nov. 24 (the Americans kept the armistice faithfully). 335
Memo, in Spanish, Aug. . Semmes, Service, 415. Sen. 11 ; 31, 1
(Hardcastle). SORelaciones to Olaguibel, Aug. 31, res.; Sept. 6, 8. 73
Lozano, no. 7, Sept. 16. Negrete, Invasi6n, iii, app., 448. 92Tornel
to M3X. ayunt., Aug. 30. 187Thomas to Eddy, Aug. 26. N. Y. Sun,
Oct. 5. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 67. Ramsey, Other Side, 330, note. And
from 76 the following (chiefly showing orders contrary to the armistice).
To Alvarez, Aug. 28. Tornel, Aug. 27, very res. ; Sept. 3. Bravo, Sept.
5. Acuerdos, Sept. 3, 4 Orders to Tenth Infantry, Aug. 28. To govs.
Puebla and four other states, Sept. 6. To govs. Mexico, Guanajuato,
Jalisco, Sept. . To Relaciones, Aug. 27. S. Anna, proclam., Sept. 7.
23. The armistice as viewed in the United States. Sen. 52 ; 30, 1, pp.
138 (Marcy) ; 231 (Trist, no. 22). Sen. 20 ; 30, 1, p. 14 (Trist). Apuntes,
278-9. Polk, Diary, Feb. 7, 19; Mar. 16, 1848. London Times, Oct.
29, Ramirez, Mexico, 241. Polk, Message, Dec. 7, 1847 (Richardson,
iv, 536). ISCrampton, no. 42, Oct. 13. Wash. Union, Oct. 4-6. 256
Marcy to Wetmore, Oct. 21. 58Jones to Polk, May 2. Negrete, Inva-
si6n, iii, app., 448. 354Welles papers. ISlFairfield to wife, Jan. 10.
N. Y. Herald, Dec. 15. Monitor Repub., Dec. 21. Baltimore Sun, Oct.
5. Ho. 69; 30, 1, p. 56 (Buchanan). 335Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 24-5,
1847.
It has been said with truth that the war was waged on the theory that
Texas extended to the Rio Grande, but the United States could have
neutralized (and this is the most that was considered by Trist: Sen. 52;
30, 1, p. 258) the region between that river and the Nueces without imply-
ing in the least that our claim to it had not been valid. The fact that
Santa Anna and Pacheco thought that an extension of the armistice would
benefit the Americans (ibid., 260) is a striking 1 , though by no means the
only, answer to Folk's charge that it would have been greatly to our dis-
advantage (ibid., 259). Ramirez (Mexico, 241) pointed out that inaction
was bad for the Mexicans, since they lacked funds to support troops lorg.
Santa Anna could not materially increase his army after Sept. 1, and he
subsisted it with extreme difficulty (Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 259-60). The
armistice in general was regarded by the Mexicans as an American trick.
400 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVIII, PAGES 140-143
The American Review (Whig) argued that the rejection of the counter-
projet (which conceded to us Texas as far as the Nueces and California
down to 37 degrees) proved that Polk was fighting, not for peace, but
for conquest ; but the counter-pro jet did not recognize the American
claim to the Rio Grande line nor to an indemnity for the costs of the war,
which Mexico had forced upon us. Any one interested in the equity of
the matter should read the reply to the Mexican commissioners drafted
by Trist (Sen. 20; 30, 1, p. 14).
21. Army feeling. 252Mackall to wife, Feb. 21, 1848. Picayune,
Oct. 17. 22lHill, diary. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 271, 290. 29lPierce
to wife, Aug. 23; Sept. 1. Robertson, Visit, ii, 344. Lawton, Artill.
Officer, 309. Diccionario Universal (Mixcoac). Semmes, Service, 414,
427. Calder6n, Life, i, 142, 146. N. Y. Sun, Sept. 16. Such scenes
were noted with keen appreciation not only by officers but by privates,
as diaries and letters attest. Clear afternoons and evenings occur now and
then even at the height of the rainy season.
XXVIII. MOLINO DEL REY, CHAPULTEPEC, MEXICO
1. Hardcastle's map (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p. 312) and (as elsewhere) the
author's observations. So. Qtrly. Rev., Oct., 1852. Negrete, Invasi6n,
iv, app., 295-6. Balbontin, Invasion, 126. Grant, Mems., i, 149. 66J.
L. Mason to J. L. Smith, Sept. 25. 66Stevens to Smith, Sept. 25.
Semmes, Service, 436, 440. Apuntes, 290-1. Picayune, Aug. 8. Delta,
Oct. 14. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 355 (Scott), 373 (Sumner), 425-6 (Smith).
Wise, Gringos (N. Y., 1849), 259. 269Molina, recoils.
The foundry was decreed in July, 1846 (76report on artillery, Nov.,
1846 ; Memoria de . . . Guerra, Dec.). The building it occupied had been
a powder mill. The principal entrance to El Molino was by an archway
near the south end. Sept. 5 Scott heard that bells had been sent to El
Molino to be cast into cannon (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p. 355). Santa Anna did in
fact call for gifts of bells, etc. to be used for military purposes (76Carrera,
Sspt. 6).
2. Sen. 52 ; 30, 1, pp. 381-2 (S. Anna to Scott, Sept. 6). 76To Herrera,
Sept. 6. lOOGuerra, circular, Sept. 11. Apuntes, 290-2. S. Anna,
Mi Historia, 75. Id., Detail, 23. TGAcuerdo, Sept. 4. Gimenez, Memo-
rias, 266. 76Alvarez to S. Anna, Sept. 25. Negrete, Invasi6n, iv,
app., 293. Balbontin, Invasi6n, 125-6. Grant, Mems., i, 151. Mason
to Smith: note 1. 76Alvarez, Sept. 6. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, app., 134-5 (Dun-
can). Roa Barcena, Recuerdos, 424.
3. Ramirez, Mexico, 299. 73Lozano, nos. 2, 8, res., 1847. 199Anon.
MS. Kenly, Md. Vol., 346. S. Anna, Apelaci6n, 49. Gimenez, Memo-
rias, 111. 358Williams to father, Oct. 1. Exposici6n dirigida. 179
Diario Esactisimo. Negrete, Invasion, iv, app., 295-6. lOOAlcorta,
circular, Sept. 11. 76Tornel, decree, Sept. 7.
4. Smith, Co. A, Corps of Engineers. 22lHill, diary. Hitchcock,
Fifty Years, 296. 260Henshaw, comments on map. 217/e/. to wife,
Sept. 13. 65Scott, gen. orders, Sept. 7. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 354 (Scott),
361 (Worth), 425 (Smith). 178Davis, diary. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 298
(Scott). Mason to Smith : note 1. GGFoster to Smith, Sept. 8. 66Beau-
regard to Smith, Sept. 20 224Hitchcock, introd. to intercepted letters.
So. Qtrly. Rev., Oct., 1852, 302. Semmes, Service, 431-4.
Under Scott's orders, Pillow with the Ninth and Fifteenth Infantry
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVIII, PAGES 143-146 401
was at S. Borja and Riley's brigade (Twiggs's division) at Nalvarte on
Sept.. 7, evening (Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 363). Late on Sept. 7
Quitman's division also was sent to the south front of Mexico. Recon-
noitring was done there on rather an extensive scale during the night,
and the Mexicans were thoroughly roused.
5. The battle of Sept. 8. Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, pp. 354, 375 (Scott), 361 (Worth),
368 (return), 373 (Sumner), 374 (Huger), 425 (Smith), 430 (Hitchcock) ;
app., pp. 134-165, 192 (officers). Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1237 (Perry). 179
Diario Esactisimo. Stevens, Stevens, i, 204-7. Sedgwick, Corresp.,
i, 170. Semi-weekly N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 1, 1848. Elder-
kin, Biog. Sketches. So. Qtrly. Rev., Oct., 1852, 298-315. Negrete,
Invasi6n, iii, app., 463-9 ; iv, app., 295-9. S. Anna, Detail, 23-5. Bal-
bontm, Invasi6n, 125-9. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 296-9, 303. Grant,
Wems., i, 152-3. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 238, 240. 217Henshaw to
wife, Sept. 13. 218Henshaw narrative. GlLetter from Mexico, Sept.
11. 69May to Harney, Nov. 17, 1848. 69Steele to Harney, , 1848.
69Harney to Marcy, May 22, 1848. GGMason to J. L. Smith, Sept. 25,
1847. 66Stevens to Id., Sept. 25. 66G. W. Smith to Stevens, Sept. 20.
Claiborne, Quitman, i, 352. Raleigh Star, Oct. 27. 22lHill, diary.
304Kirby to Mrs. E. K. Smith, Sept. 12. GOAndrews to Daniel, Dec. 10.
Louisville Democrat, Dec. 17. GSTestimony at Bonneville court martial.
London Times, Nov. 13. Semmes, Service, 436-449. Sen. 65; 30, 1,
p. 503. Apuntes, 210, 294-304. lOORelaciones, circular, Sept. 8. 199
Anon. MS. Correo Nacional, Dec. 10. Gamboa, Impug., 52. 70
"Guerra," no. 155 (testimony of Garay). 70"Guerra", no. 274 (testi-
mony at the trial of Andrade and Jauregui). Picayune, Oct. 14; Nov.
3. SSOWeber, recoils. Delta, Oct. 14, 26. Ramirez, Mexico, 304-6.
Mexico a traves, iv, 687-9. Davis, Autobiog., 271. Wash. Union,
Nov. 3. Diario, Sept. 8. 364Worth to daughter, Sept. 28 ; to S., Dec. 27.
Prieto, Memorias, ii, 238-9. 73Lozano, no. 7, 1847. Moore, Scott's
Camp., 155-63. Steele, Amer. Camps., i, 117. ' Niles, Oct. 30, p. 137.
Bartlett, Pierce, 153. Wise, Gringos (N. Y., 1849), 259. Gimenez, Memo-
rias, 112, 266. 205Graham, memo. book. 178Davis, diary. Diccionario
Univ. (Ledri). Sen. 19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, Nov. 30, 1848). Molina,
El Asalto. 29lPierce to Hooker, Sept. 15. Stevens, Vindication. 328
Sweet, statement. 69Huger, Sept. 9. Lawton, Artill. Off., 311-4, 323,
326. Roa Barcena, Recuerdos, 426-7, 437-9, 447-53. 76Herrera to
Relaciones, Oct. 14. TGOrtega, Sept. 13. 76To comte gen. Mex., Oct.
29. 76M. Andrade, Sept, 9; Nov. 3. 76J. ' Y. Gutierrez, prockm.,
Sept. 11. 76Noriega, Nov. 19. 76Alcorta, circular, Sept. 11. 76Comte
gen. Oaxaca, Sept, 15. 76/d. of Queretaro, Sept. 14. Calderon, Rectifi-
caciones
REMARKS on the battle of Sept. 8. In forming an opinion of the battle
as a military operation one must ignore the fact that the position gained
was used later as a stepping-stone, for at this time Scott was not planning
to capture Chapultepec. It appears surprising that Scott, knowing that
heavy Mexican forces were on the spot, apparently desiring to fight there,
should have thought that a place as valuable to the enemy as he deemed
El Molino (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, p. 355) ought to be attacked at night, and could
be taken easily (Sen. 65 ; 30, 1, p. 579) by men unacquainted with ground
and buildings familiar to the enemy, and should have neglected to have
more of his troops near at hand ; but we do not know what details were
included in the information upon which he so confidently relied, nor do we
VOL. ii 2 D
402 NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVIII, PAGES 143-148
know the source of it (ibid., 298). Pillow reported, apparently during
the evening of September 7, that the cannon and machinery had been re-
moved (ibid., 298, 579) ; no smoke appeared to issue from the mill ;
no sound of boring could be heard (Semmes, Service, 431). It has been
suggested that Scott felt over-eager to punish Santa Anna for disappoint-
ing his expectations of peace ; but he doubtless had learned from Trist
of Santa Anna's political difficulties. He was, however, angry on account
of the violations of the armistice. The principal information on which
Scott acted was understood to have come through Trist ; it had been
correct; but Scott seems to have erred in overlooking the chance that
conditions might change in two or three days. Rives (U. S. and Mexico,
ii, 528) states that the attack was based on a "rumor." This is an error.
On account of the apparent incorrectness of Scott's information and the
massing of Mexican troops in and near El Molino, some Americans sus-
pected that Santa Anna set a trap for him. But the fact that Santa Anna
left this quarter and took away a considerable part of his troops early in
the night of Sept. 7 leaving behind, according to Roa Barcena
(Recuerdos, 427) 4000 infantry and artillery privates disposes of that
idea. It has been said that Scott might have stopped work at the foundry
(had work been then proceeding) by cutting off the supply of water (i.e.,
power) ; but he wished to seize the finished cannon supposed to be there
(Sen. 65 ; 30, 1, p. 298) and the large quantity of powder that he had
heard was at Casa Mata.
The only argument advanced hi favor of a night attack seems to have
been the danger of fire from Chapultepec. In reply it was said that (as
had been seen at Cerro Gordo) a plunging fire did little harm. The dis-
tance of Chapultepec seems almost to nullify this reply ; but as a matter
of fact the cannon of Chapultepec appear to have done no execution in
the battle. Worth's officers met him after dark, Sept. 7, and later one of
them submitted his general plan of operations to Scott, who discussed it
at considerable length and finally (virtually admitting that a night attack
was not advisable) approved all of it except the following po : nt. Worth
strongly desired to effect a lodgement in the grove of Chapultepec, which
he believed he could take at a cost of fifty men (364Worth to S., Dec. 27).
(Indeed, he pushed some of his troops several hundred yards that way :
Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 138; Davis, Autobiog., 271). But Scott refused
positively to have this done. Semmes (Service, 447) says that Worth
desired to capture Chapultepec at this time because with his remarkable
intuitive judgment he saw, as Scott saw later, that this was the true ap-
proach to the city; but Scott's later opinion was due to a study of the
ground which neither he nor Worth had at this t~'me been able to make and
to Mexican fortifying not yet done. Even if Worth could have carried
Chapultepec rather easily, the prudent maxim that one should not buy
(because it can be got cheaply) what one does not want, appeared to apply
with especial force after losses that could be so ill afforded had been suf-
fered; and it was not certain that the castle could be taken without a
struggle. One costly surprise was enough for one day. Engineer Stevens
(Stevens, Stevens, i, 206) thought an attempt should have been made to
reconnoitre the Mexican r'ght with a view to turning the position ; but
to push a reconnoitring party between the Mexican right wing and the
cavalry of Alvarez must have looked extremely hazardous.
Clarke's brigade consisted o p the Fifth Sixth and Eighth Infantry, it
will be recalled. Cadwalader had the Voltigeurs and Eleventh and Four-
NOTES ON CHAPTER XXVIII, PAGES 143-146 403
teenth Infantry. C. F. Smith being ill, his battalion was commanded
by Captain E. K. Smith, who was mortally wounded. Semmes (Service,
445) says that Cadwalader's brigade and Drum's guns had been added
at Worth's request, but Hitchcock (Fifty Years, 296) and Scott's general
orders of Sept. 7 show that Scott originally intended to give Worth one of
Pillow's brigades. Worth could no doubt have had more light guns, but
it was said that projectiles for the heavy guns were so few that it was
necessary to husband them closely. Scott, however, stated (Sen.
1 ; 30, 1, p. 377) that he had plenty of such ammunition. Ripley (op.
cit., ii, 461) says that "the nature of the orders [given to Worth] forbade
an attack by artillery"; but (1) there is no evidence to prove this; (2)
artillery was used on Cisa Mata, only not long enough; (3) it was used
again later with success (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 527; Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 136).
See Stevens, Stevens, 206. Indeed, it seems to have been unnecessary
to attack Casa Mata. It could not have held out long after the fall of
El Molino. Ripley admits (p. 462) that the battle "was confused,"
but adds, "storming is always a work of confusion." Here he confounds
occurrences with management. The former must involve noise and con-
fusion in such an affair, but the latter should not.
Sumner had one troop of the First Dragoons, six troops of the Second,
part of a troop of the Third, and a company of Mounted Rifles. Foster
had ten pioneers. Drum had three guns, but one of them was sent out
on the road to Mexico, and during the battle one of the others became
disabled by the breaking of a priming wire. Semmes determined, as
usual, to defend Worth at all hazards says that during Mclntosh's
charge Duncan's battery was called away to repel the Mexican cavalry;
but Duncan's report (Sen. 1 ; 30, 1, app., 136) shows that his guns did not
turn against the cavalry until masked by Mclntosh's troops. The part
of Cadwalader's brigade that moved to the left was the Voltigeurs. After
the repulse of Clarke's brigade some of the Voltigeurs went into the ravine
and moved toward the rear of Casa Mata. This perhaps helped to force
the Mexicans out, and certainly resulted in the capture of many prisoners.
Vigorous pursuit of the Mex : cans was in general impracticable on account
of the character of the ground and the fire from Chapultepec. Finding
the engagement far more serious than he had expected, Scott summoned
forces from the so 
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